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Preface & Acknowledgments 
In approaching this story of a modern Greek tragedy I have taken the view 
that what is important is what the British knew and could have known at the 
time. The tale is told from the British point of view, but I have searched 
both British and American archives and memoirs, and visited Greece as 
well. 
One considerable difficulty for anyone working in the area of Greek 
history is that no one can seem to agree on the spelling of place names. 
Modern maps, for instance, have as many variants of spellings as there 
are mapmakers. Another difficulty is that during the Greek civil war from 
1944 to 1949 a number of villages were removed and no longer appear on 
the maps. And when the official historians came to make maps they 
either used such a scale that a number of names do not appear on their 
charts, or made gross errors-for example in locating railway lines-such 
as to make the maps suspect. I have usually chosen to use spellings that 
were standard in the documents of the time, particularly as they appeared 
in the military or diplomatic signals and other communications. I have 
taken the liberty of editing the signals themselves, when quoting them, to 
make them more readable. 
My thanks are due to the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office for permission to quote from numerous documents in the Public 
Record Office, and to the Keeper of the Department of Photographs at the 
Imperial War Museum and the Greek Army Directorate of History for 
permission to use their copyrighted photographs. 
I am grateful for the support of the Bureau of General Research at 
Kansas State University many years ago when the project started, and to 
many individuals who have assisted me. Since 1972, when the British 
government opened the World War II archives, I have had the invaluable 
help of Commander Edward May, former associate director of the Nation-
al Maritime Museum at Greenwich, who has followed up references and 
ferreted out sources at the Public Record Office in London and sent 
photocopies of the documents cited in these pages. As these materials 
and others from the National Archives in Washington have accumulated, I 
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have experienced the excitement of seeing the truth unfold, often in 
contradiction to statements in memoirs and official histories. 
In Greece, Lieutenant-General Joannis Metaxakis, Head of the Greek 
Army History Directorate, was particularly helpful, as were Major-Gener-
al Konstantinos Kanakaris and other Greek officers. General Kanakaris 
not only took me on tours in 1979 and 1980 from Athens to Florina, 
Thessalonika, the Monastir Gap, and Kalamata, so that I could view the 
ground, but also in 1981 translated the newly released Greek documents 
so that I could cross-check the British and Greek versions of key meetings. 
He also checked the manuscript of the book for errors. Dr. Michael 
Llewellyn Smith was kind enough to show me the old British legation 
building in Athens in 1980. 
I must also add my thanks to two participants in the events of 
1940-1941, the late Major-General Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones and General Sir 
James Marshall-Cornwall, who together with my colleagues on this side 
of the Atlantic, Alan Wilt of Iowa State University, Edward M. Coffman of 
the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and R.H. Roy of the University of 
Victoria, read and commented upon the manuscript. To them all I am 
most grateful. Errors remaining, of course, are my own. 
Introduction 
Wars are not won solely by the powers of personality and diplomacy, 
however attractive these may be to publishers and readers. Ultimately 
wars have to be fought and won by adherence to the principles of war, 
which in the modern day include not only the concentration of forces 
upon defined objectives but also an understanding of the needs and 
limits of available technology. 
At the heart of this story is the study of the interplay between heroic 
and popular personalities of the likes of Churchill and Eden, who had 
only a vague comprehension of the realities of war in a distant theater in 
1940-1941, and the military generals Wavell and Metaxas, who were 
making decisions in the threatened area. The real issues were not the 
great themes of Western Civilization, as personified by all that "Greece" 
stood for from Pericles to Byron, but what was a sensible grand strategy, 
what should be the priorities for action, what were the means to accom-
plish the goals, and when would they be available? Inevitably these 
questions required technical and technological answers; they also de-
manded intelligence operations and skillful deception. Wavell met the 
challenges in a surprising way. 
The events chronicled here took place almost entirely before ULTRA, 
the decoded German signals, became available. In the early years of the 
Second World War the British high command had yet to learn how to run 
a modern war efficiently; it was a task that required hard work, patience, 
and accurate information as well as theoretical knowledge. Perception 
and interpretation played a part: there was a certain disbelief in ULTRA 
until June 1941, because it was said to be from a Secret Intelligence Service 
agent; since the SIS had been wrong before, ULTRA was discounted by 
some. What the British needed to know, however, was reaching them 
through normal diplomatic or intelligence channels; even without UL-
TRA the British knew of German intentions from a variety of sources. If 
they made the wrong decisions, it was because they failed to read the 
messages correctly, their minds being set to see things only from their 
own perspective. 
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The involvement in Greece was never more than a limited campaign 
in an unlimited war, as far as the British were concerned, but they were 
never quite sure that Greece was not their last foothold in Europe. They 
had wonderful dreams of holding on to this last bastion of civilization and 
of protecting it with a diplomatic and military alliance, a Balkan bloc. 
These dreams bore little relation to military and economic realities, and so 
the stage was set for tragedy. 
"The margin is narrow and the risk is considerable." 
Eden and Dill to Churchill 
from Athens, 5 March 1941 
"This very unfortunate adventure .... " 
Lieutenant-General Thomas A. Blarney, 
Commanding General, Australian Forces, 
Middle East, 7 August 1941 
"I need not give you a long account of the campaign in Greece: it was a 
series of misfortunes." 
General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, 
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, 
1939-1941, to the Indian Legislature, 
1 August 1941. 
"One frequently hears the expression 'lesson of Greece' used in conjunc-
tion with another one, even more widely used, 'lack of air support: We 
did not lose Greece solely because we were weak in the air. We lost it 
because we did not have ready and thoroughly organized in Greece a 
Balanced Force of all arms, including ground and air of equal strength to 
the German invaders, with secure communications having sufficient 
capacity to maintain that force." 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, 
former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East, 
to the Royal Empire Society, May 1942. 
1 _____ _ 
Prologue 
Moving through the receiving line at a postwar reception, the taciturn 
Field Marshal Earl Wavell came to Major-General Sir Frederick de 
Guingand. He stopped, poked him in the chest, and said, "Freddie, there 
was more to Greece than you'll ever understand."1 
In the months between the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 October 
1940 and the British evacuation at the end of April 1941, General Sir 
Archibald Wavell was the British commander-in-chief, Middle East, and 
de Guingand was a major on his planning staff. The British decision to aid 
Greece changed both their careers. It led Wavell to the thankless task of 
viceroy of India, while de Guingand rose to become Field Marshal Vis-
count Montgomery of Alamein's chief of staff in the victorious campaigns 
of 1942 to 1945. 
In 1940 Wavell, the best-known and -loved general in the army, had a 
greater grasp of the political side of war than most of his contemporaries. 
He was once again to prove true a claim of General James Wolfe, often 
quoted by Wavell himself, that "war is an option of difficulties."2 He 
commanded a vast theater which stretched from Malta in the west to 
Aden in the east, and from Macedonia in the north to Kenya in the south. 
When the Italians closed the Mediterranean, his Middle East command 
had to be supplied largely by a twelve-thou sand-mile sea route from the 
United Kingdom and the United States around the Cape of Good Hope. 
Wavell had instantaneous communications with London, but a pedestri-
an supply system; there was a large gap between words and goods. 
What makes this tale of a disaster so frightening is that it could easily 
happen again. 
In order for grand strategy to be viable it must be based upon solid 
facts and realistic appraisals. In 1940 London regarded the Middle East as 
a colonial area whose center was the Suez Canal. Farther to the east lay a 
second important focus in the oil wells of Iran and Iraq. The first area was 
vital because the "lifeline of the Empire" flowed through the Canal and 
across the Mediterranean, connecting the British Isles to India and Aus-
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tralia; the second, because oil was the lifeblood of the war economy. But 
after Italy severed the lifeline, there was no sound British reappraisal and 
no consistent policy that assigned grand-strategic priorities to the various 
factors in the area; there was only a vague idea that the Italians should be 
cleared from eastern Africa and from the Dodecanese Islands, where 
their airfields were a threat to the Suez Canal. No plans were laid for 
Crete, though that 160-mile-Iong island could obviously be an important 
bastion if properly developed. 
To the north of Crete lay an area in which it was believed by Eng-
lishmen that Lord Byron (the Thomas Phillips portrait still hangs in the 
Residence in Athens) had heroically liberated the Greeks from Ottoman 
rule; somewhere to the north of that lay the Balkans and the noble Serbs. 
In that mountainous countryside were the Bashi-Bazouks and the Bul-
gars, and from a place called Salonika the British had eventually launched 
a successful campaign at the end of the First World War. To the east of 
Macedonia lay Gallipoli, a peninsula upon which a brilliantly conceived 
Churchillian campaign had foundered because of military incompetence 
in 1915. It now lay in the land of the Turks, a swarthy, taciturn, tough race. 
London was not quite sure whether Greece and Turkey were part of the 
Balkans or of the Levant; it really did not matter too much, for they would 
do what the British told them to do. 
Unfortunately, that naive picture was badly flawed in relation to the 
realities of geopolitics. Most of the commerce of Greece, the Balkans, and 
Turkey was with Germany, along the natural water and rail routes of the 
Danube valley. If many of the smaller powers in the area were not ruled by 
pro-German factions, they were linked to Berlin economically, and they 
were susceptible to the immediate physical threat of German power. Vital 
to German interests were the Rumanian oilfields, which by the winter of 
1940 Hitler was already arranging to occupy in force. Against such naked 
military power the British had virtually nothing to offer. The United 
Kingdom had barely survived the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, 
and through the winter was still afraid of a German invasion. Her forces in 
the Middle East were pitifully small, as anyone like the neutral Turks 
could see by simply going visiting. 
Notwithstanding the realities, the British and the French had insisted 
on guaranteeing Greek and Turkish neutrality by treaty in April and May 
1939, and the British had then incautiously renewed these assurances 
after France fell. Seeing which way the power seemed to be shifting, and 
anxious to protect his own interests in the Balkans, Mussolini of Italy had 
seized Albania in early 1939 and decided that he should also have Greece. 
Aware of this ambition the Greek prime minister, the doughty little 
soldier General Ioannis Metaxas, was most anxious to maintain a strict 
neutrality; in spite of the pleas of his French-trained chief of staff, General 
Alexander Papagos, he refused to go to full mobilization in October 1940, 
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unwilling to give the Italians an excuse for invasion. But he had in August 
sought British help. 
The Greek army was small and tough, based largely upon reserves. It 
suffered from a number of basic weaknesses that need to be kept in mind. 
It was largely equipped with obsolete French, Polish, and Czech arms, for 
which there was now no other source than captured Italian materiel. 
There was only a single small-arms factory in Greece, and it depended 
upon imported raw materials. That the army was short of motor transport 
was not so vital as that Greece lacked all-weather roads, had but a single 
railway line north from Athens to Salonika and Florina, and had no all-
weather airfields. Geographically the country was in most places very 
suitable for defense, provided that the troops had time to dig in and were 
equipped with adequate artillery and signals networks. As most roads 
were donkey tracks, and as the wireless sets of the day would not work in 
the mountains, most communication had to be by telephone or runner. 
Both were very slow, and once an active campaign started the country 
began to run short of donkeys, then of man- and woman-power. 
Even if the British had been in top political, diplomatic, military, and 
economic form in 1940, Greece was not an area for which they were 
mentally or physically fitted. And there was another weakness. The link 
between diplomatic and military action in wartime has to be through 
intelligence services. In London the Foreign Office handled secret intel-
ligence and was mainly interested only in Germany; there was little vital 
coordination at the top until 1942. Like most other organizations, too, 
intelligence at all levels was suffering from rapid expansion and territorial 
imperatives. Though a Middle East Intelligence Centre was opened at 
Cairo in 1939, the Balkans were excluded from its purview, while the 
Foreign Office denied it political and diplomatic information. (Nev-
ertheless, its staff of enthusiastic young amateurs was soon putting out 
appreciations on twenty countries, including those in the Balkans; this so 
infuriated the War Office that only Wavell's intervention saved MEIC from 
abolition in May 1940.) 
After Italy entered the war the Cairo branch of the Bletchley Code and 
Cypher School, which Wavell had managed to establish, began to receive 
signals intelligence ("sigint") directly over the teletype from London, 
giving Wavell access to filtered ULTRA from the Luftwaffe in Sicily and 
Rumania. But it was not until May 1941 that this unit was allowed to reveal 
the real sources of its information, and even then many chose not to 
believe it. 3 
The British were weak on photo-reconnaissance (PRU) also. One 
flight of Glenn Martin Marylands operated from Malta in the autumn of 
1940, and a second was built up in the Middle East in early 1941. But there 
were too few aircraft to cover the necessary targets on anything but a 
spasmodic basis. 4 Middle East Command had only three Blenheim IVs in 
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Egypt which could reach Benghazi, in northern Libya, and they did not 
have the right spark plugs for long-range work. 5 It was not until March 
1941 that London finally agreed that British estimates of German air 
strength had been too high and that more RAF aircraft could be released 
from the home command and sent to the Middle East; alas, that was too 
late to help Greece or this tale. 6 
Moreover, if intelligence was not yet cranked up to wartime efficien-
cies, the same was also true of the British services. The army and the RAF, 
particularly, suffered not merely from the usual post-peacetime shortages 
of tested men and equipment, but also from the fact that their officers 
were simply not trained for war. And just as the highest governmental 
levels had no grand strategy for the Mediterranean-Middle Eastern the-
ater, so also the services had not developed their doctrines. For instance, 
though it had spent the First World War as a tactical air force, the RAF 
between the wars had become enamored of grand-strategic bombing 
independently of the army, and was opposed to undertaking tactical 
work; in fact, "army cooperation" was almost a dirty word. This would 
affect the Greek tragedy, because it placed the air officer commanding-in-
chief, Middle East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, in conflict 
with his superiors at home. The trim, handsome Longmore,S feet, 8 
inches tall, 150 pounds, was a former senior Royal Naval Air Service 
officer, a veteran of Jutland, who had risen in spite of his Mediterranean 
naval background in a service dominated by former Royal Flying Corps 
airmen who had served on the Western Front in the Great War. Longmore 
was also that rare senior British officer who still flew himself. Because of 
RAF theory Longmore's subordinate after November 1940, Air Vice Mar-
shal John 0' Albiac, became embroiled in tactical arguments in Athens, 
which were largely irrelevant since his bombers often could not get over 
the mountains to strategic targets. 
Wavell's problems as commander-in-chief included not only the vast 
size of his theater but the diplomatic and economic necessities with which 
he was also saddled. These ranged from a hostile Vichy French force in 
Syria to the continentalism of the Boers in Cape Town, six thousand miles 
away. Not until 1942 was a Cabinet minister based in Cairo to take the 
civilian side off the C-in-C's shoulders, and a Middle East supply center 
established to handle the complexities of the regional economy. When in 
November 1940 Greece came within Wavell's purview, he had to deal with 
the fact that the coal for its railways came from England, and essential 
wheat supplements from India. Vitally affecting his planning was the 
miscalculation by the War Cabinet Office in London of ships available 
from September 1940 to the end of August 1941. (The error was due to 
failing to realize that the Norwegian and Greek fleets were already in-
cluded in the British totals, and therefore could not be added in again, as 
they were under hire. 7) The absence of a national inventory system in 
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Britain, together with the fear of invasion, had a doubly inhibiting effect 
on London's willingness to dispatch supplies to the Middle East. 
On the eve of the Italian attack on Greece of 28 October 1940 Wavell, in 
Cairo, had roughly 500,000 men under his command, but of these the 
South Africans could only be used in East Africa, and the Australians and 
New Zealanders could not be employed without the consent of their 
home governments. (Those from "down under" well remembered Gal-
lipoli and Chanak, in both of which Churchill had had a hand.) Wavell 
was desperately short of modern equipment for anything but an 1898-
style "Fuzzy-Wuzzy" colonial war, which is what London basically 
thought he would be waging. Indicative of this is the fact that in July 1939, 
in spite of the size of his command, Wavell had a staff of only five officers, 
of whom one was part-time. 
Air Chief Marshal Longmore's air force was equally pitiful, composed 
of biplanes and early modern monoplanes with a handful of more mod-
ern machines. He had on hand 40 Gladiators with 40 in storage, 70 
Blenheims with 70 in storage, 24 Bombays and Valentines, 24 Lysanders 
with 24 in reserve, and 10 Sunderlands. There was no radar in Egypt. The 
attitude in the Air Ministry, conscious or not, was that materiel that was of 
no use in Europe could be sent to the Middle East. As a result, Longmore 
(with Wavell's backing) was constantly making himself unpopular for 
calling his very real needs to the attention of those at home. London also 
appeared to have forgotten that in 1938 it had added to Middle East 
Command Malta, Palestine and Transjordan, Iraq, and Aden. 
The naval commander, that irascible, red-faced sea dog, the popular 
Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, was based at Alexandria 
rather than at Cairo. He was often incommunicado when the Fleet was at 
sea, and he was desperately short of destroyers for all tasks. There was no 
joint headquarters in Cairo, and not until 15 February 1940, when Wavell 
was appointed, was there a clearly nominated C-in-C ME. And each C-in-
C still reported to his own service chief in Whitehall. 
To complicate matters, in October 1940 the secretary of state for war, 
the debonair Anthony Eden (known as the "film star at the War Office," 
or "Robert Taylor"), was visiting the Middle East. One of the principal 
dramatis personae of this play, Eden seems as secretary of state for war to 
have deferred to senior military officers, for he had been but a captain in 
the First World War. When he returned for another visit in 1941, as 
Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister's legate, he operated in an 
entirely different manner: then, he thought he had full authority to make 
any decision. 
The C-in-C's had not remained mentally closeted in Cairo in the first 
three-quarters of 1940.8 Starting on 10 May Longmore had sent home the 
first of his many requests for reinforcements to bring his command up to 
establishment. By August he had noted that, with the Italians in the war 
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(from 10 June), he was twenty-two and a half squadrons short of 
requirements and that, even if his losses rose no higher than those 
suffered on restricted operations, he needed 35 to 50 Blenheims and 24 
Hurricanes a month as replacements, rather than the 12 of each the Air 
Ministry had promised on 6 July. 
On 27 May Wavell had proposed to London that the British should 
support Greece, since it was regarded as part of the Levant rather than of 
the Balkans, and that they should attempt to deny Rumanian oil to 
Germany. But he was told early in June by the Chiefs of Staff (the COS) 
that it would be unwise to repeat the mistakes of 1914-1918 war by backing 
weak countries liable to be overrun, so he was to take no action. 
On 16 July Churchill handed one of his general directives to the 
Chiefs of Staff, who after making changes passed it to Wavell, noting that, 
as the ministerial committee had pointed out to the Prime Minister, the 
Middle East had neither the modern equipment nor the air support 
needed to face the impending Italian invasion of Egypt. Strangely, in as 
small a land as England, and with their interests and reputations, 
Churchill and Wavell had never met. The Prime Minister (also minister of 
Defence) now asked the C-in-C ME to fly home so he could meet him. 
Wavell' therefore, took the risk of the long flight via Malta and 
Gibraltar and arrived in London on 8 August, just as the Battle of Britain 
started in earnest. He met at once with the Chiefs of Staff, to whom he 
gave a verbal appreciation of the situation: the Egyptian frontier was 
holding, but he was short of vehicle parts and tanks. What he feared, and 
there were already rumors of this, was not the Italians, but the arrival of 
Germans. He had no intelligence network behind the Italian lines, and 
thus two German armored divisions might reach Benghazi before being 
detected by photo-reconnaissance. The Italians had 280,000 troops in 
North Africa, and in an advance this force would have air support from 
some 300-400 bombers, 300 fighters and 200 transports. On his own side, 
the 7th Armoured Division had only 65 tanks (against an establishment of 
220) and was seriously short of spares; the 4th Indian Division lacked a 
brigade and most of its artillery; and the Anzacs (Australians and New 
Zealanders) could only be used as yet for internal security duties because 
of their lack of equipment. Internal security itself was complicated by the 
fact that, since Egypt and Italy were not at war, some fifty thousand 
Italians were free to move around in Egypt, and Wavell was hampered by 
rules that forbade him to gather secret intelligence or prepare for subver-
sive activities. 
The GOC-in-C ME also had an artillery problem: units in his com-
mand were equipped with 18-pounders and 4.5-inch howitzers, but 
ammunition for these guns was in short supply, since production had 
been stopped when the new 25-pounder gun-howitzer was introduced in 
England. The same was true for the 37-mm antitank guns, for which he 
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had only 21,000 rounds on hand. This meant that sooner rather than later 
all his units had to be re-equipped. 
Wavell also met with Anthony Eden, and after their conversation 
Eden noted in his diary that "his deficiencies are shocking. "9 The reasons 
for the shortages were, of course, the vast loss at Dunkirk of equipment 
originally given to the British Expeditionary Force in France, and the need 
to re-equip the forces in the United Kingdom to be able to resist invasion. 
Shipping to the Middle East was slow, now that the Mediterranean was 
closed (the route around the Cape of Good Hope quadrupled the dis-
tance), and the arrival of convoys at Middle East ports congested the 
limited dock facilities and delayed unloading. 
On 12 August Wavell met with the Defence Committee, chaired by 
the action-minded Churchill, from ten in the evening until two the next 
morning. Wavell was annoyed at the Prime Minister's wanting to know 
where every battalion was and why it was not someplace else. Eden says 
he commiserated with him, for he was used to it, but at nine 0' clock on the 
morning of Tuesday, 13 August, Wavell offered his resignation. No sooner 
had Eden smoothed this over than a letter arrived from the Prime Minister 
refusing to meet again with Wavell. In his epistle the voluble Churchill 
asserted that Wavell lacked mental vigor and the resolve to overcome 
obstacles, and accepted too tamely the difficulties in the various theaters 
in which he was conducting operations so that he failed to concentrate on 
the decisive point. (Yet it would be exactly this dispersion of effort that 
Churchill himself was most guilty of instituting in the Greek case.) 
Eden sent back a note to the Prime Minister saying that weapons, not 
men, were the problem in modem war, and urged him to support Wavell. 
He might have added that war had changed a good deal since young 
Churchill had charged the Fuzzy-Wuzzies on the way to Khartoum with 
Kitchener in 1898, but it really would not have helped. Churchill did not 
know or respect Wavell, though the British army did. According to Eden, 
Churchill regarded Wavell as a "good average colonel"; he constantly 
referred to him that way and said he would make a good chairman of a 
Tory association, thus damning him with faint praise. Eden tried to point 
out that Wavell had always been against appeasement and that he was a 
noted scholar at Winchester and-he might have added-a distinguished 
author of books on the successful campaigns of the First World War in the 
Middle East, in which he had participated. Unfortunately, Churchill at 
sixty-six still had his boyhood prejudices: as a Harrovian, he disliked 
Wykhamists. The secretary of state for war felt that the truth was that 
Churchill never understood Wavell, and that the general-quiet, poetic, 
and withdrawn as he was--never encouraged the Prime Minister to get to 
know him in the few days he was in England. 
Meanwhile the Battle of Britain swirled overhead. On Thursday, 15 
August, the Germans sent over some two thousand sorties, against 
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which the RAF sent up 974 fighters. lO That was also the day on which 
Churchill asked Eden who could replace Wavell and got the reply that 
General Sir Claude Auchinleck, GOC, Southern Command, could, but 
that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant such a move. On Friday 
Wavellieft England, to return again but once until 1947, after he had 
fought fourteen campaigns and served as viceroy of India. 
By the end of August it was becoming evident that the Greeks were 
concerned about their neutrality, and that the Chiefs of Staff were taking 
the view that no forces could be spared for Greece, Turkey, or Crete until 
Egypt was secure. Eden, who had wanted to aid the Balkans in 1936,11 
claims that on the twenty-first he told Churchill that, as the British might 
have to become involved in Greece, the Middle East would have to be 
reinforced. 12 The next day the Greeks asked what help they could expect 
under the guarantee treaty. After London discussed the political con-
sequences for Anglo-Greek relations and the military realities of the 
supply line around the Cape of Good Hope, the British ambassador in 
Athens, the Etonian Sir Michael Palairet, was instructed to tell General 
Metaxas that little could be done except to try to prevent the Italian 
occupation of Crete, which lay on the line from Italy to the Italian 
Dodecanese Islands. Unfortunately Palairet was emotionally involved in 
Greece and did not follow instructions. Instead he called for British forces 
to be sent to Greece and told London that Britain was letting down a 
country to whom she had given a guarantee. On 26 August the War 
Cabinet reconsidered and informed Palairet that, in addition to promises 
of British support at the postwar peace table, some financial aid might be 
available. Churchill also sent Metaxas a personal message, saying that 
Britain expected shortly to be stronger in the Mediterranean.13 On 5 
September Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, reaffirmed the 1939 An-
glo-French guarantee, in spite of the fact that France had fallen. 
As Wavell was leaving London in mid-August, British Somaliland, an 
unimportant colony consisting mostly of barren land, was evacuated by 
its small garrison. Churchill angrily sent Wavell a disapproving signal. 
Later, when the chief of the Imperial General Staff (the CIGS), Sir John 
Dill, was in Cairo in February 1941, he told Wavell that the Prime Minister 
had never forgiven the C-in-C ME for his response: "Heavy butcher's bill 
not necessarily indication of good tactics. "14 At a long Cabinet meeting on 
4 October Churchill spent some time attacking Wavell, of whom he was 
increasingly uncertain. But on that same Friday Hitler and Mussolini met 
in the Brenner Pass, and the next day the British intelligence service 
presented the Prime Minister an account of their conversations, including 
proposals to send German troops to Libya and mount a drive on the Suez 
Canal from Syria. Churchill's immediate reaction was that, as the coun-
tries of eastern Europe could not stop the Germans, the Middle East army 
had better be built up as quickly as possible. On Sunday, 6 October, faced 
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with increasing evidence that the enemy objectives were Greece and 
Yugoslavia and not an invasion of Britain, Churchill reluctantly ordered 
reinforcement of the Middle East. IS 
On 7 October Longmore signaled congratulations to Sir Charles Portal 
on his appointment as chief of the Air Staff (CAS), but pointed out that the 
Middle East was still terribly weak and would remain so for some time to 
come, in spite of attempts to reinforce it by sending aircraft out via Malta 
and via Takoradi in West Africa, both at a wastage of about 10 percent. 16 
On and off there had been mention of garrisoning Crete. It was 
discussed while Wavell was in London, but he had no troops to spare. 
With the arrival of three more Italian divisions in Albania in the autumn, 
the matter was raised again in Athens but, as the British attaches could 
make no promises, no headway was made. In any case, Metaxas wanted 
no foreign troops on his soil until war broke out. So the Joint Planning 
Staff in London took the view that a small force should be earmarked to 
move to Crete as soon as Greece was attacked, but that that action should 
be the limit of a British commitment to Greece. This was accepted in 
London, and Cairo was ordered to hold such a force in readiness. 
In fact, though Suda Bay, on Crete, was a desirable naval refueling 
base, it would have to be protected by NA guns and fighters from nearby 
airfields, and there was no grand-strategic reason why, in an air age, 
Crete should be held. Wavell knew what he had to do-clean the Italians 
out of East Africa while holding on to Egypt-but there was still no British 
grand-strategic plan for the Middle East. Part of the reason for this may 
have been personality conflicts and misunderstandings. 
The principals on the British side may be divided into two groups, the 
civilians and the military. In the former group were Winston Churchill 
and Anthony Eden and their lesser associates, principally Palairet in 
Athens. In the latter were Wavell and Longmore in Cairo, Dill in London, 
and their subordinates, particularly Air Vice Marshal John D' Albiac in 
Athens. Making a third group were four important Greek leaders-King 
George II, Metaxas (who was prime minister and president of the Coun-
cil), Papagos, and Metaxas' successor as prime minister, Alexander 
Koryzis. 
All of these players had various bonds of sympathy which drew them 
to others on the stage at one time or another. Churchill, Eden, and 
Metaxas had been soldiers, but were now politicians. Wavell, Longmore, 
Dill, Metaxas, and Papagos had a common understanding of military 
realities, which King George II in his British-style uniforms also shared. 
But the Greeks, except perhaps for Metaxas, always felt themselves to be 
in an inferior position, while Eden, at least, tended to feel that as an 
Englishman he was superior. 
Another thread woven through this tale is that of the personal rela-
tionship between Churchill and Eden, who were at moments like father 
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and son. Indeed, Eden later wrote that the Prime Minister told his young 
secretary of state for war that after the conflict he was to succeed him as 
prime minister.17 
Even in the matter of language there were interesting contrasts. The 
Greeks all spoke at least one language besides their own. Some of the 
British spoke a second language, but this was not always useful in Greece: 
Wavell was fluent in Russian, and Eden's ability to quote Persian poetry 
was at best misleading. So most discussions took place in English or with 
interpreters, with minutes kept in English and Greek and protocols in 
French. 
The final moves made before the Italians struck against Greece on 28 
October were the Cabinet decision on the ninth that Eden should pay a 
visit to the Middle East, an unusual step, and the agreement on the 
twelfth that, owing to the needs of Home defense, no more RAF squad-
rons should be sent to the Middle East. On 14 October Eden teletyped that 
he had arrived safely in Cairo; two days later he reported that Wavell was 
planning a January offensive in the Western Desert, if the equipment 
arrived, and in the Sudan, unless the Italians attacked first. On the 
seventeenth Palairet telegraphed Eden that Metaxas, an internationally 
respected strategist, predicted an Axis attack on Greece and Turkey and 
advised that the British could protect their left flank if they would pay 
attention to Greece and listen less to Turkey. Metaxas felt sure that the 
Greeks could hold the Italians on the Albanian front if they had some air 
support and antiaircraft and antitank weapons. IS The ambassador's sig-
nal had been repeated to London, and Longmore was asked by the Chiefs 
of Staff what he could do, to which he replied, "Nothing." (Wavell 
supported this opinion.) 19 The next evening Dill told the War Cabinet that 
there was no truth to the rumors that Mussolini intended to attack 
Greece. 20 
On Saturday, 16 October, the new chief of the Air Staff, Portal, 
dropped a handwritten note to his deputy chief: "You mentioned this 
evening that we now had lots of fighters in store and were just becoming 
well off for pilots. Are you satisfied that we have done all we should for 
AOC-in-C ME (I don't mean necessarily that he should use them to help 
Greece)?" 
On the twenty-seventh the first decrypt from BONIFACE (later called 
ULTRA) hinted that the German invasion of Britain was off. 21 
The stage was now set for the British decision to aid Greece. The 
record is a diary of a disaster. 
11 _____ _ 
The Metaxas Phase 
28 October 1940 - 29 January 1941 
The rattle of gunfire had begun to involve western European troops in the drama 
that became the Second World War as early as Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 
1935. Hitler had honed his weapons in Spain, and in the spring of 1940 he swept 
through Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France, until brought up 
short by the English Channel. In the last few days of the German blitzkrieg the 
Italians had joined in, and all of a sudden the Allied planners' worst possible case 
had gone out the window and been replaced by an undreamed-of nightmare: a 
hostile Continental coast from the North Cape to Spain without a single ally in 
power on the mainland of Europe, the Mediterranean closed to British shipping, 
and Italian troops threatening Egypt from two sides. 
Grim as the summer of 1940 was, with a weaponless army back from Dunkirk, 
as the year waned into fall General Wavell began to make slow headway in his vast 
Middle East Command. Without informing Winston Churchill, the belligerent 
new prime minister who had taken over in May, Wavell was even planning an 
offensive strategy and setting up his own intelligence organization. 
In the Balkans the Germans were beginning a military penetration that flowed 
down the normal lines of their economic well-being and might reach the Persian 
Gulf. Far to the west in the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt campaigned for, 
and on 2 November won, a third term. 
28 October 1940 
The Greek prime minister, General Ioannis Metaxas, was a pudgy little 
man with a pasty face, who had not the slightest physical resemblance to 
either a general or a dictator, according to C. L. Sulzberger of the New York 
Times. 1 He was spending the weekend at his country villa at Kifisia, then 
ten miles outside Athens on the road to Marathon. At three o'clock on 
Monday morning, 28 October, he was roused by the Italian ambassador, 
Count Emmanuel Grazzi, who handed him an ultimatum, properly 
couched in diplomatic French, which demanded the right of the Italians 
to occupy certain strategic positions within Greece. Metaxas refused to 
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dignify the ultimatum with a written reply. Rubbing the sleep from his 
eyes, and realizing that he was faced with a declaration of war, he said 
simply, "Ochi!" (no). 
Though the timing may have been unexpected-the Italian service 
staffs were throwing a party-the note was not. The Greeks had antici-
pated an Italian attack on the Epirus front since 3 October and had been 
partially mobilized.2 Metaxas dismissed the ambassador, called the king, 
got into his car, and drove straight to the British legation, where at 3:30 he 
handed the Italian note to the minister, Sir Michael Palairet. Palairet later 
wrote of the ultimatum, "It would be difficult to find a better specimen of 
lying effrontery even among the numerous similar productions of the 
Axis Powers." He added that Metaxas' first step had been to ask for British 
help; Metaxas' diary gives a slightly different version. 3 
Metaxas then went to army headquarters to consult General Alex-
ander Papagos, the chief of staff. They agreed that the British might not be 
able to do much in support of the guarantee of April 1939, but that they 
would press for what they could get; they judged that Turkey would 
probably remain neutral, since she had failed to act when Italy had 
brought the war to the Mediterranean in June. 4 They then spoke with 
King George II. 
Palairet at once dispatched a copy of the ultimatum to London by 
diplomatic pouch, where it arrived on 14 November, and fired off a 
telegram to the Foreign Office, repeated to Cairo, giving the news and 
asking for help. The chain effects of this were immediately evident: the 
Foreign Office telephoned the War Office at 5:25 a.m., and nineteen 
minutes later the Admiralty dispatched a war signal to all flag officers at 
home and abroad. The Mediterranean Station had already warned all 
submarines at 0715 Cairo time, a message received in London at 0650Z 
(Greenwich, the base time). In midmorning the military attache in Angora 
(as Ankara was then often called) telegraphed to say that he would pass 
on information from the Turkish general staff on the situation in Greece 
unless told otherwise; Turkish action, however, would be confined to the 
neutralization of Bulgaria. 
The military attache in Belgrade reported that the Yugoslav chief of 
the general staff "was evidently surprised by the tum of events and was in 
a depressed and nervous state .... He repeated several times, What can 
we do? We are completely surrounded. I received the impression that it 
was unlikely that Yugoslavia would come to the aid of Greece." Nev-
ertheless, some Yugoslav divisions were brought to a war footing. 
As soon as the news of the Italian attack on Greece reached London, a 
signal was sent to Wavell in Cairo, stressing that Crete was vitally impor-
tant as a Fleet base and authorizing the dispatch of up to one infantry 
brigade with field and AlA guns, despite the risks that would have to be 
run in Egypt and Malta.5 At 5:45 in the afternoon Churchill sent off a 
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characteristic word of encouragement to General Metaxas: "We will give 
you all the help in our power. We fight a common foe and we will share a 
united victory. "6 Churchill wished to bomb Rome but was promptly 
overruled. 7 
That night Sir Alexander Cadogan, the under-secretary of state for 
foreign affairs, noted in his diary, liThe dirty ice-creamers attacked Greece 
at 6 am. Luckily I wasn't woken. liB 
Early on what proved to be a beautiful sunny Monday there were 
Italian air attacks on various places in Greece, including an ineffective one 
on the Tatoi Palace about fifteen miles north of Athens. The Greek general 
staff began to move into the imposing Hotel Grand Bretagne, on the 
northeast corner of Syntgama Square just across from Parliament House 
and a short walk from the Italian embassy. 
When the news reached Cairo, Eden, Wavell, and Longmore were in 
Khartoum. Their deputies had, therefore, to act for them until late morn-
ing when they flew back into town. 9 At 1:45 Wavell sent a personal signal 
to Dill, the CIGS, in which he reported that he and the senior Air Staff 
officer, Air Vice-Marshal Drummond, had met with Admiral Cun-
ningham at Alexandria. The navy intended to use Suda Bay at once as a 
temporary base, and the assistance which the army and the RAF could 
render had been discussed. Several officers would be dispatched the next 
day by flying boat to make a reconnaissance. The Malta battalion of the 
Yorks and Lancashire Regiment was being held in readiness to move by 
cruiser to Crete, with another battalion on short notice, but no further 
action would be taken without London's authority except in an emergen-
cy. One commando troop of a hundred men was being placed at the 
disposal of the C-in-C Med' for use if urgently required. Wavell further 
asked that the burden of sending a battalion to Malta be transferred to the 
Home command. The movement of AlA guns to Crete was being exam-
ined, while air matters were covered in a signal to the chief of the Air Staff. 
Secretary of War Eden sent his own assessment to London, to the 
effect that the security of Egypt came before everything else and that, 
while the army was almost up to strength, the RAF was way behind. 
Moreover, any land forces sent from the Middle East to Greece could not 
possibly be strong enough to have a decisive influence on the fighting 
there, and by dividing resources the British would risk failure in both 
places. Even more important, such action might jeopardize the plans 
Wavell was preparing in great secrecy, plans of which Eden would tell 
Churchill when he got home.lO Eden sent this message in his own 
personal code and it was decoded in London and passed to the Prime 
Minister in an uncopied handwritten note. 
Drummond, in the absence of Longmore, had already that morning 
signaled to Portal, the chief of the Air Staff, that he had agreed to send a 
Sunderland with a party to Suda Bay on the twenty-ninth, including an 
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RAF officer charged with looking over the area to see if a full-sized airfield 
could be built near Suda Bay. Drummond was also arranging for three 
Sunderlands to be refueled there while undertaking naval reconnais-
sances. At the same time another signal requested that the Greeks be 
informed that Sunderlands, Blenheims, and Glenn Martins would be 
flying over Greek territory. 11 
At this time someone in Cairo ran through a personnel index and 
came up with the name of a Lieutenant Hunt, who could speak Greek. He 
was called in, promoted to captain, told a British force was being sent to 
Greece, made intelligence officer, and put in command of a cipher sec-
tion. And so began OPERATION BARBARITY. 12 
In London the Cabinet met at five 0' clock that afternoon and listened 
to Eden's cable declaring, "We are not in a position to give effective help 
by land or air, and another guaranteed nation looks like falling to the 
Axis." The Cabinet also heard that Metaxas had asked for air and naval aid 
to protect Corfu and Athens. Such requests had been made for some 
time, and only guarded replies had been given. It was now suggested that 
Rome be bombed, avoiding of course the Vatican, but that the Fleet be 
kept away from Corfu. The line, however, to be taken with the Press was 
that all possible aid was being given to Greece. 13 Bombing Rome was in 
accord with a thought from Sir Miles Lampson, the British ambassador in 
Cairo, who added Taranto, the Italian naval base, using Wellingtons 
based in Egypt. The Cabinet also heard that Admiral Cunningham, C-in-
C Med', was most anxious about the state of his destroyers, as it was their 
condition which would limit his operations to the west of Greece. Con-
voys to Greece would further extend his limited resources, though use of 
Suda Bay would help. 14 
The War Office was aware that Hitler might send aid to the Italians in 
North Africa. IS This was confirmed the next day when Sir Samual Hoare, 
formerly secretary of state for air and now British ambassador in Madrid, 
cabled the contents of the discussions that Mussolini and Hitler had held 
in Florence on the afternoon of the twenty-eighth. At that time Hitler had 
offered Mussolini his parachute troops-but to occupy Crete, a strategic 
stepping-stone bastion for both sides. 
The War Cabinet concluded that there was not much that could be 
done at that moment, though-as the official historian, Sir Llewellyn 
Woodward, would comment later-"During the next few days there was a 
considerable change of policy. "16 
Part of that change was reflected in an Air Ministry memorandum 
prepared in response to the Prime Minister's direction on the twenty-
eighth to move four heavy bomber squadrons (Wellingtons then fell into 
that category) to the Middle East to work from advanced bases in Greece. 
The four-page study concluded that for security reasons only four aircraft 
a night could be dispatched to Cairo via Malta and that the four squadrons 
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would need a minimum of 500 personnel, 50 specialist vehicles, and 500 
tons of shipping stores. The aircraft would have to have tropical filters and 
other modifications fitted. It would take five weeks for stores to arrive. 
Personnel could only be rushed out through the Mediterranean, and that 
would take a major naval operation during a moonless period. The only 
alternative, and it was unacceptable to the planners, was to rob personnel 
from the Middle East in order to get aid to Greece at once. Some 3,800 
personnel were already scheduled to sail from the United Kingdom in 
November to bring the RAF in the Middle East up to strength just for its 
existing units. So the conclusion was "that timely air support for Greece 
cannot be provided from RAF resources except at the expense of Middle 
East Command. Flying out additional aircraft would not affect this unless 
the appropriate personnel and equipment could also be got out." Not to 
be ignored was Eden's signal of 16 October, "Reinforcement of the RAF is 
the pressing need of the hour here and will, I am convinced, prove to be 
the decisive factor," a statement that was reinforced on the twenty-sixth 
by another saying that he was frankly disappointed in the air reinforce-
ments and stressing their need even for defense. 
In Greece itself, the planners pointed out, there was a problem of the 
location of suitable airfields. There were some on the plain around 
Larissa, which did have a railway and was connected to the small but 
usable port of Volos. There were only two good airfields near Athens 
(both of which were bombed on the morning of the twenty-eighth), which 
did have the adequate port of the Piraeus. There was one field on Crete, 
but it was too small for modem bombers and was within easy reach of the 
Italian airfields in the Dodecanese. Larissa was within range of Albanian 
airfields, and Athens could be reached from both Rhodes and Albania. 
Greek air defenses were negligible, so airfield defense would have to 
come from the Middle East Command, which was already woefully short. 
"The risks of relying on AlA. defences, dispersal, and quick refuelling 
would have to be accepted." 
To set up a refueling base would require roughly 110 personnel, 100 
tons of shipping stores, 25 vehicles, and 65 tons of bombs and 6 tons of 
small-arms ammunition weekly. "The impracticability of providing ade-
quate defences in Greece compels us to use Egypt as the main base for the 
operation," a plan that involved 1,400 miles of unproductive flying to and 
from the refueling point per sortie. This, coupled with the limited scale of 
operations from improvised bases and likely higher wastage, would limit 
operations to eight to ten sorties per day, so the best scheme was thought 
to be for squadrons to move up to the advanced refueling base for three or 
four days at a time and then return to Egypt for major maintenance. The 
planners disliked this arrangement, however, because it involved large 
numbers of maintenance personnel at both ends and many aircraft on the 
ground in daylight. Overall, the report concluded that the only means of 
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affording quick air aid to Greece was to send it from the Middle East, yet 
"We have abundant evidence that the Middle East is already dangerously 
weak in its air defence."17 
29 October 1940 
The Defence Committee of the Cabinet met that evening, and the next day 
(the twenty-ninth) Churchill asked Eden to stay on in the Middle East. 
The advanced British reconnaissance party reached Crete and at once 
found that the only airfield was at Heraklion, seventy miles from Suda 
Bay, and that it was only suitable for Gladiators. Approval was received to 
move a brigade to Crete at once. 
From Athens the naval attache reported to Admiral Cunningham that 
Metaxas had said that he "will chase the Italians out of Albania in a month 
if you can cut their maritime communications for that period." The naval 
attache reported that he had said that that was impossible, two or three 
days at a time being more likely, though submarines might be able to 
operate in the Adriatic for longer. Metaxas was delighted that the flagship 
had already used Suda Bay and said that all Greek bases were entirely at 
the British navy's disposal. In response the Admiralty signaled about 
mining Greek waters to deter the Italians, but added that the C-in-C Med' 
was "free to act as circumstances dictate in the event of Greece being 
overrun."IS Meanwhile the Air Ministry had been offered places for fifty 
men and twenty-five tons of stores on a naval vessel sailing from Glasgow 
the next day and had ordered Bomber Command to have the men aboard. 
And from Belgrade the British minister, Ronald Ian CompbeH, tele-
graphed that Prince Paul ("our friend") was under increasing German 
pressure and more and more felt the isolation of Yugoslavia. This tele-
gram made its slow rounds of the Foreign Office, where on 12 November 
Philip Nichols, head of the Southern Department, noted that it was far the 
most encouraging message from Belgrade because, as Pierson Dixon 
(recently back from Rome) had commented, thinking about war was a 
mental effort Prince Paul had hitherto refused to make.19 In fact the 
Foreign Office underrated the man. 
30 October 1940 
On Wednesday a long telegram at the expensive day rate arrived in 
London from Palairet reporting on the war situation: according to the 
Yugoslavs the Italians now had fifteen divisions in Albania with twelve 
on the Greek front. Palairet appealed for help and especially requested 
the bombing of Italian concentrations in Albania, using Greek airfields for 
refueling as required. Otherwise, he said, he would not signal in daytime 
unless it was urgent. 20 
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And from Ankara Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, His 
Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, signaled that the best course was to keep 
Turkey out of the war until the spring, as general assurances were all that 
Turkey had to give until she was well supplied and equipped, an opinion 
with which Wavell's chief of staff, General Arthur Smith, concurred, and 
so did R.J. Bowker, deputy head of the Southern Department in the 
Foreign Office.21 Ankara also sent word that the Turkish ambassador in 
Berlin had advised that the German Foreign Office had "expressed com-
plete surprise and dismay" when shown a copy of the Italian ultimatum to 
Greece. 22 
Also on Wednesday the CAS, Portal, signaled Longmore that he 
thought it made better sense to operate the Wellingtons from Malta 
against the Italian lines of communications to Greece, while Longmore's 
aircraft should concentrate on direct aid to Greek forces. "You will appre-
ciate the advantages of Crete vs the mainland as an advanced base, but we 
leave the final decision to you. "23 
A further long telegram from Knatchbull-Hugessen, who was un-
aware that his valet Cicero was a German spy, said that it was agreed that 
the Turks would not enter the war for some time unless compelled to do 
so. They regarded the German line that Greece had been refueling the 
Royal Navy as economically absurd and considered the Italian attack "a 
dishonourable, dirty business" that would recoil on Germany. What the 
Turks would do was to ship to the Greeks the antitank ammunition with 
which the British had supplied them. 24 
31 October 1940 
The tempo of a changing policy can begin to be detected on Thursday, 31 
October. That morning a Sunderland flying boat landed in Phaleron Bay 
with British officers aboard. They disembarked and motored up to 
Athens to talk with the Greek authorities. In the close community that 
was Athens in 1940, the American naval attache soon knew what was afoot 
and cabled home a diplomatic appreciation, which took the view that, if 
the Germans attacked, they would widen the war unacceptably; and so 
they were likely to seize only strategic targets and leave the older part of 
Greece alone. He had the impression that what shocked the Germans was 
not the Italian attack but the Greek resistance. 25 The American ambas-
sador, Lincoln MacVeagh, added that one of the British officers had said 
that "it took some courage to risk another Norway. "26 
In Cairo, No. 30 Squadron, a mixture of fighter and bomber Blenheim 
I's, was ordered to Greece. Each airman was issued two blankets, and SI 
Ldr. U. Y. Shannon was told, "Plans are to be prepared for the evacuation 
of personnel and material should such action become necessary. These 
plans to include arrangements for demolition of such material as cannot 
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be evacuated .... Items saturated with petrol should be ignited by firing 
a Very pistol into the dump from an upwind position." His fifteen aircraft 
("Too few" Metaxas told his diary) were to leave in two groups, the first on 
3 November and the second on 5 November, accompanied by four Bom-
bay transports, which would refuel at Heraklion on Crete and then 
proceed to Eleusis.27 
After tea Wavell signaled that he was sending Major-General M.D. 
Gambier-Parry to join the military mission in Athens at the first oppor-
tunity; he was assuming that the military attache there could provide an 
interpreter. He added that he would like to have Gambier-Parry, a useful 
field commander, relieved in Athens by Major-General T.G.G. Heywood, 
as he did "not want Heywood as a commander in the Middle East."28 
(Heywood, who had served on "Tim" Harrington's staff in Constantino-
ple after World War I, was a Balkan specialist, a linguist who when 
military attache in Paris had failed to report on the poor state of the French 
army before 1940. Persona non grata to fighting soldiers in the Middle East, 
Heywood was killed in an air crash in May 1941.)29 
A row between the C-in-C's ME and the Chiefs of Staff in London over 
the slowness in breaking Italian ciphered messages was finally resolved 
with the agreement on 31 October that a deciphering unit composed of 
staff from the Bletchley Code and Cypher School should be set up at RAF 
Heliopolis, Cairo, to be administered by the army with specialists from all 
three services attached.30 This became known as the Combined Bureau, 
Middle East. At the same time on the intelligence front London was 
beginning to get strong evidence that the Germans were going to under-
take a major campaign in the Balkans. Up to this time information had 
flowed in from normal diplomatic and Secret Intelligence Service chan-
nels. Now it was supplemented by ULTRA as German Air Force units 
began to move into the Balkans and transmit over the airwaves. But 
because of other priorities and the learning process, it would be February 
1941 before some of this Enigma traffic was deciphered and the informa-
tion made available. 
In Athens, the fact that the Germans were not at war with the Greeks 
enabled them to keep their embassy open all during this period. 
Churchill told the War Cabinet that afternoon that Britain had shown 
that she could stay in the war, although she could not yet launch an 
offensive; meanwhile invasion had to be safeguarded against, while 
Germany was master of Europe.31 Alexander Cadogan at the Foreign 
Office confided to his diary that he had tried to tell Halifax and Churchill 
what a great opportunity the Greek conflict was for an attack on Italy, but 
they had a "NarvikiDakar complex"; he therefore had to tone down a very 
discouraging telegram from the Prime Minister to Palairet. 32 
It had been agreed in London that an interservice military mission 
should be formed in Athens which would be headed by Rear-Admiral 
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Charles Turle, sometime head of the British naval mission to Greece, 
1927-1929; he had been brought out of retirement in 1939 because he 
spoke Greek, and sent as naval attache to Sofia and Athens. A signal was 
sent to Middle East headquarters announcing this decision, with a re-
quest that they supply the rest of the personnel. 
With signals coming in from Athens urging air attack on the Italian 
lines of communication, the Air Ministry became concerned, and the 
chief of the Air Staff minuted his deputy: "We cannot allow the AOC-in-C 
to maintain an altogether non-posthumous [sic] attitude failing the dis-
covery of a landing ground in Crete where bomber aircraft of his com-
mand could be refuelled. He should at once consider sending a token 
force to Athens or some other aerodrome on the Greek mainland where 
refuelling facilities can be made available. A demonstration bomber flight 
near the Albanian frontier would do much to hearten Greek troops and 
need not necessarily commit the AOC-in-C to the permanent detachment 
of bombers from his force." 
But before anyone could act, Longmore, back in Cairo from his visit to 
Khartoum, had seen Palairet's signal and taken it upon his own shoulders 
to respond, signaling Portal, "It seems that it has become politically 
absolutely essential to send a token force to Greece even at the expense of 
my force here. I have therefore arranged to despatch to Athens without 
delay one Blenheim Mark I Squadron of which half the aircraft are 
equipped as fighters and half as bombers. This makes no provision for 
Fighter Defence of the Fleet Base Crete for which no aerodrome in the 
locality is available. It also reduces by small proportion the fighter defence 
of Alexandria. "33 
That signal, sent at 1127 from Cairo, was received in the Air Ministry 
at 1405. The reply, originated at 1503 and dispatched at 1700, shows the 
speed with which action could sometimes be taken. Portal fully approved 
of Longmore's action; he reiterated the instructions to find a good landing 
ground in Crete or, if that proved impossible, to establish a more perma-
nent base in Greece.34 
In the meantime the cruiser Berwick had left the United Kingdom with 
the RAF contingent and 12 Bofors guns for the defense of Crete. 
1 November 1940 
Lecturing at the United States National War College in Washington after 
the war, Wavell said that "because they took away some of my very limited 
air support to aid Greece, I had to tell Eden that I was planning to attack 
the Italians in the Desert; otherwise I wished to keep it a secret. "35 As a 
man of deception long at home in a wartime Cairo in two world wars, 
Wavell was only too well aware of the likelihood of leaks. 
It was against this background that Eden sent from Cairo a long report 
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of his initial conversations with the C -in-C's; he dealt with the strengthen-
ing of the defense of Crete and came to the conclusion that the first line 
was the Fleet. But he then went on to point out that the RAF was so weak 
that it could not afford a high proportion of losses on the ground. It was 
essential that, as Graeco-Italian hostilities escalated, British minds should 
be clear as to the main issues. "The following are my conclusions," said 
Eden: 
We cannot from Middle East resources send sufficient air or 
land reinforcements to have any decisive influence upon the 
course of fighting in Greece. To send such forces from here or to 
divert reinforcements now on their way or approved would im-
peril our whole position in the Middle East and jeopardize plans 
for offensive operations now being laid in more than one theatre. 
After much painful effort and at the cost of grave risks we 
have, so far as our land forces are concerned, now built up a 
reasonably defensive force here. We should presently be in a 
position to undertake certain offensive operations which, if suc-
cessful, may have far-reaching effect on the course of the war as a 
whole. It would surely be bad strategy to allow ourselves to be 
diverted from this task and unwise to employ our forces in 
fragments in a theatre of war where they cannot be decisive. 
This opinion reflected that of the C-in-C's ME and of their Joint 
Planning Staff in Cairo, who felt that a whole brigade might be necessary 
for Crete's defense because it was such a crucial island. 36 What no one said 
was that Crete was far larger than Malta and much farther removed from 
the main Axis coast. It was potentially of great value, and yet everyone 
had more hesitation about defending it and the aircraft on it than they had 
about defending Malta. But at least something was done about Crete this 
day. One battalion arrived there to join the 130 officers and men with 
medical stores who had been landed at Suda Bay when the cruiser HMS 
Liverpool, severely damaged by a torpedo on 14 October, was docked for 
repairs. 37 
In Athens the Germans told Metaxas that they would not regard the 
RAF in Greece as a casus belli unless the RAP were given airfields in the 
north. 
Major-General Gambier-Parry, an amiable Etonian, now an armored 
corps general officer, arrived in Athens as the Chiefs of Staff's personal 
representative at the new military mission on 1 November and met 
immediately with Palairet and Col. Jasper Blunt, the military attache. Both 
thought that Gambier-Parry had been sent in response to an appeal from 
General Papagos and were unaware of the limitations in his instructions 
from both the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office. Unfortunately it 
seemed that Papagos had been informed that Gambier-Parry was the 
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answer to his prayers. Blunt took the general along to see the Greek 
commander-in-chief at seven in the evening and was much impressed 
with Papagos' reasonable attitude when it was explained to him that 
Gambier-Parry was not in a position to make any decision upon a general 
plan of campaign or upon British cooperation. 
Gambier-Parry reported home that he could not see, since GHQ was 
in Athens, how a British military mission could do a better job than the 
military attache. He was not wanted further forward, as communications 
were so bad in Greece that it took two days to get to the front, and the field 
communications system was heavily overloaded; it scarcely needed fo-
reigners trying to get priorities on it. 38 
On this Friday in London the War Cabinet was told of Eden's report 
and discussed the aid that could be given to Greece. Those present agreed 
that if the Greeks put up a good resistance the British would have to help 
at once. On the other hand Turkey might be more important to the United 
Kingdom in the long run. The Chiefs of Staff then expressed their concern 
that the Germans would advance into Turkey and Syria once they had 
taken Greece. 39 
2 November 1940 
The next morning, at the request of the Greek king and Metaxas, Gam-
bier-Parry saw each of them for about fifteen minutes. Both urged the 
need for maximum British air action in Albania to protect the Greek field 
army until mobilization was completed; given ten days, they expected to 
be able to go onto the offensive. Metaxas suggested that fully armed RAF 
bombers should fly to Greece to be refueled and briefed, and then attack 
the enemy. Further, the Royal Navy should occupy Suda Bay and operate 
from there to prevent an Italian landing behind the Greek lines in the 
west. Both impressed upon Gambier-Parry the need for the British to 
make a maximum cooperative effort: actions would speak louder than 
words. 
That night Gambier-Parry sat down and drafted a sketch of the three 
principal Greek leaders for the benefit of London and Cairo. He started 
with Papagos, a commander, he felt, who knew his stuff and thought 
before he made his points. Tall and aristocratic in appearance, he was very 
likable, although possibly too austere to command affection or popularity. 
But the English general liked his quiet, confident manner, which could 
not fail to communicate itself to his staff and subordinates. Though 
Papagos was obviously tired and suffering from lack of sleep, he took the 
greatest pains to explain the situation. Gambier-Parry was much taken by 
the Greek commander's patience and knowledge of detail, but he also got 
the impression that Papagos thought he was empowered to discuss a plan 
of campaign with him. Unfortunately the rest of Gambier-Parry's descrip-
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tion of Papagos was lost to a garbled transmission in which a large number 
of groups were undecipherable. 
Turning then to the king, Gambier-Parry was obviously fooled, for he 
believed that George II had a completely English outlook and was very 
easy to talk to. Though a little shy, he had great charm of manner, a grand 
sense of humor, and a witty way of putting things. He struck Gambier-
Parry as having the utmost confidence in Metaxas and Papagos and in 
being wisely determined not to interfere. Nevertheless, the king was 
thoroughly well informed and had a detailed knowledge of the military 
situation and of the requirements of the services. 
But "General Metaxas is the big noise in Greece at present and I 
should describe him as a really outstanding personality even by interna-
tional standards." Although he spoke almost no English, he understood a 
good deal, and Gambier-Parry naturally found that his distinguished 
military record (he had been chief of staff in World War I) facilitated 
discussions. A very shrewd man, Metaxas went straight to essentials, but 
appeared thoroughly to understand the difficulties of immediate cooper-
ation with the British when they were explained to him. 
At Greek GHQ itself there was a general quiet confidence which 
bespoke the efficiency of a well-trained team. The effects were evident 
even in the lower ranks: it was notable that although the Greeks had 
allowed five days for the call-up, 80 percent of the reservists had reported 
on the first day. 
But if the leadership and the spirit of the Greeks were excellent, their 
equipment was something else altogether. The four tanks in the Greek 
army consiste~. of 2 obsolete Vickers and 2 ancient Carden-Lloyds used at 
the training schools. As for antitank weapons, they had 22 .55-inch 
antitank rifles plus 19 sent by the British from the Middle East; they hoped 
for 22 more, with 60,000 rounds of ammunition from the British and 5,000 
rounds from the Turks. Seventeen hundred antitank rifles and 120 guns 
had been on order from France for more than a year but, like other prewar 
purchases, had not been delivered. What the Greeks wanted were 60 two-
gun antitank pack sections and 25 four-gun sections for mountain use, as 
they feared an Italian sweep through southern Yugoslavia down into 
Greece through the Monastir Gap.40 
Also on 2 November a plane carrying British officers flew low over 
Athens, to the cheers of the crowds. These new arrivals necessitated a 
hunt for space for a headquarters for the RAE The Near East Foundation's 
building was, therefore, requisitioned, presaging greater things to come. 
As early as 2 November, however, discussions with the Bulgarian 
minister in Athens made MacVeagh and others suspicious that the Bul-
garians would provide passage for the Germans to attack Greece. To the 
American ambassador and the Greek Foreign Office the future seemed 
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like a chess game in which Moscow was the red queen and Greece, as 
usual, but a pawn of the great powers. 41 
Eden was hot in Cairo and anxious to get back to London and tell the 
fidgety Prime Minister of Wavell's plans, but on the second Churchill 
signaled, liThe Greek situation must be held to dominate others now. We 
are well aware of our slender resources." And added that Eden should 
stay on another week. In frustration Eden scribbled across the message 
sheet, "Egypt more important than Greece. "42 And in his diary he noted, 
quite correctly, that the idea that Greece should dominate was strategic 
folly; the C-in-C's, the British ambassador at Cairo, and he all agreed that 
the key was Egypt.43 
In London the vice chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Tom 
Phillips, said, "For God's sake don't lets go fighting in Macedonia. We 
must not commit ourselves to fighting on land at present-and so we 
mustn't go into Greece. "44 Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Foreign Office represen-
tative on the Committee on Foes, later recalled that the committee at this 
time came to the conclusion that if they were Hitler they would layoff 
Spain, maintain the threat of invasion of the United Kingdom, send 
substantial reinforcements to North Africa, and attack in the Balkans. At 
the same time, he noted, Churchill said that the trouble with the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee was that it always presented the sum total of its fears.45 
The Prime Minister saw it that way because it spent half its time shooting 
down his more ill-conceived schemes. 
The big issue of the day was really the Greek shopping list, part of 
which was cabled by the military attache in Athens, while a full copy was 
sent to London by air from Cairo. Basically what the Greeks needed was 
artillery-pack, mechanized, and AlA. They needed 100,000 boots, 
helmets, 150,000 rifles of 7.92 caliber, 70,000 pistols, 1,000 motorcycles 
with sidecars, and a like number of ambulances, tires and tubes, bin-
oculars, 60 fighter aircraft, 24 Blenheims, spares for the Fairey Battles 
already delivered, parachutes, petrol and lubricants, and medical sup-
plies and beds for a 5,000-bed hospital. The navy needed mainly ammuni-
tion in a variety of calibers. 46 
The War Cabinet agreed to the Greek requests for guns, aircraft and 
supplies that could come from the United States, but at the same time the 
Prime Minister insisted that Greece be given more British help by land 
and air. So two more Blenheim squadrons and two Gladiator squadrons 
were ordered to be sent, even though this left the Middle East dan-
gerously weak. Churchill said that Britain could back out by explaining 
that the 1939 guarantee had been Anglo-French, and that all the plans had 
been in General Weygand's hands, but that public opinion would not be 
satisfied by this sort of subterfuge; in addition Britain would lose the 
Turkish alliance if her help to Greece was on a smaller scale than had been 
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proposed. And he claimed that Britain had just as great a strategic interest 
in keeping the Italians out of Athens as out of Khartoum. It was a political 
argument. 47 
While it can be argued that the duty of leaders is to lead, it can also be 
held that they must be responsible and measure ends against means. A 
frequent failing of administrators and politicians is that they want to take a 
shortcut and pull off one great coup. Churchill was always desperate to do 
that, and in this case he was jumping the gun because he disliked and 
distrusted Wavell and Longmore. They were both rational, systematic 
officers, insistent on remedying the deficiencies in their commands for 
which he was partly responsible. Having to operate at the disadvantage of 
using signals rather than holding face-to-face meetings, neither Wavell 
nor Longmore could handle Churchill in the emotional way that was, in 
his case, most effective. Nor would either of them have been capable of 
doing so. 
As Sir John Dill left Chequers after spending the evening with 
Churchill, Winston said to him, "Don't forget, the maximum possible for 
Greece!" Churchill's maxim for decades had been "Neglect no means," 
but now, as Martin Gilbert commented in his 1983 biography, the means 
were too few. 48 Dill went back to the Chiefs of Staff conference and was no 
help to Wavell there either. He opposed sending an expeditionary force to 
Greece, arguing instead for securing Crete as a naval and air base. An 
appreciation was sought from the joint planners, but this was not available 
until Monday the fourth. 
But 2 November was still one of the turning-point days when the 
policy of nonintervention other than at Suda Bay was being changed into 
all aid short of troops. That evening the Air Ministry asked the British air 
attache in Athens to supply information immediately on what airfields 
would be available for four to five RAF squadrons, and what facilities they 
would have. 
3 November 1940 
Eden reminded London that extensive discussions that morning in Cairo 
had reaffirmed the principles laid down in numerous Foreign Office 
telegrams to Athens, especially in No. 651 of 22 September that "any 
assistance that we may be able to give to Greece cannot be given until the 
German-Italian threat to Egypt is finally liquidated, the security of Egypt 
being vital to our strategy and incidentally to the future of Greece." And 
he went on later in the same message, "The security of Egypt is the most 
urgent commitment, and must take precedence of attempts to prevent 
Greece being overrun. It is also essential if we are to retain the support of 
Turkey." And in view of the fact that all that had been sent was one 
battalion to Crete and one squadron to Greece, would London please stop 
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the BBC and Reuters from giving the misleading impression that more 
was being done, so as "not to raise hopes which cannot be realized."49 
Later the same day Eden sent another signal summing up some items 
about aid to Greece not contained in his first telegram. These included the 
well-taken points that the things the Greeks were most likely to need were 
exactly those things the British themselves were so short of at this time-
NA guns, antitank guns, and rifles. Moreover, the British had but one 
spare trained brigade, and to send it would deprive the Western Desert 
Force of its only reserve, while the brigade could not reach the front in 
Greece for three weeks. Convoys due from Britain would contain only 
two regiments of artillery immediately available for the field, and the N A 
regiments which had arrived were lacking equipment. So the British 
should adhere to their position and strengthen the units in Egypt rather 
than help the Greeks. 
Sunday the third was not a happy day at the top. Eden in Cairo was 
irked that Churchill, having opposed sending reinforcements to the Mid-
dle East, was now insisting that Greece was more important than Khar-
toum and Kenya. "The weakness of our policy is that we never adhere to 
the plans we make," Eden grumbled to his diary. If Britain had thought to 
aid Greece, plans should have been made long ago, but the deliberate 
decision had been taken not to send aid, "so high sounding phrases only 
make matters worse. "so The trouble that day lay in the fact that the ever-
bellicose Churchill failed to understand that Eden and Wavell were for 
assuming the offensive, but, since Wavell was going to have to use 
deception, he wanted to be extremely secretive and he did not wish to 
send signals about his plans in case they were intercepted in the ether or 
in Cairo. Eden had all the information necessary to convince Churchill, 
but the Prime Minister would not let him fly home to deliver it. And so 
Churchill assumed that Wavell was yet" another cautious general. "51 
In London, the Chiefs of Staff agreed to send three RAF squadrons 
and N A artillery from the Middle East, which would be replaced with 34 
Hurricanes and 32 Wellingtons from home, in a policy of "all aid to 
Greece." 
The RAF was finally able to move to Greece on this rainy Sunday 
because of the arrival of a British tanker in the Piraeus with aviation fuel. 
Eight Blenheim fighters of No. 30 Squadron and 4 Bombay transports of 
No. 216 Squadron left Egypt in the morning; 6 Blenheim bombers fol-
lowed on the fifth. They landed at Eleusis airfield to the west of Athens, 
not far from the famous ancient naval battlefield of Salamis. Wing-Com-
mander Willetts, who went with them, soon reported that the Greek air 
force was badly in need of direction and would welcome RAF advice, 
especially since those Royal Hellenic Air Force officers who had trained 
abroad had done so in England. He also reported that the 11 new 
Blenheim IV's in the RHAF were grounded because of a lack of spares. So 
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Longmore signaled London later in the day that he proposed to send Air 
Commodore John 0' Albiac to be temporary air officer commanding 
(AOC) and adviser to the Greek general staff, if the secreatary of state for 
air approved. 52 
In London Col. Raymond E. Lee, the American military attache, met 
the permanent secretary of the War Office, Sir James Grigg, at Lady 
Astor's house, Clivenden, and told him that Britain had a great opportuni-
ty to seize a string of bases in the Mediterranean and that he hoped that 
they would hold Crete strongly. 53 In the Foreign Office someone wrote on 
a minute on taking over Crete that it was a pity the British had not gotten 
in before Italy attacked, "but the Greek government learned nothing from 
the fate of Norway, Belgium and Holland, and were not ready to grant us 
the necessary facilities."54 
Churchill's biographer wrote that at Chequers that Sunday Churchill 
lay in his four-poster bed with the flowered chintz hangings, chewing his 
cigar and dictating to his faithful typist, Kathleen Hill. He rapped out the 
precise phrases of a telegram to Eden, while sipping iced soda water and 
wiggling his toes under the covers. 55 
4 November 1940 
On Monday the Foreign Office told Palairet to start marking his military 
attache's telegrams "Immediate," as they had been delayed by lack of any 
priority. Palairet told the Foreign Office that the Italian minister had 
finally left with 190 Italians and 65 Germans including secret-service 
agents. 56 The service attaches in Athens reported that the Greek con-
centration would be complete in about ten days, but that even so the 
Greeks would be inferior to the Italians; they continued to press for air 
attacks on Italian communications: the sooner more aircraft could reach 
Greece, the greater would be their impact. In Cairo, however, Wavell was 
alarmed that Metaxas wished to withdraw the garrison in Crete, now that 
the British were there; he reluctantly concurred, even though it once more 
stretched his resources. 
In London the Joint Planning Staff reported to the COS that it would 
be a mistake to move forces to Greece, as it would hazard the position in 
the Middle East, but that Crete should be secured. This position the COS 
Committee endorsed the next day. As D. M. Davin, the New Zealand 
official historian, notes, "The point is an important one. For if this line of 
action had been adhered to in the circumstances later to develop, the focus 
of British attention would have been Crete, and the troops sent to Greece 
might have been sent instead to Crete with consequences that can now 
only be the subject of conjecture."57 
The War Cabinet approved the recommendations of the Chiefs of 
Staff only to have the Prime Minister skew their plan: Churchill declared 
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that "the loss of Athens would be as serious a blow to us as the loss of 
Khartoum, and a more irreparable one." He then went on to aver that the 
British public was most anxious for intervention in Greece, as it felt that 
Britain could not welch on another guarantee. The War Cabinet respond-
ed to this sentiment, and to Lord Halifax's report of the Greek ambas-
sador's request for arms and the use of the British Purchasing 
Commission in Washington, by steadily increasing the British commit-
ment. 58 
After the War Cabinet meeting on the fourth, the Chiefs of Staff 
signaled the C-in-C's in Cairo their plan, beginning, "It has been decided 
that it is necessary to give Greece the greatest possible material and moral 
support at the earliest possible moment. Impossible for anything from the 
United Kingdom to arrive in time. Consequently only course is to draw 
upon resources in Egypt and to replace them from the United Kingdom as 
quickly as possible." 
The COS then went on to spell out what should be sent to Greece, 
noting that 34 Hurricanes were being sent on the aircraft carrier HMS 
Furious to Takoradi, to be flown across Africa to Egypt, while their ground 
crews would be sent on a fast convoy through the Mediterranean, due to 
arrive about 2 December. In addition 34 Wellingtons were being flown out 
via Malta, with their ground crews also to be in the same convoy. The COS 
concluded, "It is fully appreciated that this plan will leave Egypt very thin 
for a period. Every endeavour is being made to make this period as short 
as possible."59 Eden responded unenthusiastically to this telegram the 
next day that "these risks must be faced in view of the political commit-
ments to aid Greece."60 
Longmore was ordered to send to Greece as soon as possible, once 
defended airfields were available, BARBARITY FORCE, five RAF squad-
rons. This was in addition to No. 30 Blenheim squadron, which had just 
arrived in Greece. These actions, the Cabinet hoped, would encourage 
Turkey to offer help.61 How naive the Cabinet was to think that one 
squadron was going to make realists like the Turks risk their national 
independence in such a confused situation! But in London Cadogan, at 
least, wrote "Thank Heavens we are doing all we can in the air for 
Greece. "62" All" was not much. The CIGS said 22 antitank rifles had been 
sent from Egypt and he might be able to find 50 more.63 
And, at last released, the secretary of state for war reported that after 
flying to Malta and Gibraltar he would arrive at Plymouth at 0900 on the 
eighth. 64 
The one piece of good news that London sent out was a signal to 
Longmore saying that the appointment of D'Albiac was approved and 
"Sending you earliest possible opportunity Air Officer to act as second in 
command to yourself. "65 
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Guy Fawkes Day, 5 November 1940 
Among a number of signals from Athens was one reporting that the 
minister of war was delighted with the antitank rifles that had been flown 
in from the Middle East on the second; on the Epirus front they had been 
used on 4 November to destroy nine Italian tanks. Now the Greeks could 
use at least another hundred on that front alone. Gambier-Parry added 
that he had seen Metaxas and Papagos late the day before to establish a 
close working relationship well beyond what the military attache could 
achieve: they would discuss future intentions and reactions to current 
events. He also noted that Metaxas had reserved "the right to assume the 
supreme direction of operations. "66 
In another signal Jasper Blunt, the military attache, reported that 
General Papagos was "not a popular figure, but commanded respect 
owing to his quiet confident manner and sound common sense. Greek 
staff impress with their complete absence of excitement .... Majority of 
public transport commandeered. Complete black-out and curfew im-
posed for foreigners. All Italians arrested and some fifth column Ger-
mans but latter mostly free owing to undefined German position .... All 
are convinced that we are sending aircraft and arms, and, from aspect of 
morale, swing of public opinion ... if we are found not to have done so 
will be [violent?]." 
Blunt added that the BBC's assertion of British air superiority every-
where in the wake of the Battle of Britain did not help matters. British aid 
in Crete was considered by the Greeks to be "ineffective self-help" and the 
last bombing of the Dodecanese a waste of effort better employed against 
troop concentrations in Albania.67 
Later in the afternoon the Admiralty said that the C-in-C's of the 
Mediterranean and East Indies could decide between them if the 36 
magnetic mines at Aden could be used. Further supplies were being 
shipped.68 In the meantime a slow convoy filled with fuel, coal, and RAF 
stores had left for the Piraeus, and the next day a fast one had come up the 
Suez Canal and left for Suda Bay and Malta carrying guns, troops and 
fuel. 
In Cairo this Guy Fawkes Day 0' Albiac received his orders from 
Drummond, the senior Air Staff officer, to proceed to Athens and relieve 
Wing-Commander Willetts as AOC, British Air Forces in Greece: 
You will have the status of an independent Air Force Com-
mander but although not under the control of the Greek general 
staff, the conduct of air operations by the R.A.E should, as far, as 
practicable ... conform as closely as possible to the Greek plan 
for the defence of the country .... 
The fighters are being provided for the defence of your aero-
dromes and vulnerable ... rear area. The attack of ... enemy 
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lines of communication and . . . rear areas appear to be suitable 
tasks for the Blenheim bombers. You are not to allow the bombers 
to be used as artillery or to participate in the actual land opera-
tions unless the military situation becomes so critical as to justify 
the temporary diversion of our bombers from strategic bombing 
to support the Greek land forces .... Appropriate objectives for 
the Wellington bombers are points of disembarkation and con-
centration areas on the Albanian coast. . . . 
Bombing is to be confined to military objectives and must be 
subjected to the following general principles: (a) Intentional bom-
bardment of civil populatin as such is illegal. (b) It must be 
possible to identify the objective. (c) The attack must be maade 
with reasonable care to avoid undue loss of civil life in the vicinity 
of the target. (d) The Provisions of the Red Cross Convention are 
to be observed. 
29 
And after sundry instructions about not attacking Rome and coordi-
nating operations with the AOC-in-C ME, "You are empowered to refuse 
to undertake any operation which, in your opinion, would jeopardize the 
security of the air forces under your command. In such an event you are to 
report the circumstances direct to this Headquarters." 
He was also to inform the AOC-in-C of important discussions with 
the Greek general staff and to keep the British military mission in Athens 
informed, for "the possibility of a sudden and complete collapse of 
Greece must not be lost sight of when making your decisions on the 
location of the squadrons." If time did not allow for consultation with the 
AOC-in-C, he was to use his discretion as to the appropriate moment to 
evacuate the RAF from Greece. 69 
Meanwhile the AOC-in-C had reported to London that he was send-
ing 0' Albiac (with his wife) to Athens and requested that the Air Ministry 
"deal entirely with this HQ in all that concerns RAF matters in Athens 
otherwise grave danger of three-cornered interchange of signals resulting 
in complete confusion." As a staff was being improvised from Middle East 
Command personnel that Longmore expected Portal to replace, the AOC-
in-C understandably later complained that one thing that was wrong with 
the RAF at this time was its lack of trained staff officers for just such 
emergencies. Further, despite explanations by the chief of the Air Staff 
about serviceability, spares, hours flown, type of operations, and the like, 
London still tended to make grandiose schemes based upon paper fig-
ures which included all training and communications aircraft in the whole 
command. 70 Longmore, who had been commandant of the Imperial 
Defence College in 1939, was well aware of the political and other aspects 
of the problem, but, nevertheless, he had every right as the AOC-in-C to 
object when his fighter force was reduced by 30 percent and his bomber 
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force by 50 percent at a time when aircraft deliveries were well behind 
schedule. Yet just before Eden left for England, Wavell, Longmore, and 
Eden had agreed that more aircraft would have to go to Greece for political 
reasons. 71 
Back in London the Chiefs of Staff completed their study of the 
possibilities of German intervention in Greece, seeing the Italian attack as 
a diversion to draw the British away from Egypt and agreeing that the 
Greeks might hold up against an Italian attack, but not against a German 
one. Nor would any forces which Britain could send delay the Germans; 
and the Turks were not likely to help. Furthermore, it would be a mistake 
to divert forces from Egypt and tie them up in Greece, so help should 
remain restricted to sea, air, and technical aid. 72 
Others in London were fretting over the list of supplies the Greeks 
wanted and trying to see if the British Purchasing Commission in Wash-
ington could obtain most of them. But these requests raised the whole 
problem of Allied needs, and so a reduced Foreign Requirements Com-
mittee was established to handle them. And it had a not uncommon 
problem of its own: "As for the possibility of Greece getting war material 
in the U.S.A., it is not clear from the minutes of yesterday'S War Cabinet 
meeting exactly what our policy is to be. The North American Supplies 
Committee are finding out from the Minister without Portfolio (Mr. 
Greenwood) what was decided." It was intended that the small committee 
should be chaired by the Third Sea Lord, but, as it "never materialized," a 
new committee was established under the ubiquitous Lord Hankey, long-
time secretry of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and it met at last on 
the eighth. 73 
On that Tuesday evening of Guy Fawkes Day Churchill told the 
House of Commons that so carefully had Britain respected Greece's 
neutrality that the United Kingdom did not even know Greek disposi-
tions or intentions. And it might be added that no one in British service 
seemed to know much about modern Greece at all. 
6 November 1940 
On arrival in Athens 0' Albiac reported that it was expected to take three 
weeks to mobilize the Greek army and get it into position to make the 
country generally safe from the Italians. During this period, since the 
Greek road and rail network was so limited and many reservists had still 
to come from the islands, the Italian air force should have been able to 
play havoc, if properly handled, which it was not. The Greek air force had 
done well with limited numbers. Its pilots were keen, but with mostly 
French and Polish aircraft and limited spares, they suffered from an 
abnormally high rate of unserviceability. In addition the general staff used 
the air force solely for a tactical role, never to achieve air superiority, with 
28 October 1940 - 29 January 1941 31 
the result that they soon suffered heavy casualties. D' Albiac had at once 
had a conference with the Greek prime minister and the commander-in-
chief which resulted in a long-drawn-out argument over the proper 
employment of air forces, ending with agreement that the RAF bomber 
force should be employed against ports of disembarkation and centers of 
concentration behind the Italian lines. The big problem was still that 
Greece had no all-weather airfields, and there were few areas on the 
mainland in which fields large enough for modern aircraft could be 
constructed. 74 
In Cairo orders were issued for one flight of No. 84 Squadron of 
Blenheims to join No. 30 at Eleusis. Evidently Cairo had now learned that 
Greece was not as balmy as Egypt, for the airmen were kitted up to six 
blankets apiece and blue uniforms. In addition every airman was to carry 
a rifle with ammunition, and every officer a pistol. 75 
On his way home on 6 November Eden telegraphed from Malta that 
the more he thought about it, the more dangerous it was to withdraw one 
of the three fighter squadrons in the Western Desert, as "a third of our 
fighter forces is a very drastic cut, and, unless we can improve upon 
present plans, cannot be replaced for some weeks." And he added that 
Wellingtons were no use for daylight work and so were not half as good to 
the theater as were Blenheims, more of which were urgently needed 
along with four-gun Martin fighters, then known to be in the United 
Kingdom and which could be flown out. 76 
On the sixth little else happened. Wavell proposed to use New 
Zealanders on Crete. This was seconded by Freyberg but dropped when 
the government in Auckland opposed it on the grounds that one brigade 
of the New Zealand Division was still in the United Kingdom.77 S/Ldr. 
T.H. Wisdom arrived in Athens by Sunderland flying boat, checked in at 
the King George hotel next to the Grande Bretagne on Syntgama Square, 
and then sought out RAF headquarters. When he got back to his room his 
baggage had been gone through most carefully, as had that of all the 
others in his party. He also noted that soldiers leaving for the front were so 
ill equipped that people in the crowds along the streets were taking off 
their socks and shoes and giving them to the troops. 78 
In London the War Office was telling the Foreign Office that it had at 
last been able to look at the list the Greeks had sent and was shipping out 
50 antitank rifles and 5,000 rounds of ammunition by air, together with 
some telephone cable. The Greek minister told Cadogan that the 
Yugoslavs were concentrating tanks near Monastir apparently with the 
intention of making it clear to the Italians that any drive for Salonika, 
which contained a Yugoslav free port, would be opposed. And the Air 
Ministry signaled Longmore that it was pleased that he was going to use 
Wellingtons from Greece, but hoped that they would be available again 
for Libyan targets if needed. The Air Ministry also noted that it was 
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passing control of the Wellingtons based in Malta over to the Middle East. 
Bombers in Greece, the Air Staff said, should be used against targets 
agreed on with the Greek general staff; as for the fighters in Crete, 
Heraklion was too far from Suda Bay for effective defense, so the fighters 
were better employed in Greece. Since he could not spare another squad-
ron for Crete, Longmore should leave it unguarded but press on with the 
development of airfields and facilities to allow operations there if re-
quired. 79 
Other British officials were meeting in the War Cabinet offices in 
Richmond Terrace, across Whitehall from Downing Street, to decide 
whether or not the Greeks should be allowed to have the £5 million credit 
that Britain had given them in dollars so that they could buy some sixty 
aircraft in the United States. The Foreign Office view was that the Greeks 
would not be able to use the aircraft if they could get them, so it would be 
better to see that the RAF got them (though, in fact, at the time the RAF 
was shorter of trained pilots than the Greeks were). The matter was finally 
resolved on the eighth by the Greek Requirements Committee, which 
decided that Greece had plenty of dollars and that "there was no need 
whatever for the time being to consider granting her a dollar credit. "80 
In the meantime a much more volcanic row had been building in the 
Prime Minister's own realm. He was demanding to know how the army, 
naval, and air intelligence services were organized and who was in 
charge. The basic problem was that the Joint Intelligence Committee (the 
JIC) was loaded with many administrative as well as interpretive respon-
sibilities, and with the sifting of materials which properly should have 
been handled by the service departments. 81 This meant, because of the 
abrupt way in which war in the twentieth century expanded across the 
face of the earth, that senior people were apt to ask embarrassing ques-
tions about little-known places which suddenly came into prominence. A 
6 November minute from Churchill illustrates the dilemma: "It was a 
disappointment to me to learn yesterday that the Air Ministry knew 
nothing about airfields in Crete. It seems that there should be a close 
investigation of our Air Force dispositions in the whole of the Middle East, 
for it is probable that inquiry will disclose a similar lack of information in 
other directions." 
A week later Churchill exploded that he was receiving too many 
intelligence summaries, most of which contained no more than he had 
already read in Foreign Office and individual service directorates sum-
maries and telegrams. It appeared that more than a year after Britain 
declared war the Higher Direction was still trying to get geared up. (It was 
not running smoothly until 1943.) Unfortunately, in democracies at least, 
it seems that by the time the apparatus is working well the war is running 
down. In many ways the Greek campaign of 1940-1941 came at the wrong 
end of the war. 
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7 - 12 November 1940 
On the seventh, Thursday, a large supply convoy reached Greece with 
RAF ground crews and equipment; Squadron Leader Wisdom felt that 
German and Vichy French spies were a real nuisance; Cable & Wireless 
reported that all lines east of Athens in the Balkans were out; and in 
London Major-General Heywood was appointed head of No. 27 Military 
Mission in Athens and was told, "You will not commit His Majesty's 
Government even by implication to the provision of any such 
requirements as may be referred to you by the Greek Government. Nor 
will you encourage any expectation of specific support without prior 
sanction in order that false hopes may not be raised. "82 The policy, he was 
told, was to sustain Greek resistance without committing forces to Greece 
which were vital elsewhere. The BARBARITY force was to be made 
expandable to take two divisions, but on no account were the Greeks to be 
told this. 
From Athens Gambier-Parry told Wavell that the king and Metaxas 
stressed the urgency of getting the six Greek battalions out of Crete and 
up to the Epirus front. Vice-Admiral H.D. Pridham-Wippell, second in 
command of the Mediterranean Fleet, was in Athens with HMS Orion, 
and he agreed with the others that the danger to Crete was not as great as 
the danger to Greece, and that if Greece went, Crete was useless. Gam-
bier-Parry added that if the reinforcements for the Epirus were late, 
naturally the British would get the blame. The War Office at the same time 
was telling Wavell that "it is considered indispensible that further rein-
forcements be sent to Crete." To enable him to form a Cretan force, as 
suggested by the military mission, 20,000 rifles were being sent out. And 
the War Office told the military mission to inform Papagos that they fully 
understood his difficulties; they could not possibly object to his taking the 
six battalions, but would he please leave the twelve guns behind until the 
British could find replacements for them.83 
The COS representative in Athens signaled Wavell that, in answer to a 
question on how Greece might employ a British military force if one were 
sent, the Greek prime minister replied that it was too early to tell. Metaxas 
was not as cheerful as he had been, because Italian air activity had 
increased; he stressed again the need for air support. 84 
However good his intentions, Gambier-Parry's signal sent palpita-
tions of fear through certain quarters on the British side, and he was 
forced to send a long explanatory telegram about the hypothetical ques-
tion that he had asked. Metaxas, he noted, was "a man with whom the 
utmost frankness is not only possible but desirable and will in no way be 
abused." Relations with all three Greek leaders were most cordial and 
lacking in suspicion. As Gambier-Parry saw it, the straws in the wind 
seemed to indicate that the wind was blowing in the direction of the 
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dispatch of a British force to Greece. If this was so, then the commander-
designate and the staff should be sent to Athens at the earliest possible 
moment. The terrain on and beyond the Albanian frontier was difficult, 
and the climate severe, and a British force would encounter both tactical 
and administrative problems. The country closely resembled the North-
west Frontier of India; he recommended that any force dispatched should 
have a high proportion of Indian and British forces "thoroughly experi-
enced in mountain warfare." Moreover weather conditions were such in 
winter that the question of acclimatization needed to be seriously consid-
ered. 
But London was not to be placated and on 9 November the War Office 
sent a sharply worded signal: "You are entirely wrong in supposing that 
wind is blowing in the direction of possible despatch of British Military 
Force to Greek Mainland and you are expressly forbidden by any word or 
suggestion of yours to imply that such a course is contemplated." 
And so on the eleventh a contrite Gambier-Parry replied, "Much 
regret both my misinterpretation of the direction of the wind and my 
importunity resulting therefrom. Your expressed instructions are thor-
oughly understood and appreciated and I can only assure you that no 
harm has been done. "85 
But that apology crossed another signal from the War Office wanting 
to know if it was true that the head of the military mission had revealed to 
the press that the British squadrons in Greece would soon be followed by 
troops. Had he given an interview to the press? He was to leave that to the 
press attache. He was in future neither to grant interviews nor to say 
anything at all regarding contemplated British action, hypothetical or 
otherwise. 86 
Poor Gambier-Parry was generally unlucky. After a spell in command 
of Crete, he returned to the Western Desert only to be captured by 
Rommel in the April 1941 retreat. He spent the rest of the war in an Italian 
prisoner-of-war castle. 
Crete was another sensitive issue. The broad lines of policy had been 
laid down in discussions in early November, and it was eventually agreed 
that Suda Bay should become "a second Scapa Flow," which meant 
sending a mobile naval base team, consisting of 8,800 men with 72 
antiaircraft guns and 10 to 15 coastal defense guns. 87 (Whether or not this 
organization actually was to be sent was still under discussion in April 
1941, when Greece and then Crete fell.) 
Again raised was the question of employing Australian and New 
Zealand troops. This had been discussed in September 1940, and leaders 
of the two Dominions had stipulated that the troops were to be used if 
properly equipped, and provided that such activity did not prevent their 
serving in their own divisions commanded by a Dominions officer. 88 
The South Africans were not to be employed outside of Africa at this 
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time. When consulted on the matter of aid to Greece, Prime Minister 
Smuts had in early November indicated that northwest Greece would 
after mid-November be an impassible swamp, but that the Cretans were 
the best fighters in the Greek army. Queried as to the source of this 
strange-to London-opinion, Smuts (who had been a member of Lloyd 
George's War Cabinet in 1917 and was instrumental in creating the RAF) 
replied that it came from Professor Arthur Wellesley Falconer, formerly 
the assistant consulting physician to the British Salonika forces 
(1916-1918) and then principal and vice-chancellor of Cape Town Univer-
sity.89 
In London there was another wide-ranging discussion of sending 
more air support to Greece, in which questions like the following were 
asked: Why did not the Greeks spend their dollars for aircraft? How many 
aircraft could they get for eight million dollars? Why not take over the air 
defense of Greece (and get blamed for the failures)? As this was a matter of 
supply, should not the Ministry of Aircraft Production be consulted? And 
would it really make much difference, because the Greeks did not have 
the trained personnel and so the wastage would be so high as not to be 
worth it?90 
At the War Cabinet meeting on 7 November concern was expressed 
that Germans were still running around loose in Crete, since Greece was 
not at war with Germany. The Prime Minister suggested that they be 
disposed of by an accident, to which the very proper Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Halifax, replied that thirty-five" accidents" would hardly look acci-
dental!91 
At this time the Greek government was asked by Lord Halifax to send 
a representative to the meeting of Dominion and Allied governments in 
London. But as the Greeks were the only ally fighting on their own soil 
under their own government still in their own capital city, they declined 
to do more than ask their minister in London, Simopoulos, to be present 
as an observer. 92 
To Metaxas' relief, at last it began to rain on 8 November, and Athens 
was hidden under clouds until the twelfth. Bombing was thus less like-
ly.93 
Middle East Command signaled the Air Ministry that it would start 
forwarding at noon daily an operational summary from Greece which 
would show the situation up to six 0' clock the previous evening; the first 
of these reports gave the situation to eight o'clock on the morning of 8 
November. This showed 15 Blenheims at Eleusis, 6 Wellingtons on the 
way in daylight for night operations, one flight of Blenheims warned to 
proceed from Egypt to Athens, and two squadrons withdrawn from the 
Desert to prepare to move. 94 
Eden himself got back to London on Friday, went to the War Office 
and saw Dill in his room overlooking Whitehall with the red London 
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buses trundling by, and then went across to the War Rooms underneath 
the Foreign Office and saw Churchill. Winston gave him an affectionate 
greeting and was soon purring like a kitten as Eden at last could unfold 
the details of Wavell's bold plan for an offensive against the Italians early 
in December. After having spent the previous day approving all sorts of 
complicated plans to deny anything useful in the Middle East to the 
Germans and Italians (including ranging as far afield as Vichy-French 
Syria and the destruction of the oilfields in Iraq) as well as help for Greece, 
all Churchill could say when Eden laid out Wavell's plans was that he had 
wished that he had known earlier. Though Churchill later wrote that no 
harm had been done, nevertheless, as Parkinson notes, it had. There was 
in fact a very serious danger that Middle East Command had been 
saddled with more than it could handle with increasingly thin resources. 
In line with Wavell's desire for extreme secrecy for his forthCOming 
COMPASS offensive, only a very few people heard Eden's exposition of 
the plan; not even the War Cabinet knew about it until the troops actually 
attacked.95 
It was hard for London to comprehend that although Greece was a 
European country and a founder of Western Civilization, it was in 1940 a 
relatively underdeveloped nation. For instance, the communications sys-
tem was divided between the Hellenic Telephone Company, which 
owned the system in the towns, and the government TTT ministry, which 
controlled the landlines between them. While there was plenty of skilled 
manpower, there was a great shortage of equipment and wire, and all the 
exchanges were still manual. There were only fourteen teleprinters in the 
country, of which four were in Macedonia. There was a government 
point-to-point wireless system, but the Germans had a large part in it and 
most of the engineers in the telephone system were Germans. The Greeks 
were willing to help, and the telephones so far needed by the British had 
been installed; but at this time the RAF was manning only the airfields at 
Eleusis and Tatoi (a field later called Menidi, taking the name of a nearby 
village rather than that of the sylvan royal palace in the hills), and so the 
connections to Athens had not been difficult. As the RAF's signals opera-
tion was so efficient, it was recommended that the army signals units be 
placed under the chief RAF signals officer. 96 
Saturday the ninth started with what would be the routine signal 
summarizing operations in Greece. While more aircraft had arrived, two 
of the six Wellingtons dispatched to bomb Valona had not returned from 
that raid. Better news came to the Foreign Office from that old Etonion Sir 
Ronald Ian Campbell in Belgrade, who reported most confidentially that 
he had had a talk with Dr. M. Tupanjarin, the Serbian Peasant Party leader 
in British pay, who had talked on the fifth with Prince Paul. The situation 
appeared to be that Yugoslavia would join Greece if either Bulgaria herself 
or Germany via Bulgaria attacked Greece, or if there were a serious threat 
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to Salonika, and that Yugoslavia would refuse passage to German troops 
going to Greece. Whether or not the Yugoslavs would fight rather de-
pended upon the amount of help Britain gave Greece, and "in this respect 
the strategical and psychological presence of Salonika is very great. The 
whole Serb nation," Campbell continued, "remembered Salonika as the 
base from which Serbia was reconquered. The Bulgarians equally remem-
bered it as the base from which they were defeated. Thus while the 
landing of a large force may now be out of the question, even the presence 
of a few officers and men would have an incalculable effect on Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria. Naval support is vague and removed to the Serbs who are a 
nation of soldiers. "97 
Early on 10 November Prime Minister Metaxas apparently suffered a 
heart attack which was complicated by diabetes, for which insulin was 
flown in from abroad.98 The next day the Air Ministry suggested to 
Longmore that it was up to him how much he told the king about 
supporting operations from Malta. 99 What was not said was how to tell 
the king that the air force which had only just won the Battle of Britain was 
so powerless. That night Longmore must especially have rejoiced when a 
dozen Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers struck the Italian fleet a severe 
blow at Taranto, a station Longmore had commanded at the end of the 
First World War. 
On 12 November Professor EA. Lindemann, Churchill's one-man 
research department, informed the Prime Minister that the United King-
dom could supply only 1 percent of the supplies Greece needed, "if 
indeed, we are ready to send anything." He then listed what might be 
made available. Churchill had this memo typed up, signed it, and sent it 
to the Chiefs of Staff, who then found some material including 20 Hur-
ricanes at Malta for Greece. The Prime Minister vetoed the Hurricanes 
and ordered them to Egypt. 100 
13 - 23 November 1940 
During these weeks Wavell's plans for Africa were explained to the 
Cabinet by Eden, the one politician with whom the taciturn Wavell could 
talk, and the air situation was constantly discussed. Churchill authorized 
sending Hurricanes to the Middle East to free Gladiators for Greece, an 
action to which Lord Beaverbrook vigorously objected. (Beaverbrook was 
overruled.)101 But Churchill did not help matters by cabling Longmore on 
the thirteenth that he was astonished at how few fit modern machines he 
had operational from the vast numbers in his command, and demanding 
he report on steps being taken to remedy this and on the daily arrival of 
new aircraft. (A glance at what had happened to the Royal Hellenic Air 
Force in combat would have indicated the difficulties, as the RAF was to 
learn the next April: on 2 November the RHAF had 8 Blenheims and 8 
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Battles, and five squadrons of fighters of 6 to 8 serviceable aircraft each. By 
15 November these had been reduced to 6 serviceable fighters.)102 Lon-
don tended to overestimate Longmore's strength by counting training 
aircraft in his command as operational aircraft. 
A serious problem, both in the United Kingdom and abroad, was the 
lack of a repair organization in the RAE This had almost led to disaster in 
the Battle of Britain. Damaged aircraft had accumulated until Lord Beaver-
brook created a repair organization and forced the service to abandon 
peacetime acceptance standards: by October 1940 the number of aircraft 
being returned to service had begun to rise. But a similar organization was 
not created in the Middle East until mid-1941. Moreover, recovery of 
damaged aircraft was a much more serious problem than in Britain. 
In Greece 0' Albiac made a tour of potential airfield sites and urged 
that all-weather runways be constructed at Araxos and Agrinion. (Because 
of limited resources and shortage of labor, Araxos had not been com-
pleted in April 1941 when British engineers were forced to blow it up to 
prevent its use by the Germans.) 
On 14 November the inter service mission, more correctly known as 
No. 27 Military Mission, was formally established under Rear-Admiral 
C.E. Turle.103 He was told, among other things, 
Our policy in supporting Greece is based upon the hope that 
Greece will continue to resist the Italian attack, and upon the 
assumption that the Germans will not intervene against Greece in 
the near future. In present conditions it is not possible to issue 
instructions covering the eventuality of a German attack which 
would radically alter the military situation in Greece .... 
The object is to secure a firm foothold in Greece, when 
adequate forces have arrived in the Middle East in order to extend 
and intensify our offensive action against Italy, and possibly 
eventually to take effective action against the Roumanian oilfields 
and communications with Germany. 
Turle's instructions went on to deal with the possibility of Greek 
withdrawals and demolitions and suggested holding, if possible, the line 
Naupaktos/Lamia, and if that fell to hold the lower mainland, the islands, 
and Crete. British forces in Greece were to conform in their movements to 
those of the Greeks, but if the latter collapsed, they were to be withdrawn 
to the Middle East. And, "In the event of German or Bulgarian attack, you 
will receive further instructions." 
O'Albiac's position in Athens was one of some embarrassment and 
some power. In mid-November he was forced to have a showdown with 
Sir Michael Palairet and point out to him that his constant appeals to 
London for air power were awkward for all concerned. Sir Michael was 
persuaded that in the future all such messages should be sent through the 
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AOC, British Air Forces Greece. In addition D'Albiac pointed out that it 
was not much good asking for more support until there were airfields 
from which the aircraft could operate. 104 
In an attempt to resolve some of the tensions developing between the 
Air Ministry in London and the AOC-in-C ME and his staff in Cairo, 
Portal suggested that Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, the 
Inspector- General, make a six- to eight-weeks' tour of the Middle East 
starting in January. In December Longmore sensibly declined this offer, 
and Portal accepted his claim that, given his small staff and operations on 
four different fronts, it was not the time for interrogations or spit and 
polish, no matter how well meant. 105 
Three more RAF squadrons were dispatched to Greece in four 
cruisers and four merchantmen on the 15 November, some 4,247 men and 
supporting equipment hastily gathered from RAF and army sources. But 
Metaxas told his diary they still came in "drop by drop." 
Further to the north the Yugoslavs were partially mobilized, but 
professed to believe that they would not be attacked. From London King 
George VI responded to a melancholy letter from the Anglophile regent, 
Prince Paul, urging the prince to open negotiations with Greece and 
Turkey and hinting that Britain would in the not too distant future be able 
to supply armies other than her own with arms.106 In Athens Metaxas 
continued to press Palairet for more help, suggesting on the sixteenth 
that, as nothing was happening in Egypt, surely Hurricanes could be sent 
over. Air Ministry intelligence pointed out that the rumors of Luftwaffe 
aid to Italy were contrary to the facts.107 London learned that 0' Albiac 
planned to deploy two Blenheim squadrons at Menidi with the Well-
ingtons based in Egypt rotating through for operations, one Blenheim and 
one Gladiator squadron at Eleusis, three bomber or fighter squadrons at 
Sedes, three at Larissa, one at Drama, and more squadrons further north, 
as more airfields there were inspected and became available. 
Meanwhile early November had seen the genesis of OPERATION 
MANDIBLES, the plan to seize the Italian Dodecanese Islands located off 
the southwest coast of Turkey. These were a double threat to the British 
position, for they provided advanced air bases for attacks on the British 
center in the Middle East and they allowed the interdiction of the supply 
routes to Greece. Unfortunately, too often the subsequent operations 
failed for sending a boy to do a man's job, impelled by the Prime Minis-
ter's demand for action and a lack of a grand-strategic plan with objective 
priorities. As a result the Dodecanese were still in Axis hands when the 
war ended in 1945. 
On 17 November Wavell sent in a "remarkably accurate" (in the 
official historian Playfair's words) appreciation that the Germans were 
massing in southeastern Europe to aid Italy and might attack Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia. Metaxas told the American ambassador, MacVeagh, that if 
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the Italians provoked Yugoslavia, the Germans would come in and 
Greece would be lost. 108 
In Washington the question of fighters for Greece was making its slow 
round of desktops and by mid-November had reached the stage where 
one hundred machines were available for export to Greece. 109 But, in fact, 
Washington never could get organized, in part because of British intrigues 
over aircraft to Greece, and so no machines were shipped before Greece 
was overrun in April 1941.110 
In the meantime London had decided that a second squadron of 
Gladiators might be sent to Greece for close support of Greek troops, and 
that twelve additional aircraft should be turned over to the RHAF if 
suitable forward airfields were available. 111 In summing up this decision 
the next day to the War Cabinet, Churchill added that he did not think that 
the practical difficulties of moving aircraft from one country to another 
were quite realized by the lay mind, and evidently they were not realized 
in Greece. "It should be the business of our Air Attache in Athens to 
acquaint our Minister there with them and thus prevent impossible and 
unreasonable requests being put forward."1l2 (In the same message 
Churchill observed-interestingly enough, in the light of later deci-
sions-that "the assistance which we now proposed to give to Greece 
would mean that our Air Force in Egypt would be greatly depleted and 
might be barely sufficient to cover requirements there should the enemy 
decide to stage an air offensive on that front.") 
People in Athens were cheered on the twentieth by the news that one 
flight of No. 80 Squadron Gladiators had been in action the day before, 
flying from the grass field at Trikkala west of Larissa near the ancient 
monasteries of Meteora; but they were shocked also to learn of King Boris 
of Bulgaria's visit to Berlin. The Foreign Office in Athens took the view 
that Hitler would probably bypass the tough Yugoslavs in favor of an 
approach through Greece's old enemy Bulgaria.1l3 In London Churchill 
was excited about Wavell's plans and had an argument with Eden in a 
Cabinet meeting because the latter tried to stop him from peppering the 
C-in-C with telegrams-which not only contained irritating gratuitous 
advice but also might breach security. At this time Churchill wrote Presi-
dent Roosevelt the fateful letter which stimulated the idea of Lend-Lease, 
a concept whose passage at times affected the course of this Greek 
tragedy. 
On 22 November Longmore flew over to Athens to inspect and to 
consult with Metaxas. At the same time Papagos told Gambier-Parry that 
his 1912 field guns were wearing out and that, while he would welcome 
fully equipped British troops, what he really wanted was equipment so 
that he could raise his own divisions. 1l4 
On Longmore's plane to Athens was Stanley Casson, an old Greek 
hand who had already seen the Greeks fight four wars and only lose the 
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one in Anatolia in 1921-1922. In his later memoirs Casson noted that the 
British knew little about the Greeks, overlooked their spiritual core and 
their history, and admired them in 1940 because they had done so much 
better at resisting than the British, who had had five years' warning that 
war was coming. The Greeks, he wrote, had absorbed all the lessons of 
the victims of Axis attacks. Casson, the chief intelligence officer, was the 
first member of No. 27 Military Mission to reach Athens. When he arrived 
the Greeks had just taken Koritza in Albania, and the crowds in the streets 
of Athens reminded him of those in 1912-1913 when the Greeks took 
Janina from the Turks. But he felt, as did the Greek general staff, that the 
Greek victories would bring in the Germans to save Italy (a decision Hitler 
had in fact made on the eighteenth). The deadly enemy, to anyone like 
Casson familiar with the Balkans, was Bulgaria, which saw the Greek 
advance into Albania drawing the troops further and further away from 
Macedonia and Thrace. According to Casson, the Greeks were still hop-
ing that the Germans would referee a Graeco-Italian peace; for this reason 
they wanted British aid limited. The military mission, therefore, was only 
a token army. Casson concluded that though the Greeks were living in a 
fool's paradise, most really knew what would happen.115 
Casson thought that the Greeks had a very modern mountain army, 
and that the average Greek was a very quick student who could learn how 
to use a new weapon in half the time it took the average Englishman. He 
told Gambier-Parry this at the time, and the latter told Wavell and the War 
Office that he was alarmed at what Casson was reporting to him. It 
appeared that the Greeks felt that after only twenty-five days of war they 
had scored the only Allied victory. Sending officers to instruct them in 
mountain warfare and modern weapons would be a very delicate matter. 
"I am convinced that the slightest signs of patronage or anything savour-
ing of interference now or at any time would be bitterly resented and 
might have the most deplorable result." Gambier-Parry went on to sug-
gest that the whole matter should be thoroughly discussed with his 
successor, Heywood. He added that Palairet agreed and had asked him to 
point out that the presence of a large military mission without troops 
would not be understood by the Greeks. "They would, he feels sure, 
particularly resent our sending people whom they know to be Arch-
eologists and not soldiers."116 
Coincidentally, arriving at the same time was David Hunt, the arch-
eologist and Oxford don who had been plucked out of the card files to be 
the intelligence officer for BARBARITY. His observations on arrival were 
that the Greek army had mostly World War I equipment captured from 
the Austrians, and regimental transport consisting of carts captured from 
the Bulgars in 1912. The strength of the Greek forces was the infantry, 
which could fight on a loaf of bread and a handful of olives a day. Hunt, of 
course, had a lot of do with Stanley Casson, an old friend now, like Hunt, 
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in intelligence. Casson had a bright collection of Greek-speaking young 
officers, some of whom would be left behind as liaison officers during the 
German occupation of 1941-1944. Hunt himself was the only army officer 
assigned to the RAF staff and, because he was the only Greek-speaking 
member of that team, the only one with ready access to the Greek GHQ 
and operations room in the Hotel Grande Bretagne. In Hunt's view 
Papagos had done wonders, but his army could only advance at a foot-
pace. 117 
British Air Forces Greece headquarters was originally on the second 
floor of the Hotel Grande Bretagne, a wonderfullate-nineteenth-century 
edifice which still graces (although with a 1950s facade) one corner of 
Syntgama Square with its glass-roofed lobby and multistory interior 
court. Col. Guy Salisbury-Jones used to look out of his fourth-floor room 
in the morning to see what the weather was and would see General 
Papagos' balding head two floors below doing the same thing. The RAF 
staff liked being housed and fed in the Grande Bretagne and eating at 
Zonar's, but on 24 November D'Albiac moved them out to cheaper quar-
ters in the Marasleon School on Aristomenous Street, on the northeast 
slope of Mount Lycabettus, above Evangelismos Hospital. The new quar-
ters were about an eight-minute walk from the Grande Bretagne. 
Meanwhile the army signals people had discovered that they had 
assigned call signs for BARBARITY which were already in use by the RAF, 
so these had to be changed from XBL and XBA to THE and THB. Other 
problems were the use of "bastard addresses" due to the scarcity of cipher 
staff, and the need to cut down on traffic and hours because of a shortage 
of RAF signals staff. This meant limiting the traffic to Greece to 5,000 
groups daily, and traffic from Greece to 3,000. It also turned out that Cairo 
was not ready to receive messages until 2 December; even then its sig-
nalers had trouble keeping up with the RAF senders in Athens: "Opera-
tors this end are inexperienced." On top of that Cairo pointed out to 
Athens that its set faded off from 2359 to 0600 hours each night on 10,000 
kcs, and suggested a switch for those hours to the SO-meter band. Signals 
continued to be a problem into January, when it was suggested that all 
messages be sent on the WIT links and not by commercial cables, which 
were liable to interruption, expensive, and being used to capacity. Com-
plaints about operators also persisted. On the No. 5 net, the army's 
operators in Cairo were known to be guilty of acknowledging "X" code 
messages in plain language, so the RAF refused to use it.118 
On 22 November Churchill told Wavell that he was disappointed in 
the ambiguity of Wavell's response about the date of COMPASS, and that 
he hoped that Wavell would realize his position. Sir Stafford Cripps, the 
British ambassador in Moscow, reported that the Germans were likely to 
attack Greece through Bulgaria, in which case, according to the Prime 
Minister, the Turks would either come in and need a lot of supplies, or 
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they would stay out and Greece would fall. If Yugoslavia could be brought 
in, then the importance of getting that country and Turkey aligned against 
Germany would far outweigh any Libyan operation, and Wavell would be 
relegated to the very minimum defensive role in Egypt. If, however, 
Wavell could accomplish COMPASS within the first two weeks of De-
cember, that would create a changed situation. It was up to the C-in-C ME 
to judge whether or not he had the air forces he needed. "We may," the 
Prime Minister continued, "be forced to abandon Compass altogether, or 
there may be time to work it in before other things develop. I must, 
however, know what you are going to do, and when it would happen. "119 
Although in the end the Germans did not attack Greece until spring, 
in November there was plenty of evidence flowing into Athens and 
London from diverse sources that the Germans intended to intervene. 120 
In London on Friday evening the twenty-second, the War Cabinet dis-
cussed Bulgaria. (The effort was largely vitiated by the news the next day 
that the Bulgarians had joined Hitler.) All that the War Cabinet did that 
night was to agree to send a signal to Campbell in Budapest and Knatch-
bull-Hugessen in Ankara urging them to get Turkey into the war. To this 
the British ambassador in Ankara quickly replied that Turkish participa-
tion at this time would be more of a liability than an asset. 121 
On 23 November Greek troops occupied Koritza, and there was great 
excitement in Athens. On the same day No. 211 Blenheim Squadron 
demonstrated what could be done when the pressure was on: it packed up 
its fifteen aircraft and left the Desert in three hours, arrived at Menidi just 
after its ground party, and was fueled, bombed-up, and ready for opera-
tions that night. 122 
24 November 1940 
Longmore returned to Cairo late on the twenty-fourth, after visiting RAF 
units in Greece, and reported to London that he had met with the king, 
Papagos, and Metaxas. They were "proud of their success, the first allies 
to carry the offensive to enemy territory." Metaxas hoped that the Greek 
victory at Koritza would affect Turkey, Yugoslavia, and possibly even 
Bulgaria, and went on to speak of chasing the Italians out of Albania and 
of being the future Allied bridgehead in the Balkans from which the 
Allied armies might advance to right the final battle against the Germans. 
Where else, Metaxas asked, could it be fought? Static war had set in in 
North Africa. He wanted to know what was proposed by the British in the 
event of a German advance through Bulgaria toward Salonika. Longmore 
reported that he had assured the Greeks that planning staffs were consid-
ering these points, and had warned the Greek leaders that the Italians 
were likely to counterattack in Albania with heavy air support. 
The king, Papagos, and Metaxas all expressed appreciation for the 
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work of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean and for the excellent 
work of the RAF in Greece. They stressed the need for more aircraft, but, 
said the AOC-in-C ME, completely ignored in their pleas for more aircraft 
was the capacity of their indifferent airfields for large numbers of ma-
chines. (Moreover, most of the fields were on the wrong side of the 
Pindus Mountains, where the weather either kept the aircraft grounded 
or prevented them getting through to the battlefields. Longmore himself 
had encountered such weather while trying to fly to the forward air-
fields.) After the meeting with the Greeks, he had then laid down to 
Palairet the difficulties of getting aircraft reinforcements from Britain to 
the Middle East in the next two critical months. He was disturbed by the 
fact that no one seemed to have a very dear idea why the British military 
mission, which had officially arrived that day, was in Athens. He doubted 
if the Greeks needed or would tolerate advice on their kind of mountain 
warfare. And the danger still remained that the roughly 3,000 army troops 
which were servicing the RAF and providing its antiaircraft defenses were 
assumed by some to be an advance guard of a larger force (a difficulty 
which the BBC's evening broadcast of 23 November to Athens had rein-
forced). 123 
25 - 28 November 1940 
On 25 November Major-General Heywood arrived in Athens to take over 
officially as head of the No. 27 Military Mission. (Later, when Admiral 
Turle was sent out to fill this position, Heywood became head of the army 
section of the mission.) General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, who shared 
a house with Heywood and his wife in Constantinople after the First 
World War, has since described Gordon Heywood as about five feet, nine 
inches tall, rather bulky in figure. He spoke French perfectly, a legacy 
from a French mother, but his judgment was not always to be trusted: as 
military attache in Paris he had misled the War Office about the quality of 
the French army. 
The mission's job were liaison, transmission of Greek requests, in-
struction, and "to prepare for the destruction of oil stocks in Greece in 
case of necessity." It was established in the Hotel Grande Bretagne with a 
Greek liaison team composed of a Major Kanakis and Capt. H.R.H. 
Prince Peter of Greece as second-in-command (he took over in January 
1941).124 In fact the main function of 27 MM was to work with the 
Deuxieme Bureau of the Greek general staff and establish intelligence 
links, which were used to obtain information on enemy forces in Albania 
and later in Bulgaria. It also acted as liaison between the Greek intel-
ligence service and the intelligence branch in Cairo. The operations 
section kept in dose touch with the Troisieme Bureau of Greek GHQ to 
keep track of Greek actions, making frequent visits to the front, and with 
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British liaison officers at army HQ at Janina and at corps HQ at Koritza, 
through direct wrr links to Athens. The "Q" side of 27 MM had a 
particularly heavy workload, since it was made the channel through 
which all Greek requests for aid had to be sent to the War Office, the 
Ministry of Supply, the Foreign Office, and the British Purchasing Com-
mission in the United States. "Q" also had to work with the Greek Powder 
and Cartridge Factory and check and distribute all incoming supplies. 125 
The RAF Athens status report for 25 November showed what effect 
Longmore's gallant gesture, Churchill's prodding, and Palairet's plead-
ings had had. No. 30 Blenheim Squadron was at Eleusis; No. 70 Well-
ington was using Athens airfield as an advanced base; No. 84 Blenheim 
had one flight at Eleusis and the others at Menidi; No. 211 Blenheim had 
thirteen aircraft at Menidi; No. 80 Gladiator had one flight at Eleusis and 
the other at Trikkala; while No. 112 in Egypt would leave for Greece as 
soon as some Gladiators for it were available. 
But as the AOC-in-C signaled later in the day, in elaborating on these 
dispositions, there were problems developing with winter coming on. 
Eleusis, for one, went unserviceable for periods after heavy rain; Menidi 
was more weatherproof than most; Trikkala was small and unserviceable 
after very heavy rain, but was not too far from Larissa, which was a large, 
reasonably weatherproof field. Araxos had been reported upon favorably 
by a survey party as being possible if runways were built; it could be used 
to refuel Blenheims currently when dry. Agrinion, situated north of the 
Gulf of Patras, was suitable only for Gladiators-though it was being 
extended-and had a bad approach. 
An hour later London received word from Longmore that D' Albiac 
had so many administrative problems that he wished to avoid further 
commitments, so Longmore was arranging to have 12 Gladiators ferried 
over to the Greeks, while No. 112 Gladiator Squadron would fly over 
skeleton maintenance crews only with its B Section. Including his army 
support forces, D'Albiac now had over 5,000 officers and men, and 
Longmore therefore strongly recommended that he be given the rank of 
acting air vice-marshal, thus placing him on a more equal footing with the 
rear admiral and major-general of the British military mission, who had 
no executive responsibilities. London acted that night!126 Longmore also 
recommended that his senior air staff officer, Wing Commander Willetts, 
be upgraded to acting group captain. 
The British Air Forces, Greece, now consisted of about 60 aircraft 
equally divided between bombers and fighters, of which a number were 
unserviceable. The RAF Wellingtons had been withdrawn to Egypt, as it 
was not advisable to operate them in a non-moon period until a west-coast 
airfield was available that was clear of mountains in its immediate vicinity. 
Longmore concluded, liMy general impression as a result of this visit is 
very favourable. Air Force has settled down remarkably quickly and has 
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carried out most successful operations contributing very largely to the 
Greek success."127 
The Air Ministry responded to Wavell at lunchtime that construction 
work in Thrace and Anatolia should move as quickly as possible to 
prepare airfields for use by heavy bombers in the spring at the latest, with 
one runway 1,500 yards by 50 yards and three, 1,200 by 50 yards (dimen-
sions adopted recently in the Canal Zone). 128 Also a top secret signal was 
sent to air force headquarters in Greece from the chief of the Air Staff: 
"You should on no account mention to anyone that dispatch of Hurricanes 
is being considered since the chance of its being sanctioned is remote and 
it is important not to risk disappointing the Greeks. "129 
In London on 25 November an element of tragedy was surfacing. Dill, 
whose wife was slowly dying of a paralytic stroke, was caught in a 
crossfire between Churchill and Wavell, and did not know what to do. 
Brigadier Dudley Clark, who was his military assistant at this time, has 
described Dill as upright, with thin fair hair, slightly greying, stern but 
with an Irish twinkle and a soft tuneful voice verging on a brogue. He 
spoke with the hesitation of a schoolboy trying to keep up with his 
thoughts. He had for years wanted to be chief of the Imperial General 
Staff and had taken infinite pains to prepare himself for the job in the total 
war he had foreseen coming; he knew Hitler personally and most Conti-
nental armies intimately. He had been recalled from Palestine in 1936 
thinking he was going to be CIGS, but in the Hore-Belisha reforms Sir 
Cyril Devereux and then Viscount Gort, Vc, had been given the job. Dill 
thought he had been assured of the British Expeditionary Force when war 
broke out, only to be disappointed again. Meanwhile Lady Dill was 
stricken and Sir John was sent, when the crisis came, as deputy to Gort in 
France. At last, in 1940, he had been made CIGS in place of Lord Ironside, 
VC, just when the army was in its deepest trouble and when he felt he 
could do little about it other than wait and encourage all efforts. That the 
unemotional Dill should clash with Churchill was probably inevitable; 
many service officers did, over working hours alone. 
Dill liked to arrive at the War Office at 8:30 and be briefed by his staff 
for the next hour, which left him thirty minutes to read urgent mail before 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee met; then followed a Cabinet meeting at 
11:30 and lunch. In the afternoon he conducted the domestic business of 
the army, because he was in all but name also commander-in-chief, that 
old position which both Wellington and the Duke of Cambridge had held 
in the nineteenth century. He was punctilious about this role. Then at 6:30 
there was often another meeting of the Chiefs of Staff followed by dinner. 
By then the Prime Minister would have arisen late, read the papers, 
tended to some business during the middle of the day, had a nap and 
dinner, and would now be ready to roar along until the wee hours of the 
morning. To try to lighten the load on himself, Dill quickly brought in a 
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vice chief and three assistant CIGS's; but, as he had trouble delegating, it 
did not help much.130 
Dill was not treated very graciously by Churchill, as indeed the Prime 
Minister did not honor others who served the country well in arduous 
posts, notably Dowding and Wavell. When Dill reached the age of sixty on 
Christmas Day 1941, he was not retired but sent to work in Washington. 
(He died there and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.) In part 
from the very first Dill was a victim of Churchill's old prejudices imbibed 
in his Hussar and World War I days. Though Dill may have seemed to be a 
bumbling brass-hat, he was not, and Winston badly underestimated his 
abilities. Unfortunately, the fact that Dill supported Wavell, that "ordinary 
colonel" in Egypt, did not endear him to the Prime Minister. 
But further complicating the problem on the evening of 25 November 
was another shadow from the past and a very good example of Churchill's 
perversity. General Jan Christian Smuts played a decisive, even a sinister, 
role in British history on a number of occasions, and Churchill's fondness 
for him is an illustration of the old saying about an expert being a man five 
hundred miles from home. Smuts had been one of the Boer leaders in the 
war which humiliated the British army, in that colonial conflict in which 
young Churchill as a war correspondent had made a considerable name 
for himself. Then in the First World War the goateed Smuts had shown up 
in London as a lieutenant-general, victor of a bloody East African cam-
paign against the Germans. He had been made a member of Lloyd 
George's inner War Cabinet and had been very largely responsible for the 
creation of the Royal Air Force. In 1939 he had been elected prime minister 
of South Africa, the culmination of a long and distinguished political 
career in his homeland. 
Nor was Smuts going to be the only Dominion prime minister to have 
a direct hand in the British decision to aid Greece. On this November day, 
in Canberra, Australia, Robert Gordon Menzies had already told his 
Cabinet that he had decided to go to London to see Churchill and discuss 
Singapore, whose weakness had just been revealed. 131 Both Menzies and 
Smuts, who would be raised to the rank of field marshal by Churchill 
early in 1941, would pass through Cairo, and their visits would be 
influential. 
After the Defence Committee broke up that night, Eden stayed be-
hind and discussed with Churchill the future after COMPASS succeeded. 
Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, had reported that Germany had not made 
up her mind over the Balkans, though Churchill, correctly as it turned 
out, guessed that she would strike through Bulgaria at Salonika. The next 
day Halifax said that both Budapest and Sofia reported that no German 
activity was likely in the Balkans. 
And Wavell cabled that he thought that the allocation of antiaircraft 
guns in his command was something that should be his responsibility; he 
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advise that no more should go to Crete for the time being, and that when 
allocations were made they should be done by his own Interservices 
Committee in view of his shortages, and on the general understanding 
that as much as possible would be sent from the United Kingdom. 132 
On 26 November Major-General Sir John Kennedy, the director of 
military operations at the War Office, told the American Colonel Lee that 
because of a shortage of shipping, 16,000 troops for the Middle East were 
still standing by in the United Kingdom, and that the delay was affecting 
the rapidity with which the British could help the Greeks. 133 On Wednes-
day the twenty-seventh the planners tried to talk Churchill out of OPER-
ATION WORKSHOP (which Admiral Cunningham called "a wildcat 
scheme ... the height of unwisdom") to take the island of Pantelleria. l34 
That evening the secretary of state for air was asked to report on the 
suitability of airfields in Greece as bases for possible action against the 
Rumanian oilfields, about which the British actually knew a good deal, 
and on the necessary preporatory measures. A few days later his report 
could not be found in the Cabinet office-it was not in the "Op. Box," nor 
in "Greece," nor in "Air," nor in "Gen. Wavell." Someone suggested that 
they had better contact the CAS,who had actually sent it over, to make 
sure that no action was necessary. 135 It seems that even the highest offices 
are not immune to gremlins! 
29 November 1940 
On Friday Longmore teletyped from Cairo to Portal in London that from 
signals received by Wavell and himself they had the feeling that London 
was thinking of air operations in the Middle East on a grand scale in 1941 
without regard to supply routes: "It seems to me that there is the greatest 
danger of large scale operations being planned and timed to take place 
long before the necessary Air Forces to undertake or support them could 
possibly be expected to be ready to take part. Even our existing commit-
ments are right out of step with our air strength even with what is 
immediately in sight yet we are already being asked what immediate 
assistance can be given Turkey in the event of her becoming involved. "136 
Longmore might have added that the Air Staff was guilty of bad staff 
work and quoted Portal himself, who as AOC-in-C of Bomber Command 
in 1940 had suggested to the Air Ministry that the means should govern 
the ends rather than vice versa. 
Rear-Admiral Tude, having arrived in London from Greece, was 
present at 10: 15 am at the Chiefs of Staff meeting for Item 10, Assistance to 
Greece. He outlined the situation at the time he left Athens on the 
eighteenth, reporting that the Greek government was in good fettle and 
confident that, provided the British continued to assist them, they could 
drive the Italians out of Albania. Metaxas had been sure on 16 November 
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that they could hold Koritza and the mountains against the Italians 
during the winter. "There was no doubt that our assistance had turned the 
scale and the Greeks were aware of this. Nevertheless, it would be idle to 
imagine that the Greeks could hold out without considerable further 
consignments of materials and of increased air forces." Even so, Turle 
said, "The Greeks had expressed no desire for the despatch of British land 
forces." And, furthermore, he understood the disinclination of the au-
thorities in the Middle East to release forces for Greece which could ill be 
spared; the scale of equipment which it was now intended to send Greece 
would be adequate. 137 
Actually Metaxas' diary on 16 and 17 November indicates that he 
thought he had briefed Turle that the first objective was to get the British 
to shift their primary effort to Greece, and to supply aircraft, weapons, 
trucks, and tanks to counter a German attack in the spring. He was 
gloomy: if the British could not supply aircraft to counter the Italians, how 
could the Greeks afford to provoke the Germans? 
For the next few days bad weather in Greece canceled air operations. 
The Greeks rolled up successes during the following weeks, but these 
mountain operations were taking their toll, especially of the ubiquitous 
pack animals, mostly donkeys, which the Greeks used so much in moun-
tain areas. The motor vehicles that had been requisitioned were already 
heavily worn in civilian life; the drivers were not trained, maintenance 
was ragged, and the roads were unpaved and treacherous, especially in 
the mountains. The British supplied some Canadian-made lorries and 
Italian booty captured in the Desert, and Casson claimed that this was 
having a direct effect on the front line by February. 138 Yet the report of 27 
Military Mission shows that for the whole period of its existence the 
mission only handed over and obtained receipts for 62 ambulances, 13 
Austin 3-tonners, 200 8-h. p. cars, 150 Bedford 3-tonners, 182 Chevrolet 3-
tonners, 78 Ford 30-cwt and 44 Ford 15-cwt vans and 122 Fordson lorries, 
86 Italian Spa and 60 Lancia lorries plus two other odd ones, 491 Norton 
motorcycles, and 104 horses. Some sources say that lorries arrived from 
the United Kingdom on Christmas Day but that their tires did not follow 
for another ninety days.139 The only military material delivered to the 
Greeks before the arrival of the British Military Mission in Athens in late 
November were 100 Boys antitank rifles. 140 Almost all supplies for Greece 
came in the end from the Middle East. Four shiploads were sent direct 
from England in the first "Bullet Consignment," but only three arrived; 
and another large ship (the Clan Fraser) that came around the Cape became 
a total loss in the Piraeus harbor. No American orders arrived until the 
Greek government had moved to Crete in late April. 
On 30 November 1940 Churchill was 66. 
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30 November 1940 - 8 January 1941 
During nearly six weeks at the end of the year, as the snows fell in the 
mountains and the fighting on the Albanian front became a race between 
Italian morale and Greek supplies, action generally slowed down. Much 
that took place was preparatory. 
Perhaps the most important development during the period was the 
growth of a misconception, later denied, that Britain would field a twenty-
three-squadron air force in Greece in the spring. The rumor appears to 
have started while Rear-Admiral Turle was in London being briefed to 
become the head of the military mission. On 5 December the Air Ministry 
ordered Longmore-in a day of picks and shovels and steamrollers-to 
have ready by spring airfields in the Balkans for ten fighter squadrons, 
ten medium bomber squadrons, and three heavy bomber squadrons. At 
the same time Portal signaled that he was planning to fly out six fighter 
and six medium bomber squadrons during the December fine-weather 
period in the Mediterranean so that they could be put in storage until 
their ground and aircrews could arrive by sea in February or March. And 
in that signal he reinforced the idea that Longmore would have twenty-
three squadrons in the Balkans in the spring. Somehow these figures 
were transmitted to the Australian commander, Blamey, but they were 
denied by Portal in November 1941 when a formal inquiry was made upon 
an Australian complaint of having been misled into the Greek adven-
ture. 141 On 5 January Portal had to withdraw the idea of sending six of the 
bomber squadrons to the Middle East because he was short of aircrews 
and Churchill was demanding that Bomber Command be built Up.142 
On 5 December 12 replacement Gladiator biplane fighters were deliv-
ered to the Greek air force, the only aircraft the British or the Americans 
managed to give them before Greece was overrun four months later. That 
the Greeks were not better served was due in part-as Turle found in 
talking to the Prime Minister-to the fact that no one appreciated that time 
was not on the British side. Yet Turle believed that he had been assured by 
Portal that there would be fifteen squadrons in Greece in a few weeks and 
twenty-two by spring; he recorded this in his diary and reported it in 
Athens when he arrived there on the twenty-fourth. 143 In fact, there were 
four half-strength RAF squadrons in Greece. l44 
No one appears really to have grasped what Longmore was up 
against. When Wavell began his successful COMPASS reconnaissance in 
force, which turned into a rout of the Italians, the AOC-in-C had three 
fighter squadrons and four bomber squadrons with which to face approx-
imately 250 Italian fighters and a like number of bombers. 145 But on 9 
December, the day that COMPASS opened, an early model B-17 arrived in 
Cairo from London carrying a quiet, pipe-smoking deputy for Longmore, 
who had long requested such a person. Air Vice Marshal Arthur Tedder 
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arrived with verbal orders to write back personally to Portal and his vice 
chief about Longmore. 146 By May 1941 this arrangement led to Long-
more's recall for consultations and his replacement by Tedder as AOC-
in-Co 
In Greece D'Albiac's attempts to do something about more airfields 
was frustrated by the shortage of labor and supplies and by Metaxas' 
refusal to let British officers proceed north of Larissa to explore sites for 
airfields. The Greek prime minister, who had recently been overlooked at 
a tea with the British because, as he noted in his diary, he was too short, 
was convinced that the Germans would invade Greece in the spring and 
that the Greeks would have to lay down their arms as they would have 
nothing left with which to fight. He did not want the British pursuing 
schemes to build airfields from which it might be thought they could 
bomb Ploesti, the source of Germany's Rumanian oil, and thereby 
provoking the Germans into earlier or more destructive action. 147 
In London as Christmas approached Churchill continued to be buoy-
ed up by the Desert victories; he promised more Hurricanes and urged his 
victorious general to rip the Italians out of Africa. Only when Wavell 
could go no further should he switch his offensive to the Dodecanese, 
which the C-in-C's in the Middle East had suggested should be taken in 
OPERATION MANDIBLES, (which might in the end have better been 
called NIBBLES). 148 On 23 December Eden became Foreign Secretary, and 
the secretary of war became a cipher under the minister of defence, 
Churchill. In Athens Metaxas had morbid dreams of Eden's elevation, 
which he overcame with prayers. 
At the end of December Churchill ordered Portal to proceed with 
plans for nine new airfields in Greece south of the line Arta-Olympus, 
even though they would demand a large increase in military support staff 
and would strain the limited port and transportation facilities in that 
country. 149 At the same time the deputy quartermaster-general ME made 
a detailed report on Crete and Greece which backed up the report from 
Heywood on Papagos' need for lorries. ISO On the vital question of an 
artillery supply, General James Marshall-Cornwall, head of the military 
mission to Turkey and himself a gunner, sent Wavell a handwritten note 
on Christmas Day suggesting that the British ship out to the Greeks their 
four hundred new 1918 75-mm guns, obtained in the summer of 1940 
from the United States. lSI But nothing was done. There were also pro-
posals to re-equip the RHAF with Gladiators and older Blenheims and to 
replace these in the RAF with Curtiss P-36 Mohawks and P-40 
Tomahawks, but these plans, too, were not carried out. And the year 
ended with yet a further exchange of signals all round about bases near 
Salonika and suitable aircraft for operations in Greece.1S2 Longmore 
concluded that 0' Albiac needed Group Captain John Grigson as a deputy 
in Athens and that the AOC himself should fly down to Cairo for a general 
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consultation, while also taking over the post of air attache. Portal 
agreed. 153 
On 1 January 1941 Metaxas reluctantly agreed in principle to the 
establishment of British bomber bases about Salonika. But no attacks to 
provoke Germany were to be made until Italy was defeated. He wanted to 
limit RAF activity to surveys. 
In London early in January Churchill was testy and irritable, tired, 
angry, and strained. Eden was jumpy. 154 The War Cabinet kept changing 
its priorities from North Africa to the Balkans to Home defense. From 
ULTRA they had the impression that the Germans would attack Greece on 
20 January, but it was still possible that England might be invaded, and 
now half the best tanks and much of the artillery was on its way to the 
Middle East. All the units in the United Kingdom were actually up to 
strength, but the British did not at this time sit down and systematically 
calculate what it would take for the Germans to land an army on a hostile 
coast, and they were more scared than they needed to be. As Churchill 
himself noted later in The Grand Alliance, in September 1940 the RAF still 
had fifty-one fighter squadrons and twenty-seven bomber squadrons, 
and the numbers were increasing. At the same time the army grew from 
twenty-six active divisions and a Home Guard of one million in Sep-
tember 1940 to thirty-four active divisions and five armored divisions plus 
one and a half million men a year later. Nevertheless, it is dear in Basil 
Collier's The Defence of the United Kingdom, and in contemporary docu-
ments, that almost everyone in London was fearful about invasion.155 
At about this time the American military attache in London, Colonel 
Lee, told his Russian colleague that in British opinion the new German 
armored divisions were being prepared for an attack on the USSR.156 In 
Athens Metaxas was pleading for more lorries: his badly exposed and 
exhausted troops on the Epirus front needed to take Valona to stem the 
Italian effort, since the RAF was failing to do that. Palairet was questioning 
the role and duties of the military mission in Athens: in response London 
decided that it should be called a Liaison Delegation (but it never adopted 
the name), and should communicate only through the C-in-C in Cairo. 157 
Longmore signaled that although reinforcements were en route, "they 
are not actually here. Risks we have run against Italians in denuding back 
areas defence cannot be repeated with impunity continuously and cer-
tainly not against Germans. "158 
On 4 January 1941, alerted by his military attache in Berlin, Metaxas 
had his ambassador in London tell Eden that the Germans were con-
centrating twelve divisions against Yugoslavia in order to obtain free 
passage to Salonika, and that Greece would fight if attacked. Almost 
immediately Athens received telegrams from Berlin, Bucharest, and 
Belgrade saying that the German destination was Bulgaria. This was true, 
but the price of the ticket was to be Salonika for Bulgaria.159 
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On 6 January Churchill gave his merry-eyed chief of the Cabinet staff, 
General Sir Hastings Ismay, an appreciation for the Chiefs of Staff in 
which he made the destruction of the Italian army in North Africa the 
primary objective in the opening months of 1941. Once that had been 
accomplished by a force of 40,000 to 45,000 men (about four divisions), 
then the Army of the Nile would be free to go on to other things. He 
hoped that the East African campaign would also be over by April, thus 
freeing the 5th Indian Division. With these victories in hand, there would 
be a force of twelve divisions in the eastern Mediterranean and, with 
Egypt secure, the invasion of Sicily could then be given priority. But, he 
concluded, since nothing would suit the British better than that the 
Germans would delay attacking in the Balkans until spring, it had to be 
concluded that they would do so earlier. Thus as soon as Wavell had taken 
Benghazi, all forces must be switched to Greece so that Valona could be 
taken. It was clear to Churchill that unless this was done the Greeks would 
become dispirited and make a separate peace with the Italians. But above 
all, Hitler could not afford to have Britain with her airpower stabbing him 
from the west and so he would seek to destroy her: Britain had absolutely 
to be protected first. 160 And the next day he sent Wavell another reminder 
that waste in rear areas could not be afforded-he had far too few fighting 
men for his 350,000-ration strength. Wavell responded that he would 
carefully re-examine the situation, "but the more I see of war, especially 
present-day war, the more I am impressed by the part that administration 
plays. "161 How right he was. 
Eden at this time sent Churchill a note that everything pointed to a 
German attack on Greece no later than the beginning of March. 162 Al-
ready the Germans had twelve modern divisions in Rumania, while all 
the Greeks had to defend the Bulgarian frontier with were three under-
strength reserve divisions. 163 In Belgrade the Yugoslav Foreign Minister 
told the British ambassador that it was too late to repel a German invasion 
and to please pass that view along to his government. Sir Ronald Camp-
bell did not take him seriously, but the Greek ambassador did and relayed 
the point to Athens. 164 
The seventh of January also saw two visitors arrive in Cairo. First 
came Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan, President Roosevelt's emissary, who, 
after talking to British officers, went on to Athens on the fifteenth to see 
what the Greeks needed, as if Washington had not been told. And later in 
the day 0' Albiac flew in from Greece in the single-engined Percival Q6 
piloted and owned by Wing-Commander Lord Forbes, his chief intel-
ligence officer. 
The next day in London the newly knighted Sir Alexander Cadogan 
was immensely cheered by the fact that Eden had told him to inform 
Palairet that His Majesty's government was prepared to send Wavell to 
Greece at once. 165 Churchill then told the Defence Committee that British 
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help might not arrive in time to save Greece, but Eden added that it was 
vital to act to win over the Turks "furthermore, the Greeks are a tempera-
mental race and we must do something to maintain their morale." 
Therefore it was decided that plans should be drawn up and that every-
thing possible should be done within twenty four hours.166 Wavell 
should halt his advance as soon as Tobruk was taken and switch all his 
forces to the Balkans. Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa and the 
Chiefs of Staff wondered if, in fact, perhaps Hitler was not making a feint 
to draw off strength from the United Kingdom prior to an invasion 
attempt. 167 The trouble was that no one on the British side was paying 
much attention to the German economic, diplomatic, and military grip on 
the Balkans, and no one would stand up to Churchill and say that the 
Greek armed forces were inadequately equipped, that the British could 
not re-equip them, and that Wavell did not have the forces to do the job 
envisioned. 
As Churchill had only so recently noted and as Wavell's planners, 
including de Guingand, agreed, Wavell would not have any spare troops 
until mid-April, and these would then need rest and re-equipping. Thus 
Wavell's staff regarded the switch to Greece as unsound. 168 What they did 
see as just feasible was continuing the advance to seize Tripoli by a coup de 
main and joining up with the French in Tunisia, a much more desirable 
political objective which would open up the Mediterranean. The man 
who should have stood up for Wavell in the arguments in London was 
Dill, but he was mentally tired; by early 1941 the strain of his wife's slow 
death was causing him to sit ineffectively at COS meetings and ask 
irrelevant questions. 169 
In the meantime the RAF in Greece was having second thoughts 
about its doctrine, as Longmore admitted in his memoirs. Though the 
textbooks and staff college courses laid down that an air offensive should 
be an attack on rear lines of communications rather than an intimate 
participation in the ground battle, there was much to be said for close-
range support visible to troops about to make an attack. Certainly it was a 
stimulant on the Greek front in Albania. 17o On 8 January Ambassador 
Lincoln MacVeagh was reporting exactly these views to Washington, 
pointing out that the RAF had not enough airfields and was limited in 
range in attacking the Adriatic ports, even when refueled at Larissa on the 
way from Athens; it was considering more bombing closer to the front 
lines because it often could not reach Durazzo. Moreover, while RAF 
officers, the ambassador reported, openly sympathized with Greek cau-
tion, privately they said that Greece would have to become a base for a war 
on Germany, and they had been laying their plans accordingly. As cabled 
by MacVeagh, the Greek under-secretary of state for foreign affairs said 
that the presence of the British made the chances of German mediation 
very unlikely, and Metaxas himself might have been behind the idea 
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circulating in Berlin and in Athens that expulsion of Italy from the Balkans 
would be to Germany's advantage: some of the Greek leaders believed 
Germany not unsympathetic to Greece. Both the Greek prime minister 
and the Turkish ambassador in Athens thought that, if the Germans 
attacked Greece through Bulgaria, the Turks would attack the Ger-
mans. 171 (On the other hand, the Turkish Foreign Minister in Ankara told 
the Greek minister there just the opposite.)172 
Between 7 and 9 January 1941 happy delusions, as Hinsley has called 
them, that the Germans were in Rumania only to protect the oilfields were 
swept away by Enigma messages that made it plain that Greece was the 
objective. Already on 27 December London had picked up mentions of 
OPERATION MARITA, and this confirmed diplomatic and other intel-
ligence, including a note from Sofia that 1,800 trains were scheduled, 
enough for twenty divisions. In view of all this information, the Defence 
Committee, with a wonderful ignorance of winter conditions in the 
Bulgarian mountains (despite the sojourn of the Salonika Force not far 
from there in 1916-1918), decided that the Germans would attack Greece 
on 20 January. On the tenth they ordered Wavell to visit Athens. 173 What 
he could have done if the Germans had actually attacked on that schedule 
is entirely unexplained and does not seem to have crossed London's 
collective mind in any rational way related to movement timetables. 
Because of scarce shipping resources in the Middle East, for instance, 
when the decision was later made to send a force of only three and a half 
divisions, twelve weeks were required to transport it to Greece, let alone 
get it firmly in place to resist a professional blitzkrieg attack. 
A further difficulty at this time was that general staff intelligence in 
Middle East Headquarters had not been informed of the Engima inter-
cepts and was getting very little of this ultra-secret (ULTRA) information 
even secondhand .. By 15 January London had begun to have second 
thoughts about an attack on the twentieth, a point the realists in Athens 
would have already reached. 174 
9 January 1941 
Ambassador MacVeagh reported from Athens that the Rumanian premier 
had told the Yugoslav minister in Athens that he was 100 percent sure that 
the Turks would attack Bulgaria in relation to the build-up of German 
troops in Rumania, and 50 percent sure that Russia would act to prevent 
the Germans from gaining control of the Dardanelles. On the other hand, 
he thought that Germany's ultimate aim was certainly the conquest of the 
Ukraine and that she might attempt this directly without imperiling the 
very real economic advantages she was already enjoying from the Bal-
kans.175 
Longmore signaled Metaxas that on D'Albiac's advice he was sending 
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two more squadrons to Greece, but neither would be at full strength until 
more aircraft were available.176 
From London Portal told Longmore that he was reluctant to interrupt 
his successful chase of the Italians in Libya, but that political reasons 
necessitated a shift to major support for Greece: the Germans appeared 
likely to be going to move into Bulgaria and then strike rapidly at Sa-
lonika, supported by divebombers and Mel09's "which would blast 
straight through the Greek defences unless we helped. Absence of British 
help might put Greece out of the war, keep Turkey out, and cause most 
serious political consequences both here and in America. I therefore 
regret that the reinforcements you propose must be considered quite 
inadequate. Most doubtful if two squadrons of Gladiators would do any 
good and think you should consider two or three squadrons Hurricanes 
and one or two Squadrons Blenheim IV." 
He then went on to urge that these fighters be based on all-weather 
airfields about Salonika, from which they could cover both the Rupel Pass 
and the Albanian front. The withdrawals to Greece were to be considered 
immediate and urgent, and plans for the move were to be made at once. 
Portal ended by telling Longmore that this was a warning; a full order 
from the COS to the C-in-C ME would follow shortly. This order was 
dispatched the next day, and it warned of a possible German attack down 
the Struma valley on 20 January by three divisions, supported by 200 
divebombers and employing air landings to disorganize the resistance. 
Support for the Greeks would have to come from the Middle East and the 
C-in-C ME was authorized to send up to one squadron of infantry tanks, 
one regiment of cruiser tanks, two field artillery regiments, two antitank 
regiments, two heavy and two light AlA regiments and two medium 
artillery regiments, as well as three Hurricane and two Blenheim squad-
rons and whatever was needed to maintain them. Speed was essential, 
and plans to move the force were to be made before Metaxas was con-
sulted. 177 
Longmore replied with a detailed signal in which he pointed out that 
he had already warned that Hurricanes could not operate from Greek 
airfields then within range of the Italians, and could only sit around 
Salonika awaiting a German or Italian attack-which was considered 
unlikely in the winter. To send his Blenheims and Hurricanes from Libya 
would allow the Italian air force there to recover its balance. He reminded 
London of his slim resources and concluded by asking if the German 
threat might not be a feint to pull the British away from the Libyan front. 
Wavell cabled the CIGS that Portal's signal to the Longmore "fills us with 
dismay." He went on to say that nothing the British could do would stop a 
serious German advance; to attempt to do so would only disperse Bri-
tain's forces and lower Greek morale. "I am desperately anxious lest we 
play the enemy's game and expose ourselves to defeat in detail." Church-
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ill responded stiffly that they were not; Wavell was to proceed at once to 
Athens. 178 
It was an unhappy Thursday in London. At noon, when Wavell's 
response to the signal ordering him to switch priorities to Greece was 
received at the War Office, Kennedy, the director of military operations, 
who had not seen the original signal before it was sent, immediately got 
hold of Dill. Kennedy told Dill forcefully that it was imperative that the 
British secure Libya so that they could pass convoys through the Mediter-
ranean with fighter cover from North Africa. Further, he went on, to hold 
Salonika would require at least twenty divisions and an air force. The 
Germans could take Greece whenever they wanted and then menace 
British shipping in the Mediterranean, unless the British held the North 
African shore. In other words, the British stood to gain far more by 
clearing North Africa than by trying to hold Greece. 179 Dill was too 
dispirited to make a response. 
Elsewhere in Whitehall on that day, the Hankey Committee on Sup-
plies for Greece reported that some munitions had been found, including 
70 percent of the Greek needs in 10S-mm shells, from General de Gaulle, 
but not much else except shell steel. Anything ordered from the United 
States would not be ready until the end of 1941.180 
10 - 13 January 1941 
Over the next few days London and Cairo said many of the same things to 
each other and to their friends. In London Roosevelt's emaciated, chain-
smoking emissary, Harry Hopkins, deplored Churchill's working habits, 
especially on weekends, while listening to him prepare the British for 
withdrawal in Greece. 181 Heywood flew over to Cairo from Athens and 
told Wavell that the reinforcements authorized by London were not what 
the Greeks needed-they wanted transport, AlA guns, aircraft, and 
clothing. Wavell agreed, but these were just the things that he was 
desperately short of himself. 182 
On 11 January Churchill told Wavell that London's information, 
which we now know was ULTRA, was reliable. They had to conform to 
the "larger interests at stake .... We expect and require prompt and 
active compliance with our decisions, for which we bear full respon-
sibility." And he ordered Wavell and Longmore to make a joint visit to 
Athens. 183 It was a somewhat propitious moment, since three 10,000-ton 
ships escorted through the Mediterranean by the aircraft carrier Illustrious 
and several cruisers had at last delivered 200 Bedford 1 Y2 ton trucks, some 
motorcycles, a few antitank guns and a snowplow. 184 (Metaxas grumbled 
to his diary that the British still refused to grant credits.) With these 
supplies No. 27 Military Mission officers could at last begin training the 
Greeks, to whom they shortly became advisers as the units pulled out for 
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the front. Metaxas let it be known that he wanted two days of talks in 
Athens and three days to show his visitors the front. 
Wavell got back from the Desert on the evening of the twelfth and left 
for Athens the next morning, followed by Longmore on the fifteenth. 
Before leaving Wavell indicated to London that he could not supply much: 
one squadron of light tanks, one regiment of cruisers, but no infantry 
tanks at all; artillery would be very thin, and the widely dispersed 
locations in Greece would create problems for medical and administrative 
units; additionally there was an acute shortage of signals. And he con-
cluded that as Admiral Cunningham was still at sea he had not been able 
to discuss shipping, but it would be a serious matter, especially with the 
appearance of the German air force in the Mediterranean. On the thir-
teenth Longmore had to send London the unpleasant news that Her-
aklion airfield in Crete had been strafed by German aircraft from the 
Dodecanese .185 
It was very cold that Monday morning when Wavell stepped out of 
the Sunderland flying boat in Phaleron Bay just east of the Piraeus. He 
went by launch to the Piraeus Yacht Club for lunch before meeting with 
Metaxas and Papagos. 186 
14 - 16 January 1941 
Conferences were held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offices on both 
the fourteenth and the fifteenth. Present on the British side were Wavell 
and his staff, Palairet, Longmore (on the second day), Turle, Heywood, 
and D'Albiac; for the Greeks there were Metaxas, Papagos, Under-secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs Mavroudis, and representatives of the Greek 
services. The minutes were kept in English by General Heywood and in 
Greek by Col. Stylianos Kitrilakis, the director of operations. 
Wavell and Papagos each gave a summary in English of the operations 
in their respective commands. Metaxas noted that night in his diary that it 
was amazing that the British had survived and won in Africa, as they did 
not have anything. They obviously could not help against the Germans. 
Metaxas, in French, then reviewed the political situation in the Balkans 
and observed that in the event of Germany's (or Germany's and Bul-
garia's) invasion of Greece, Yugoslavia would remain neutral, but that she 
would fight to protect her neutrality. Moreover, Prince Paul's government 
would not be pleased to see British troops at Salonika, as that would 
provoke the Germans and hasten the spread of the war to the Balkans. 
(This was information which the Greek minister had obtained that morn-
ing from the president of the Council in Belgrade.)187 Metaxas, making 
his points by drawing maps on paper, also held that Turkey would remain 
neutral even if Bulgaria as well as Germany came in. From the information 
on hand the Greek prime minister did not foresee either Yugoslavia or 
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Turkey abandoning their reserved positions; Greece would resist the 
Germans or the Bulgarians by all possible means. 
Papagos told the meeting all he knew about the German dispositions 
up to that time, including the fact that German air force officers in mufti 
were in Bulgaria setting up advanced observation posts, improving and 
building airfields, and restoring roads; the bridge across the Danube was 
being widened, and it appeared certain that the Germans would move 
through a partially mobilized Bulgaria first into eastern Macedonia and 
then into western Thrace. He then pointed out the Greek dispositions-
twelve infantry divisions and three brigades plus one cavalry division on 
the Albanian front, and four infantry divisions on the Bulgarian front in 
addition to those in the fortifications; another division was shortly to be 
moved to the Albanian front to face more arriving Italians. In order to 
establish a good defensive position on the Bulgarian front he needed nine 
divisions, and he looked to the British to supply these. If the Germans 
were to be countered, the British had to land speedily and in security, and 
then concentrate rapidly, for the Greek staff estimated that the Germans 
could concentrate on the Greek border in eleven days. If the British 
landing could not take place before German troops entered Bulgaria, it 
should at least take place before they took up offensive positions along the 
Bulgarian frontier with Greece. For this it would be necessary to carry out 
rapidly, and in absolute secrecy, the following preparatory measures: (1) 
safeguard AI A defenses for ports in eastern Macedonia and western 
Thrace (which Papagos suggested the Greeks man during the Italian 
phase of the campaign); (2) make a start on air bases for the RAF, with the 
British providing the material and funds and the Greeks the work; (3) land 
supplies for the British Expeditionary Force and Greek forces, to be stored 
under Greek guard; (4) concentrate the BEF and its RAF wing in Egypt as 
soon as possible, ready for embarkation, but with rumors spread that they 
were going to take Tripolitania; (5) collect the shipping needed for the 
operation in the eastern Mediterranean as soon as possible. 
On the assumption that this could be done without hastening the 
German descent, and taking into account the capacities of the ports of 
Salonika, Amphipolis, and Cavalla, it would be possible for the British to 
land in Greece and to take up positions along the Axios-Evros line, from 
the Vardar (sometimes called Axios) valley to the Maritza, on the Turkish 
border. From the political point of view such a successful operation might 
encourage Yugoslavia and Turkey to join the Allies. 
Wavell replied that he had not sufficient forces in the Middle East; he 
had beaten Graziani with only very small forces and had none to spare. 
Britain could dispose of only two or three divisions and a few aircraft to 
aid Greece, and some of these would be Imperial troops used in the 
Cyrenaican campaign. Time had to be allowed to concentrate and trans-
port them. The only forces immediately available were one regiment of 
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artillery and a unit of about 65 armored cars; Wavell suggested that these 
be sent immediately. Metaxas replied that two to three divisions were in-
adequate, and the dispatch of armored cars and artillery would do no-
thing more than provoke the Germans. Wavell, as Metaxas put it, in the 
words of a commander-in-chief thrice insisted that his government wished 
the Greeks to accept the antitank regiment and the armored cars, which 
were all he could offer. Metaxas, therefore, refused them. He said that 
Greece could not fight for victory, only for honor, preferring to destroy 
herself. At that, Palairet shook his hand and Wavell, in a rare emotional 
moment, also congratulated him. Metaxas wondered that night in his 
diary if they would ever again consider him pro-German! And so the 
session broke Up.188 
At noon they adjourned for lunch at Sir Michael Palairet's. 
On the afternoon of the fifteenth Wavell sent a long telegram to the 
CIGS in London. He reported that they had discussed in detail the 
problems of supplies for the Greeks and that he had promised to send a 
ship just arrived from the United Kingdom straight through with 200 
vehicles. He noted that he had already sent from his own stocks 180,000 
pairs of boots and 350,000 pairs of socks, as well as blankets and clothing, 
but that he was short of most other items the Greeks urgently needed, 
especially pack animals. There had been a long discussion of the Salonika 
problem in which Metaxas had argued that the appearance of any British 
troops would alarm the Yugoslavs and provoke the Germans.Metaxas' 
idea was that the British should provide material and that the Greeks 
would build defenses about Salonika which should only be occupied 
when the British could send a force that was capable of offensive as well as 
defensive action. "The President concluded that we must not interpret his 
attitude as a refusal to accept assistance at Salonika, but as a request for 
postponement." Metaxas was seeing the Salonika front as a new one after 
the Greeks had cleaned the Italians out of Albania, so Wavell recom-
mended that the British should "make every possible arrangement as 
regards preparation of bases, which will in any case be necessary pre-
liminary to despatch of troops, and we will examine defensive pos-
sibilities on this front."189 
Longmore and "Wild Bill" Donovan arrived in time for lunch on the 
fifteenth, and in the afternoon Longmore discussed the future with the 
Greeks. He said that nothing could be done about greater RAF operations 
or about training the Greek air force until airfields for fourteen squadrons 
had been prepared with training fields around Salonika. At an evening 
conference Metaxas agreed to let the Greek air force re-form in the 
Salonika area, where their airfields could be used as advanced landing or 
refueling grounds in the event of a German attack. He would now allow 
RAF officers to visit Greek air force establishments in the area and 
reconnoiter landing grounds on Lemnos and Mytilene. Longmore asked 
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for facilities for fourteen squadrons in the area south and west of Mount 
Olympus, which 0' Albiac enumerated, and impressed upon the Greek 
prime minister that until these were available, with the capacity to meet 
British requirements, the RAF could not operate, no matter how many 
aircraft were sent: this would be the deciding factor in sending squadrons 
from Egypt. Mention was also made of the fact that 30 Wellingtons and 
Blenheims had been waiting for a week at Menidi for the weather to clear 
sufficiently for them to raid Albanian targets, while Eleusis was still 
unserviceable. Taking all these factors into account, Longmore was satis-
fied that no more than Nos. 112, 11, and 33 squadrons on standby to move 
to Greece could be handled there. 190 
That there was confusion as to the size of the British air force in Greece 
may be assumed from a report sent home by the American air attache in 
Athens that he had been told in secret conversations with Metaxas and 
0' Albiac that after 15 January the RAF in Greece would consist of six 
heavy and six medium bomber squadrons and five fighter squadrons in 
two composite wings, totaling altogether seventeen squadrons, and that 
the Greek air force was to be expanded also. And in the course of the 
British discussions in Athens there was a specific mention of a force of 
nine British divisions supported by three weak Greek ones.191 
Certainly no British landing in Greece made sense unless it was 
strong enough not to be overrun or thrown out. Prince Paul of Yugoslavia 
had made it plain that any British force at Salonika would be a provocation 
to Yugoslavia, which would then let the Germans in. And as Metaxas 
noted in his diary on 15 January, the British were too weak to influence the 
Balkans and everybody knew that. 192 To put a force in place as a rock 
upon which the Germans could stumble made sense, and parts of north-
ern Greece lend themselves to that sort of positional warfare, provided 
that the forces placed there have enough men and support forces to invest 
and hold the ground. But the last thing the British could afford in 1941 was 
another fiasco such as Norway, where they had been overrun by German 
airborne troops, infantry, and air support, or another Dakar, where they 
had badly misjudged the military and political circumstances. 
Just before Wavell flew back to Egypt, he and Heywood talked again 
with the Greek commander, Papagos, to try and persuade him at Lon-
don's insistence to accept the two regiments (one of artillery and one of 
armoured cars) which had been proffered earlier. Papagos responded that 
it was mainly a political question (as Wavell had surmised at the end of his 
message to London on the fifteenth), and that it was not, therefore, up to 
him to reply. Wavell agreed and asked him to take it up with his govern-
ment. Wavell then left for Egypt, and the Greeks went into conference. 
Papagos later wrote that they quickly concluded that the British did not 
have the means to send Greece adequate and timely help. The Germans 
already held the initiative with superior means and priority in prepara-
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tion, and as soon as the weakness of the British was known to the 
Yugoslavs and the Turks it would only confirm them in their neutrality. 
Papagos suggested to the prime minister that an attempt be made to 
persuade the British that not only would the aid offered be politically 
disastrous to the Balkans, but also it would be contrary to sound strategic 
principles as far as operations in the Mediterranean theater were con-
cerned. The two or three divisions that Wavell could send would be far 
more useful in Africa. The best course was not to halt the attack in Libya, 
but to defeat the Italian Marshal Graziani and seize Tripolitania (before 
any Germans got there). Then the British could undertake much more 
extensive operations in the Balkans. The abandonment, Papagos said-
no doubt with Metaxas' full agreement-of a likely success in favor of 
operations in another theater already doomed to certain failure "would be 
to commit a strategic error in contradiction with the principles of a sound 
conduct of war." 
The Greek discussions then entered the tricky ground of trying to 
outguess world opinion. If they refused outright the British offer, they 
might be accused of not being resolved to fight. Papagos countered this by 
arguing that militarily the British knew that their proposed intervention 
was undesirable. The other side of the argument was the unfortunate 
guarantee treaty of April 1939, which was likely to cause an outcry against 
Britain even within the island kingdom if Greece fell without a single 
British soldier on her soil. It would also adversely affect public opinion in 
America. (Both these arguments were in a sense specious, as the RAF was 
already on Greek soil, while it could be argued that the 1939 treaty became 
null and void at the fall of France.) 
Fortunately, Metaxas still retained his clear head. He maintained his 
decision to refuse the British offer outright, so as neither to provoke the 
Germans nor to unsettle the Yugoslavs. But he would ask the British to 
land as soon as the Germans crossed the Danube or the Rumanian border 
into Bulgaria, as then their intentions would be unmasked. This decision 
was finally communicated to the British government on 18 January. 193 
As for Wavell, he was much relieved, for, as he told a postwar 
audience, "If Metaxas had accepted my offer of guns in January 1941 I 
should have had to stop my advance at Tobruk as that would have 
deprived me of the very considerable part of my technical arm .... I 
could not have gone any further. 194 (Wavell had become in many ways a 
Greek hero, like Metaxas. He caught the imagination-so very British, so 
very firm, so decided, so clearly impossible to ruffle or alarm; he was to 
the Greeks a legendary character. When he left on 17 January the Greeks 
felt lonely.) 
As Casson pointed out, while the diplomats got excited about the 
German threat early in January, the soldiers could discuss it calmly since 
they knew the Germans simply could not get through the Bulgarian 
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passes in the winter. But the real Greek tragedy began then, because the 
Greeks knew that a German attack was now inevitable. 195 
One of the interesting things about war and the mind of man is that 
something that is true of one side is never assumed to be true of the other. 
Thus on the one hand the British in London were suggesting in early 
January that the Germans could attack Greece on the twentieth, while 
D'Albiac was reporting on the fourteenth that weather had closed all but 
two of his airfields. At Larissa a squadron of Gladiators had been 
grounded by fog for fourteen days waiting for good enough weather to be 
able to fly across the mountains to Janina to support the Greeks. Eleusis 
was waterlogged. 196 The Germans were not credited with similar diffi-
culties. 
There were many reasons why the matter should have been left 
where it had fallen then. It was, as Casson suggested, a tragedy plodding 
towards its inevitable conclusion when the Greeks would run out of 
supplies and momentum just as the snows melted, the flowers bloomed, 
and the Germans attacked in April. But London was filled with noble 
thoughts and unnecessary miscalculations, which would lead to further 
tragedies and prolong the war. A better course would have been to secure 
North Africa before the Germans could cross over from Italy or establish 
the Luftwaffe. By mid-January Wavell was already concerned that the 
Luftwaffe was moving into the central Mediterranean to reinforce the 
Italians for an attack on Malta. This meant that Egypt's western 
flankguard had become Benghazi rather than Tobruk. 
On another level, on 14 January the bureaucratic mind was at work in 
Cairo, dutifully reporting to London that the first estimate for services 
rendered to the Greeks for three months of campaigning amounted to the 
following sums, not large by the standards of the day: 
Hospital and other costs .................... £2000 
12 old Gladiators ........................... £1800 the lot 
Supplies & road transport ................... £4000 
£7,800 
The Greeks paid Shell Oil Company directly for fuel, while airfields, 
billets, and the like were supplied free. So the cost of aid to Greece was 
hardly a consideration.197 
In London Metaxas' refusal of the proffered help was accepted, but in 
order to cover his position Churchill insisted on 17 January that Wavell 
and Longmore tell the Greek prime minister that if the special force the 
British had proposed was not sent before the German advance began, it 
would certainly be too late, and no offensive British force would go to 
Salonika at any time; therefore nothing needed to be done to prepare 
ports in northern Greece.198 
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In mid-January Cunningham was planning a series of pin-prick sea-
borne raids on the Dodecanese, but the Admiralty ordered him not to stir 
up a hornet's nest until their capture could be settled upon. Churchill told 
the Chiefs of Staff on the thirteenth that the arrival of the German air force 
in the central Mediterranean was evil, and promptly revived the idea of 
WORKSHOP, the taking of Pantellaria; the Defence Committee replied 
that the proper solution was the seizure of Sicily, but to this Churchill 
strenuously objected, declaring that the failure to take Pantellaria would 
be one of the classic mistakes of the war. So it was agreed to reconsider it in 
a week. 199 
Long a frustration for Metaxas and Papagos had been the failure to 
develop a Balkan alliance system or mutual security pact. At the heart of 
the problem lay the jealousies and suspicions of the various states-
Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece, as well as Turkey. 
There were religious differences as well as linguistic and racial ones. 
Yugoslavia itself was made up of Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes. On top 
of this there were the enmities inherited from the three wars of 1912,1913, 
and 1914-1918, as well as the Graeco-Turkish affair of 1922. Nor did 
geography help. Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia, was right on the 
Danube in the east central part of the country, while the principal seaport 
in the area was Salonika in Greece, long coveted by Bulgaria. Numerous 
conferences and exchanges had failed to solve these problems, though 
the Greeks kept trying. From 6 through 17 January 1941 there was an 
exchange between Metaxas and the Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul, which 
concluded with a still-secret conversation between the Yugoslav ambas-
sador and the Greek prime minister. Evidently Prince Paul stressed his 
country's geographic disadvantages, bringing the whole discussion to an 
unsatisfactory conclusion as far as Metaxas was concerned.2oo 
17 - 18 January 
On 17 January the Luftwaffe bombed the Suez Canal, which had to be 
closed for twenty-four hours. 201 
The British minister in Sofia, George Rendel, reported in a telegram 
that the story in Bulgaria was that the Germans in Rumania were there 
mainly as a precaution against a British attempt to establish a Balkan front 
and were no menace to Bulgaria itself. Rendel was not so sure. Certainly 
the Foreign Office in London viewed the story as German propaganda. 202 
Late on the seventeenth Papagos sent for Heywood and passed along 
the word which the Hungarian regent, Admiral Horthy, had given to the 
Greek minister at Budapest: the Germans had 280,000 troops in Rumania 
with material for double that number. The Greek (or British?) military 
attache in Bucharest put the number at 180,000. 
On the evening of the eighteenth Heywood reported that Metaxas' 
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policy was to gain time so that he could clean up Albania and shift troops 
to Macedonia while the British built up a strategical reserve in Egypt, "if 
His Majesty's Government concurs in his plan." Heywood then went on 
that Metaxas was "very anxious that it should be understood that his 
attitude is not one of refusal but is dictated by the latest date that the 
arrival of such assistance as we can give should be prepared and timed to 
effect surprise without provocation."203 
Longmore signaled the Air Ministry from Athens that he recalled that 
he was to get 220 Mohawks (Curtiss P-36's) sometime, of which the Greeks 
were to get 30 early. A recent signal had indicated he was to get 500 
Tomahawks (Curtis P-40's), but he did not know whether these were to be 
helpful or not, as he had heard that the Tomahawks were not yet satisfac-
tory and might not meet RAF requirements. He needed to know at once as 
it affected the decisions he had to make on the re-equipment of both the 
RAF and the Greek squadrons. 
From Cairo Wavell told the CIGS that on the sixteenth he had visited 
British units in and near Athens and had then spent a quarter of an hour 
in the evening each with the king, Metaxas, and Papagos. The Greek chief 
of staff had explained that they could not accept British troops for the 
Albanian front owing to administrative difficulties. Just as he was leaving 
Athens on the morning of the seventeenth, Wavell had received the COS 
signal relaying Churchill's warning, which he had immediately communi-
cated to the king, emphasizing that London thought an attack on Salonika 
much more imminent than did Athens and stressing the point that British 
help could not arrive rapidly if an emergency arose. The king then asked 
Wavell what units he could supply, to which Wavell replied that he could 
send four or five regiments of artillery and one regiment of cruiser tanks. 
"He asked whether any infantry formations could be sent, and I said that I 
had no authority to send any." Late that night Wavell sent another 
telegram to the War Office giving his views of the Salonika situation: 
1. Present proposal is a dangerous half measure. I do not believe 
that troops it is proposed to send are sufficient to enable the 
equivalent of three Greek divisions to hold Salonika if the Ger-
mans are really determined to advance on it. We shall almost 
inevitably be compelled to send further troops in haste or shall 
become involved in retreat or defeat. Meanwhile advance into 
Libya will be halted and Italians given time to recover. 
2. Factor which may cause Germany to hesitate from move into 
Bulgaria is that, by doing away with Bulgarian neutrality, she at 
once exposes Rumanian oilfields to bombing attack. I have seen 
no reference to this fact in spite of many Foreign Office telegrams 
on Balkan situation, but surely it is most important one and 
Germany's fears in this respect may deter her moves. 
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Wavell then went on to point out that tying up technical troops in 
Salonika was poor investment if no attack came, and that with the poor 
communications in Greece they could do little to help on the Albanian 
front. He then further stressed the terrible weakness of his command in 
AlA and fighter aircraft. Moreover, while he had been assured that his 
forces were to be expanded and that troops sent to Salonika would be 
replaced, he was now finding convoys being cut of drafts and units 
essential even to keeping his present force up to strength. "If this repre-
sents a change of policy and we must be prepared to live on our own 
leanness for some time, may I please be informed; it would, of course, 
greatly increase dangers of sending forces to Salonika .... My conclusion 
is that we should accept Greek refusal, but shall make all necessary 
reconnaissances and preparations of Salonika front without giving any 
promise to send troops at future date."204 
The Air Ministry told Longmore that he would get 300 Tomahawks 
from the United States over the next five months, though they would 
have American guns and be unusable until ammunition arrived. The 200 
Mohawks, which he was to share with the South African air force, did 
need to have their engines modified before their next flight, so there 
would be a delay of a month while the fix was made; engines would be 
shipped out for the aircraft he already had. Longmore was naturally 
unhappy with this and complained that he needed then as many Hur-
ricanes as possible until the supply of American aircraft was assured. 
Obviously, he continued, this affected the allocation of equipment and he 
hoped that it would be borne in mind when new commitments were 
made, especially now that the Luftwaffe had appeared in the Mediterra-
nean. He, therefore, proposed to retain No. 33 Hurricane Squadron as 
insurance and only send No. 112 Gladiator and No. 11 Blenheim squad-
rons to Greece in order to assure cover for the newly reinstated advance 
on Benghazi. 
A garbled signal from the COS had reached Athens earlier on Satur-
day, but it was not until five o'clock that Heywood could send on to 
Longmore the corrected version, which said that he was given both the 
option of retaining No. 33 Squadron in Egypt and permission to return to 
Egypt. 205 
Metaxas now began a more complicated game. He asked formally that 
British troops be landed as soon as the German army entered Bulgaria. 
This was to be the basis of staff talks from which large-scale planning was 
to come. The Greek prime minister also sent a copy of this note to 
Belgrade, knowing it would immediately be passed along to Berlin. The 
Greek dilemma was that if Yugoslavia joined the Allies, Salonika was 
needed as the port through which she would have to be supplied, and the 
Metaxas Line, those well-designed fortifications on the Bulgarian border, 
would be needed to cover Salonika. If Yugoslavia stayed neutral, then it 
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was better to hold the shorter line along the Vermion Ridge through 
Edessa to Mount Olympus. But if Yugoslavia let the Germans pass 
through, then the Vermion Line could be turned and it was better to fall 
back on to the Aliakmon Line, which blocked the exits from the Monastir 
Gap. These three lines would keep cropping up in discussions over the 
coming weeks. 206 Unlike the Metaxas Line, the other two existed only on 
maps. In the note that Metaxas gave Palairet for London he pointed out 
that the Yugoslavs had withdrawn their pledge not to let the Germans 
pass through their country; and while on the one hand Metaxas had 
talked of a strategic reserve for which the shipping would be gathered, on 
the other he now observed that the British forces in the Middle East were 
inadequate to solve the problems of southeast Europe.207 
19 - 28 January 
Wavell's visit to Athens was intended to be secret, but Reuters in Istanbul 
published that it was for discussions with the Greek general staff on plans 
to counter a German thrust across Bulgaria into Greece, so Eden tele-
graphed Metaxas that they had given to the press and the BBC the story 
that Wavell had been over to consult about British aid to the Greeks 
against the Italians. 208 
Like an omen, at noon on 19 January a long-range German "Heinkel" 
photo aircraft (probably a Ju-86P at 33,000 feet) made a successful recon-
naissance, lasting over two hours, of the Athens-Piraeus area, where 
twenty-one ships had arrived on the seventeenth carrying all sorts of vital 
war supplies, including parts for the Blenheims. Just after noon the next 
day 9 Italian SM-79's attacked the Piraeus from 1,500 feet and hit one 
empty 7,OOO-ton ship. The Italians lost one bomber and the British one 
fighter. 209 
"Will Bill" Donovan had since the fifteenth been staying with the 
Palairets at the British embassy, where he learned that the embassy in 
Moscow reported that the Russians felt that any German moves in the 
Balkans were no threat to them. Donovan also understood that the British 
were having no luck in Ankara either: the Turkish view was that the 
British should finish off the Italians in Libya so that they could shift their 
forces to meet the threat in the Balkans, and that it was inadvisable to 
provoke Germany as long as her concentration in Rumania was defen-
sive.210 By the twentieth Donovan had reached Sofia on his tour of the 
Balkans. 211 
Meanwhile in London on the night of 19 January the Chiefs of Staff 
had met to sort out the muddle left by the Greek refusal of inadequate aid. 
Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, believed that the eastern 
Mediterranean should be consolidated so that later on forces could be sent 
to Greece and Turkey. To do this Cyrenaica should be cleared, Benghazi 
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secured, and the Dodecanese occupied, especially now that the Germans 
were using the air bases there for attacks on the Suez Canal. He ruled out 
attempts to seize Sardinia and Sicily for lack of air support. Naturally, 
Churchill, still suffering from a week-old cold, reacted bitterly to this lack 
of offensive-mindedness, demanding instead that "the great forces in the 
Middle East" be used to open the lines of communication with Turkey, 
then blocked by the Vichy occupation of Syria. The victorious Army of the 
Nile, as Winston had recently renamed the Western Desert force, was to 
be a mobile reserve to be dispatched to Greece, or to Turkey if the 
Germans swung around through the Ukraine and down through the 
Caucasus. Orders were sent to the Middle East accordingly. But Long-
more was allowed to retain No. 33 Gladiator squadron.212 
Unlike the commanders at home, who had modern railway networks 
to save their motor transport, and vast civilian factories and repair organi-
zations handy, as well as limited distances to travel, the commanders in 
the Middle East had to operate over distances commonly the length of the 
United Kingdom or more, almost always with motor transport fueled out 
of leaky four-gallon cans. But this was only one of the disadvantages faced 
by the AOC-in-C ME. For the Battle of Britain, Air Chief Marshal Dowding 
had twenty nine Hurricane and nineteen Spitfire squadrons, giving him 
about 760 first-class single-seat fighters, of which he could launch 570 at 
anyone time because they were serviceable. In contrast, in January 1941 
Longmore had yet to have in the theater 100 Hurricanes, of which he 
could normally not expect more than 70 to be serviceable, and these could 
not operate from all his airfields. Of the 26 Hurricanes and 15 replace-
ments which landed in Greece for the campaign between mid-February 
and mid-April, 33 were lost and only 8 flew out to Crete. Forty-two of 47 
Blenheim bombers and all 16 Gladiators sent were destroyed.213 It was 
small wonder that Longmore's wastage in his fast-moving campaigns in 
remote areas was high. The Prime Minister should not have been sur-
prised, but, as Eden said in November 1940, Churchill did not understand 
modern maintenance problems of motor transport, tanks, and aircraft 
operating in a country of desert spaces and devoid of industrial capaci-
ty.214 
In the latter part of January, intelligence of various sorts was flowing 
into the Foreign Office from its consuls in the Balkans, all indicating the 
likelihood of German action and of Yugoslav inaction.215 On the twenty-
first the Chiefs of Staff ordered Wavell to proceed to Benghazi as fast as 
possible and turn it into a well-defended naval and air base, then to 
capture the Dodecanese so as to clear the lines of communications to 
Greece and Turkey. He was informed that a special force of four Glen ships 
carrying landing craft and 1,500 commandos was being sent out, and that 
he was to create a four-division strategic reserve in the Delta as soon as 
possible.216 
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It was said that four divisions was the minimum that Metaxas would 
accept as assistance against invasion.217 But it seems that at this point a 
typographical error crept in, which on 22 February Papagos would try to 
correct, but which would help lead to ultimate disaster A 9 and a 4 are 
fairly similar when handwritten. Both the record and common sense 
show that the Greeks meant nine, but that the British could only find four. 
This conclusion appears logical, especially later when the British were 
trying to justify to the Australians having sent inadequate forces. 
On 23 January Eden telegraphed Palairet an account of the Turkish 
Foreign Secretary's meeting with the German ambassador, von Papen, in 
Ankara, at which the latter had said that the Germans were in Rumania 
defensively to meet the threat posed by British landings after they cleaned 
up in Libya. However the Germans did not regard the current level of 
British activity in Greece as dangerous, nor did they have any intention of 
going into Bulgaria. The Turkish Foreign Minister had not believed von 
Papen, and his country's partial mobilization was proceeding. At the 
same time in Moscow the German ambassador had let it be known that his 
country had not forgotten "the fatal Salonika front."218 On the twenty-
first Athens had heard from Rumanian sources that the Germans would 
attack Salonika through Bulgaria.219 On the twenty-second Eden had 
lunched with the Yugoslav ambassador, who stated categorically that 
Salonika was absolutely vital to his country and that she would fight to 
protect it. He and the Turkish and Russian ambassadors also agreed that 
British forces in the Middle East were too small to get involved in Europe 
and that the Germans were already in Bulgaria: the British were too 
late. 220 
London received on 22 January a status report on airfields in Crete 
which indicated that Heraklion had been ready for use since the end of the 
year, with 1,000 yards of runway laid and rolled; that work had com-
menced on Retimo; that Maleme near Suda Bay could now take fighter 
aircraft; and that a new site had been found at Pediada Kastelli fifteen 
miles southwest of Heraklion which allowed approximately 1,500 yards 
for take-off in any direction. 221 
In Cairo two senior doctors, Col. N. Hamilton Fairley and Col. J.S.K. 
Boyd, gave Wavell a medical appreciation of the dangers of malaria in 
southeast Europe. Fairley was consulting physician to the Australian 
Imperial forces in the Middle East and consultant in tropical diseases to 
the British forces, while his colleague was the deputy director of pa-
thology for the British forces. Both were worried because there had 
already been trouble in the training areas in Palestine, especially in Arab 
villages where more than 20 percent of the children had the disease. 
Antimalarial measures at this time were mostly confined to avoiding 
known infectious areas and control of mosquito-breeding sites near camp. 
Quinine was only used clinically, followed by atabrine. Malaria was not a 
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significant problem in the Desert because there was almost no water, but 
Greece was another matter. 222 
The Fairley-Boyd report, apparently drawn up at Wavell's request, 
dealt with both Greece and Turkey. It was compiled by men with great 
authority and was based upon both research and personal experience. 
The report pointed out that malaria was hyper-endemic in the plains of 
Macedonia and in the Struma and Vardar river basins. In 1916-1918 the 
British army in these areas had suffered extremely heavy casualties from 
the disease. Now the area had many refugees, as a result of the exchange 
of populations with Anatolia, and there were great dangers in using 
unseasoned troops there. Moreover, the Germans knew more than the 
British about the problem, as they had established a major research center 
in the area. Fairley and Boyd reported that only in October-through-May 
season would it be medically safe to conduct military operations in north-
ern Greece. Wavell asked about the antimalarial work the Greeks had 
done and concluded that their analysis was "typical of non-medical and 
non-military experience." But after a 7 February meeting with Greek 
officers he agreed to help carry out measures needed to mitigate haz-
ards.223 
While this discussion was going on, Prime Minister Churchill had 
been trying to get a commitment from the Turks, his old Gallipoli enemies 
of the First World War. This simply exacerbated the tensions between 
London and Cairo over supplies. Already the AOC-in-C had been told 
that he was to regard Malta's defense as his first priority. Longmore had 
been forced to signal back that he had not yet received three squadrons of 
fighters promised and that he could not guarantee to fly them into the 
island in winter. The response from London was to tell him that he could 
form as many additional squadrons as possible from what he had. Once 
those in London had made a decision, they seemed to assume that 
sufficient material and trained personnel would be found-which was 
true enough in England but not in the Middle East where there was 
usually a three to six months' lag between order and delivery. 
For instance, 21 Battalion, New Zealand Army in England was or-
dered to go to Egypt on 26 November 1940. The first vehicles were sent off 
on 28 November, but the battalion did not march out from its Camberley 
barracks until 3 January 1941; the Duchess of Bedford sailed on the fifth, 
only to anchor off Newport, Monmouthshire, for several days, finally 
leaving Belfast for Cape Town on the twelfth. It called at Freetown, Sierra 
Leone, and reached Table Bay on 8 February. Four days later it sailed 
again, passed through the Gulf of Aden, arrived at Port Tewfik on 3 
March, and began to disembark on the eighth. The battalion was still 
unloading on 14 March when it was put on forty-eight-hours warning for 
Greece, arriving finally at the Piraeus on 29 March, four months after it 
was ordered from Britain.224 It is scarcely any wonder that Wavell and his 
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fellow commanders viewed London's orders of:21 January as instructions 
to live on "their leanness" for the next three months. 225 
There were two basic reasons that supply was a constant bone of 
contention between London and Cairo-time and distance. London for-
got that ships could only make two round trips a year, and they tended to 
think that once items were ordered shipped they could be considered as 
being on hand in the Middle East. Nor did London appreciate the geo-
metric scale of the increase in supply needs with the distances involved. 
And decision makers in London underestimated the needs of modem 
war, especially in maintenance and communications, and the break-
downs of untested equipment in its early battlefield use-a common 
problem after a long period of peace. 
The relationship with Turkey at this point well illustrates the very 
frustrating position in which Longmore, in particular, found himself 
because of the actions taken by Churchill and Portal in London. 
Alerted by ULTRA and expecting the attack in Greece any day, Lon-
don was terribly anxious to get Turkey into the war. But the Turks were 
realists. They were dissatisfied over the slow delivery of the aircraft they 
had been promised, they needed fighters and antiaircraft guns, and 
many Turkish squadrons were grounded, and their training delayed for 
lack of spares. While they for their part had promised to hasten the 
development of ports and airfields, they had no wish to provoke the 
Germans while they were themselves unready, as they patiently ex-
plained during staff talks. The report of these conversations reached 
London on 22 January. Churchill then appealed to the president of 
Turkey, Inonii, and promised him ten squadrons of fighters and bombers 
as soon as they could be received, and 100 AJ A guns from Egypt with 
more to follow. This, he reasoned, should allow Turkey to make a threat 
against both the Rumanian and the Russian oilfields. On the twenty-
fourth the air attache in Ankara signaled Longmore that the Turks wanted 
five hundred first-line aircraft of the latest type with bombs, fuel, training 
aircraft, lorries, and so on. 226 
This coincided with a signal from London telling Longmore to work 
up plans to knock the Luftwaffe out of Rhodes and Sicily, to which he had 
reasonably responded, Had the air staff worked out the maximum 
number of squadrons the Middle East could maintain, given existing air 
and sea communications? Nor was Longmore happy when he learned 
that he was to supply the ten squadrons promised by the Prime Minister, 
even though London told him that by the end of March he would have a 
further 100 Hurricanes, 120 Blenheims, 45 Marylands, and 35 Well-
ingtons. 227 
Additionally on 24 January the Chiefs of Staff ordered the C-in-C's in 
Cairo to plan and prepare for the invasion of Sicily, an operation to follow 
shortly after that in the Dodecanese, especially if there was a falling out 
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between the Italians and the Germans. Moreover, the C-in-C's were to 
provide all the necessary forces from their own resources, though they 
might retain shipping as it arrived in the Middle East. And even though 
the feasibility of the whole operation might be in some doubt, the com-
manders and their forces were to be nominated. 228 
This was followed two days later by a signal from Churchill admitting 
that the message of the twenty fourth was sent at his urging, but returning 
to the theme of support for Wavell only if he was not wasteful of resources 
in his rearward areas. This signal made clear that the reason for invading 
Sicily was to open the Narrows of the Mediterranean and to shorten the 
route to the Middle East for troop convoys, a hope which was dashed by 
the arrival of the German air force in the Mediterranean. The second 
paragraph was devoted to puzzlement over Wavell's recent refusal of 
another South African division unless it came fully supplied with its own 
administrative tail. Churchill pointed out that the offer of the South 
African division was part of a master plan gradually to get the Afrikaaners 
committed to the main theater of war: "On no account must General 
Smuts be discouraged from his bold and sound policy of gradually 
working South African Forces into the main theatre." He then went on to 
conclude that the Germans were active in the Balkans: "We must expect a 
series of very heavy disastrous blows in the Balkans, and possibly a 
general submission there to German aims. The stronger the strategic 
reserve which you can build up in the Delta, and the more advanced your 
preparations to transfer it to the European shores, the better will be the 
chances of securing a favourable crystallization. "229 
To this Wavell responded on 27 January that he could assure the Prime 
Minister that "my demands for rearward services are the result of the 
most careful and prolonged examination and that everyone of my princi-
pal administrative officers is working on what he (and I) regards as 
dangerously low margins. At the moment my forward movements in 
Cyrenaica, in the Sudan and in E. Africa are all in danger of coming to a 
halt, not from lack of fighting troops, but for want of transport, signals, 
wokshops and such." And he went on to point out that he had 100,000 
prisoners of war to guard, which further strained his manpower. Then he 
reminded London that his two divisions had defeated eleven enemy 
divisions by their superior equipment and mobility, only made possible 
by superior rearward services. As for the South African division, none of 
the telegrams he had seen had ever suggested that they could be used 
north of Kenya, as that was Smuts' political pledge. If they could, he 
would welcome them, provided they came with a full complement of 
administrative services. As far as the Balkans was concerned, he fully 
agreed on the danger there and on the need for a strong general reserve in 
the Nile Delta, "but such reserve will be useless unless it is fully equipped 
with the necessary proportion of modern weapons ... and unless ad-
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ministrative services and base units are available to enable it to be trans-
ferred and maintained in overseas theatre. This is policy on which I must 
continue to work so long as you entrust me with responsibility for this 
theatre. 1 need hardly point out again that Army operations anywhere are 
entirely dependent on effective air support and that air reinforcement 
must continue to keep pace with reinforcement of troops .... Possibly 
most effective deterrent to German advance in Balkans would be knowl-
edge that any infringement of Bulgarian neutrality would at once bring 
heavy air attack on Rumanian oilfields. "230 
There followed another long signal later in the day from Cairo to 
London detailing the shipping problems occasioned by the capture of 
Benghazi, which entailed running a coastal convoy service over a distance 
equivalent to that from John O'Groats to Lands End, in an area already 
starved of shipping. This had already required that three ships be taken 
off the Greek and Turkish services. Certainly OPERATION MANDIBLES 
needed to be done, but it would be early April before the Glen assault 
ships arrived. The capture of Rhodes was urgent, but would have to start 
with the taking of Kasos, and even when all of Cyrenaica was in British 
hands fighters would have to be retained in Egypt to guard against attacks 
from Rhodes. And apart from Longmore's problems in forming new 
fighter squadrons from the material trickling in, he was saddled with the 
defense of Malta; but owing to distances and weather, even fighters with 
long-range tanks could not easily get through to the island.231 
On 29 January Churchill replied, "1 quite understand that your rear-
ward services must be specially maintained because of the great distances 
and the absence of local reserves and repair facilities such as we have 
here." But then he went on to say that he was preparing another analysis 
of Middle Eastern ration strength which he was sending out and he 
expected Wavell to "help in every possible way." He added that Smuts 
said he could send troops anywhere in Africa-but there was no hurry, as 
far as Churchill was concerned, in taking the division. He ended by 
saying that London would be considering the impact of various new 
events in the Aegean, including the possible collapse of Greece and 
abstention of Turkey. 232 
While London was trying to push Turkey and Yugoslavia together, 
Knatchbull-Hugessen telegraphed from Ankara that the German military 
attache had told his Greek opposite number that the Germans expected to 
walk into Salonika on 2 March without opposition; that would give them 
Mediterranean bases there, at Trieste, and at Gibraltar. The Greek had 
hotly replied that Turkey would fight on the side of Greece.233 
Meanwhile on 27 January air intelligence had been able to point out 
accurately that the Germans now had 80 long-range divebombers at 
Benina, near Benghazi (but the Middle East was not as yet able to make 
full use of such intelligence). It was also able to warn Admiral Cun-
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ningham three days ahead that the Germans were going to mine the Suez 
Canal. 234 
But perhaps the most important development was taking place in 
Athens, where on the eighteenth Metaxas had had to cancel a meeting 
with Longmore and had ever since been increasingly, but secretly, ill. 235 
29 January 1941 
Early on Wednesday, 29 January, General Ioannis Metaxas, president of 
the Council and prime minister of Greece, died. Seventy years old and 
suffering from a variety of ailments, he passed away lying on the old 
leather couch at his home in Kifisis, surrounded by his wife and daugh-
ters. According to what Metaxas' son-in-law told Laird Archer that morn-
ing, the doughty old man died of a combination of diabetes, intestinal 
troubles (kidney infections), and influenza, as well as a heart attack. The 
seriousness of his condition had been kept a secret, as people pinned their 
hopes of ultimate victory on this little man of rugged fortitude and 
undoubted patriotism. Casson says he died after a tonsil operation. 236 
The prime minister lay in state in the Greek Orthodox cathedral, the 
Mitropolis on Miropoleos Street, attended only by four Efzones, the elite 
Greek soldiers, in their traditional white kilts. The British ambassador 
and the four attaches went, knelt, kissed the icon, and departed in sorrow 
at the loss of a personal friend. 237 
c.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times, then a young correspondent in 
the Balkans, found that the short, fatherly-looking dictator, known as "the 
Little Moltke," despite his unpopularity, inspired an immense outpour-
ing from the emotional Greek people on his passing, perhaps because fear 
of Germany now replaced euphoria. Wavell, writing in The Army Quarterly 
just before his own death in 1950, said that Metaxas was the heart of the 
Greek defenses, that "he may have been an arbitrary politician, but he was 
a very stout-hearted and skillful director of his country's defense at a 
critical hour." Sir David Hunt, who was present in Athens at the time, 
called his funeral the burial of British military luck in Greece. 238 
Ioannis Metaxas was a significant figure in the early history of the 
Second World War. To a non-Greek not involved in the emotions of 
internal Hellenic politics of then and now, the scales of justice seem to tip 
decisively toward a verdict of patriotism, realism, and strategic sound-
ness, if not genius. He knew his country and he knew the Balkans. Britain 
was lucky that he was there steadfastly to deflect foolish proposals con-
cocted in London and dutifully relayed by Cairo (where it was hoped he 
would turn them down). As a contemporary, it was his fate to have to be 
associated with Churchill's ideas in both World Wars. But as the leader of a 
lesser power and a man of fewer words, he was the greater realist. 
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Certain moments are decisive in history because they see the release 
of historically decisive forces that turn the footsteps of Fate in a certain 
direction. The death of Metaxas was one of these. Greece was, as he 
recognized, marching inevitably to tragedy even if she had the power and 
the luck and the time to push the Italians out of Albania. By the time of his 
death, and perhaps helping to cause it, the Little Moltke knew that the 
Germans were going to combine with Greece's traditional enemy, Bul-
garia, to invade Hellas. That the British were in Greece was less the excuse 
than, on the petty level, the settling of old Balkan scores left from 1913; at 
a higher level the motivation was to stabilize Italian and German spheres 
of influence on the Balkans before Hitler began the great crusade against 
the Soviet Union. 
Whether they realized it or not, the British were in a race against time 
in Libya and the Mediterranean. They needed to clear North Africa and 
save Malta, in order to open the Mediterranean to convoys, protect 
shipping, and shorten their supply routes; and they needed to clear the 
Dodecanese, and probably Syria, in order to bolster Turkey. Aside from 
the proper strategic necessity of securing Crete, aid to Greece was a noble 
distraction, but an irrational one which the United Kingdom could not at 
that time afford. Yet, unfortunately, Churchill and Eden insisted on 
setting Britain on the same path to tragedy that Greece was taking. Self-
analysis and rational calculation were not British strong points, and 
Churchill still tended to fight the Second World War as though it was the 
Kitchener expedition to avenge General Gordon, an operation in which 
he himself had fought. Had Metaxas lived, he might have saved the 
British Empire by keeping Wavell on the path to Tripoli. 
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29 January 1941 - 4 March 1941 
During the winter of 1940-1941 British armaments production climbed, but so did 
shipping losses as the U-boats took their toll. Civilian casualties mounted during 
the Blitz (the nighttime German air raids) and exceeded military losses. Most 
dangerous of all, the supply of dollars was fast running down as exports were 
curtailed and armaments sucked bank accounts dry. But once safely reelected, FOR 
came to the rescue with Lend-Lease, which enabled the British to borrow weapons, 
and other helpful measures. In fact, Britain found she was better off by late March 
than she had thought, for a judicial review came to the decision that the Air 
Ministry had far overestimated the size of the German air force, while evidence 
from many sources, including ULTRA, began to point toward German activity in 
the east rather than an invasion of the British Isles. 
To secure their flank for their move toward Russia, and to smooth the flow of 
badly needed raw materials, especially Rumanian oil, the Germans were deter-
mined to clean up the mess made by Mussolini's ambitions in Greece, and to block 
his schemes elsewhere in the Balkans. To this end in December they began shifting 
troops to Rumania, put on pressure to obtain bases in Bulgaria, and sought to 
coerce Yugoslavia to allow passage to Salonika. The Turks played a waiting game. 
By early 1941 all the rest of continental Europe, with the exception of the 
neutral Iberia, Switzerland, and Sweden, was essentially under German 
hegemony. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom could destroy that 
control without Soviet help, and that was unavailable before 22 June. 
The weeks after the death of Metaxas were less significant for Greek than 
for British history. The story we have now to tell explains a great deal 
about how history is made by people, not by luck, and how the ignoring 
of geographical and timely obstacles leads to disaster. The Prime Minister 
in London kept changing his mind about the objectives like a puppy in a 
fire-hydrant factory. The presence of senior politicians in unusual places 
complicated the decision-making process, while the timorousness of 
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those who had doubts again prevented timely warnings. Once the ra-
tional Metaxas was removed from the scene, there was no one to say 
"Ochi," and it was all a tragic march to the final evacuation at the end of 
April. 
The passing of the tough little Greek leader was but an incident, of 
course, in an ongoing drama. Other themes continued to develop. The C-
in-C's in Cairo asked whether in the event of a ceasefire between Italy and 
Greece the policy was still to hold Crete, to which the COS replied in the 
affirmative. l The question of Turkey remained unsettled. On 23 January 
AVM Elmhirst had reported that the Turks badly needed 500 planes to re-
equip their air force and that, in addition to supplying spares for the 
British machines they already possessed, they wanted the British to build 
and stock all-weather airfields, especially in Thrace, so that in the event of 
war the RAF could move in rapidly. Elmhirst then left on a tour of Turkish 
positions, not to return to Cairo until 15 February. To meet Turkish 
demands, Portal proposed that three fighter and two bomber squadrons 
plus 100 AlA guns be diverted to Turkey (in spite of their virtual nonexis-
tence in the Middle East). 
After the news of Metaxas' death reached London, Churchill and the 
COS settled on a new policy, which was not to give priority to the seizure 
of Benghazi, but to aim instead at neutralizing Bulgaria. This was coupled 
with a scheme to bomb the Rumanian oilfields from Turkish airfields. 
Once again the trouble with London's strategic vision was that Churchill 
thought that the vast forces in the Middle East were underemployed, and 
that the capture of Benghazi and of the Dodecanese would not occupy 
them sufficiently. Not surprisingly, when Longmore heard of the cavalier 
offer of his forces to Turkey, he was astounded. Eden noted in his dairy 
that Churchill and Portal were touting the plan as the key to the Balkans, 
because in their view Wavell did not see the dangers there sufficiently. 2 
On 30 January Portal sent Longmore a personal signal which began, 
"This is a warning telegram only. It is possible that during the next few 
days Turkish Government may agree to suggestion His Majesty's Govern-
ment are making that they should allow us to infiltrate air forces into 
Turkey forthwith .... We suggest three fighter, four Blenheim, three 
Wellington at first, possibly followed later by two more fighter and three 
more Blenheim squadrons from Greece. Actual dispatch of any squad-
rons would be subject to stabilized situation in Libya, but it would take 
priority over operations against East Africa, Abyssinia, Sicily, and further 
assistance to Greece." And the signal ended that all of this would be most 
urgent and might have to be accomplished immediately if the Turks 
accepted. 3 
Longmore's popularity in London was surely not improved by his 
reply, which began, 
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Quite frankly contents astound me, but, as both Wavell and 
Cunningham will be seriously affected by the removal of squad-
rons concerned to Turkey, full reply cannot be sent until after 
consultation with them. In meantime, I cannot believe you fully 
appreciate present situation Middle East, in which Libyan drive in 
full career and Sudan offensive into Eritrea progressing satisfac-
torily. Neither shows signs of immediate stabilization. Arrival of 
aircraft in Middle East all routes now hardly keeping pace with 
casualties Libya, Sudan, Greece, Malta, and there is no chance of 
forming Nos. 250, 251, 89 or 91 Fighter Squadrons in immediate 
future. Nos. 47 and 223 Squadrons in Sudan are still operating 
Wellesleys, No. 237 a mixture of Lysanders and Hardys. No. 39 
has no aircraft at all until Glen[n] Martin's arrive here. Have not 
sufficient personnel or stocks of bombs to disperse them in Tur-
key whilst still meeting our existing commitments .... Under 
these circumstances and however strong the political advantages 
may be of impressing the Turks, can you really afford to lock up 
the squadrons you propose in Turkey, where they might well 
remain for some time inoperative even against the Dodecanese, 
until the Turks declare their hand? Would it not be forsaking the 
substance for the shadow?4 
To this Portal replied that he could understand Longmore's astonish-
ment, but the limit on cipher signals did not make it possible to keep him 
fully informed. It was the considered opinion in London that they were 
putting first things first, by deterring Germany from taking Greece, 
Turkey, and the eastern Mediterranean through fear of having the Ruma-
nian oilfields bombed. Besides, by the end of March Longmore should 
have an additional 100 Hurricanes, 120 Blenheim IV's, 45 Glen[n] Martins 
and 35 Wellingtons. As to the shortage of bombs, the CAS could not 
understand this, as Middle East Command had 4,500 tons on hand, 
according to London's count, and 7,000 tons en route, while Turkey 
would need only 350 tons per month. 
On the thirty-first Churchill sent a message directly to the president 
of Turkey formally offering 100 antiaircraft guns and ten RAF squadrons. 
Unprepared to fight until 1942, the Turks saw this as a declaration of war 
and refused all but some instructors.5 So next the government in London 
decided that the way to force Turkey'S hand was to give all aid to Greece. 
Longmore had hoped that success in the Desert, if not elsewhere, 
would allow him to rest and refresh his tired squadrons. In Greece 
D'Albiac could do not much else, except try to rebuild the RHAF. Some 
reinforcement of the RAF in Greece took place, but it could not be raised to 
the anticipated strength of fourteen squadrons by 15 April until all-
weather airfields could be built. 6 
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Meanwhile in London Cadogan and Eden had been discussing which 
of them should visit the Middle East; the under-secretary was reluctant 
because he thought he was too much like the" chaps out there," but on the 
other hand he thought that if Anthony went he would scare the Balkan 
governments out of their wits. 7 
In his recent assessment of the state of British intelligence at this time, 
Hinsley has come to the conclusion that the British knew a good deal 
about the German plans but not very much about Greek, Turkish, or 
Yugoslav plans, and that it seems clear that Whitehall's hopes of coopera-
tion with those Balkan countries were largely based upon wishful think-
ing.8 
29 - 30 January 1941 
A secret memo circulating at the top of the War Office identified Field 
Marshal List as commanding the German 12th Army in southeast Europe, 
and set the date for his attack on Greece as the first week of March, an 
estimate based in part on "Most Secret" Luftwaffe sources. We now know 
this was from ULTRA decrypts. 9 
In Athens the king summoned Alexander Koryzis to be prime minis-
ter. He was an honest banker who had been the minister of public 
assistance from 1936 to 1939 and was highly respected for the reforms he 
had made in the departments of national health and hygiene. Meeting 
with Laird Archer for the last time as chairman of the Greek War Relief 
Committee, he left an impression of a conscientious, upstanding self-
made man with a high degree of integrity. Koryzis knew he had been 
drafted by the king, in spite of His Majesty's own doubts and the advice of 
his friends, on the strength of his record and reputation. But he was not a 
politician, though he had been in the government, for he was fiery, 
impetuous, disdainful of political expediency or party popularity. A 
towering figure of a man with a handsome broad head and great driving 
force, he was in many ways the antithesis of little Metaxas, but as Archer 
sadly concluded his diary entry, he said goodbye to the Greek War Relief 
Committee as one going to his death, for he was not a well man. 10 And it 
was true; the events of the next three months would kill him. 
D' Albiac, Turle, and Heywood were most unhappy over the appoint-
ment of Koryzis, as they did not think that he had what it would take to 
keep Greece in the war. At the same time the orthodox D' Albiac com-
plained about Papagos, who wished to use the RAF as flying artillery, 
while D' Albiac himself wished to maintain a wide-ranging, independent 
role for the RAE 
Papagos and Koryzis now told Heywood that the Greeks had only a 
two-months' supply of artillery ammunition, and Koryzis also said that 
he did not think that the Germans would attack Greece. If they did, 
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outside help could not arrive in time, and the premature dispatch of an 
effective British force to Greece could only mean disaster,11 
The distances spanned in the Cyrenaica campaign were now begin-
ning to affect wireless traffic. Because of the shortage of sets, transmis-
sions from Athens to Cairo were limited to the 0800-1200 and the 2200-
0200 watches, but the latter fell into the dead time when signals would not 
pass because of atmospheric conditions. 12 
Meanwhile in London on 29 January Eden had a talk with the Soviet 
ambassador, Maisky, to try and get an assurance that if the Germans went 
further into the Balkans the Russians would stay neutral to Turkey; but 
Maisky was noncommittal. In response to a question from Maisky, Eden 
said that Germany's attitude to the war in Albania "was to disinterest 
herself in the operations there." 
The next day the Foreign Office received a 24 December letter from 
George Rendel in Sofia, informing them that in late November and early 
December the British and Turkish air attaches had discussed whether or 
not the German use of Bulgarian bases for attacks on Greece would create 
a state of war. The view just before Christmas in Sofia was that this was a 
hypothetical question as the Germans did not wish to get involved in that 
part of the world and that it was "extremely dangerous for us to draw 
them in here as it would mean the destruction of Greece. German policy 
aims to neutralize the Balkans for fear of the ultimate political complica-
tions with Russia. But only 'until the Spring' as the Germans say here." 
Enclosed with this letter was a copy of one written by the assistant 
British air attache, S/Ldr. Aidan M. Crawley, to Air Commodore R.A. 
George, who was air attache to both Ankara and Athens, in which he 
predicted an air attack on Greece and noted that eight to ten all-weather 
bases with satellites already existed in Bulgaria. Crawley went on to 
predict that a German air attack in the face of the very weak Greek and 
British air forces could devastate every town of importance in Greece, as 
well as road and rail junctions and RAF airfields, and all in two weeks. 
Greece would collapse; Yugoslavia would be isolated. In his opinion the 
best approach for the Turks was to attack Bulgaria as soon as the Germans 
started to move in, to try to seize the country first, and let winter thus 
save Greece for a few months. 13 
Lincoln MacVeagh cabled home from Athens that the view common 
in Athens was that the Turks would not move and that the Yugoslavs 
probably could not, and that the new prime minister thought that the 
ultimate German aim was the Ukraine. 14 
Late that night a Luftwaffe raid led by a former Suez Canal pilot flew 
from Sicily, refueled at Rhodes, and successfully dropped eleven para-
chute mines into the Canal and nine on the banks. As these proved to be 
new delayed-action acoustic-magnetic mines, they defied sweeping and 
wreaked havoc for thirteen days. Between the third and the sixth of 
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February four vessels were destroyed in the Canal and a fifth damaged, 
reducing the fairway from 197 feet to 85 and the permissible draught from 
34 feet to 26 feet, 3 inches. Most seriously it deprived Admiral Cun-
ningham of his only carrier, since Illustrious had been bombed on 10 
January. Formidable had been ordered round from the South Atlantic via 
the Cape, but was held for ten days at the south end of the Canal. This 
meant that Cunningham had to stop worrying about Malta while he got 
the stopper out of the Canal. On 13 February he had Egyptian sentries 
placed along the whole length of it to spot falling mines as an aid in 
sweeping. This whole incident meant that the docks at Alexandria, the 
only ones equipped to handle large amounts of cargo, worked well below 
capacity, while a large number of vessels began to back up at Suez 
awaiting a place to unload; and all of this compounded the shortage of 
shipping. The Luftwaffe raids were effective enough to close the Canal for 
sixty-six days in 1941, forty-five of them while the British were aiding 
Greece.15 
31 January 1941 
Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, reported to Lon-
don that the German news bureau representative in Moscow had told the 
Yugoslav ambassador that Germany had no territorial ambitions in the 
Balkans, but that Yugoslavia would be offered Salonika and that "Greece 
would have to be occupied because of the British front which was being 
organized there; the Germans knew for a fact that there were 7 to 10,000 
British motorized troops in Greece."16 
It has never been easy to sift the kernels from the chaff in this sort of 
intelligence. But an understanding of German economic as well as histor-
ical interests in the area helps to explain the attitudes of both Germany 
and the Balkan states. The reason the British did so poorly in the area is 
that they had devoted little time to the Balkans, a place generally regarded 
as a comic or sinister backwater through which characters in Graham 
Greene and Agatha Christie novels passed on the Orient Express. 
On this Friday in London a massive intelligence review including 
Enigma sources indicated that only the renewal of the invasion of the 
United Kingdom would give Germany the victory she so desperately 
needed in 1942, but the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the Germans would 
not make the great gamble until autumn 1941, hoping in the meantime to 
wear the British down at sea and in the Balkans. When she did strike, 
Germany would mobilize her full resources against England, which 
would, air intelligence concluded, mean a Luftwaffe of 14,000 aircraft. 
This estimate was later proved to be way too high, but, unfortunately, the 
Chiefs of Staff refused during February to sanction the dispatch overseas 
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of any more armor or divisions because the air intelligence estimate gave 
only a three-weeks' strategic notice.!7 
The problem had been, starting in October, that the egocentric British 
were thinking along different lines from the Germans. When in early 
January intelligence in London made its first reassessment since October 
of German aims, it failed to envision a German attack upon Russia, 
making the mistake of assuming that what was logical from the British 
point of view was also what the Germans would see as desirable. 
The Air Staff were not so much concerned with impressing the Turks 
as with deterring the Germans from using Bulgaria. They, therefore, 
wished to make the threat to the Rumanian oilfields, and they gave this a 
higher priority than beating the Italians in Africa. The trouble was that the 
Air Staff had learned nothing from the campaigns of 1940, when their 
efforts to bomb the German back areas had been impotent in the face of 
the blitzkrieg. Prewar RAF doctrine of the grand-strategic use of air power 
had already been visible in Athens in the arguments between D' Albiac 
and the Greeks over the tactical employment of his force. It was a fine 
theory when based on an insular set of airfields, but it was not very 
helpful in the face of actual battlefield necessities. The arguments about 
bombing the Rumanian oilfields were really vitiated by more practical 
considerations--there simply were neither the aircraft nor the airfields for 
the job, nor would Balkan winter weather permit it. On top of this, grand-
strategic air power was not much use if the Germans could overrun its 
bases, which was exactly what Hitler intended to do. IS 
At the end of January the fate of the Middle Eastern theater hung in 
the balance. Wavell signaled that the taking of Benghazi was a month 
away, but on 5/6 February the highly mobile O'Connor was at the gates, 
while a flanking force had struck across the desert to cut the coastal road, 
closing the escape route to Tripoli. In Greece, the outnumbered Greek 
army under Papagos was about to start a winter offensive aimed at 
capturing Valona before the Germans intervened, and D' Albiac had been 
persuaded to use his aircraft in close support. In London it had been 
decided to send Eden back again to Cairo. 
1 - 5 February 1941 
The military attache in Athens reported to the War Office that his visit to 
the Albanian front had revealed that Greek morale was high, but their 
losses of pack animals due to bad weather was from 30 to 70 percent in 
December and early January, while the bulk of the troop casualties were 
from frostbite, not the Italians. 19 
In Cairo, Wavell had once again over the weekend to deal with 
Churchill's incessant complaint that his administrative forces were too 
large, and Wavell's blunt, soldierly, telegraphic prose, was not really to 
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Churchill's liking: "Experience in Libya, Eritrea and East Africa continues 
to confirm necessity for ample rearward services. Tail in each instance is 
so long that it simply has to wag the dog, but you may rely on me to ask for 
nothing unnecessary. "20 In this respect it was especially unfortunate that 
Wavell and Churchill had never gotten to know each other in peacetime, 
and that Churchill the historian overlooked the fact that an underdog 
general who was a master of the art of deception and realism, whether on 
peacetime maneuvers or in war, would be unlikely to have a fatter tail than 
necessity demanded. 
Wavell also got a signal from the COS that the Prime Minister had 
decided that the C-in-C ME's priorities should be arranged so that "steps 
to counter German infiltration into Bulgaria must now have the highest 
priority." He could go on to Benghazi as long as this could be "done 
without prejudice to European interests .... We must repeat that the 
Graeco-Turkish situation predominates and should have first place in 
your thoughts. "21 
From his own brilliant Brigadier John Shearer the C-in-C received an 
appraisal of the situation in southeast Europe which took the view that the 
Germans wanted an Italian victory in Albania to compensate for Italy's 
loss of prestige in North Africa, and to quiet the Balkans. "Her first 
objective, therefore, is likely to be the settlement of this conflict and the 
resumption of active trading notably in tobacco of which a large part of her 
requirements normally come from GREECE."22 
It seems highly likely that Wavell, a soldier who had spent much time 
studying politicians and one who had been trained by Allenby in the First 
World War (and had long ago learned the necessity of not hinting to 
anyone what was in his mind), had by this time worked out his own plan. 
He indeed had a grand strategy for his vast theater, in which he would try 
to deal with an "option of difficulties," but because of faulty British 
intelligence, a paucity of resources, and the normal bad breaks of war, he 
did not quite succeed. He never revealed his plan, but we can hazard a 
guess as to what it was. 
2 - 5 February 1941 
In Athens the king told Heywood he thanked God that the new prime 
minister had no knowledge of military affairs, and he told MacVeagh that 
the appointment of Koryzis was his own idea, since Metaxas had always 
refused to discuss a successor.23 In London L.S. Amery, a distinguished 
elder statesman and friend of Churchill's, proposed that the British take 
Tripoli, but his letter never reached high places. (After the war Wavell said 
that he could never have done it because of the wear and tear on his 
vehicles, inferior numbers, and the reluctance of the navy.)24 
On 4 February Heywood had extended discussions with Koryzis 
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about the Greek arms situation in which it became plain that, since 
Metaxas had refused British support and the Greeks had no sources of 
supply for their metric weapons except captured Italian materiel, their 
war effort would fizzle in about sixty days. 25 At the same time Wavell flew 
up to Bomba in the Desert and talked with Lieutenant-General Sir Mait-
land ("Jumbo") Wilson, who was the military governor of Cyrenaica. 
Wilson was a pedestrian commander. Technically he was the mercurial, 
birdlike O'Connor's superior, and as long as Wavell kept his hand in 
things worked welJ.26 O'Connor's forces were already beyond their sup-
ply line on the way to Benghazi, but Wavell and O'Connor, well supplied 
with decrypted information from Italian signals, decided on the bold run 
across the desert to cut the coastal road. 27 
On 5 February the Defence Committee decided to send the largest 
possible land and air forces from Africa to Greece to oppose a probable 
German attack through Bulgaria. In order to concert action, Eden and Dill 
would visit Cairo, Athens, and Ankara. 28 
Unfortunately there were several faults in this whole scheme, starting 
with the evolution of Churchill's sixth of January mythical four-division 
reserve in the Middle East into a viable force. First, there was the lack of 
double-checking that there was shipping available to move a force to 
Greece rapidly. Second, there was no solution to the Greek ammunition 
problem. Third, there was a failure to ensure the availability of airfields 
for the fourteen squadrons Longmore had specified earlier, or of the 
planes to use them. Palairet cabled the Foreign Office on 5 February that 
D'Albiac hoped that the airfields would be ready at the end of April-but 
that date was two months after the Germans were expected to be able to 
attack! And a month before that the Greeks might well be out of ammuni-
tion. 
Even if troops were to be shipped out from England to the Middle 
East, the twelve-week voyage around Africa was so debilitating that the 
staff in the Middle East reckoned that the troops would need a total of 
three months more than if they had come through the Mediterranean, to 
be ready for action. 29 If these questions did not occur to those in London 
who were making the decisions, they did occur to the C-in-C's and their 
staffs in the Middle East, who made themselves unpopular by asking 
Whitehall if they had thought about such things. (Small wonder, then, 
that by mid-summer 1941 two of the three C-in-C's had been removed 
from active command in the Middle East, with Longmore on the road to 
retirement and Wavell moving into exile in India.) 
Already other serious problems were developing. The Luftwaffe at-
tacked Tobruk on the fourth and Benghazi on the eighth. The lack of small 
ships and of AlA defenses ashore caused the C-in-C Med' to refuse to run 
more than one convoy a fortnight to Benghazi, so it could not be built up 
as a major base. The first convoy to reach Benghazi was so heavily attacked 
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that it retired (Tedder claimed prematurely) to Tobruk to unload. Long-
more was relieved when the advance stopped, because he felt that the 
long lines of vehicles were far too vulnerable to air attack, and besides, he 
was worried about the Greek situation. 3o Aircraft arriving over the route 
from Takoradi were a mere trickle (less than wastage), and almost no 
Hurricanes had come in by sea. 
About this time a change began to emerge in intelligence available in 
London. Though it had been known since October that the Germans 
planned a major campaign in the Balkans, its precise nature had not been 
determinable from the normal intelligence sources. It was only when the 
Luftwaffe began to move into the Balkans that large amounts of Enigma 
intelligence suddenly began to flow in. Even so, its significance was 
nearly lost because of lack of knowledge of the mundane: On 6-7 Febru-
ary, Bletchley had broken by hand methods a variant of Enigma used by 
the German railway administration, but only by bringing in experts from 
the British Railway Research Service had they been able to determine that 
this mass of messages dealt with movements orders and railway needs. 31 
Meanwhile, the German army, which had not fought since the June 
1940 blitzkrieg, had been able to assimilate the lessons of combat, expand, 
and improve. What could be deployed in the Balkans was only limited in 
quantity or quality by the Balkan road system. On the other hand, 
Wavell's forces were in the midst of a series of scattered, mostly colonial, 
campaigns which had exhausted their men and materiel, and Wavell 
wished to complete the campaigns in East Africa and the Sudan before he 
undertook any more assignments. The 2nd Armoured Division had just 
arrived from England, but it had been sent out with tanks whose tracks 
needed replacement. The Australian-made substitutes would not work, 
so the division was partly equipped with captured Italian tanks. And its 
commander, Major-General J. Tilly, died suddenly in January. 32 
By the time Benghazi was taken on 6 February, the 7th Armoured 
Division had been continuously in action for eight months and it was 
"mechanically incapable of further action" -it had no tanks! So it had to 
be withdrawn and its men dispersed to other units. 
Battle fatigue of a sort was surfacing elsewhere, too. Even though he 
was an old Etonian, the gang at the Foreign Office were getting fed up 
with Sir Michael Palairet by early February 1941 after at least three months 
of his signals and dispatches urging aid for the Greeks. Now he was 
sending secret messages in general telegrams and these were getting 
double distribution, as they were repeated to Sofia and Belgrade, where 
recipients had had to be instructed to utterly destroy those parts. It was 
decided that since many of Palairet's questions could not be given a simple 
reply, a short telegram should be sent to him to say they were under 
consideration. The staff were also irritated because Palairet, who after all 
had been in the Foreign Service since 1905, failed to read the copies of 
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messages that were sent to him and went on asking questions which these 
repeats were intended to answer. 33 
The fifth of February was significant because the Australian prime 
minister arrived in the Middle East on his way to London. Menzies stayed 
in Cairo unti113 February discussing with Wavell the general proposal to 
offer a force to Greece. In the course of these discussions the six-foot 
Menzies got the impression that the force to be sent would amount to 
200,000 men. 
"Chips" Channon, a wealthy member of Parliament who had been 
sent as an informal emissary to encourage the Yugoslav regent, had by 
now arrived back in dirty, sunny Cairo from cold Belgrade and was 
present that evening for the cocktail party on a barge on the Nile given by 
General and Lady Blarney. Here he again met Lady Eugenia Wavell 
("Queenie," as her husband called her), whom he liked enormously, 
confiding to his diary, "She is a vague, motherly, lazy, humorous crea-
ture .... Of course, he is altogether more charming, more cultured, more 
silent-a very rare bird indeed." Menzies was there, too, "jolly, rubicund, 
witty, only 46 with a rapier-like intelligence and gifts of a raconteur. "34 
6 February 1941 
In London the government was as usual upset by events and changing its 
mind. The capture of Benghazi had come a month ahead of prediction, no 
doubt because Wavell was protecting himself against impatience at No. 10 
Downing Street. Churchill had switched the priorities to the Balkans 
when early March was the date for Benghazi, but now he decided that the 
Italians could be cleaned out of North Africa completely if priority was 
returned to that area.35 
But there were now two schools of thought on this in the Desert 
because of the state of the troops. When on 6 February the Italians 
surrendered on the coastal road, the Rifle Brigade was out of antitank 
ammunition and the 7th Armoured Division was down to the last 10 of its 
350 tanks. Only 50 of the whole war establishment were considered 
salvageable, and these were being returned by sea to Alexandria for 
repairs. XIII Corps was regarded as exhausted.36 Standing against these 
pessimists were those who argued that nothing succeeds like success, that 
the Italians were on the run and in a hopeless funk, and that all of North 
Africa was there for the taking. These included the Joint Staff Planners in 
Cairo, who were just putting the finishing touches to their appreciation, 
and also O'Connor and his staff in the Desert. In the end, waffling in 
London allowed the whole thing to fall flat as a pancake. 
In Athens Prime Minister Koryzis was just back from a tour to the 
front, where he was shocked by the starving children along the road 
begging for food in the cold. As Laird Archer noted, few ships were 
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getting through with any food. Most of the Greek merchant marine was in 
British service outside the Mediterranean and, with the Suez Canal 
blocked by the new German mines, there was an acute shortage of 
shipping within the Mediterranean and the Aegean.37 
On Thursday, 6 February, Longmore reported from Cairo that he was 
using everything he had including Gauntlets, the obsolete biplane fighter 
predecessors of the obsolescent Gladiators, that he was 90, repeat 90, 
Blenheims short of his program, and that he had 32 Merlin engines in 
depots awaiting spares before they could be overhauled. The Mohawks 
were "out of sight with a major engine defect and the Tomahawks an 
unknown quantity. With hardly straw sufficient for bricks to meet mini-
mum local requirements difficult to export in qty. visualized, but all 
preliminary preparations now in hand. "38 
At the same time Churchill sent Portal a personal minute noting that 
some time ago Portal had proposed offering the Turks ten squadrons 
while also pushing the Greeks for airfields for up to fourteen. Now it 
looked as if the Turks were likely to accept, and what was the CAS going to 
do? "I am afraid that you have got to look at this very seriously. I am in it 
with you up to the neck. But have we not promised to sell the same pig to 
two customers? ... Nothing was said about time or priority, so we have 
that to veer and haul on. W.S.c." Portal replied the same day that he did 
not think that any pledges had been given to Greece about further 
squadrons. All Longmore had said to Metaxas was that he could not 
operate any more aircraft in Greece until more airfields were ready. After 
the January refusal by the Greeks of additional air and ground units, 
Portal did not feel that Britain was in any way bound to provide reinforce-
ments in the future. And this was substantiated, Portal thought, by 
Longmore's account of his talk with Papagos on the seventeenth in which 
he had refused to promise any further air support at distant dates because 
we were anxious to avoid promises we might not be able to fulfill. But 
Churchill wrote across the bottom of this "Superseded by later develop-
ments. W.S.c. 11.2.41."39 
7 February 1941 
On this Friday the military mission in Athens reported on the likelihood 
of an Italian collapse in Albania, and on the Greek response if the 
Germans attacked. General Heywood said that, with 170 battalions in 
Albania plus many Fascist leaders, an Italian collapse was unlikely unless 
fine weather allowed the Greeks to make real progress. If the Germans 
attacked before the Albanian situation was cleared up, the Greeks could 
offer no effective resistance in Macedonia without Yugoslav participation 
and British assistance. As the country had not been prepared for a war 
against Germany, such a war would be a severe strain on morale, and 
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resistance might only be nominal unless the king gave a strong lead. One 
of Heywood's assistants had talked with General Papagos, just back from 
the front, who believed that the Germans would go into Bulgaria but that 
their ability to strike then at Greece, Turkey, or Yugoslavia would be 
sufficient to quiet the Balkans without war: "If Germany did attack 
Greece, Greece would resist, but, as neither Jugo Slavia nor Turkey 
appeared willing to assist and Great Britain was unable to afford the 
necessary help, Greek resistance would be more of a political than an 
effective military operation and could only be short lived. He thought the 
German Army would not increase its glory by overrunning small nations 
like Greece, and, therefore, would not do so unless provoked by the 
arrival of British forces intended for operations against Germany." 
Papagos still felt that any British reinforcement before the Germans 
actually crossed the Greek frontier would only provoke Germany into 
immediate action; he suggested that the British prepare plans based on 
what forces they could send, but he was not prepared to allow an officer to 
reconnoiter the Aliakmon position until the British knew what forces they 
could send to assist in holding it. Heywood concluded that Papagos was 
gambling that the Germans would not intervene but that, if they did, 
there was little he could do about it. The British officer believed that 
Papagos was falling for German propaganda, as had all the other small 
states.40 
On the whole Papagos' assessment was right, and Heywood reported 
it correctly. Unfortunately Heywood's reputation had been tarnished by 
his failure to see the weakness of the French army in the 1930's, and so it is 
likely that Wavell discounted what he reported from Athens. If Wavell 
appears to have leaned the wrong way, assuming that the noble Greeks 
were stronger than they were, he was an unwitting victim of the "aura of 
allies" phenomenon. 
Wavell's reaction on 7 February to an earlier order to send two bat-
talions of infantry to Malta was simply that he did not have them to 
spare.41 Undoubtedly the most significant signal that he received in many 
a day was the order received on the seventh to secure his flank in 
Cyrenaica and to swtich his forces to Greece. Succinct but fateful, it was 
arguably a major grand-strategic blunder. He obeyed it because he was a 
dutiful soldier. 
The trouble in part was that Wavell had been too successful. His forces 
under O'Connor, never more than two divisions strong, had destroyed 
ten Italian divisions while taking 130,000 prisoners, 180 medium and 200 
light tanks, and 845 guns. The small British air force had captured 91 
Italian aircraft intact, and shot down 58.42 The rest of his few divisions 
were either actively campaigning in East Africa, garrisoning widely scat-
tered holdings from Iraq to Aden to Palestine, or under training. 
In the past the British have blamed the switch of direction on the 
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Greeks. But Koryzis, as we shall see, sent no urgent plea for help. Nor was 
Wavell influenced by a plethora of ULTRA material. He had developed his 
own intelligence organization in the Middle East, including a small codes 
and ciphers section which worked on tactical intelligence faster than it 
could be sent to Bletchley Park and back. 43 It must be remembered that 
not until 14 March was ULTRA teletyped directly to the Middle East, and 
that was only three weeks before the campaign in Greece began. On that 
date two special cipher officers reported into BAFG headquarters in 
Athens to handle the materials sent there, but not until 5 April, the day 
before the German attack, was the British commanding officer in Greece 
given ULTRA and told what it was. (He was then kept supplied through-
out the campaign, a fact which would seem to explain the very few serious 
engagements that took place before evacuation.)44 Wavell got some UL-
TRA, of which there is no trace, and of his reaction there is even less. Such 
messages were hand delivered by the cipher officer, signed for, read in his 
presence, and then destroyed. We do know that Wavell got one such 
message on 6 February telling him that Rommel had arrived in Tripoli, but 
the War Office had no file on "this obscure German officer." If the 
significance of the arrival of Germans in Tripoli was lost on the British, it 
was in part because of what Roberta Wohlstetter has called "noise"45 and 
in part because the British were expecting the Italians to withdraw. They 
were further misled (in spite of the fact that the textbooks on blitzkrieg 
had been written by Wavell's friends J-F.c. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart) 
by the British view that no one could get organized in under three 
months. Rommel, if they had only known, was one of those unorthodox 
generals who felt he did not have to be bound by the rulebooks. 46 
8 - 9 February 1941 
On the eighth intelligence came in from Sofia that the roads leading to the 
Struma (sometimes written Strymon) Gorge were being widened and 
strengthened and that it was reckoned that the Germans would need ten 
days to cross Bulgaria on their way to Greece. 47 In Athens it was clear that 
the king was interested in knowing just how many British troops could be 
sent to Greece, in view of the pressure from both the minister and the 
military mission that he accept some, but it was becoming clear, too, that 
neither Papagos nor Koryzis was aware that on 18 January Metaxas had 
refused the aid proferred. When he found out about that action, Koryzis 
gave the British a declaration that Greece would fight to the end, and yet 
also sensibly suggested that the document of 18 January should be care-
fully reexamined (though that is not quite how the British interpreted his 
request: Palairet forwarded it as a plea for help). A second note from 
Koryzis essentially left it up to the British to decide whether reinforce-
ments should be sent to Greece and, if so, when.48 
90 The Garden of Eden 
The fact that the Greek officials in Athens usually went to the British 
legation for meetings would seem to indicate that they either feared that 
their own quarters were not secure, or suffered from a built-in deference 
to Great Britain and its representatives, or both. On the other hand, 
General Papagos, as the senior officer, usually relied on military protocol 
and required General Heywood to visit him at his headquarters in the 
Hotel Grande Bretagne. 
That Saturday afternoon, 8 February, Palairet had tea with the king 
and told him that his government ought to be strengthened by the 
inclusion of members of the opposition, including Venizelists, as neither 
Koryzis himself nor any other minister seemed ideal for their jobs. Then 
he wondered aloud if the army would fight the Germans, and asked 
bluntly whether His Majesty was satisfied with the military position and 
with his commanders. Although it was all done tactfully, it is said, the 
king's responses were mostly negative. But George II did say he trusted 
his commanders and was satisfied with progress in Albania. 49 
That night General Papagos sent for Heywood and said that, when he 
had implied that the Greeks would not ask for British help until the 
Germans crossed the Greek frontier, he had not known that on 18 January 
Metaxas had said both orally and in writing that he would appeal for 
British aid when the Germans crossed either the Danube or the Dobruja 
frontier into northern Bulgaria. Papagos now thought it probable the 
Germans would cross into Bulgaria at the end of February or the begin-
ning of March, and possible courses of action in the event of German 
attack should be studied as quickly as possible. 
There were really two choices, according to the Greek commander: if 
Yugoslavia came in, to hold the line along the Struma River or east of it; if 
they did not, to hold the Aliakmon to cover Thessaly and the rear of the 
army in Albania. If the British were going to send reinforcements, it was 
desirable to start building up stocks, supplies, and ammunition at once, 
but to avoid arousing German suspicions these should be delivered to the 
Greeks at the Piraeus and Volos, to be held for the incoming British 
forces. 50 
The next day the British military mission met with King George II at 
the legation and then reported to Wavell that the increasing German 
menace and the death of Metaxas had unfavorably affected the Greek 
nation: liThe new president does not possess the personality or the 
pugnacious optimism of his predecessor. There is a growing feeling of 
doubt amongst the Greek population as to whether the Army can go on 
winning without Metaxas. Many people realize the strategic situation is 
difficult and even critical. ... We felt it was our duty to point out to you 
that there was a danger that military and political situation might deterio-
rate rapidly and in consequence security of existing British forces in 
Greece might become jeopardized." The king had pointed out that it was 
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difficult to plan without knowing what the British might send, and the 
military mission went on to say that it thought the information should be 
given.51 
From Cairo Longmore signaled Portal that he had now given warning 
orders for No. 274 Hurricane and No. 45 Blenheim squadrons to with-
draw to the Delta to refit and subsequently join Nos. 37 and 38 Wellington 
Squadrons in what he proposed to call his "Balkan Reserve." In two or 
three weeks he hoped to be able to withdraw two or three incomplete 
squadrons from Eritrea, and possibly one from Aden, refit them, and add 
them to the reserve. With air infiltration into Turkey now accepted, he was 
concerned to establish a headquarters somewhere in Greece or Turkey to 
control the operations of that force. He thought that the best plan was to 
operate the forces in Greece and Turkey as one, not to allocate squadrons 
to one country or the other. And what did Portal think of his appointing 
Tedder to the command? 
To this Portal replied, with some logic, that a single headquarters 
below Longmore's own did not make good sense; the RAF in Greece was 
operating against the Italians in Albania, while the force in Turkey would 
only be preparing for operations against the Germans. It would be diffi-
cult for one headquarters to keep closely in touch with both the Greeks 
and the Turks. Moreover, if the Germans attacked Greece and the Greeks 
could not hold the Thracian line, then forces would have to be withdrawn 
either to Turkey or at least to positions south of the Lepanto-Lamia line, "if 
you believe that the Greeks can hold that." To have the same headquarters 
trying to run a retreat on the one hand and offensive operations from 
another country on the other would be difficult. So Portal favored leaving 
D' Albiac in Greece and sending Elmhirst to Turkey until the Germans 
attacked, when Tedder might be sent to command. Meanwhile the Turks 
had been promised ten squadrons and Longmore was to be prepared to 
send these at once if the Turks accepted. "On the other hand, Greece has 
been promised only one more squadron, and you should carefully avoid 
any further commitment. If deterrent succeeds and Germans do not 
advance into Macedonia, question of sending units across from Turkey to 
help Greece against Italy might arise, but this must be dealt with at the 
time."52 
In London on the eighth the government changed its mind again and 
decided that Wavell should not be allowed to go on to Tripoli because he 
lacked air support and because, although he might be able to take it, 
Tripoli would be difficult to maintain. Why this was so was not entirely 
clear, since although convoys to there from the east would have to travel 
along the inhospitable Cyrenaican and Libyan coast, with protection and 
air cover from Crete, the shore, and Malta they should have been able to 
survive. And while it was true that aircraft from Tripoli could not have 
covered convoys coming from the west in the Narrows between Sicily and 
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North Africa, Malta could have been used as an advanced landing ground 
for such operations. This procedure would have immeasurably shortened 
the route from Britain and shifted the locus of the war from the eastern to 
the central Mediterranean. It seems fairly illogical for London to have 
considered mounting attacks on Pantelleria (WORKSHOP) and Sicily 
(INFLUX) and not to have chosen to clear the coast of North Africa. The 
ultimate argument against going to Tripoli advanced in London was the 
fallacious one that to hold it would use up the reserve needed for the 
Balkans. 
Once it was decided that Wavell should halt at Benghazi, the question 
then was where the British should concentrate their forces in opposition 
to the Germans in Rumania. It was argued that it was logical now to follow 
up on Koryzis' request for a study of the size of the force the British could 
send to Greece. Thanks to Palairet, this request was misinterpreted in 
London as "a definite invitation to us to send troops," whereas it was 
intended only to bring about a realistic assessment, with the hope of 
dissuading the British from acting in their own worst interests. It was with 
this misapprehension in mind that the War Cabinet decided on Saturday 
that Eden and Dill should visit Athens to offer assistance. 53 
In London, AVM Charles Medhurst, director of plans at the Air 
Ministry, sent a note to the private secretary of the secretary of state for air 
that no promise had been made to the Greeks of fourteen RAF squadrons: 
Longmore in January had asked Metaxas if airfields for up to fourteen 
squadrons could be prepared, and it was clear that the Greeks had taken 
this to mean that fourteen squadrons would be sent. Medhurst concluded 
by noting that the most that the British had said they would send was 
nine.54 At the same time a memorandum was circulating in the Foreign 
Office pointing out that if these airfields were to be of any use against a 
German attack they had to be ready long before the end of April, since 
everything pointed to the Germans making an early move in the Greek 
direction. 55 (In fact, we now know that the Germans had planned to attack 
on 7 February but had had to postpone the operation because of bad 
weather.) And in a more elegant office Cadogan noted on the eighth that 
the reply from the Turks was not too discouraging; they even seemed to 
consider a visit by Anthony Eden to Angora. 56 
In the Middle East the first inklings of the German arrival in North 
Africa were trickling in, and as the deputy AOC-in-C, Tedder, put it later, 
"Rommel had no 'Balkan mirage' to lead him astray." Because of their 
poor knowledge of the enemy's communications with North Africa and 
the fact that Rommel was an unknown, the speed of the German build-up 
would come as a nasty surprise to the British high command in Cairo. 57 
On 9 February, a balmy Sunday night, Chips Channon dined at Air 
House, sitting between Tedder and Wavell. The latter was silent and 
bored at first, but gradually thawed. Chips noticed that with his single eye 
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he suffered occasionally from knocking things over. After the meal they 
sat in embarrassed silence listening to Churchill's broadcast, during 
which Wavell hid behind a door while the Prime Minister's fulsome 
comments upon his leadership rolled from the set. Chips was ill at ease 
with the forced language. Afterwards Wavell offered to drive him back to 
the embassy, but he had already arranged to travel with Menzies. The 
invitation only further put him in Wavell's palm: "I cannot get over 
Wavell's modesty, his lack of surface brilliance, his intellectual detach-
ment and seeming boredom with military matters. He is on a high scale 
and as great as he is charming. "58 
10 February 1941 
By 10 February Wavell had received O'Connor's response to the idea of 
going on to Tripoli brought back by his chief of staff, Brigadier John 
Harding, and had begun to feel that the long-range benefits outweighed 
the risks. He believed that a small force could do the job and would make 
an immense difference to the French in Tunisia. O'Connor, however, 
unlike Nelson, refused to put his earphones on the back of his head and 
present Cairo and London with a fait accompli. 59 (Interestingly, Rommel 
believed that if the British had attacked Tripoli before mid-April they 
could have succeeded.)60 
In London on 10 February the Defence Committee agreed that Eden 
should go to the Middle East and support Greece, which was fighting the 
Axis, as opposed to Turkey, which was avoiding its obligations. This was 
decided in defiance of Eden's report that the Greeks would not be able to 
hold in the face of the Germans, and that the British did not have sufficient 
forces to help them, unless-and then only possibly-the Turks came in. 
The Defence Committee, nevertheless, decided to honor the 1939 guaran-
tee treaty, although France was no longer a party to that obligation.61 In a 
sense the Joint Planning Staff in London supported this move by recom-
mending that Britain's best response for the moment was to subdue the 
Italian Dodecanese, to assist Greece, and to strengthen Crete. The next 
day Churchill told the C-in-C's that, failing a satisfactory agreement with 
the Greeks, they had to try to salvage as much as possible from the wreck, 
but that at all costs Crete and those Greek islands which could be used as 
air bases had to be held. Unfortunately, Crete, which was the linchpin of 
such a grand strategy, and a vital bastion of British power in the eastern 
Mediterranean, was never the center of policy or planning. By mid-
February it should have been the base for operations against airfields on 
Rhodes, only seventy miles to the northeast, from which the Germans 
were mining the Suez Canal. Its far from exalted place in British thinking 
is exemplified by the fact that in six months it had six different comman-
ders.62 
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The tenth also saw the emergence of the whole Blarney-Menzies 
problem. Menzies, the Australian prime minister, was told by Wavell that 
the "aggregation principle," under which the Australian Imperial Force 
was gradually accumulated and consolidated, was fine, but it should not 
be so rigidly applied that he could not make use of less than the whole 
corps when necessary, as there would not always be a front large enough 
for it. When Menzies told the Australian commander this the next day, 
Blarney, a blunt soldier who had a low opinion of Menzies anyway, said 
that "Australian forces must be regarded as national under national 
command. This does not exclude the use of smaller units in special places, 
but all must be subject to the consent of the G.o.c., A.I.E If you give 
these British generals an inch, they'll take an ell!"63 
Blarney was a redoubtable character who looked something like Colo-
nel Blimp, the Australian cartoonist Lowe's famous character. In Sep-
tember 1938, at the time of Munich, Blarney was fifty-four and had been 
out of the army for thirteen years. Left in financial straits, he had taken a 
job as a broadcaster, and he was largely, according to his official biog-
rapher, an outcast. However, he had been chief of staff on the Western 
Front from May 1918 to the end of the war, when Sir John Monash 
commanded the Australian Corps, and after the war as a general he had 
kept active as a militia officer. Thus several men in high places had their 
eyes on him after Munich, and Sir Frederick Shedd on, the secretary to the 
War Cabinet in Canberra, got the Cabinet to make him chairman of the 
Manpower Committee. Blarney had a reputation as a drinker, which 
probably did not count against him in Australia, and he had a powerful 
personality and the ability to talk even a hostile prime minister like J.A. 
Lyons into his camp. In April 1939, when Menzies succeeded to power, he 
supported Blarney, who on 28 September 1939 was appointed as GOC 6th 
Division. At 5 feet, 6-112 inches, with dark hair turning grey and a clipped 
mustache, Blarney gave the impression of being taller than he was. When 
he was appointed to command the Australian forces, he had his charter 
drawn up by the best legal minds down under, because he had acute 
memories of Gallipoli and France, where he had had firshand experience 
of how the British treated colonials. In this distrust he was quite right. 
One of his first rows with the British in Palestine and Egypt was over the 
presence of his wife; it was quite silly, considering that the British had 
their own wives along. 64 
11 - 12 February 1941 
On Tuesday the planning for OPERATION LUSTRE, as the expedition to 
Greece was misnamed, began. At ten that morning, when General Dor-
man Smith, sent back by O'Connor to plead with Wavell for permission to 
go on, walked into Wavell's office, the walls were hung with maps of 
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Greece. The C-in-C ME greeted him with his quiet smile, saying, "You'll 
find me busy with my Spring campaign." While he listened to Smith, 
Wavell arranged the pencils on his desk in neat drill formations. 65 
Wavell had just signaled the CIGS that aid to Greece or Turkey was 
limited not so much by reserves as by shipping and escorts. This signal 
crossed the one from the Chiefs of Staff saying that their review showed 
he should send the four-division reserve. To this Wavell responded that 
the following reserves were available at the present: one armored brigade 
group and the New Zealand Division of two brigades only; by mid-March 
there would be another brigade group, the New Zealand Division would 
be complete, and there would be one Australian division of two brigades 
only. But all of this was dependent upon the arrival of equipment then in 
passage and on progress in East Africa. The administrative and base units 
then on their way out in convoys would be sufficient, but all the AI A units 
would only give a low-scale protection in Greece. Moreover, medium 
support artillery was in a low scale. The major limiting factor was likely to 
be shipping, which would also affect the building up of a reserve of 
supplies and ammunition at the Greek ports. (It was obviously inadvisa-
ble to stock large reserves at Salonika if this was unlikely to be held. )66 
Another puzzle still bothered the Foreign Office in London: did the 
ten squadrons for Turkey come out of the fourteen squadrons that Long-
more had promised Greece? "It certainly would be useful to get this point 
cleared up," wrote a Foreign Office staffer, to which Eden added a note to 
the effect that the Greeks obviously thought they were getting the eight 
additional squadrons. Another hand added, "This is disturbing. I had 
understood when we offered ten squadrons to Turkey that the Greeks had 
refused to prepare aerodromes for which we had asked near Salonika. 
Clearly this is not so. We shall have to find some squadrons for them from 
somewhere. "67 
Over at the War Office the director of military operations, Kennedy, 
was joyfully noting that Greece was "still refusing our aid and we at the 
General Staff think we are well out of it." In the comfortable Old War 
Office Building, Dill, that unimpressive, charming person, as Cadogan 
called him, was trying to get Kennedy sent to the Mediterranean in his 
stead, but Churchill would have none of it. Dill in his nice rational way 
was also trying to tell the Prime Minister that the troops in the Middle East 
were fully employed, and that none were available for Greece. Churchill, 
who had made up the four-division Middle East reserve in his own mind, 
lost his temper and said that what the Middle East needed was a good 
court-martial. Dill told Kennedy later that he should have said, II And who 
do you want to shoot?"68 
That afternoon the director of military intelligence gave the Defence 
Committee a timetable, sent by the military attache in Sofia, for the 
German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece. It was to start on 17 February 
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with the move into Bulgaria, arrive at the Greek frontier by 12 March, and 
reach Salonika on 24 March. Ten divisions would then march down 
through Greece to Athens between mid-April and mid-May. Given this 
schedule, there was time to render help; and so this was the basis for the 
decision to stop the advance to Tripoli and switch the forces to northern 
Greece.69 But the shipping problem remained. 
The DMI's assessment was made three days after the first Germans 
left Naples for Sicily, but it was eleven days before the British woke up to 
the reason why the convoys between Naples and Tripoli were being 
escorted by the German air force. Nor did they put two and two together 
when heavy air transport flights were also observed. Because British 
thinking had been preconditioned to the idea that the Italians would 
evacuate, it never occurred to them that the Germans might be sending in 
reinforcements. It was not until HQ ME signaled contact with Germans 
on the ground on 22 February that the awful truth dawned in London, 
and even so German broadcasts were dismissed as propaganda until 27 
February. 70 
From Athens on 12 February Heywood told Dill and Wavell that 
Papagos had reported that, in response to Wavell's queries about the 
Greek reaction to a German attack, he was forming a new division of two 
infantry regiments and a mountain artillery regiment to be stationed at 
Edessa-Veria, and erecting supply depots at Florina, Corowits (Amyn-
deon), Kosani, and Kastoria. He intended to renew the offensive in 
Albania on the thirteenth, though a serious problem was Italian superi-
ority in the air. He had appealed personally to the AOC-in-C ME, and 
asked Heywood to appeal also to Dill and Wavell, for all possible air 
reinforcements. Sent a copy of this the next day, Churchill demanded, 
"Please report on all possibilities. W.S.C."71 At the same time Heywood 
was ordered to arrange passage on RAF transport on the thirteenth so as 
to be in Cairo on the fifteenth.72 
In an air-raid shelter in Athens Lincoln MacVeagh had a long talk with 
the king on the night of the eleventh. His Majesty said that he regarded 
the German attack against Greece as "overwhelmingly probable," and 
that to oppose such a stab in the back Greece had now only three 
divisions. The British had so far only proposed sending one artillery 
regiment to Salonika. Turkey's attitude was undetermined, and 
Yugoslavia showed "the lethargy of a rabbit faced by the snake which will 
devour it." The king's plan was, therefore, to shorten the Albanian line 
and to move some troops to oppose the Germans. He asked for complete 
secrecy, as only the C-in-C, himself, and the staff knew of this. He 
declared that "no less than Finland, this country is fighting in civiliza-
tion's front line." After three months not to have gotten planes from the 
United States was heartbreaking. The December 1940 statement of the 
British Purchasing Commission that the British had 400 planes helping 
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Greece, when in fact there were now only 32, "is shocking." He went on 
to tell MacVeagh-with admirable restraint, in the ambassador's phrase-
"1 realize England's desperate need for supplies, but the 30 or 60 planes 
that we need quite as desperately won't break the British Empire."73 
The Prime Minister on 12 February cabled Wavell his congratulations 
on the Cyrenaican campaign and then went on, "Defence Committee 
considered whole situation last night, comprising extremely favourable 
developments in United States supplies .... Undoubted serious proba-
bility of attempt invasion here. In this general setting we must settle 
Mediterranean plans .... Your major effort must now be to aid Greece 
and/or Turkey. This rules out any serious effort against Tripoli, although 
minor demonstrations thitherwards would be a useful feint. You should 
therefore make yourself secure at Benghazi and concentrate all available 
forces in the Delta in preparation for movement to Europe." 
He went on to say that he was afraid that Greece and Turkey would 
make the mistake of the Low Countries and fool away their chances of 
combined resistance. The Greeks were obviously the ally most needing 
support at the moment and must have some idea of fighting the Germans: 
"If they have a good plan it would be worth our while to back it with all 
our strength and fight the Germans in Greece, hoping thereby to draw in 
both Turks and Yugoslavs. You should begin forthwith plans and timeta-
bles as well as any preparatory movements of shipping .... It is not 
intended that you delay Mandibles which we regard as most urgent." 
Churchill then announced that he was sending out the Foreign Secre-
tary and the CIGS to undertake discussions in Cairo, Athens, and An-
kara. "It is hoped that at least four divisions, including one armoured 
division, and whatever additional air forces the Greek airfields are ready 
for, together with all available munitions, may be offered in the best 
possible way and in the shortest time .... We must at all costs keep Crete 
and take any Greek islands which are of use as air bases. We could also 
reconsider the advance on Tripoli. But these will only be consolation 
prizes after the classic race has been lost. There will, of course, always 
remain the support of Turkey. "74 
In their supplemental signal containing what Churchill called "opera-
tive orders," the Chiefs of Staff told the commanders-in-chief that "the 
only way to make sure that the Turks do fight is to give sufficient support 
to the Greeks to ensure that they fight." And they went on to suggest that 
now that the ten RAF squadrons did not have to go to Turkey; they could 
be sent instead to Greece. They wanted the British forces landed at 
Salonika, but thought that the Piraeus was going to have to be accepted. In 
addition they stressed the need to occupy at once the Greek islands of 
Mytilene, Lemnos, and Levithia in order to keep the passage open to the 
Straits. The C-in-C's were to collect shipping and have timetables ready 
for discussion by the time Eden and Dill reached Cairo. 
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Churchill laid down that Eden should do everything in his power to 
aid Greece, including if necessary slowing down the campaigns in East 
Africa and the Mediterranean except for the Dodecanese. According to 
the Cabinet minutes, "The governing principle stated by the Prime Minis-
ter was to secure the highest form of war economy in the armies and air 
forces of the Middle East for all the above purposes and to make sure the 
many valuable military units in that theatre fitted into a coherent scheme 
and pulled their weight. "75 
13 - 14 February 1941 
Knowing that Heywood was going to Cairo to see Wavell, Papagos called 
him in and gave him a briefing on the Greek estimates of a German attack. 
The Greek staff estimated that the Germans had twenty divisions with 400 
aircraft in Rumania, and the staff calculated that they could concentrate 
seven to eight of those on the Greek frontier twelve days after crossing the 
Danube. To meet this threat the Greeks had 10,000 frontier troops backed 
by three divisions. Though the Greeks had frontier defenses, these could 
easily be turned, and Papagos' guess was that the Germans would strike 
with impunity through Yugoslav territory and be in Salonika within 
twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The most economical line to hold was 
that along the Vardar, but it meant giving up Salonika or the line from the 
mouth of the Aliakmon to Veria, Edessa, and Kajmakalan. His problem 
was whether to defend the frontier or to withdraw to the Vardar. The latter 
was more logical, but impossible for reasons of internal policy. He consid-
ered, therefore, that he had to defend the frontier while preparing to hold 
the Aliakmon Line, and that it was essential that that position be held for 
twenty to twenty-five days to give time to withdraw his forces from 
Albania. "He reckoned that we could count on having 25-30 days from the 
time the Germans crossed the Danube before they could arrive in any 
strength opposite the ALIAKMON position. We have to consider, there-
fore," Heywood's report continued, "what can be done in one month, 
remembering that once SALONlKA is gone the two Northern Corps in 
ALBANIA, which are supplied by the SALONlKA-FLORINA railway, 
will have to be supplied by M.T. [Motor Transport]."76 
On this Thursday, 13 February, Wavell cabled that he thought he 
could do better than he had proposed, as Menzies was agreeable and 
Wavell expected the Australians to make some more concessions. Men-
zies had talked with Blarney, but they had not discussed the idea of using 
the Australians in Greece, and when Churchill's directive arrived on the 
twelfth, Blarney was in Cyrenaica at I Australian Corps headquarters. 
And Menzies left for England before they did discuss it. Later Wavell told 
Eden that Major- General Freyberg, of the New Zealand forces, was 
prepared to go ahead in Greece, but that Blarney had not been consulted. 
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Blarney wrote Percy Spender, minister for the army in Canberra, on the 
twelfth that his views had not been sought; he was simply instructed. 
When he asked what additional formations would be available, he was 
told perhaps an armored division at an unknown date. He told Wavell that 
he considered the enterprise "most hazardous." To Spender he wrote that 
neither Dill nor Wavell appreciated the German ability to improve com-
munications in Greece rapidly, or the German strength in the air. Blarney 
concluded that as action was going to take place, adequate forces should 
be provided as rapidly as possible. 77 
On the eve of Dill's departure from London, he and the DMO, 
Kennedy, had a long talk and agreed that the government was trying to 
cram an unsound policy down Wavell's throat, and down those of the 
Greeks and Turks also. It was playing the German game to get involved on 
the Continent again. Moreover, Dill and Kennedy did not accept the 
argument that Britain's prestige would suffer in America if she backed out 
now, and that Lend-Lease might not pass Congress, for they felt that 
Britain's prestige would suffer far more if she failed in Greece as they were 
sure she would. Dill was surprised that Portal and Pound, the First Sea 
Lord, favored the idea. Churchill considered Portal to be the real strategist 
among the Chiefs of Staff, and Portal's idea was to use Greece as a platform 
to bomb Rumania and Italy.78 (This latter was a revival of the cockeyed 
prewar strategic thought of basing the RAF in the Low Countries to bomb 
Germany, regardless of retaliation.)79 
According to Sir John Colville, Churchill's personal secretary, the two 
members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee left behind in England were 
both similar and different. Both were reticent and observant, but they 
were otherwise dissimilar. Sir Dudley Pound, who would die in harness, 
had a long, straight nose, a pointed chin, and deep-set eyes. He appeared 
lethargic, but-courageous, matter-of-fact, and with a fine mind-he was 
willing to oppose Churchill and take great risks to support Wavell. He had 
a wry sense of humor. Sir Charles Portal was tall and slim, with streaky, 
untidy, receding hair. He never volunteered any information or an opin-
ion unless asked. He ate alone daily at the Travellers' Club in Pall Mall 
except when ordered to have his meal with the secretary of state or the 
Prime Minister. He understood and sympathized with Churchill, and 
dominated everyone in the Air Ministry and the RAF except his eventual 
successor at Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Harris. 80 
February in England is not always the best time for flying, and so it 
proved in 1941. Eden and Dill, Eden's parliamentary private secretary, 
Ralph Stevenson, and Pierson Dixon of the Southern Department of the 
Foreign Office, together with Dill's aide Brigadier Mallaby, traveled down 
by train to Poole on 12 February, where they found the weather too bad for 
their Sunderland to take off, and so there they sat, incognito. On the 
thirteenth it was too bad to land at Gibraltar, and they did not finally get 
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away until just before midnight on the fourteenth, the day Menzies, 
Colonel Donovan, and Chips Channon left Cairo for London. They then 
ran into more bad weather, and the pilot is reputed to have said that he 
doubted if they could make Gibraltar: they would have to make a choice 
between Tangier or the Spanish coast, either of which might mean intern-
ment for the duration. It was decided to try for Gibraltar and hope that if 
they had to come down at sea they would be rescued by a patrol from the 
Rock. Five and a half hours later they landed at Gibraltar with what the 
pilot said was ten minutes' fuel left (though actually it turned out to be 
more like an hour's supply). At any rate it was a good enough story to 
repeat to Col. Raymond Lee when they got back in April. 81 
Eden and Dill were then delayed in Gibraltar for several days. They 
discussed the danger of attack by the Axis, talked among themselves 
about future actions in the Near East, and dispatched signals to Middle 
East Headquarters. And they opened and digested Churchill's sealed 
orders, which, in the best naval tradition, Eden had been forbidden to 
read until en route. These read, II ••• First, to send speedy succour to 
Greece against a German attack. Second, to make both Turks and Yugo-
Slavs fight or do the best they can. Third, to provide for necessary help to 
Turkey in case Germany attacks her. II While MANDIBLES should be 
executed at the earliest possible moment, it should not delay assistance to 
Greece, and it might be necessary to leave the Italians in Ethiopia to rot in 
order to find the necessary forces. 
II Anglo-Greek operations must aim at establishing a defensive front 
which will have a reasonable chance of withstanding or at least checking a 
German attack. . . . It may well be necessary to establish the line further 
south perhaps, covering Athens and the Morea. In any event it will be 
necessary to hold the Greek Islands .... A possible alternative means of 
helping Greece is by Anglo-Turkish operations in Thrace. . .. Mean-
while, whatever plan is adopted, it will be necessary to send to Greece air 
reinforcements at the earliest date by which aerodromes are ready for 
them."82 
Eden and Dill agreed that aid to Greece would depend on Greek plans 
and the rate of movement to Greece of British forces. Limitations were the 
garrisoning of Cyrenaica, the earliest possible inception of OPERATION 
MANDIBLES, and the urgent need to finish the campaign in Eritrea. On 
the alternative plan, an Anglo-Turkish operation in Thrace, Wavell should 
seek the opinion of General Marshall-Cornwall, as the new commander of 
British troops in Egypt had had extensive experience in Thrace as a 
boundary commission member in 1924-1925. 
On 13 February in London, conversations between the Foreign Office 
staff and the Greek counselor seemed to show that Prime Minister 
Koryzis was changing his mind. While on the one hand he was adhering 
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absolutely to Metaxas' January declaration to the effect that the Greek 
government would appeal to the British for aid as soon as the Germans 
crossed into Bulgaria, rather than waiting until they reached the Greek 
frontier, on the other hand Koryzis thought the two general staffs should 
discuss the matter. It was puzzling that the Greeks wanted to wait until the 
Germans committed an actual act of aggression, which meant waiting too 
long. The Greek counselor said he thought Koryzis hoped that the Ger-
mans would stop in Bulgaria, but Cadogan said that that was not likely. 83 
On the same day Portal told the Prime Minister that Longmore already 
had the authority to send aid to Greece, and that he had been told that he 
could go ahead and draw on the ten mythical squadrons allocated to aid 
Turkey to do this.84 
On Valentine's Day Admiral Cunningham signaled the Admiralty on 
the difficulties of operations in the Aegean in the face of German aircraft 
operating out of Bulgaria, and especially his concern with magnetic and 
acoustic mines, for which he had inadequate counterforces. And he 
concluded, "If I can feel sure more anti-mine resources are actually on 
their way more risks can be taken at Egyptian and Libyan ports so as to 
provide something for Greek ports. But it would be illusory to embark on 
this new undertaking without facing facts that mine risks are considerable 
and that my reserves for combating them are extremely slender. "85 
The commanders-in-chief in Cairo told London on 14 February that 
they felt they had to go on record, in spite of the later arrival of an 
additional signal from the COS, that they were overstretched and that 
London seemed not to understand that they could not undertake opera-
tions in all directions until reinforcements and equipment promised 
actually arrived and were available for operations in the theater. Until 
MANDIBLES was carried out and the Axis menace in the Dodecanese 
Islands was eliminated, defensive forces had to be kept in the Delta and 
especially to safeguard the Suez Canal, at that moment closed by mines, 
as well as to guard the Benghazi area against increasing German air 
activities from Tripoli and Sicily. Longmore also told Portal that he was so 
short of medium bombers that he was probably going to have to convert 
some squadrons with Tomahawks. He could not supply all ten squadrons 
promised the Turks or anyone else because he did not have them. More-
over he was in urgent need of more long-distance communications aircraft 
and wondered if another six Lockheed Lodestars could be acquired from 
the United States. (To this Portal replied on the fifteenth that there were 79 
Blenheim IV's and 6 Glenn Martins at sea, and 19 Blenheim IV's and 23 
Glenn Martins at Takoradi, and that Longmore would know the numbers 
en route between Takoradi and Egypt. They would look into communica-
tions aircraft. On the nineteenth Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher 
Courtney, the air member for supply and organization, told Longmore 
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that he might be able to send out a few twin-engined transports for BOAC 
and 16 Bombays; he hoped that these would help. )86 
On 14 February, ME HQ prepared an order of battle for the GHQ 
Overseas Reserve. This was eventually to consist of one corps of three 
infantry divisions and one armored division, but for the present, HQ had 
to consider what units were available then, what would be available in 
mid-March, and what would become available after that date. To be 
included at some time would be the New Zealand and 7th and 9th 
Australian divisions. The whole order of battle was to be ready by noon on 
that day, as the C-in-C required it for a conference early on the fifteenth. 87 
(Wavell would have presented this to Eden on Saturday, 15 February, if 
the latter had arrived on time.) 
On Valentine's Day in London Cadogan-noted in his diary-it 
sounds like the best British music-hall tradition that he gave the Bulgarian 
minister a lecture and told him that his country must fight! Poor Sir 
Alexander, the Bulgarians had long since been in the German pocket. In 
Greece the Greek high command moved from their long-time command 
post at Janina to the area of Grevena-Kozani, in order to be in a better 
position to face the Germano-Bulgarian threat. 
15 - 16 February 1941 
On the fifteenth Ankara wired that the Axis ambassadors there said that 
Germany would soon face a settlement of the Graeco-Italian war. The 
Italian minister said that the Germans would advance in the Balkans, as 
British help to Greece was beyond allowable bounds. Beneath this some-
one at the Foreign Office scrawled "tittle-tattle."88 
The headquarters of the 1st Australian Corps had just moved out into 
the Desert, and General Blarney went with it. He did not at that time know 
of the decision to go to Greece. The next day he lunched at Barce with 
Jumbo Wilson and was told to report to Wavell in Cairo; he rode back after 
lunch with O'Connor, whom he had just succeeded in the Desert com-
mand.89 
In England Sir John Kennedy went down to spend the weekend with 
Churchill and was summoned at the unusually early hour, for Winston, of 
10:30 on Sunday morning to hear a three-hour discourse on what was 
wrong with Dill. The CIGS' great failing, Churchill said, was that he 
allowed his mind to be impressed by the enemy's will. Churchill did not 
argue with Kennedy when he gave his own views of the Balkans; he 
merely brushed them aside. So as soon as Kennedy got back to the office 
on Monday he dictated a long memorandum for the record on this 
conversation, which is reproduced in full in his memoirs. The gist of it was 
that Britain could hardly be too strong at home, and that all of her strategy 
had to be directed to safeguarding her sea communications. "An immedi-
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ate measure in which the Army can assist is the seizure of Tripoli." And 
that was the view of the general staff. Otherwise, Britain must not throw 
away its power of offensive action by an unsound strategy in the Middle 
East, where the real bastion of its position was Turkey. And, Kennedy 
concluded, lilt is essential to cling to things that matter, and not to waste 
our strength on things that are not vital to our strategy. "90 
17 February 1941 
On Monday the Turks, having learned that the Yugoslavs had been 
talking to the Germans in Vienna, signed a nonaggression agreement 
with the Bulgarians which allowed the Germans to deploy behind the 
Bulgarians provided they did not go within fifty kilometers of the Turkish 
frontier. 
Wavell reported to the War Office conversations which General Mar-
shall-Cornwall, who had been sent from Egypt on a special mission to 
Turkey with Air Vice Marshal Thomas Elmhirst, had held in Turkey. The 
officers' impression was that the Turks expected eventually to fight on the 
British side, but thought they would do better by procrastinating to 
improve their material position. They considered the offer of ten squad-
rons a drop in the bucket in the face of the 1,500 German aircraft in 
Rumania and Bulgaria that could be deployed against them; they claimed 
they needed 1,300 aircraft to assure their frontier and communications 
across the Straits to Anatolia. An extremely heated argument had de-
veloped in Ankara between Marshal <;:akmak and the Turkish delegation 
on the one side, and Marshall-Cornwall and Elmhirst on the other. Both 
British officers spoke Turkish from long association with the area, and 
knew many of their verbal opponents well. But they had to report to 
Wavell that, in spite of lacing their arguments with examples from the 
Battle of Britain and the Libyan campaign and pointing out that the 
Germans would be just as much hampered by the lack of airfields as the 
Turks were, they had made no impression with their contention that five 
RAF fighter squadrons (sixty aircraft) would be a sufficient addition to the 
Turkish air force. But at least one beneficial result of the discussion was 
that the Turks realized the urgent necessity for expanding the number of 
airfields and letting the RAF establish and improve bases at Ismir and 
Kilia. At this time London said that if the Turks would not accept complete 
units, then they should not get equipment, as the British would then lose 
control over it and it would not be available for Greece. 91 
A proposal had been made in London on 14 February to send out a 
division in Convoy WS-7 without its 15,000 administrative troops, be-
cause with the capture of Benghazi the Middle East did not now need so 
many people on the lines of communications. Now, on 17 February, 
Wavell sent a personal message to the secretary of state for war to the 
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effect that the proposal did not make good sense: the fall of Benghazi had 
only released some transport units, and advanced bases had to be estab-
lished there and at Tobruk, while the work of supply and ordnance 
services was spread over a wide area. "Operations in the Balkans will 
mean establishment of one or more bases and advanced bases, much 
engineer work, road construction, etc. Balkans is notoriously unhealthy 
area in summer and it would be folly to weaken medical services or allow 
scale of reinforcements to be reduced .... Operations in the Balkans 
against German troops will require full artillery support. Arrival of addi-
tional division would emphasize lack of supporting corps troops. We are 
already 3,000 signallers under establishment and recent operations have 
been hampered by this shortage." Therefore, as much as he wanted 
another division, he refused it in favor of the administrative personnel 
already agreed upon. He then indicated what effect cuts would have, 
pointing out that he could not tolerate "any reduction of artillery in view 
of present shortage and as the Australians have no Corps artillery." All 
told he could only see cuts of 5,076 administrative troops and possibly 
2,000 infantry.92 At about the same time Hitler announced the formation 
of the Deutsch Afrika KOrpS.93 
Also on the seventeenth Major-General Bernard Freyberg, V.C, was 
told that the New Zealand Division would be the advanced guard of the 
troops going to Greece. Freyberg was upset. He thought Wavell had gone 
over his head and bypassed his charter, which gave him the right to 
consult his own government, but actually the fault lay in London, where 
Eden had suggested the arrangement to Churchill; the latter had gotten 
the Dominions Office to get the permission of the New Zealand govern-
ment, which assumed that Freyberg had been consulted. 94 
The respected Australian official historian, Gavin Long, wrote that 
Wavell's notes showed his unhappiness with the Greek plan. With Greece 
and Turkey politically hesitant, to say nothing of the Yugoslavs, the 
British were going to be put in a difficult situation. The military objective 
in the Balkans was, Wavell noted, purely defensive for the present, and it 
was likely to be a long time before this could be an offensive front, so that 
it should get the minimum force. But if it became an offensive area (as 
eventually it was in the First World War), the British would need Salonika 
and the Bulgarian passes to be able to hit the Rumanian oilfields. "Unfor-
tunately," the C-in-C wrote, "our forces are very limited and it is doubtful 
if they can arrive in time." The use of the Aliakmon Line would help. He 
had told Menzies, when the Australian passed through, that his head-
quarters suspected that the Greeks would not hold against the Germans. 
Though regular convoys were arriving from the United Kingdom, they 
carried mostly depot units, equipment, and reinforcements; except for 
the ill-equipped 2nd Armoured Division, no fighting units had reached 
the Middle East since the fall of France. Freyberg was upset enough after 
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his talk with Wavell that he told his New Zealanders going to Greece that 
everything was still makeshift: "The strategy behind the move to Greece 
was fundamentally unsound." And though the troops were issued pith 
helmets and mosquito nets, the Cairo bootblacks and Greek restaurateurs 
told them they were going to Greece. And indeed they were soon board-
ing small, overcrowded ships for the voyage north in early March. 95 
To the west Eden and Dill were still delayed in Gibraltar, as it was too 
rough for the Sunderland to take off. Dill proposed that if they could reach 
Malta they should then proceed in a Martin Maryland, but the only one 
there was too badly needed for photographic reconnaisance to be avail-
able for courier duties. So they remained at the Rock, where they had 
been visited the day before by Sir Samual Hoare, the ambassador at 
Madrid. 
Ironically that same day Cadogan repeated his music-hall act and 
lectured the Yugoslav minister in London on his failure to get together 
with the Turks, as the only hope for the Balkans lay in creating a bloc.96 
Meanwhile just a short walk up Whitehall on the Thames-side in the Old 
War Office Building, Sir John Kennedy was noting in his diary that the 
Germans had twenty to twenty-five divisions in Rumania and would 
move south through Bulgaria in late March or early April, as soon as the 
weather permitted. A political front in the Balkans was useless without a 
military one, but the Greek case was hopeless and in one month their four 
divisions would suck up all Britain's ammunition reserves in the Middle 
East. As far as he was concerned, Britain should be prepared to lose 
anything that was put into Greece for political reasons, and she would 
lose so much that she would not be able to keep up the Middle East 
offensives or defend Egypt. 97 
18 - 19 February 1941 
On the eighteenth Blarney met again with Wavell and was gloomy from 
the start about the Greek expedition. Three days earlier he had warned 
Menzies that 1942 was going to be the big year for the war on land, if the 
army was not forced to fight piecemeal in places like the Balkans. 98 At 
their meeting Wavell outlined the plan to the Australian commander, who 
said that the 6th rather than the 7th Australian division ought to go, as it 
was better trained. 
Not far from Cairo the Germans successfully mined the Suez Canal 
once more on 18 February and again four days later, closing it until 8 
March. 
For the RAF, the wing commander, Administrative Plans, produced a 
paper showing the provisional schedule of reinforcements and shipping 
for the RAF in Greece, which included a rough order of battle. This 
envisaged three squadrons being sent by 15 March and six by 15 April. 
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His estimate was that by 15 April there would be six fighter, seven bomber, 
two heavy bomber, and two army cooperation squadrons available for 
Greece, a total of seventeen, but airfield space for only fourteen. In Greece 
D' Albiac was arranging for the gradual remounting of his fighter squad-
rons on Hurricanes.99 
Meanwhile in London the Foreign Office had heard in a roundbout 
way from the Poles that the Greek Foreign Office had on 8 February said 
that the war in Albania had to be terminated because of the situation in the 
Balkans, where British help would be too limited: the RAF had already 
been sent back from Greece to Libya. The Air Ministry pointed out that it 
was true that one squadron had been withdrawn to Libya, but that had 
been because of the weather, which made the Greek airfields unusable. 100 
Cadogan noted that various telegrams showed that unless the British 
could make a really good show in the Balkans they would be better off 
cleaning up in Africa. lOl 
Planning for the movement of the LUSTRE forces to Greece was 
proceeding apace in Cairo. A meeting was held at 3:30 on 19 February in 
"G" Conference Room to coordinate sailing priorities of force, corps, 
base, and lines of communication units in proportion to the fighting 
troops of the first three flights of Phase I and the first three of Phase II. For 
planning purposes LUSTRE was assumed to consist of one armored and 
three infantry divisions, with each flight to consist of 8,400 personnel and 
1,200 vehicles proceeding at two- to three-day intervals with an additional 
two days between the third and fourth flights. The total at this stage 
would amount to 50,400 men and 7,200 vehicles. Units were then placed 
on twelve-hours notice to move to Greece, with movements prepared to 
begin as soon as 21 February or as late as 21 March.102 
Eden and Dill finally got away from Gibraltar and passed through 
Malta and Crete, landing late in the evening on the Nile at Cairo, where 
they were met by Longmore and Hutchinson. It had taken them twenty-
nine hours from Gibraltar. 
In London on that Wednesday the Foreign Office staff was discussing 
the possible Greek collapse and what it would mean. These effects were 
divided between the strategic consequences, which were the concern of 
the Chiefs of Staff, and the political ones, which were in the realm of the 
Foreign Office. It was concluded that it would be best, to avoid total 
collapse and the appearance that siding with Britain was fatal, that the 
Greek government be persuaded to move to Crete and carryon the war 
from there. Greek troops not needed in the islands could be used to 
garrison Cyrenaica. Certainly a "Greek Dunkirk" was seen as very likely 
and needed to be planned for at once. 
So Sir Alexander Cadogan dictated and sent to Churchill, then also 
acting foreign secretary, a memorandum on the pros and cons of a Balkan 
expedition. He pointed out the need to get General Weygand, the Vichy 
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commander in Tunisia, into the British camp, and noted that the word 
from Vichy was that Petain was delaying negotiations with the Germans in 
the hopes that the British Army of the Nile would take Tripoli and arrive 
victorious on the borders of Tunisia; such an event might impel Weygand 
into action. Unless a German advance into the Balkans could be held, 
Britain would lose there anyway, said Cadogan, while on the other hand 
victory in Tripolitania would eliminate the Italians in Africa for the most 
part, possibly stiffen the French in North Africa, and allow the British to 
undertake counter-infiltration. He realized that a change of policy would 
be embarrassing for Eden, now on his way to Athens and Ankara, and 
that it might be thought cynical to abandon Greece, but he feared that 
nowadays one had to do that. Moreover, he had a nasty feeling that the 
Germans wanted to entice the British into the Balkans to destroy them 
there, while there were signs that the Germans were apprehensive about 
their success in North Africa. "If by any chance we do abandon Greece we 
should have to explain to America, as you will remember that Colonel 
Donovan was very insistent on our retaining a foothold in the Balkans 
(but can we?)" 
Churchill replied the same day that it was impossible to advance to 
Tripoli without taking the forces needed for effective aid to Greece and 
Turkey. All the points Cadogan had raised had been considered by the 
COS and by himself and were not to be denied. "It may well be that 
neither Turkey nor Greece could accept our aid, judging it the offer of a 6-
foot plank to bridge a IO-foot stream. If however Greece resolves to resist 
the German advance, we shall have to help them with whatever troops we 
can get there in time. They will not I fear be very numerous." The 
alternative was a separate Greek peace, and that might well happen. 103 
20 February 1941 
While Eden and Dill were in Cairo, probably on the twentieth, the 
director of military intelligence there, Brigadier E. J. Shearer, sent up a 
paper which showed the very great dangers of a campaign in Greece. It 
was returned with a note, "War is an option of difficulties-Wolfe. 
A.P.W." De Guingand has said that the staff questioned this judgment. 
John Connell, in his biography, says that Wavell wrote across Shearer's 
appreciation that it was better to be active than passive, and to go to 
Greece, provided there was a good chance of being able to establish a 
front there against the Germans. 104 The decision was based upon locally 
available intelligence, as Wavell got little ULTRA from London until after 
13 March. Eden and Dill thus brought tremendous confirmatory evidence 
to an assessment based upon meager intelligence. lOS 
On 19 February Marshall-Cornwall had returned sick from Turkey 
and had a long conversation with Wavell, who told him with a heavy heart 
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that he had decided to go to Greece. Marshall-Cornwall was horrified and 
said it was a gamble that could only lead to military disaster. Wavell 
replied, very slowly, that strategy was only the handmaiden of policy, and 
here political considerations must come first. "The policy of our Govern-
ment is to build up a Balkan front." The next day, sick as he was, Marshall-
Cornwall was called in to see Eden, who insisted that he make greater 
efforts to get the Turks into the war and was astonished when Wavell and 
Longmore both supported the Turkish-speaking general's arguments that 
Turkey would be more of a liability than an asset, with her bow-and-arrow 
army. The next day Marshall-Cornwall went into the hospital, where he 
was looked after by the Wavell's oldest daughter, Pamela, who was a 
nursing sister.106 
Connell, Wavell's official biographer (who, in spite of recent family 
denials that such papers existed, worked from Wavell's own manuscript 
on the Greek affair), says that Wavell had made an early military apprecia-
tion which recognized the risks in the Balkans, the wastage of shipping, 
and the Cyrenaican problem, but which came to the conclusion that to 
save Salonika would put new heart into Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey; 
the effort might force the Germans to fight, where they hoped to make a 
peaceful penetration, and so would make it more difficult for the Ger-
mans to exploit the corn and oil of southeast Europe. Not to act, Wavell 
argued, would lose Britain almost as much prestige as defeat, and it 
would end the chance of gaining Yugoslavia and Turkey as allies, put 
fresh heart into the Italians, and render the whole Mediterranean more 
difficult. He believed that the Axis forces could not counterattack in 
Cyrenaica because they did not have control of the sea and were short of 
transport for an advance from Tripoli to Cyrenaica. He, therefore, con-
cluded that the British would more likely be playing the enemy's game by 
being inactive than by taking action in the Balkans: "Providing the con-
versations with the Greeks show that there is a good chance of establish-
ing a front against the Germans with our assistance, I think we should 
take it." Wavell now saw the problem as one of finding the means to 
implement the choice he had already made between two sets of "difficul-
ties."107 
(Dill appended a note to his official diary about Wavell's appreciation, 
and Eden mentions that he only saw it after he got back to England in 
April.108 I have never been able to locate this analysis. It is in neither the 
Dill nor the Avon (Eden) papers. It may just be lost, or it could have been 
deliberately misfiled by being placed in some harmless folder called up 
from the registry and innocently returned slightly thicker than when 
received, or pushed out the back of a drawer and ever since stuck in the 
CIGS' old desk-all possibilities suggested by J.F.e. Fuller's experiences 
in the War Office.) 
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Another of the peculiar things about the background of the British 
decision was that de Guingand wrote to Heywood's GSO-I, Colonel 
Salisbury-Jones, that he never could find in Cairo the reports that he had 
sent from Athens on the talks with Papagos and the unhappy factors in 
the Greek situation. 109 It is not clear if de Guingand meant talks that he, or 
Salisbury-Jones, or Heywood had with Papagos. It is not clear either 
whether or not Wavell had those papers at one time. (I know they existed 
because I have a set.) What is clear is that Cairo had sufficient information 
upon which to base an accurate appreciation. 
On 20 February Heywood drew up in Cairo a seven-page memoran-
dum, including a map of the Yugoslav situation, entitled" APPRECIA-
TION OF THE SITUATION IN MACEDONIA WITH REFERENCE TO 
POSSIBLE GERMAN ATTACK ON GREECE." This pointed out that the 
combined German-Italian forces available to be brought against Greece 
from Rumania and Albania totaled more than fifty divisions, plus four-
teen Bulgarian divisions then three-fourths mobilized; against this, 
Greece had perhaps twenty divisions. Within the next two months the 
British were assumed to have available one armored division and three 
infantry divisions "with a low scale of Anti-Aircraft, Anti-Tank and Medi-
um Artillery." To these might be added sixteen to twenty-four Yugoslav 
divisions, not fully mobilized, and forty Turkish divisions. The report 
then described briefly the primitive state of the ground and the preva-
lence of malaria: "The mountainous nature of the country and the paucity 
of communications make the ground on the whole unfavourable to the 
employment of mechanized forces, ... [whose] operations must be 
confined to the plains. The prevalence of malaria, however, makes it 
advisable for British troops to avoid the plains." 
Much of the rest of the report was based on Greek staff estimates of 
the likely German course of action, and would prove in April to be quite 
accurate. It was envisaged that less than three British divisions would be 
called for on the Aliakmon Line, if that was the one which had to be held, 
because of the unsuitability of the area for forces equipped with mechan-
ical transport. Heywood recommended the formation of pools of pack 
transport to be used as sector troops until communications could be 
improved. And he concluded, "In any of the alternatives considered, the 
early despatch of medium artillery is recommended as BALKAN armies 
are particularly short of artillery. "110 
It is likely that Heywood's analysis introduced for the first time the 
possibility that three British divisions would be sufficient. The Greeks 
had 10,000 frontier and fortress troops in Macedonia, backed by three 
mountain divisions and another forming in Salonika. The third position 
that might be held was the Struma line, which was estimated to need only 
seven divisions all told. British troops would have to be landed at Salonika 
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en masse and be in place before the Germans arrived, and that-the Greek 
staff estimated-would be ten days after motorized troops crossed the 
Danube. 
At 11 a.m. on that Thursday in Cairo the secretary of state for foreign 
affairs, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the three commanders-
in-chief sat down for informal talks of which no record was kept. Evi-
dently, when Wavell was asked what he could provide, he replied that he 
had the new Australian division, the Indian motorized brigade under 
training, and the one armoured brigade of the 7th Division; he could put 
these in Cyrenaica. He would keep the 4th and 5th Indian divisions to 
clean up Eritrea. He would reduce the troops in Kenya, and as soon as 
shipping was available he would move the South African Division to the 
Middle East. For OPERATION MANDIBLES against Rhodes he would 
use the new 6th British Division then being formed out of oddments. 
This left for Greece, ready to sail: one armored group and the New 
Zealand Division (less one brigade still on its way from England), two 
medium artillery regiments, and some AlA artillery. Later the Polish 
Brigade Group, one armored brigade, and another Australian division 
could be moved. The first lot could go thirty days after a decision was 
made, and the second and third at three-week intervals; the movement 
would need at least fifty ships and would have many side effects. Very few 
aircraft could be sent to Greece, now that the Luftwaffe had appeared in 
the Mediterranean and losses were rising. If all went to Greece, there 
would be nothing for Turkey, and it would be best, therefore, to tell the 
Turks that, by helping Greece, the British were helping all their friends. 
"Guido" Salisbury-Jones reported from Athens to Cairo that discus-
sions with the Greek general staff on British participation could be sum-
med up as follows at this point: To hold Salonika would take nine 
divisions on the easternmost Nestos River-Rupel Pass line, eight on the 
hills west of Kavalla and Drama, and seven for the position along the 
Struma River up to the Rupel Pass. Only about three divisions would be 
Greek, unless there were a major change in the Albanian situation. The 
Greeks considered the "minimum additional force required to hold Sa-
lonika would be two Corps [eight divisions], which should be in position 
on the Struma from the start. Unless these additional forces are available, 
it will be necessary to concentrate on defence of Thessaly." For the latter 
there were four possible main lines stretching westward to the sea, all of 
which utilized the Aliakmon River: (1) Aliakmon-Veria-Edessa-Albanian 
frontier to the sea. (2) The same except from Mt. Grammos via the 
Kalamas River to the sea. (3) Aliakmon-Venetikos River-Mt. Vra-
deton-Kalamas River to the sea. (4) Aliakmon-Venetikos River-E--
-Arackthos River to the sea. (The signal was blank for E--.) 
It was estimated that the first and second positions needed fifteen 
divisions, the third fourteen, and the last, which would become the basic 
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Aliakmon Line, twelve. The last position would entail a morale-straining 
Greek retreat and re-forming, which might not be feasible. But the first 
two would expose Greek forces in Albania to being cut off if the Germans 
broke through at Veria or Edessa. Salisbury-Jones said that from other 
sources he had gathered that the Greeks were determined to fight and 
that the Ministry of Security said that there were still another 300,000 men 
in the country who could be mobilized. 111 
The trouble with the Aliakmon Line was that it was not a line at all in 
the World War lor even the French sense. It was a series of passes through 
very sharp and steep mountains, but with weak, relatively narrow, flat 
flanks which could be turned. Even more important, there were no lateral 
road or railway systems; the whole was much more like a garden fork with 
the vital passes at the tips of the tines. All supplies and reinforcements 
had to pass to and from the shank or handle, which meant that anyone 
pass might be overwhelmed before sufficient forces could be brought up 
to block it. Moreover, even this concept assumed that the enemy would 
not have mountain troops who might scale the slopes in between if 
blocked in the passes. 
On the evening of 20 February a second signal from Salisbury-Jones 
reported that Papagos had just given him a brief appreciation of the 
German threat in Bulgaria. If Yugoslavia stood firm, the Struma valley 
would be unattractive to the Germans, but if she were neutral Salonika 
would have to be abandoned. If the Germans attacked before Papagos 
could clean up Albania, it would be a disaster, so he had decided to do 
nothing to precipitate German action before the Greeks could establish 
themselves on the line Berat-Valona. The Greek C-in-C could then consol-
idate and shift some troops to northeast Greece. He had arranged for the 
newly formed 20th Division to move to the Edessa-Florina area, and for 
the 19th to go to Veria to prevent a German rush through. Greece would 
not make a separate peace with Germany. Salisbury-Jones concluded, 
"Capital importance of Jugo Slav position being clarified cannot be over-
estimated. "112 
A third signal from Salisbury-Jones that evening indicated that Steers 
and Major Miles Reid of the special HQ Liaison Regiment might shortly 
be allowed to make a reconnaissance of the north in plain clothes. 113 
The best news of the day was that the first six Hurricanes sent to 
support the Greek offensive against Valona arrived at the front. Eight days 
later they put on a real morale-building performance by teaming up with 
some Gladiators to shoot down twenty or twenty-six enemy aircraft in full 
sight of both armies, a performance which, in D'Albiac's words, "caused 
the greatest jubilation. "114 
At six o'clock all the principals met at the embassy in Cairo again for 
another conference, then for dinner with Wild Bill Donovan, followed by 
a further conference over the wording of a telegram to the Prime Minister 
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which, it was eventually decided, had better wait until clearer heads could 
draft it in the morning. 
At dinner the evening after they arrived, Eden, Dill, and Wavell had 
been briefed by Donovan on his strategic appraisal of the Balkans, with 
which all three agreed, stressing in particular the necessity of aircraft and 
mechanized equipment to make any effort effective. After dinner Do-
novan cabled President Roosevelt that the British were acutely worried 
about their shortage of shipping and equipment. Whatever developed in 
southeastern Europe would seriously strain shipping, and convoys from 
the UK would have to be cannibalized for the Mediterranean, so anything 
FOR could do to make more shipping available would be an important 
contribution to Britain's war effort. 11s 
In the course of conversations with Eden and Dill, Wavell proposed 
that Salonika be defended. (Both Longmore and Cunningham were 
doubtful, however, and on the twenty-first Eden cabled London that an 
evacuation might have to be undertaken.) Wavell in early February had 
come to the conclusion that risks were worth taking in the Balkans, if only 
for two months, in order to put new heart into the Greeks and make the 
Yugoslavs and the Turks fight. If we assume, as we must, that Wavell 
drew up his appreciation, within a few days of Metaxas' death (if not 
earlier), because he was a general much more interested in political 
nuances than in military affairs, then we can begin to unwrap the enigma 
about Wavell's decision to go to Greece. It seems logical to assume the 
following undocumented sequence of actions: aware of the stakes in 
keeping the Greeks in the war, and at that time unaware of the German 
threat in Tripoli, Wavell worked on the political possibilities. Then he 
received confusing messages from London, including the word that Eden 
and Dill were on their way out, due on 12 February. Naturally, militarily 
and dutifully, as any sound and proper manager would do, he prepared 
plans for likely eventualities and alerted those who would have to act 
upon them, for he expected that he would be ordered to send troops in 
force to Greece shortly after the twelfth, when Eden and Dill were to 
arrive. This did not happen, simply because of the vagaries of the weather, 
which delayed their flight out. Moreover, he reasoned, if he were not to be 
ordered to campaign in Greece, why had London interfered with his 
highly successful drive to the west? There remains then merely the 
question as to why Dill did not show Eden Wavell's appreciation until late 
April. One answer is that it was not required, as it was a military paper. 
But it did point to eventual evacuation, and Dill sent it over in London 
when the disaster occurred, saying, in effect, we told you so. 
In Cairo the decision to proceed was taken in spite of Salisbury-Jones' 
warning. Unfortunately General Heywood was killed shortly after Crete 
fell in May, and so he was not able to speak for himself, but Salisbury-
Jones claims that he did send a memorandum to the War Office setting the 
29 January 1941 - 4 March 1941 113 
record straight, after No. 27 Military Mission was criticized for not having 
properly represented the military situation. 116 The criticism was un-
justified, but neither General Wilson nor Brigadier Alexander Galloway, 
his chief of staff, liked Heywood. The military mission had reported that 
to hold the Aliakmon Line would require two corps, but before the 
inevitable post-disaster inquest in Cairo, de Guingand was lobbied to 
water down the views he was widely known to have held that the whole 
thing was a mistake from the beginning.117 
One of the puzzles of the British decision to aid Greece in 1941 is 
Wavell's change of mind. Was he a loyal soldier following orders to make 
plans according to directive from London? Had he intended only to make 
plans, relying on Dill (who was pro-Turk) and Eden to face realities? Was 
he expecting that the Greeks would again reject what Britain had to offer? 
Was he planning simply to show by the rational process that the British 
could not succeed because they did not have the men, materials, or 
shipping and could not hope even to begin to occupy positions until 
months after the German attack? Was he hoping that the Germans would, 
in fact, make their overt moves first and save him from moving? Was he 
stalling for time to get rid of the Balkan problem and then go on to Tripoli? 
Wavell was no fool, and he was not a hidebound World-War-I-style 
general. He may have looked at the map of Greece, realized what the 
terrain was like and the impossibility of holding there without adequate 
transport, guns, and air support, and believed that others seeing this 
would make the rational decision on political-military grounds not to go. 
Or he may have been misled ultimately by his powerful sense of duty. 
But even these questions may not be the right ones. For it may well be 
that the solution lies in a circle of assumptions. Wavell assumed that Eden, 
as in October, would be sensible and would clearly see that Middle East 
Command simply could not undertake the Grecian campaign, and that 
Dill would support him. But Eden and Dill thought they were there to 
reconnoiter for Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff, who for their part now 
thought that the people on the spot should make the decision. And in 
Athens Koryzis was too deeply embroiled and too much aware of his lack 
of expertise to interfere; he relied on Papagos, who did try to be rational 
but, like Wavell, felt that it was a political decision. 
Above all, these men were tired. They had been working night and 
day under arduous circumstances for more than three months. They 
wanted to do the right thing, but they were too tired to think clearly. And 
for one reason or another they all deferred to Eden, a dangerously 
mercurial character holding carte blanche from Churchill. 
Later in the war, on 1 October 1942, in a speech in the House of Lords, 
Viscount Cranborne, God's courteous, outspoken gift to Eden, defended 
the government by saying that Wavell was always in favor of "the Greek 
episode," nor was his advice ever disregarded. us This was queried by 
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Churchill, so on 9 October old Etonian Cranbome wrote to Wavell for 
confirmation. The loyal Wavell replied then, as he wrote in 1948 to Liddell 
Hart, that he had always believed the Grecian decision the right one, that 
militarily it had a chance, but above all that politically and psychologically 
it was the right choice. 119 (Still burdened with the ULTRA secret, could he 
have answered otherwise?) 
In London the War Cabinet met at noon on 20 February. The Prime 
Minister told them that Eden and Dill had arrived in Cairo on their way to 
Athens and Ankara, and that the object of the visit was to see what help 
could be given to the Greeks and the Turks in the event of a German 
advance south through Bulgaria, and to ascertain how the diplomatic 
situation in that part of the world could be made to conform to the military 
situation. The minutes include Churchill's conclusions: 
If the Greeks decided to oppose a German advance into their 
country, we should have to help them to the full extent of our 
power and Mr. Eden would inform them of what help we could 
give .... If the Greeks decided to fight, we should do what we 
could. It was possible, of course, that before making their advance 
the Germans would offer the Greeks such attractive terms that 
they would feel bound to make peace. In that case we could not 
very well blame them, nor should we take such a decision on the 
part of the Greeks too tragically. We should have done our duty 
and should then have to content ourselves by making our posi-
tion in the Greek Islands as strong as possible. From these Islands 
we could wage air war against Germany, which might eventually 
turn in our favour. 
Churchill then went on to say that the extremely experienced RAF 
pilots in the Middle East were being remounted on the best machines 
available, and that if Greece fell and Turkey remained an honest neutral, 
"it would remain for consideration what we should do with our strong 
forces now in the delta. In that event, the question of advancing into 
Tripoli would again arise. He hoped that we should not have to put any 
large part of our army into Greece. In fact it was unlikely that it would be 
possible for a large British force to get there before the Germans."120 
The Prime Minister also noted that the Germans were politely press-
ing Yugoslavia and that there were signs of German infiltration into North 
Africa. 121 Apparently by this time Churchill had begun to come to his 
senses, but Eden's hopes had now gone the opposite way; and that is the 
stuff of which tragedies are made. 
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21 February 1941 
On 21 February Lincoln MacVeagh cabled Washington that the Greek 
under-secretary for Foreign Affairs had called the Bulgarian-Turkish non-
aggression agreement of 17 February a British diplomatic defeat.122 
Salisbury-Jones sent a "Most Secret Officers Only" to Wavell and the 
VCIGS: "Operation has been delayed by bad weather. Country unbelieva-
bly difficult for example to go due west from point on road Berat-Klissoura 
to top of Shendeliru distance 7 miles as crow flies takes two days. "123 
(Much later, in his final report on the campaign in Greece, Jumbo 
Wilson, the defeated British commander, started with a blistering descrip-
tion of the Greek roads and communications system. In 1941 British 
wireless sets simply would not work in the mountainous areas of Greece, 
and the best communications were by liaison officers, who often took 
twenty four hours to make the round trip from their front-line posts to 
headquarters and back again. The campaign in Greece encountered many 
such disadvantages, compared to Western Desert warfare of the same 
day. By 1945 the quantum jump in the efficiency of wireless sets and the 
availability of radio/voice communication, liaison aeroplanes, and even 
helicopters would significantly alter operations in mountainous terrain. 
But none of these improvements could overcome the failure to have 
gathered adequate information on the country in the first place.) 
The deputy director of military intelligence in Cairo issued on 21 
February an appreciation which followed the line taken by Brigadier 
Shearer at the end of January, but went further and insisted that it was 
inconceivable that the Germans would commit their forces to invade 
Turkey and Iraq: dumps of supplies were nonexistent. 124 
At 11:45 Eden, Dill, Mallaby, Dixon, Wavell, Cunningham, and Long-
more sat down again to go over the situation; for part of this discussion, 
AVM Elmhirst was present. It was agreed that "our best course in the 
whole world" would be to get the Turks to declare war on Germany. "All 
our information points to the fact that the Germans intend to eliminate the 
Greeks .... Our object is to forestall, not to precipitate, a German 
attack." And similar sentences dot Pierson Dixon's record of the discus-
sions. In the afternoon Dill went off to see the Free French General 
Georges Catroux, Churchill's "Frenchman in the Levant." In the evening 
the group reassembled and read a message received from the Prime 
Minister, which said in part, "Do not consider yourselves obligated to a 
Greek enterprise if in your heart of hearts you feel it will be another 
Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made, please say so. But, of 
course, you know how valuable success would be."125 
The group in Cairo then discussed once again the line of approach to 
the Greeks, and Cairo 358 was finally dispatched to the Foreign Office that 
evening: Palairet had advised from Athens that Koryzis felt that a meeting 
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in Crete would be impracticable and impossible to keep secret. He there-
fore suggested that the British party fly into Menidi airfield and meet at 
the nearby royal palace at Tatoi. Palairet would meet them there. 
On the same day London had cabled that Hugh Dalton, the minister 
for economic warfare, wished the Rumanian oilfields bombed in connec-
tion with a program of subversive operations which was expected to start 
on the twenty-eighth. This would require the use of Greek airfields, 
which might bring German retaliation against Greece: would this be a 
difficulty? The Foreign Office had no objection to violating Bulgarian air 
space. Would Eden discuss this in Athens and let London know? 
And the chief of the Air Staff had warned Longmore that he was 
getting more commitments for Hurricanes in the Middle East than the 
spares situation would stand in the future, and the same might apply to 
the Tomahawks. 
From Cairo Eden reported the consensus that limited air resources 
would not allow Britain to help both Greece and Turkey at the same time. 
There followed a long paragraph in which Eden laid out the air situation, 
which really had not changed a great deal from what it had been in 
October 1940 when he was last out there, and noted especially that 
Longmore had a "much smaller margin of modern aircraft suitable to 
meet the Germans than we had estimated." And rate of wastage would 
rise as Germans rather than Italians were encountered. After further 
technical comments, Eden went on, "Present limited air forces available 
make it doubtful whether we can hold a line covering Salonica .... 
Commander-in-Chief of Mediterranean considers that he can supply the 
necessary protection at sea to enable Salonica to be used as base, but 
emphasizes that to do this he will need air protection, which we fear 
would prove an insuperable difficulty. Question of line to be held in 
Greece will be discussed with Greeks whom we hope to meet Sunday." 
He then limned out Wavell's dispositions and the forces he could 
send to Greece, concluding, "Despatch of this force will inevitably strain 
administrative resources to the utmost and must involve much improvisa-
tion." Nevertheless, those in Cairo were agreed that immediate help 
should go to the Greeks and that the Turks should later get air reinforce-
ments if their volume would allow it. "My present intention is to tell the 
Greeks of the help we are prepared to give them now and to urge them to 
accept it as fast as it can be shipped to them. If they will accept this help 
and brave any risk it may entail of involving them in early hostilities with 
Germany, there is a fair chance we can hold a line in Greece. If we now 
split our small resources, especially in the air, we can effectively help 
neither Greece nor Turkey. "126 
Eden emphasized that Longmore's squadrons were simply not up to 
the standard of those at home, because they had been chasing Italians all 
over the place and because "many good troopers are still mounted on 
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wretched ponies." He also reported that Longmore and Cunningham 
were in agreement that Salonika was not possible, but Eden and Dill 
would reserve judgment until they had talked to the Greeks. 
As regards general prospects of a Greek campaign, it is, of course, 
a gamble to send forces to the mainland of Europe to fight 
Germans at this time. No one can give a guarantee of success, but 
when we discussed this matter in London we were prepared to 
run the risk of failure, thinking it better to suffer with the Greeks 
than to make no attempt to help them. That is the conviction we 
all hold here. Moreover, though campaign is a daring venture, we 
are not without hope that it might succeed to the extent of halting 
the Germans before they overrun all Greece. It has to be remem-
bered that the stakes are big. But if the Greeks do not want us to 
come, then we shall have to think afresh, but all my efforts will be 
concentrated on trying to induce the Greeks to accept our help 
now. 
As to the question of command in Greece, they had decided that they 
needed a first-class tactical man who could command the respect of the 
Greeks, and they had selected General Wilson, then governor of 
Cyrenaica. "We have carefully considered the claims of O'Connor, but, 
although a dashing leader, we do not think he is of the same stature as 
Wilson. Moreover, Wilson will have to command an Australian corps and 
a New Zealand division, both of them led by strong personalities who are 
also senior soldiers." Wilson's "appointment to lead the forces in Greece 
will be a guarantee to the Greeks that we are giving of our best." 
22 - 23 February 1941 
In the pleasant early morning stillness of Cairo in spring, at eight o'clock 
on the twenty-second the party drove out to Heliopolis airfield, where 
they boarded two Lockheed 18's for the flight to Athens. As a security 
measure, the word was leaked that they were paying a visit to the Western 
Desert. In addition to Eden, Dill, Wavell, and Longmore, there were 
Lieutenant-Colonel de Guingand, Major-General Heywood, Major 
Smith-Dorrien, and others, making in all a total of ten with their baggage, 
in those days usually consisting of good solid leather suitcases and 
portmanteaus. 
In North Africa Jumbo Wilson got a signal to meet Wavell at the 
airfield at El Adem. He flew in the four hundred miles from his headquar-
ters at Barce to find that no one knew anything; but at 11:15 two planes 
landed, and out stepped Eden, Dill, and Wavell. Wavell said, "We are off 
to Athens to discuss sending a force to Greece. If it is decided to do so, you 
are to command it, but don't say anything to anyone about it until you 
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hear from me again!" And he got back into his airplane and at 12:15 flew 
off. 127 
Jumbo Wilson, the nephew of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, 
who had been commander of the XII Corps at Salonika in 1918,128 had 
been one of Wavell's brigade commanders in the 2nd Division at AI-
dershot before the war, and had succeeded him as GOC there in 1937. 
Described by one colleague as "un bon soldat ordinaire,"129 Wilson was 
now sharing a house with Wavell in Cairo. Sulzberger of the New York 
Times later said that Wilson told him shortly after this episode that the 
meeting took place at Benghazi and that he was promised fourteen 
divisions but eventually got three.l3O Wilson himself later commented on 
the whole Balkan policy that it involved "strategical gymnastics." He also 
claimed that he only learned of the really poor state of the Greek forces 
after he arrived in Athens. A further problem for Wilson was that, just as 
in North Africa, the British had not built up an intelligence service in the 
Balkans prior to the war.131 And other difficulties included shortages of 
staff officers to go view the ground, the Greek refusal to allow reconnais-
sance, and the lack of a dossier system on the Balkans. -
And if Rommel was an unknown to the British, this was perhaps 
scarcely surprising. In February 1940 London had sent out a senior major-
general of the Royal Engineers to take command of the 4th Indian Divi-
sion. Though he was a VC and the author of an appreciation of why Hitler 
would attack Russia, Philip Neame was unknown to Wavell, who relied 
on O'Connor's judgment that Neame was all right, and on the VC as 
evidence that he was a brave soldier, and so gave him the command in 
Cyrenaica when Wilson was moved to Greece. 132 Neame wrote in his 
memoirs that he could not imagine that Rommel had been sent to the 
Desert in a passive role, as GHQ intelligence in Cairo maintained. 133 But 
the forces left to guard Cyrenaica-one armored regiment mostly in 
Italian tanks, one brigade group of infantry and all arms, and a motorized 
brigade of 1,000 Indian cavalry armed with rifles (and the whole supplied 
from Tobruk 450 miles to the rear)-were too small to do anything to 
counter Rommel. 
In Athens MacVeagh on 22 February penned a long letter to the 
American secretary of state, Cordell Hull, in which he noted that King 
George II was carrying on the Metaxas tradition of upholding the honor of 
Greece by vowing to fight, but that resolution might wither and die if the 
Germans escalated the pressure slowly. 134 
At 3:15 the two Lockheed Lodestars bearing the British party, now in 
mufti, settled down on Menidi airfield north of Athens. The visitors were 
met by Palairet, D' Albiac, Blunt, and a guard of honor, though their arrival 
was supposed to be a secret. (The German ambassador was still in 
Athens, where people were no longer saying if the Germans attack, but 
when.)135 
Reconnaissance party in Crete, November 1940. In the background are Royal 
Navy ships in Suda Bay. Below, Wavelllanding in Crete (probably at Suda) 
15 November 1940. 
Except as otherwise indicated, photographs are reproduced with per-
mission of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum, London. 
Above, "Father and son": 
Anthony Eden and Winston 
Churchill . 
Left, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Portal was regarded by 
Churchill as the master strategist 
of the Chiefs of Staff. 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore with his son's mother-
in-law, Lady Wavell, in Cairo, October 1940. 
The chief of 
the Imperial 
General Staff, 
Field Marshal 
Sir John Dill, 
talking to an 
RAF officer 
in Cairo. 
Above, No. 80 Squadron's "A" Flight (the only one equipped with Hurricanes) 
in Egypt, October 1940. Below, the Gloster Gladiator, last of the RAF's biplane 
fighters, was the mainstay of the RAF fighter force sent to Greece. Here pilots 
return from a Western Desert flight. 
Above, a Blenheim aircraft flying over typical Greek countryside. Below, the 
first contingent of the RAF arrives at the Piraeus. (The sailors are Greek.) 
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Above, Air Commodore John H. D' Albiac, immediately after his arrival in 
Athens-probably at the Hotel Grande Bretagne. Below, Major-General Gambier-
Parry, Prime Minister Metaxas, King George II of Greece, Air Commodore 
D'Albiac, and General Papagos meeting in December 1940. 
The Hotel Grande Bretagne on Syntagma Square, Athens, as it appeared in 
1940. The Grande Bretagne was the headquarters of the Greek general staff 
and also at times of British groups assigned to Greece. Courtesy of Lefteris 
Pavlides. 
Loading supplies into an Australian Hobart-class cruiser for a fast run to Greece, 
November 1940. 
Designed to stop the traditional Greek enemy, the Bulgarians, the Metaxas Line could 
not hold a German blitzkrieg attack. Courtesy of Greek Army History Directorate. 
Above, Palestinians unload a ship somewhere in Cyrenaica, February 1941. (Un-
fortunately, the few photographs in the Imperial War Museum from this period 
have only censored captions.) Below, a meeting of Greek ox-drawn carts and British 
motor vehicles . 
Above, a British liaison officer on a motorcycle in a Greek village. Below, 
the motorized artillery moving up; corners had to be watched at both ends. 
Anthony Eden, 
Sir Miles 
Lampson, and 
Sir Alexander 
Cadogan . 
Dill, Wavell, Eden, Dixon, and Arthur Smith in conference. 
Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O'Connor and General Wavell in the 
Western Desert. 
General "Jumbo" Wilson demonstrating the reason for his nickname. 
Admiral Sir Andrew 
Cunningham with 
Wavell's chief of 
staff, Arthur Smith. 
Brigadier Galloway 
with General 
"Jumbo" Wilson, 
then commanding 
British troops in 
Egypt. 
That eminence barbu, Field Marshal Smuts of South Africa, second from left, 
talks with Brigadier Guy Salisbury-Jones. 
Blarney, Prime Minister Menzies, Galloway, and Arthur Smith beside a Lockheed 
Lodestar in early 1941, probably at Barce. 
Above, RAF ground crews evacuated from Greece arrive in Alexandria; below, 
others, less lucky, are rounded up in Greece to be sent to POW camps. 
Brigadier Frederick 
de Guingand study-
ing a map with 
Wavell's successor, 
Field Marshal Sir 
Claude Auchinleck. 
General Sir 
Archibald Wavell 
lecturing to the 
British staff in 
Singapore, 
November 1941; 
behind him is the 
map of his Middle 
East Command. 
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The party drove at once up the winding road through the pines for 
about three miles, then down into the vale in which the secluded Tatoi 
Palace lay. A Gothic country house, not in 1980 visible even to official 
visitors, it was something of a miniature Sandringham, a private retreat, 
yet with adequate facilities for a secret meeting. 
Immediately upon his arrival at the palace, Eden had a private au-
dience with the king, at which he told George II that he would not meet 
with Koryzis alone, as he wanted the discussions to be on a purely 
military and not on a political basis. 136 Then an English tea was served at a 
long polished table, at which nine Englishmen (excluding 0' Albiac) faced 
King George II, Koryzis, Papagos (in whom the British lacked confi-
dence), and the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, who kept the 
Greek set of minutes. The Greeks felt on the defensive, because they did 
not have all their experts present, and so would be much more guarded in 
what they said than were the British. 
When the meeting began at 5:30 the Greek prime minister presented 
a declaration in French. He observed that Greece had received the spon-
taneous guarantee of Great Britain, had obtained her aid from the mo-
ment of the unprovoked Italian attack, and had become her faithful ally. In 
the course of the struggle against Italy Greece had committed all but three 
divisions, which were still on the Bulgarian frontier. In consequence, 
Koryzis was asking the purely military question of what would be the 
number and composition of the forces that the British could send to 
reinforce the Greeks against a German invasion. There were then twenty-
five German divisions in Rumania, plus Bulgarian forces. In effect the 
Greeks said they were ignoring the intentions of the Turks and the 
Yugoslavs, as no one knew whose side they would be on. The question 
was now extremely urgent, and the arrival of Their Excellencies most 
opportune. And, the declaration concluded, Greece would fight for Mac-
edonia even with only her own forces, no matter what help came. 137 
With General Heywood acting as interpreter, Eden undiplomatically 
then launched into his own statement. He failed to pay tribute to the 
Greeks. Instead he noted that the Germans had twenty three divisions in 
Rumania, and four hundred to five hundred aircraft. In his view the 
Germans sought control of the Balkans so they could strike decisively at 
the British in the Middle East. He then said that the British could send 
three divisions, an armored brigade group, the Polish Infantry Brigade, 
possibly another armored brigade group, and two medium regiments of 
artillery, plus some antiaircraft guns. The whole came to 100,000 men, 240 
field guns, 202 antitank guns, 32 medium guns, 192 light and heavy AlA 
guns, and 142 tanks. 138 The first flight would be landed thirty days after 
the decision was taken, using fifty three ships. This force would be 
commanded by General Wilson, "the victor in the Desert." "What," 
Pierson Dixon's record said, "we were offering was the limit of what we 
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could do at the present. The troops were well equipped and well trained 
and should acquit themselves well." Koryzis then raised the matter of the 
attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey, "and Eden replied, 'Frankly, we did 
not know what they were likely to do.' " 
The military session then took place at 6:20 p.m. Papagos and Col. 
Stylianos Kitrilakis of the Greek headquarters were on one side of the 
table, with Dill, Wavell, Longmore, Turle, Heywood, and Mallaby on the 
other. Papagos noted that the Italians had thirty to thirty-four infantry 
divisions in Albania with 197 light batteries, 39 medium or heavy bat-
teries, 3 cavalry regiments, and 5 tank battalions with perhaps 250 mostly 
light tanks. In Eastern Macedonia the Greeks had but 4 mountain bat-
teries, 12 field batteries, 17 modern and 8 old heavy batteries (164 guns 
plus 25 in fortifications, or a total of 189 guns), while in Thrace there were 
13 battalions and 3 field and 2 mountain batteries. There were no anti-
aircraft or antitank guns in Eastern Macedonia or Thrace. Under the 
circumstances, the only viable place upon which to make a stand was the 
Aliakmon Line. Greek forces had to be left in Thrace if the Turks were 
going to attack Bulgaria, as there was an agreement to this effect, and 
these forces would in wartime be maintained by the Turks. 
As for the Aliakmon Line itself (Mt. Olympus-Veria-Edessa-
Kajmakalan), Papagos said that eight divisions would be needed to hold 
it, with one in reserve (or fifty four battalions). It had to be held for twenty 
to twenty-five days in order to allow the withdrawal from Albania. He 
went on, "There might be some difficulty in finding sectors of the line 
suitable for the high degree of mechanization of the British forces and in 
deploying so large a number of motor-drawn guns." 
Papagos did all the talking at the conference, according to the British 
notes. At the end he asked Dill and Wavell if they agreed, and they said 
that they did. It was an acceptable military proposition. 139 De Guingand, 
writing later in Generals at War, said that Wavell blandly gave his opinion, 
and de Guingand wondered if he was at the time influenced by Eden's 
enthusiasm. Otherwise either his military judgment was unsound or he 
was arguing for a bad case out of political loyalty. 140 At any rate, with aid 
on the scale Wavell was citing, and with the Greeks so desperate, the 
soldiers had no trouble agreeing, though the vital matter of timing was 
not properly explored. 
During the conference Wavell took notes in pencil on sheets of palace 
stationery stamped with the Greek crown. According to John Connell, 
who saw them, it is quite clear that at the time Wavell understood that the 
possibilities depended upon the attitude of the Yugoslavs. 141 It was 
Wavell's loyalty and sense of duty to his superiors that led him later into 
agreeing with Eden that the Greeks had misunderstood, when, as will 
become evident, it was the British who had been slipshod in failing to pass 
on the decisive information. 
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Speaking in the United States in 1949, Wavell said: 
Papagos made a very clear exposition of the military situation and 
said the best line to hold was that on the frontier, the Metaxas, 
which needed 9 divisions, of which the Greeks had ~we did not 
have the other 6. The Struma, which we had held in World War I, 
needed the same number, but the Aliakmon to the Yugoslav 
border needed only 5. We thought that even if the Germans got 
into Yugoslavia, it would be some time before the Serbs would 
allow them to outflank the Aliakmon Line, naturally itself very 
strong. So after Papagos agreed to move in the three good divi-
sions from the frontier and one from Albania, it did not look like a 
risk to try to hold the Germans with 4 Greek and 3.3 British 
divisions dug in on a line Papagos said could be held by 5. The 
chief danger was German superiority in the air, which Cun-
ningham and Longmore saw rather more clearly at the time than I 
did .... The political advantage was that it showed we would 
support our only active ally. 
What then happened is that we left the Tatoi thinking that the 
Greeks would be dug in on a fortified line when we arrived, but 
Papagos maintains that we were not to move until after the 
attitudes of Turkey and Yugoslavia were known. I don't know 
whether it was a misunderstanding or whether politically Pa-
pagos could not issue the orders to withdraw the divisions. After 
the return from Ankara, it became a political argument. 142 
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The military session broke up about 7:45, and the British delegation then 
met to brief Eden. Captain R.M. Dick, RN, was now present as stand-in 
for the C-in-C Mediterranean. It was held that the military discussions 
had concluded acceptably and that the British would push for their 
implementation as soon as possible, under a British commander who 
would be subordinate to Papagos with the right to appeal to Wavell-in 
the same way in which Blarney and Freyberg already operated. 
Everyone then adjourned for dinner, and the sessions resumed at 
10:45 (not, as is commonly said, at eight o'clock.) 
Papagos led off the discussion with a summary of the military session 
and concluded that much depended upon whether the attitude of 
Yugoslavia was ascertained or ignored, assuming she would not move. If 
the latter, then the Aliakmon Line had to be used as this was the only one 
the Germans could not turn by coming down the Rupel Pass and the 
Strumitsa valley. 
Wavell said that the only reasonable course was the one Papagos had 
indicated. It was a strong natural line upon which the Allies could estab-
lish their forces before the Germans attacked. From a military point of 
view, it was wise to establish themselves there in great strength as soon as 
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possible. Roads and tracks needed to be improved so motorized guns 
could be moved. General Wilson needed to be brought over as soon as 
possible and allowed to undertake reconnaissances. 
Eden said it was clear the British and Greeks agreed militarily. He 
added that military requirements dictated an immediate withdrawal of 
Greek forces from Eastern Macedonia to the Aliakmon Line, but politi-
cally there would be three possibilities: (1) withdraw now; (2) withdraw 
while talking to Yugoslavia; (3) wait until Yugoslavia's attitude had been 
ascertained. He offered to send a message to Prince Paul, and this was 
accepted. It was decided that Greek troops should be withdrawn to the 
Aliakmon Line, and it was further agreed that roads and communications 
in Greece be improved for use by a mechanized force. 
A draft instruction was then drawn up for a staff officer to take to 
Prince Paul, but Dill and Wavell suggested that this might endanger the 
British convoys moving to Greece, because Prince Paul would be likely to 
discuss the British move with his government, and with this Papagos 
agreed. 50 instead Eden sent word to the British minister in Belgrade to 
explain to Prince Paul the dangers to 5alonika of German activities. 
It is clear that at the end of the meeting the Greeks laid particular 
stress on the attitude of the Yugoslavs, "on which," in the words of the 
diary of Eden's journey, "depended the choice of the line to defend 
Greece. The British representatives made clear it would not be safe to 
count on Yugoslavia." But no one stated precisely what stand had been 
taken on the schedule for moving Greek forces. 
At three in the morning of 23 February the Greeks agreed to accept the 
British offer and welcomed the appointment of Wilson as the British 
commander-in-chief subordinate to Papagos. The British thereafter claim-
ed that it had been agreed that Papagos would move his troops at once. 
When in 1946 Wavell's statement appeared in the London Gazette,143 the 
Greeks at once arranged for Papagos' memoirs, with a different con-
clusion, to be published in English. A misunderstanding had certainly 
developed. The question is, Why? 
It may be suggested that apart from the fact that the minutes were 
kept in English and Greek, so it would have been difficult to compare 
them (if any attempt was ever made to do so), and the communique was 
issued in French, Papagos had every reason to think that he was entitled 
to find out what the Yugoslav position was. Eden had evidently agreed, 
since he had during the conference sent the specially coded telegram to 
the British minister at Belgrade. Moreover, though the British claimed 
urgency, Wavell simply could not move quickly because of lack of ship-
ping, and he was not expecting to be able to concentrate his small force for 
some sixty to ninety days; why should Papagos have felt that he should 
issue orders that night for action taking sixty days? What the Yugoslavs 
did made a very considerable difference because of the great Cherna and 
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Monastir gaps that pointed at the hinge of the Greek line. (In fact, the 
whole situation in Yugoslavia changed radically within five weeks; Pa-
pagos, long familiar with the Yugoslavs, was correct.) 
At any rate, when the conference was over, de Guingand noted that 
Eden preened himself before the chimney-piece and sent a fulsome signal 
to Churchill. l44 In his own diary for this time Eden noted that Longmore 
was weaker in the air than London thought and much weaker than he 
should have been. He also jotted down that Papagos said that the Ger-
mans would need twenty days to get to the Aliakmon if demolitions were 
made before they could attack. 145 In fact, in April the Germans advanced 
the whole length of Greece in twenty days, but then the situation was 
quite different. The Germans were not held up on the Metaxas Line, there 
were few demolitions to delay them on the plains north of the Aliakmon, 
and they swept around through a collapsing Yugoslavia and down 
through the Monastir Gap before the weak British force ever got into 
place. In retrospect Papagos appears to have been a realist in everything 
except his hope that Yugoslavia would decide in time to fight, and his 
faith in British abilities. 
In his telegram to Churchill Eden said he had explained the interna-
tional situation and German intentions in the Balkans as London saw 
them. 146 And after giving details he concluded by saying that there was 
full agreement with the Greek government: 
(a) In view of the importance of the Yugoslav attitude as 
affecting the deployment of troops in Greece, it was agreed that I 
should make a further effort to persuade the Yugoslav Govern-
ment to play their part. 
(b) That the Greeks should at once make, and begin the 
execution of, preparations to withdraw the advance troops to the 
line which we should have to hold if the Yugoslavs were not 
willing to come in. 
(c) The work should immediately be started on improving 
communications in Greece to facilitate the occupation of this line. 
(d) That the movement of British troops should begin forth-
with, time being the essence of the problem. The utmost secrecy 
to be observed and deceptive stratagem devised. 
After covering other details, Eden praised the "frankness and fair 
dealing of the Greeks," and ended by saying, "I am quite sure that it is 
their determination to resist to the utmost of their strength and that His 
Majesty's Government has no alternative but to back them whatever the 
ultimate consequences. While recognizing the risks, we must accept 
them." He was convinced that they had done the right thing and that time 
was insufficient to refer it all back to London. "The risks are great, but 
there is a chance of success." To this Churchill replied that Eden's pro-
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posals had been studied that day by the COS and would be studied on 
Monday by the War Cabinet. "In the meantime you should proceed on 
the assumption that full approval will be given. "147 
Longmore came away from the Tatoi conference feeling that whatever 
happened the British were right in honoring their moral obligations. 148 
Unfortunately, lack of thorough study cannot be covered by hope and 
righteousness, as events would soon prove. 
At 10:30 a.m. the visiting British party boarded their two Lockheeds at 
Menidi and departed, ostensibly for Turkey. Flying via Melos, at the west 
end of Crete, and Alexandria, they reached Heliopolis at 3:15 Cairo time. 
That evening Dill drafted a reply to the War Office signal requesting action 
against the Rumanian oilfields. He pointed out that it was impossible, as 
bad weather over Bulgaria would require violating Turkish air space, and 
because it was unwise to call attention to the decisions taken at Athens. 
While Eden was in Athens economic discussions were also going on 
with the Yugoslavs, who were anxious about supplies for war and wanted 
raw materials and petroleum products. Before any resolution could take 
place, of course, war came. 149 
Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, who had been an undergraduate at Oxford, 
was in a very difficult situation. On becoming regent in 1934, he had 
assumed that his mandate was to weld the tripartitioned country of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes together for the minor King Peter, who would reach 
his majority in autumn 1941. Though an Anglophile, Paul had to face the 
realities of geography, internal politics, and German power, with his 
capital city on the western bank of the Danube at the easternmost edge of 
the country. Already he had felt threatened by the British, having been 
told on 12 January that the British were sending a mechanized force to 
Greece and that, therefore, his neutrality would not be good enough. He 
was horrified and dismissed the bureaucratic British ambassador, Camp-
bell, with the words, "This stinks of Anthony!" At that time the British 
offer of help to Greece had, of course, been refused by Metaxas, so Paul 
was correct in not having moved. It is scarcely surprising, then, that he 
refused to see Eden.150 Unfortunately, Chips Channon, who had been 
sent to sound him out, had left Cairo for London the day Eden left 
England for Egypt. The situation was also complicated by the muddled 
work of the Turkish ambassador in Belgrade, which allowed the Knatch-
bull-Hugesson view of the Yugoslavs as untrustworthy gradually to gain 
the upper hand at the Foreign Office. 151 
In London Cadogan recorded in his diary his surprise at Eden's 
telegram from Athens that he had argued for aiding Greece-it was 
certainly respectable, but Britain would eventually be beaten there. He 
also noted a suggestion from Belgrade that King George VI wire Prince 
Paul. Churchill liked the idea, but the king did not, and refused to send a 
message, saying it would be too peremptory.152 
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In Belgrade the American minister, Arthur Bliss Lane, had presumed 
to lecture poor Prince Paul, who patiently explained to him that, with the 
Germans already in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia would be defeated in two 
weeks, and that if he shifted troops he faced a civil war. The regent 
commented bitterly to Lane that the British could offer no help and that he 
wished he were dead, yet he still had pride in his country and believed 
that the British would win in the long run. Ever since 1935, however, 
Yugoslavia had faced the dilemma of neutrality between Britain and 
France on the one side and the Axis on the other. At this time, then, the 
Yugoslavs sought, unsuccessfully, Mussolini's aid in working out a com-
promise with the Germans. Thus when Eden inquired about Salonika 
from Cairo, the regent, discouraged by what Campbell had told him, was 
uncommunicative. 1S3 
General Kennedy at the War Office in London lamented that from 21 
February things began to shift in U a very curious fashion." Churchill, who 
had urged the Greek venture from the outset, had sent Eden the signal to 
drop it if he sensed it would be another Norway. Then another unex-
pected thing happened: Dill and Wavell changed their minds. On Sunday 
the twenty-third, the COS met from 4:45 p.m. until 2:30 a.m. and pro-
duced a paper which said that on balance the enterprise should go ahead. 
(But the Cabinet had never asked for nor received a purely military 
appreciation from either the Chiefs of Staff or Wavell: all service advice 
given had been colored by political considerations, a very dangerous 
procedure.) So again on Monday the Prime Minister told the Cabinet that 
on the evidence he was in favor, and they approved. l54 
Prime Minister Menzies of Australia recorded that the first matter to 
come before the War Cabinet after he arrived in London was Greece, an 
issue which Churchill raised at Chequers on Sunday, 23 February. 
24 February 1941 
The day started with a conference at the Marasleon School headquarters 
of the British forces in Greece with D'Albiac in the chair joined by Turle, 
Heywood, and their staff. The discussion centered about the arrange-
ments for the arrival of considerable army forces in the guise of reinforc-
ing units for the RAF in Greece. As this would mean that an army 
commander would take over, it was agreed that the responsibility for 
arrangements would be split between HQ BFG and the military mission. 
General Heywood then asked for a photographic mosaic of the Olympus 
Line, which 0' Albiac said the RAF would provide; he would ask the 
Greeks to make one for the ten to twelve miles in front of the line. Also 
discussed were the difficulties in the Larissa area: it was a very good target 
for German bombers, and the army would have to be careful in siting 
camps not to use ground that the RAF would need for satellite airfields. ISS 
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Having heard of Eden's visit, MacVeagh went to see Palairet, who did 
not deny it, merely saying that Eden was then in Cairo. Palairet asserted 
that the Germans intended to attack Salonika to keep the British from 
going there; in case of an attack Britain would certainly send aid to the 
Greeks. He wished there were not so many question marks connected 
with Turkey. 156 
Salisbury-Jones called in the elderly Major Reid of the HQ Liaison 
Regiment and told him to get into civilian clothes and go make a recon-
naissance of Macedonia. Prince Peter of Greece obtained the permits and 
Greek vehicles, instead of the conspicuously British ones, and they set off 
the next day. Secrecy was blown, of course, by having the unit paraded 
outside the Hotel Grande Bretagne before departureps7 
This Monday in Cairo Dill visited Freyberg and the New Zealand 
Division, met all the brigadiers and some of the troops, and then inter-
viewed at GHQ Neame, soon to be governor-general of Cyrenaica, and 
Everts, the commanding general of the 6th Australian Division. He also 
visited the defence minister and chief of the Egyptian general staff in the 
morning and spent the afternoon with Jumbo Wilson and the chief 
ordnance officer. That evening he attended a meeting at the embassy at 
which the line to be taken with the Turks was discussed. At ten in the 
evening there was a further meeting in Eden's room to hear a report on the 
Rumanian situation from Mr. Berthoud of the Bucharest legation, which 
resulted in a telegram to the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff to urge 
that one more heavy night bomber (Wellington) squadron be sent out via 
Malta for the attack on the Ploesti oil targets between 6 and 20 March, the 
next moon period before the Danube thawed and the stocks at the 
refineries could be shipped out. ISS This, of course, countered Dill's mes-
sage sent off just the day before, but that response had been based on 
insufficient knowledge of the economics of the situation. 
The director of military intelligence at the War Office, unaware as yet 
of the German plans (known as BARBAROSSA) for an attack on Russia, 
warned the VCIGS that as Field Marshal von Rundstedt had moved to 
Rumania, the British would lose all forces sent to Greece. With this 
knowledge, the Chiefs of Staff were inclined to agree that, unless 
Yugoslavia and Turkey cooperated, going to Greece would not affect the 
outcome of the war as a whole. But the Cabinet stuck to its decision to go 
to Greece and, as will be seen, reconfirmed it on 27 February. In Cairo in 
the meantime, general staff intelligence had been against the Cabinet 
decision, because they did not think the Germans would attack Greece; 
but when Dill arrived he changed their minds. Ironically, as Hinsley has 
pointed out, in early March when London was about to abandon the 
Greek campaign, Cairo persuaded London to stick with it. IS9 
Though it is not in the minutes of the Monday meeting, the Chiefs of 
Staff in their paper had noted that in creating a Balkan front the British 
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would be forcing the Germans to fight at the end of a long line of 
communication (though actually it was a great deal shorter than the 
British one, and was dominated by railways through friendly countries, 
not by shipping lanes through hostile seas). But the COS also noted that 
the Greek commitment would be endless and exhausting, using up 
Britain's reserves in the Middle East and perhaps leaving none for Turkey 
and Egypt. liThe possible military advantages ... are considerable 
though their achievement is doubtful and the risks of failure are serious. 
The disadvantages of leaving Greece to her fate will be certain and far-
reaching. Even a complete failure of an honourable attempt to help 
Greece need not be disastrous to our future ability to defeat Germany."l60 
At the Foreign Office, Cadogan read the Chiefs of Staff report endors-
ing proposals for a Balkan expedition to help Greece and noted in his 
diary that on all moral and sentimental (and consequently American) 
grounds, he was driven to a grim conclusion that in the end it must be a 
failure. However, it was perhaps better to have failed in a decent project 
than never to have tried at all. Anthony had rather jumped into it, but 
what impressed Cadogan was that Wavell and Dill endorsed him. He 
thought the Cabinet had made the right decision, and, when the Greek 
ambassador said his country did not want help until invaded, he had let 
this pass because it was useful camouflage. 161 
At five o'clock on 24 February, just in time for a late cup of tea, the War 
Cabinet met, with Prime Minister Menzies present. They had before 
them telegrams from Eden and Dill and a report from the Chiefs of Staff, 
as well as telegrams of 11 February from Churchill and the COS to Wavell 
and the other C-in-C's. As usual the Prime Minister opened the meeting. 
He said that the Cabinet had to reach a most important decision, namely, 
whether or not to open a new theater of war in Greece. He noted that he 
had warned Eden that if Greece was likely to be another Norwegian fiasco, 
he should say so; but Eden, Dill, and Wavell had recommended going 
ahead. What particularly impressed him was the telegram from Dill in 
which the CIGS, who had always doubted that Germany could be suc-
cessfully resisted on the mainland of Europe, and had always taken a 
restrained view about going into Greece, now thought Britain had a 
reasonable chance of resisting the Germans by going there. As the Chiefs 
of Staff also thought on balance that the enterprise should go forward, he 
had given orders for it to proceed pending Cabinet approval. So now was 
the time for any dissenter to speak up. 
Menzies then said that he needed assurances on two points--that 
shipping would be adequate to get the forces there and into position in 
time, and that the 7th Australian Division, which was then in Palestine 
and only equipped to the training scale, would be fully equipped. 
The Prime Minister replied that he did not anticipate that the Ger-
mans would advance until about 12-15 March and that Allied troops 
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would arrive at their positions at about the same time. The VCIGS said 
that the 7th Australian Division was almost fully equipped, and it was 
practically certain that General Blarney would have been called into con-
sultation on this question; he thought that Menzies could rest assured that 
no Australian division would be put into the line without a full establish-
ment of the necessary weapons. 
Asked about the air situation in Greece, Portal said that there were 
seven RAF squadrons there now, but that Longmore hoped to raise this to 
fourteen and possibly sixteen in March (Portal's italics, in his defense 
written in response to Australian charges of 22 November 1941 that the 
RAF had never reached the number of squadrons promised.) Longmore's 
estimate included three heavy bomber squadrons which would probably 
operate from Egypt. (This information was telegraphed to Australia by 
her prime minister after the War Cabinet adjourned. The next day the 
Dominions Office cabled the New Zealand government that there would 
only be fourteen squadrons, a signal which was repeated to the British 
high commissioner in Australia.)162 
Portal then went into a detailed discussion of the airfield situation in 
Greece and ended with the statement that the RAF would have some 250 
aircraft with which to face about 450 German aircraft over Greece. Lon-
don's assumption that five more squadrons might go immediately to 
Greece was noted later by the official New Zealand historian, but no one 
in these discussions really raised the question of the time that would be 
absorbed in the shipping process. (Moreover, Longmore did not have, as 
Turle and others had been led to suppose, twenty squadrons available for 
Greece: when he did get Hurricanes, he had immediately to dispatch two 
squadrons to Benina to defend Tobruk against Fliegerkorps X; the one 
which he did manage to send to Greece late in the campaign was wiped 
out almost at once.)163 
Menzies asked if the price of failure would be confined to the equip-
ment of one armored division. Churchill replied that, if they were pressed 
back, they should be able to evacuate all but the wounded. Menzies then 
said that if the justification for the enterprise was only a forlorn hope, it 
had better not be undertaken. Could he say to his colleagues in Australia 
that the venture had a substantial chance of success? On this Churchill 
was naturally evasive, saying that it was up to the Australian cabinet to 
make their own decision based upon what Menzies told them. In Church-
ill's opinion, the operation was a risk which had to be taken. At the worst 
he thought the bulk of the men could be got back to Egypt, where new 
equipment could then be provided. The war turned, he said, on holding 
England, holding Egypt, retaining command of the sea, obtaining com-
mand of the air, and being able to keep open the American arsenals. The 
enterprise in Greece was an advanced position which Britain could try to 
hold without jeopardizing her main position. 
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In response to another question, the Parliamentary under-secretary 
for foreign affairs, sitting in for Eden, said that aid to Greece would 
probably make the Turks ask for more material, though they might come 
into the war; the Yugoslav position was obscure and he did not think there 
was much chance of her entering the war against Germany. To which 
Churchill rejoined that the courage of the Serb race must not be forgotten, 
and helping the Greeks might stiffen Balkan resistance. It was recalled 
that Colonel Dovovan in his telegram to President Roosevelt had stressed 
the need to form a Balkan Front, and forsaking now would have a bad 
effect in the United States. As to the suggestion that Eden should talk with 
Stalin on this, Churchill had already telegraphed Eden opposing it unless 
he received a specific invitation. 
The minister for aircraft production, Lord Beaverbrook, said he 
thought that the whole impact of the Greek idea upon the shipping 
needed for Britain itself had to be looked at, especially if an evacuation was 
likely to be involved. 
The meeting concluded with all the ministers present being in favor of 
sending military assistance to Greece. Menzies noted that there was 
almost no discussion, for Churchill dominated the subordinate ministers, 
who accepted any of his proposals without question. 164 
At 8:15 that evening Churchill signaled Eden that the War Cabinet, 
including Menzies, was unanimous in support of the action taken in 
Athens. "Therefore while being under no illusions, we all send you the 
order 'Full Steam Ahead.' "165 
25 February 1941 
On the twenty-fifth Eden told London just before he left Cairo for Ankara 
that they were going ahead with the decision as taken at Athens, their 
chief anxiety being that the closing of the Suez Canal would jeopardize 
the operation. 
Some time after this the Greek campaign and its risks were explained 
to General Sikorski, who agreed to allow the Polish Brigade to participate, 
though pointing out that it was Free Poland's only fighting force. 166 
On this day the Greek military attache in Bucharest learned from the 
Deuxieme Bureau of the Rumanian general staff that the Germans were 
bridging the Danube along its entire length-indicating a concentration 
against Bulgaria and Yugoslavia-and so informed Athens. 167 
Meanwhile, after a number of false starts, MANDIBLES began on the 
night of 25-26 February when a landing was made at last, after three 
abortive attempts, on Castelorizo Island, the easternmost of the 
Dodecanese, only two miles off the Turkish Coast. HMS Ladybird actually 
sailed into the harbor, but she was driven out by air attacks when day 
dawned, and had to retreat to Cyprus. And as it turned out, the British 
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had underestimated this operation, and the force put ashore was 
eventually forced to surrender a few days later; another case of poor 
intelligence, wishful thinking, and bad planning, although a simulated 
attack had been made there on 27 July 1940.168 
26 February 1941 
Among many concerns mentioned in a signal to Wavell on 26 February, 
Churchill included this one: "We have great anxiety about closing of 
Canal particularly on account of 'Mandibles,' which assumes ever-grow-
ing urgency. . . . Surely you want about three thousand trustworthy 
white men watching Canal, but with your large numbers of personnel not 
incorporated in tactical formations this should present no difficulty. Canal 
problem must be mastered at all costS. 169 
Wavell replied on the next day, as part of a long response to many 
questions, "You are mistaken in supposing I have large numbers of white 
troops available. My only spare battalions are being incorporated in 6 Div. 
and training for Mandibles operation." As those needed for guarding the 
Canal had to be permanent and not transients, Middle East headquarters 
had arranged for Egyptian units to be used. And to Churchill's concern 
that there would not be enough British troops in the Grecian campaign, 
he responded that armoured troops, artillery, and administrative serv-
ices, amounting in all to about one-third of the LUSTRE forces, would be 
British. But he concluded with the warning, "We have the last two months 
had only second-class opponents, but I think you will admit we have 
played quite impressive cricket against them and scored at good pace, 
now we shall be up against the real thing and shall have to stonewall for a 
bit. "170 
In London Menzies received an affirmative cable from his Cabinet 
supporting the Greek adventure, provided the troops were fully 
equipped and that plans existed for their evacuation. Menzies then asked 
for an up-to-date appreciation from Wavell and a clear statement from 
both Eden and Churchill of the broad objectives of aid to Greece. Above all 
he wanted assurance that to go north would not weaken the Western 
Desert position. l71 Two days later General Blarney raised with Menzies 
the idea that he should command the British and the Greek forces, an idea 
he mentioned to both Wavell and Sir Frederick Shedden, the Australian 
minister of defence, who was accompanying Menzies and whose brain-
child it was in the first place. 172 Once again Menzies was too late; Wilson 
had already been appointed. 
On 26 February the New Zealand government also gave its assent, 
though it had yet to receive Eden's cable of the twenty-second. 
29 January 1941 - 4 March 1941 131 
27 February 1941 
Very early on this Thursday by European time, the New Zealand govern-
ment in Wellington was in something of an uproar, for it had just dis-
covered that it had agreed to the dispatch of the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force to Greece assuming that its commander, General 
Freyberg, had been consulted. Now a cable arrived from him which 
clearly indicated that he was in the dark. Normally if confronted with a 
request from the United Kingdom without an indication of Freyberg's 
assent, the New Zealand Cabinet would have asked for it, but they 
thought he knew. They were also confused by London's cable of the 
twenty-sixth that the Australian government had agreed to send its 
forces. A second cable arrived, containing more details of the expedition 
to Greece, after the New Zealand government had given its consent, thus 
making even stronger the possibility that it had been tricked. A query to 
London received a surprisingly confident response from the Dominions 
secretary on 2 March. (Of course this query reached London when it was 
bouncing high again, before the mess in Athens had become known). 173 
Though Eden's party had a wonderful social time in Ankara, the 
Turks were implacable in their refusal to move. The only incident of real 
importance to the Greek story occurred on this Thursday morning, after a 
party that broke up at four in the morning. Eden called a meeting for 8:00 
a.m. The Yugoslav ambassador arrived at that time to report that Belgrade 
would be unable to make any move, and he was then treated very rudely 
by Eden and his colleagues, who berated him because his countrymen 
had gone to Vienna to see Hitler. The minister was dismissed, but he 
reappeared just before bedtime with a very unsatisfactory reply from 
Prince Paul to Eden's message from Athens: essentially the regent would 
take no stand on what Yugoslavia would do if the Germans moved across 
Bulgaria to attack Greece. Eden was furious. 174 
Meanwhile in Athens Papagos had repeatedly asked Heywood 
whether or not the British had had a reply from Belgrade, and was each 
time told no.17S 
And so the critical misunderstanding in Anglo-Greek relations 
blossomed on the evening of Thursday, 27 February 1941. The fault lay 
with Eden and his staff member Pierson Dixon. Prince Paul's reply had 
been negative. Sound diplomatic staff work demanded that the answer be 
at once communicated to Athens and repeated to London and Cairo, so 
that Papagos could be informed and the executive order for the movement 
to the Aliakmon Line could be given. But nothing was done. If Eden and 
Pierson Dixon told anyone at the time, the others in the party-Dill and 
Mallaby particularly-assumed that the political head of the mission had 
taken care of it. Certainly Dill did nothing to inform Papagos or even 
Heywood in Athens. All of this would lead to recriminations in a few 
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days. Historically, General Papagos' version of the events between 22 
February and 2 March on this point is absolutely correct and the British 
accounts are not. 
Equally serious, as late as the War Cabinet meeting on 6 March, 
London still had no idea that the Yugoslavs were refusing to take any but 
a neutral stance. 
Eden's party spent Friday, the twenty-eighth, in Ankara and then left 
that night by train. On Saturday, 1 March, just as the Germans moved into 
Bulgaria, they arrived at Ismid and proceeded to a siding on the jetty at 
Derince on the Sea of Marmora, where they sat for twenty-four hours 
awaiting the fIying boat from Athens. They were thus incommunicado for 
almost two whole days. 
In Athens the king told MacVeagh that it was an absolute secret that 
Eden, Dill, and Wavell had come to Greece last Sunday; Greece was not 
admitting it. The king said that they had talked over military plans and 
that Greece was still cautious about the British going to Salonika, for to 
send them there while Yugoslavia's attitude remained uncertain would be 
pure folly. The Greek defensive line was only designed to hold against the 
Bulgarians, not against the Germans, so unless the Yugoslavs protected 
their interests in Salonika, the line now contemplated was in the moun-
tains west of the Vardar. I76 
Meanwhile back in Cairo the 3d Battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment 
had been ordered to send its tanks to the shops to be repainted from sand 
to green. By the second half of the month the battalion was fully as-
sembled, but all its tanks were in the shops. On 27 February it was placed 
on forty-eight-hour notice to move and knew that it was going to Europe, 
with Greece the most commonly rumored spot. Then it was issued khaki 
drill and long woollen underwear, made to turn in its battledress, and 
refused an issue of jerkins. Its brigadier went to see Jumbo Wilson, who 
agreed that if they were going north they should keep their battledress 
and draw jerkins! It was all, as Robert Crisp noted, a not untypical mix-
Up.I77 
And at Helwan the New Zealand 20 Battalion was for the next week 
also engaged in the throes of departure, being issued weapons and 
equipment, mosquito cream, antigas ointment, tommy guns, and rain, 
which frayed tempers and made the many parades irritating. There was a 
last session in the gas chamber to test respirators (for the December 1940 
War Office general staff Notes on the German Army still emphasized the use 
of gas), a final fling in Cairo, and a farewell party in the "Naafi."178 
In the interim, in London the War Cabinet reconvened at 5:30 p.m. on 
27 February to continue its discussion on military assistance to Greece. 
Churchill said that he had no doubt that the decision taken at the meeting 
on the twenty-fourth had been right, even though there would be ship-
ping difficulties. He dismissed these, including the enforced use of the 
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long route round the Cape of Good Hope, by saying that after all they had 
planned to maintain a larger force in the Middle East anyway, so the 
slightly longer voyage to Greece was not a formidable addition to Britain's 
difficulties. 
Menzies then said that his colleagues in Canberra had given their 
assent, but with the two concerns already mentioned. Since Dill felt that 
the forces initially being dispatched were adequate, Menzies would point 
this out to his own Cabinet. The Dominions secretary, Viscount Cran-
borne, reported that New Zealand had also given her consent, on condi-
tion that the fully equipped New Zealand Division was accompanied by 
an armored brigade. Like the Australian Cabinet, New Zealand also had 
doubts, which had been expressed in a second telegram. 
Menzies then summed up by pointing out that the decisions had been 
made on political grounds, but since they involved half of the Australian 
divisions and the only New Zealand one, the issues involved were of 
outstanding importance to those down under. 
Churchill responded that he deeply appreciated their magnificent 
response to what was probably the most severe proposal ever put to the 
Dominion governments. The political value of the military steps just 
taken could not be ignored. The course adopted was the policy best 
calculated to retain the eighteen Greek divisions now in the field and 
twenty-seven Turkish divisions now in Thrace; and these, together with 
the British forces, would be more than anything the Germans could put 
into the field for some months. Nor should the possibility of Yugoslavia 
joining in on the allied side be ignored. He hoped that the 6th Division 
could be sent as a reinforcement from the Middle East, and the 50th from 
the United Kingdom, in about two months. Two South African divisions 
should be available when fighting stepped in East Africa. 
As Wavaell's timetable for the move to Greece had not yet been 
received, the whole business was being kept most secret. It would be a 
mistake, Churchill added, to draw any pessimistic inferences from the 
recent clash of British and German armor in Africa. There were no 
indications that the Germans were preparing to undertake an advance 
across the Libyan Desert, nor was it known how many German mecha-
nized formations had been ferried over to Libya. 179 
There were at least two problems with this fallacious reasoning. First, 
Churchill was equating untrained and ill-equipped Allied divisions with 
well-rested, battle-hardened Germans under experienced commanders. 
Second, he was overlooking the fact that, thanks to American ineptness 
and British chicanery, the United States had not yet managed to ship to 
Greece any of the desperately needed aircraft which had been requested 
four months earlier. To put it inelegantly in the words of Pilot Officer 
Prune, RAF, "The Americans had not yet been able to get their finger 
out." And even if American supply ships sailed at once, it would still take 
134 The Garden of Eden 
close to three months for the material to arrive at the Piraeus. It should 
have been evident to London from the comments coming in from its 
diplomatic listening posts, not to mention by simple intelligent observa-
tion, that Wild Bill Donovan had been talking a mouthful of New York 
Irish blarney. 
Meanwhile Longmore had told the chief of the Air Staff that the 
Grecian airfield situation was terrible. Lines of communication were 
clogged. The dry airfields were in out-of-the-way places, and others 
lacked communications. Priority messages on the local telephone system 
took five to six hours. At Larissa, through which all messages had to be 
routed, the local air-raid warning net monopolized the lines. And the 
distances from Athens to the fronts were too great for effective opera-
tions. But at least some Hurricanes had arrived: these belonged to No. 33 
Squadron, which had finally reached Greece in early February. 180 
Papagos later claimed that during the period January through March 
1941 the Greek air force received 12 fighters and 5 bombers from the 
British. At the same time the RAF in Greece was reinforced to the tune of 
24 fighters and 28 bombers, but in view of the German threat these aircraft 
were reserved for the Macedonian front and were not available for opera-
tions in Albania. 18l 
That night Cadogan noted that the Cabinet was very gloomy over the 
shipping situation in general, discussed the contents of Eden's telegram 
on his talks in Turkey, and agreed to give him some leeway in suggesting 
revisions of the Italo-Yugoslav border.182 The latter entry in particular 
indicates how far removed the British were from the realities of power and 
international politics in the Balkans: Eden could not even get an invitation 
to Belgrade! 
That Thursday the War Office asked Wavell for an appreciation of the 
Germans in North Africa since contact had been made on the twenty-
fourth. He cabled back that there was no evidence that more than one 
armored brigade had landed, and that the distance to Benghazi and the 
lack of communications and water made it unlikely that they could main-
tain a large enough force to attack in the near future. A larger offensive 
was extremely unlikely before the end of summer. Cairo had already 
pointed out that it suffered from a paucity of intelligence from Italy's 
North African possessions,183 but the problem went much deeper than 
that. The British estimates were based on their assumptions that it took 
three months for troops to get acclimatized and trained in the Desert, 
which was nonsense as Rommel proved, and apparently no one yet had 
any information on Rommel. (By the time he got to North Africa in 
November 1942 the American General George S. Patton, Jr., faced a much 
better-known Rommel.)184 
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28 February 1941 
Nine Hurricanes and 19 Gladiators rose on 28 February to challenge an 
Italian air raid over Tepelene, Albania; they claimed 20 shot down and 8 
probables out of 50 attacking aircraft for a loss of 1 Gladiator.I8s The 
trouble for 0' Albiac was that he had been providing, when the weather 
permitted operations, tactical support for the front lines; this left the 
Italian airfields immune, and the enemy were now attacking his bases. He 
decided to revert to his earlier ports and airfields strategy. 
In the evening Longmore, visiting in Athens, told Major Crow, the 
American army air attache, that the Libyan advance was temporarily 
slowed down by the activity of the Luftwaffe, but would be resumed 
when additional air forces became available after the conclusion of the 
campaign in East Africa and the Sudan. "The ultimate fall of Tripoli is 
expected," MacVeagh cabled home next day. He added that Malta was 
under heavy attack and hard to supply, and the Suez Canal was suffering 
from attacks from Rhodes, against which land, sea, and air operations 
were planned. Both Yugoslavia and Turkey had changed their attitudes 
and were stiffening against the Axis, and Turkey had agreed to allow the 
British to use her airfields in the event of open German aggression in the 
Balkans. It would be at least a month before the weather improved 
enough to allow operations and the German force was not yet nearly 
strong enough for operations against both Greece and Turkey. The Greek 
government would not make a separate peace with Italy, would strongly 
resist the Germans, and would allow British troops to operate in Greece in 
the event of a German threat. Longmore had told Crow he was pleased 
with the situation, saying, "We have sunk the Italians now and have got to 
get on with the Germans, which I am afraid is going to be a more difficult 
proposition. "186 
Far to the north Major Reid and his party of "American correspon-
dents," in their six big Greek military limousines with uniformed drivers, 
were surveying the area around Serrai on the Struma, where the next day 
they found that there were no explosives at all in the prepared demoli-
tions.187 
The GHQ instructions for LUSTRE were issued in 143 copies "For 
Officers Only" on 28 February 1941. Greece was referred to as 1285. For 
the lower part of Greece, since there were no maps left over from the First 
World War, those issued were all in Greek. 
Admiral Cunningham was considered by some to be as great as 
Nelson and was known as "Uncle Ned" or" ABC" During the First World 
War he had seen a troopship sunk off Gallipoli with all on board, because 
of insufficient naval escort, and he was determined that that would never 
happen again. But he was at sea fighting off Matapan when the move-
ments to Greece had to be planned, and his chief of staff, Rear-Admiral 
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A.U. Willis, had agreed to use both Alexandria and Port Said. When 
Cunningham returned to port, however, he said he had not enough 
escorts and that all troops would embark at Alexandria. The Palestine and 
Egyptian railways had, therefore, hastily to redo all the schedules. 188 
Greater secrecy than normal was exercised for the move to Greece, a 
precaution that Wavell, no doubt, insisted upon because he was all too 
familiar with the leaks that abounded in Cairo and the Middle East in 
general. Thus in the case of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force all 
cables to the New Zealand government were sent from divisional head-
quarters at Helwan and not from the expeditionary force headquarters. 
The result was that the move had started before HQ 2NZEF woke up to its 
responsibilities, and the campaign ended so quickly that the breakdown 
in support was not noted. However, the lesson was learned and 
thereafter, according to its official historian, HQ 2NZEF was alert to its 
responsibilities. That it should have been bypassed in late February is not 
surprising, since at this time it consisted of the officer in charge of 
administration, one other officer, and not even a car. 189 
Around Cairo other activities were taking place to ready troops for the 
journey to Greece. New Zealand 20 Battalion was issued Tommy guns and 
rumors at Helwan, while 19 Battalion had all its newly issued battledress 
called back in, and when it had all been checked in, it was reissued again, 
much to the irritiation of those whose garments had been carefully 
tailored to fit. Tents were turned in-and it promptly rained for two 
nights; and topees were issued, some fifty-seven of which ended up in 
Greece, while others washed overboard on the way over.190 
1 - 2 March 1941 
In the meantime, Lt. Col. Freddie de Guingand from Wavell's staff in 
Cairo had stayed on in Greece and been sent north disguised as a war 
correspondent to reconnoiter the Aliakmon position, for it was, after all, 
only a line on the map. He had already visited the wounded in a Greek 
hospital and had come away very gloomy about the possibilities of doing 
much for people who were so poor that they were suffering badly from 
frostbite. Unfortunately, in his memoirs he skims over the vital expedition 
to the north, saying merely that the members spent six days, looked at the 
water obstacles, bridges, and mountain passes, and came to the con-
clusion that it was pretty vulnerable to the German air force as well as 
needing a large number of troops to defend it. 191 On the way back he was 
caught in the Larissa earthquake of 1 March, but fortunately he was 
staying in the one earthquake-proof hotel in town and so managed to get 
down intact with his suitcase from the sixth floor and out to the airfield. 
This was a major earthquake, which destroyed or damaged half the 
stone buildings in the town. The RAF spent several days helping the 
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natives dig out, clearing streets, reestablishing phone lines and the like, 
as well as repairing gaping fissures in the runways. On top of this the 
Italians bombed the airfield while No. 11 Squadron was trying to fly on 
and off around the fissures and the working parties. 
An RAF pilot took de Guingand for a reconnaissance of the area 
around Mount Olympus. After viewing that 9,750-foot peak and its very 
narrow coastal plain, they flew on to Salonika. A depressing view of the 
Vardar and Struma plains helped convince him that even the Aliakmon 
position was not likely to be held, because the front by British standards 
was so immense and even on the narrow coastal plain below Olympus a 
turning movement was possible. The next day he drove back to Athens, 
looking at a couple of possible ports along the way, and reported to 
Wavell's chief of staff, Arthur Smith, who was in Athens to supervise the 
arrival of the expeditionary force. Major Reid had also been flown down 
from Salonika to brief Smith and Dill. Tired, de Guingand turned in about 
eleven o'clock, only to be called up at 1:00 a.m. on 3 March and ordered 
downstairs at the Hotel King George II to see General Smith, who then 
dictated a memorandum on the difficulties which had developed with 
Papagos and ordered de Guingand to take the next plane back to Cairo to 
report to Wavell. 
As de Guingand saw it, Papagos was a realist who saw four principal 
difficulties: the improbability ofTurkish or Yugoslav assistance, the politi-
cal and morale consequences of withdrawal from northeast Greece, the 
lack of time, and the doubtful arrival, in time, of adequate British forces. 
General Smith ended his memo with the sentence, "From the strictly 
military point of view this would provide us with the opportunity of 
withdrawing from what appears now to be an unsound venture." 
De Guingand left on the 9:00 a.m. plane and passed Wavell's flight on 
its way to Athens. 
(Getting back to Cairo early on the afternoon of the third, de 
Guingand, finding that the C-in-C had already left for Athens, reported 
to his own office, the Joint Planning Staff. After listening to his eye-
opening description of the condition of the Greek fighting men and of the 
country, the staff at once agreed that the best thing they could do was to 
start planning another evacuation. The planners kept their work dead 
secret, but they knew that once the Aliakmon position was turned they 
had to be ready with a plan. After a few days it was decided that de 
Guingand, since he possessed a Greek press pass as a war correspondent, 
should go to Greece again, to make a reconnaissance of the ports. It 
happened, he wrote, that while he was waiting for the plane by the Nile in 
Cairo Wavell appeared, also on his way over. He asked de Guingand what 
he was up to, and, when told, put him under pain of death to keep it a 
secret. The next day in Athens, he called de Guingand into his office and 
had him discuss the nascent plans with a select group of officers. Why the 
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idea of evacuation should be so secret, except that Wavellioved mystery, is 
open to skepticism, since D'Albiac's directive of 5 November 1940 had 
required him to make such plans and be prepared to carry them out 
without reference to higher headquarters.)l92 
Rear-Admiral Turle, in his dual role as head of the military mission 
and naval attache, had been considering what should be done about 
Salonika, and on 1 March he signaled the C-in-C that the military mission 
had come to the conclusion that they were faced with a complex interna-
tional problem involving the Greeks, the Yugoslavs, and the Germans, in 
which time was of the essence. Their recommendation was that Salonika 
harbor should be mined before the Germans arrived, and that all sweep-
ing gear should be removed, as well as anything larger than a rowing boat 
located farther north than Volos; while on land all rolling stock, motor 
vehicles, and militarily useful materials should be withdrawn, and stocks 
of all oils together with tanks, pipelines, and piers should be destroyed. 
What they proposed, without apparently seeing the consequences, was a 
scorched-earth policy that would have further endangered the Greek 
population. It is scarcely surprising that in the end the Greeks themselves 
resisted this suicide. 193 
At about this time Longmore noted that photographic reconnaissance 
showed a complete German division in Tripoli, being supplied by sea and 
air. What he needed was not Wellingtons, which were a headache in the 
Middle East because of their maintenance, bomb-loading and refueling 
problems, but fighters and a transport squadron. Nor did he want to be 
forced prematurely to reduce air support in East Africa, because that was 
an area in which victory would be final,194 As to the Dodecanese bases 
from which the Italians were operating, and from which the Germans had 
begun to be a nuisance, Cunningham was right that there had to be a 
choice of Greece or the Dodecanese. S.W. Roskilll, the naval historian, 
later wrote that the true solution would have been to pulverize the bases 
there with long-range bombers, such as Wellingtons (which Longmore 
did not have).195 
When he heard of the Bulgarian adherence to the Axis, Churchill 
cabled Wavell and Eden to try to get Prince Paul, in Yugoslavia, to strike, 
but he also gave Eden the option of dropping the bargain with Greece. 
Again, London was simply being unrealistic. Paul sat across the river in 
Belgrade from large German forces. Yugoslavia's trade was heavily with 
Germany. Any Yugoslav action was likely to embroil her in a three-front 
war against Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria, while at the same time leading 
to the possibility of a Croatian uprising and mutinies at home. The 
Churchillian suggestion that an attack on Albania would create a disaster 
for the enemy naively overlooked the realities of Axis politics; Hitler 
simply would not allow Mussolini to be demolished, especially if it 
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resulted in the establishment of a British-led bloc based on Greece, as in 
the First World War. The English are a gambling nation and Churchill was 
no exception, but he was an ill-informed amateur at guessing the odds in 
the Balkans. The Yugoslavs had been notified by the Bulgarians of their 
adherence to the Axis, and warned that German troops would be moving 
through Bulgaria to the Greek border. And when Prince Paul visited 
Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 4 March the regent emerged from the five-
hour confrontation with a sinking heart, knowing where Yugoslavia 
really stoOd. 196 
While in a sense much activity took place elsewhere, the center of 
gravity was for the next few days in Athens. There, on 1 March, it was a 
pleasant, sunny 50-degree day with light clouds. General Papagos waited 
to give the decisive order to move to the Aliakmon Line until he had heard 
from Belgrade. He was faced with a critical decision (which, my own 
conversations with Greek army commanders in 1979 indicated, was still 
primarily limited by the geography of Greece). With sufficient forces the 
logical position to hold for military and especially political purposes was 
the Metaxas Line on the Bulgarian frontier, but it left a gap on the Greek 
left flank, since it did not extend to Lake Prespa. If Yugoslavia were 
neutral or a friendly ally, then that gap was not significant, but if 
Yugoslavia became a passageway for an enemy, then the whole northeast 
was at hazard. The only viable position then was the Aliakmon Line, 
which had to be extended west of Servia in order to cover the Monastir 
Gap. Potentially it was a strong position if prepared in depth and held by 
adequate forces backed by strong artillery and a good communications 
net. Its weakness lay in its roadless geography and lack of communica-
tions, which made lateral reinforcement behind the lines impossible 
without lengthy journeys back almost to the plains of Thessaly. 
For Papagos the German move into Bulgaria posed not only the 
military problem of being caught in the flat Thracian and Macedonian 
plains but also the political-psychological one of retreat and abandonment 
of the population. Although the Germans were then temporarily held up 
by snow in the Bulgarian passes, there was no telling when they might 
decide to attack. Nor was air cover available. These were the crucial ques-
tions with which the leaders in Athens had to grapple, while in Egypt the 
expeditionary force was moving toward the docks in Alexandria. 
Sunday, 2 March, was also a lovely day in Athens. Mere puffs of 
clouds gave less than two-tenths cover, the temperature rose to the low 
fifties, and there was a pleasant northeast wind. Though in Belgrade it 
was raining, it remained dry in the Greek capital. 
That morning some 700 RAF and 3,300 other British troops landed at 
the Piraeus, and there was a rumor that more had landed farther north. It 
is said that when they had sailed from Alexandria, Major-General B.o. 
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Hutchison, the QMG, told Wavell the news, and the C-in-C ME replied, "1 
suppose it is worth it. "197 
Much further north that Sunday the weather-delayed flying boat 
finally arrived in the Sea of Marmora at eleven in the morning, and Eden's 
party embarked. Shortly after two they arrived at Salamina Island, close 
by the classical battlefield of Salamis, disembarked by launch, crossed 
over to Attica proper and motored to Athens for tea at the British legation. 
Some of the party were put up at the home of M. Efgenides, at the corner 
of Vassilis Sofia Avenue and Ag. S. Pyrri, and the rest at the Hotel Grande 
Bretagne. They were back in circulation again. 
Eden and Dill stayed in the legation (which is now the British ambas-
sador's residence, opposite the Byzantine Museum). A stately Greek 
Georgian house, it had been built for Eleftherios Venizelos and on his 
death in 1936 had been bought for the legation. The British party drove up 
the short curved driveway and stopped under the portico. Sir Michael 
Palairet conducted them through the twin bronze doors, up the white 
marble steps, and across the front hall, turning right past the three-
person lift through double doors in a cast iron screen into the Grand Hall. 
After the normal pleasantries and an examination of the famous Thomas 
Phillips portrait of Byron at Missolonghi, and of one of his letters, the 
visitors were no doubt shown to the guest suites on the second floor. 
During his stay in Athens Eden appeared in public in the sartorial 
splendor of a gray, impeccably cut, light tropical suit with one of his 
famous soft felt hats. Instantly recognized, he was widely cheered by the 
Greeks, and C. L. Sulzberger came down from Belgrade to interview him. 
Elegant and courageous, in Sulzberger's words, Eden quizzed him about 
Yugoslavia and was highly pleased when the young American told him 
that the Yugoslavs would fight.198 (Eden also talked with Campbell, the 
British ambassador to Belgrade, who spelled out Prince Paul's difficulties, 
including the fact that the Serbs were pro-Allies but the Croats pro-
German. He added that the Yugoslavs were scared of Germany, but there 
was a chance that, if they knew of the British plans for aiding Greece, they 
might help.)199 
At 5: 15 on the afternoon of 2 March, in the diningroom of the legation, 
thirteen Englishmen, including General Arthur Smith from Cairo and 
Ronald Campbell from Belgrade, first heard from a reluctant Eden, who 
tried to avoid the subject, about his visit to Turkey, his impressions of the 
Turks and of their intentions, and likely British aid to Turkey-which 
boiled down to nothing much. Eden was obviously, according to the 
Greek version of the minutes, embarrassed.2OO The Greeks moved the 
conversation to the subject of Yugoslavia. Eden said that he did not expect 
the Yugoslavs to do anything, though under cross-examination he and 
Campbell took the view that in the end Prince Paul was to be trusted to do 
the right thing. Prime Minister Koryzis then expressed his own views that 
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the Greeks would be forced to surrender, and the king and the govern-
ment would be evacuated to one of the islands; the people would suffer 
greatly under an occupation unless Britain could immediately supply 
substantial aid. To boost Greek morale he asked for the freeing of econom-
ic controls from British dominance and the promise of Cyprus for Greece. 
The group then went on to discuss the implications of the withdrawal to 
the Macedonian position. The Greek minutes, signed by Papagos, end at 
a little before 10:00 p.m. 
A full meeting then convened, with the military present. A detailed 
exchange took place between Papagos and Dill as to what the Turks would 
do if the Germans made a move to the south: Dill seemed to think that the 
Turks would allow the British to fly over their territory but would not 
declare war until they felt themselves suitably armed. This ambiguity led, 
therefore, quite naturally back to the Aliakmon position. According to the 
Greek minutes, Papagos asked if there was any knowledge yet of the 
Yugoslav position. The British accounts say that then General Heywood 
reported that General Papagos had not yet moved any troops to the 
Aliakmon. (Perhaps because Dill himself had not passed on the Yugoslav 
reply received in Turkey, the CIGS reprimanded Heywood severely for 
not reporting earlier that Papagos had not moved.) 
Because of the detailed nature of the Greek minutes, they deserve to 
be taken very seriously as accurate. They show that Papagos had a sound 
grasp not merely of Balkan strategy but of German capabilities as well, 
and was prepared to expect the enemy to act in much more unorthodox 
manners than were the British, including winter attacks. Because he did 
not wish his eastern Macedonian garrisons to be caught on the plains of 
Thrace by ground or air attack, at this meeting Papagos held out against 
moving them, stressing that they were better off in their present fortified 
positions, especially if the British refused to land any farther forward than 
the Piraeus and Volos. This had not been resolved when Koryzis and 
Eden came into the room and Eden immediately asked why Papagos had 
not yet moved his forces. Papagos replied once more: because the order 
was not to be given until he was informed of Yugoslavia's attitude. Eden 
then read off the notes his secretary had made of the discussions on 22 
February, and Papagos countered by reminding him of the ensuing 
discussion on the wording of the letter to Yugoslavia; and he repeated that 
this was a political matter which had to be settled before he as a military 
commander could give orders. (Other senior British officers felt that the 
Greek commander-in-chief would rather be stabbed in the back by the 
Germans than give an inch to the Italians at that point. Though this was 
not the case, Papagos was anxious that his generals not tell Heywood that 
they would fight the Italians to the end and then surrender to the 
Germans, and he sent Prince Peter to tell them SO.)201 
Papagos having bettered him on that one, Eden withdrew. 
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Papagos and Dill then got into an argument about whose forces 
would be most exposed if the Germans attacked while they were still 
moving into position, the Greeks going to the Aliakmon or the British to 
the forward fortified line. Just before adjourning at midnight, the Greek 
minutes testify, Papagos reemphasized that they still had not heard of the 
Yugoslav position, but that the situation had already been changed from 
what it was on 22 February by the presence of the Germans in Bulgaria. 
According to the British accounts, Eden stated at the afternoon meet-
ing that withdrawal to the Aliakmon Line had been agreed upon on 22 
February, but "evidently there had been an unfortunate misunderstand-
ing due to General Papagos's hopes that Yugoslavia would in fact come 
in." Dill testified that it would be militarily unsound to hold another line 
but the Aliakmon, or to hold even that line with less than eight divisions 
with one in reserve. The available British forces alone were insufficient. 
Longmore claimed that the Germans could not get through the passes for 
a month yet because of snow, and Eden said that he would tell the king, 
when he saw him that evening, of the British worries. 
The group then passed on to a discussion of the air problem, and 
Longmore said that he could do little for the Turks until late 1941. Repair 
facilities were inadequate, and there was no ammunition for the American 
guns in the Tomahawks at Takoradi. 
After dinner at the legation, Colonel Casson, intelligence officer of the 
military mission, gave an account of a German plan for OPERATION 
MARITA in the Balkans, dated 4 December, which had fallen into British 
hands. 
A series of meetings was then held with the president of the Council, 
Koryzis, starting at 10:45 and running on until 12:45 the next morning (the 
Greek transcript says ten to midnight).202 Eden opened the first session 
by saying that they could not count on Yugoslavia. Koryzis said that in 
that case the military should reexamine the question to see if three 
divisions would be sufficient. Eden responded that this had already been 
discussed at the Tatoi meetings, that Papagos and Wavell had decided that 
there was a good chance, and that their decision had been based on no 
support from either Yugoslavia or Turkey. The Greeks countered that 
there was now not enough time to move the Greek and British troops. (In 
this they were quite right, for by Wavell's own schedule the British 
needed ten weeks to bring over their proposed forces, and that meant 
they would not be in place on the Aliakmon until early May.) 
The meeting then turned into a military discussion. Dill urged speed 
(without seeming to realize that the Greek forces were geared to the speed 
of a footsoldier-3.5 kilometers an hour-and the British to cargo-ship 
speed-lO knots). Papagos pointed out that the Germans now had five 
divisions in Bulgaria and that they could launch land and air attacks 
within ten days. If he knew positively that they would not move for 
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fourteen days he could move his troops, but his information was that the 
Germans already had dumps in the Struma valley. Dill said he thought 
the Germans could not attack for twenty-one days, as they had only just 
crossed the Danube, and Papagos admitted that that was possible. Dill 
added that he did not want to take the risks of disembarkation in the 
north, though he admitted moving north by land from the Piraeus and 
Volos would be slow. 
The full group came back together just before midnight for a brief 
discussion of the Tatoi misunderstanding, but quickly broke up so that 
Dill and Smith could discuss it alone with Papagos. As General Heywood 
testified the next day, Papagos had repeatedly asked for news from 
Belgrade, and no one had asked why, or what difference did it make. Nor 
had Eden or Dill realized that they had failed to pass on the vital answer 
received in Turkey. When the full meeting resumed right after midnight, 
there was a further pointless exchange between Dill, Papagos, and Smith, 
until Papagos said, "If the Yugoslavs fight, the Greeks should stand on 
the forward line," and Dill said, "General Papagos will have to fight his 
battle." 
At that the meeting broke up. The British went back to the legation 
and sent a signal to Wavell urging him to fly to Athens at once. That was 
the morning that Smith sent de Guingand back to Cairo with a written 
memorandum for Wavell. 
The British report on this meeting is most unflattering to Papagos, 
calling him "frightened" and implying that he knew he was in the wrong 
and had been caught making excuses for not having moved his men. This 
is untrue and unfair. The evidence can certainly be interpreted that the 
Tatoi decision included agreement to determine the Yugoslav position 
and to take only preparatory action. 
Two lessons, of course, emerge from this misunderstanding. First, 
that the minutes of the meetings should have been drawn up and agreed 
on before the participants dispersed from such a conference as that on 22 
February. Here Eden was at fault because he was not a detail man, nor was 
Pierson Dixon, whose notes were not transcribed until several days after 
the conference, and whose record on a number of occasions was consider-
ably at variance with Dill's more precise diary of the trip. Second, if a 
conditional situation existed, then both sides had a duty to check on it and 
report back. Heywood probably was at fault for not telling Cairo that 
Athens had received no reply from Yugoslavia, and that Papagos had not 
ordered the moves to the Aliakmon to commence. Eden and Dill were 
equally to blame for not keeping Athens informed of the reply from 
Yugoslavia. And Eden and Dill were in error in their interpretation of 
what had been worked out with Papagos as to preparatory moves to the 
Aliakmon position. 
Basically, the trouble in March stemmed from that old problem that 
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tired people left a committee meeting thinking that what they wanted to 
believe had been agreed on. The more polite the meeting, as in such a 
well-mannered international group, the better the chance for a misunder-
standing. 
On 2 March the Chiefs of Staff in London told Wavell they assumed 
that he had planned demolitions in Greece in case of need, and that he 
had enough materials and British personnel to deal with all the ports, 
railways, oil stocks, and installations, and for blocking the Corinth Canal. 
The Greek authorities were not, repeat not, to be consulted at this stage. 
3 - 4 March 1941 
Before he departed for Athens on 3 March Wavell cabled the latest 
appreciation of the German presence in North Africa, which indicated 
that while the Italians had landed two infantry divisions and two artillery 
regiments, the Germans had only put ashore one armored brigade and 
were still very short of transport, though the latest air reconnaissance 
showed a considerable increase in motor transport on the Tripoli-Sirte 
road. From Tripoli to Benghazi was 646 miles, with only one road and 
inadequate water, and these factors would limit the present enemy threat. 
Wavell did not think the Germans were strong enough to take Benghazi, 
and, what with shipping risks, difficulty of communications, and the 
approach of hot weather, it was "unlikely that such an attack could 
develop before the end of the summer." Effective air and naval attacks 
might delay the Axis further, but to face 260 German bombers and 60 
fighters Longmore had only one squadron of fighters in the Western 
Desert, one of bombers, and one army cooperation unit. As a temporary 
measure a second fighter squadron destined for Greece had been re-
tained in the Desert. And while air attack on Egypt from the west was not 
likely, raids from the Dodecanese had virtually closed the Suez Canal and 
necessitated maintaining a strong defensive fighter force in Egypt. Only 
one fighter squadron was available for the whole area, and Longmore 
would have to divert his heavy bombers to Dodecanese airfield attacks, in 
order to try to put down that menace, to the detriment of other targets. 203 
In Athens Heywood reported that the Greek military attache in 
Bucharest reckoned that the Germans had thirty divisions in Rumania, 
including one or two Alpine Army corps, that they were crossing the 
Danube, and that the German headquarters in Bulgaria would be in the 
monastery at Chamkoria (an aristocratic resort area in the pine trees), near 
Sofia. 204 
MacVeagh told Washington that the British party had arrived and 
seen the king. He himself had met with Eden that morning by invitation, 
and afterwards talked to the Greek under-secretary for foreign affairs and 
to the Yugoslav minister. Eden told the American that the immediate 
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German aim was to gain air bases in Greece, but that this would not affect 
Britain, now rapidly cleaning up the Middle East and Africa. Greece was 
holding firm, and Britain, Eden said, would give her all possible support 
in the month before the state of the Balkan roads would allow any action. 
All the reinforcements were for the air force. Eden was delighted at his 
reception in Turkey; the Turks were loyal and realistic, but had neither the 
forces nor the equipment for offensive action. If the Germans attacked 
Greece, Eden thought the Turks would declare war and allow the British 
to use their air bases and other facilities. The Yugoslavs had not made up 
their minds, and the British were still trying to get the Turks and 
Yugoslavs together. Eden ended, "I believe that Greece, Turkey, and 
Yugoslavia will all eventually come into the fight, but there will be a lot of 
slipping and slipping before that happens." Mavroudis, the Greek under-
secretary, did not know that MacVeagh had talked with Eden; he said that 
all that had come out of the visit to Ankara was that the Turks would not 
fight if the Greeks were attacked by the Germans. Later, Alexander 
Vouktchevic, the Yugoslav minister, confirmed that, despite Eden's 
cheerful optimism, his trip had not been a success, and Vouktchevic 
became even more defeatist, saying it was now too late to stop the 
Germans. 205 
About noon Wavell and Wilson arrived from Cairo. Joined by Eden 
and various staff members, they went over to the Hotel Grande Bretagne 
for lunch with Prime Minister Koryzis. Afterwards the whole party 
proceeded to the Acropolis, being given a most enthusiastic reception by 
the public along the way. When they got back to the legation, the whole 
position was discussed informally until 6:30 p.m. (6:00 in the Greek 
version), when General Papagos and Colonel Kitrilakis arrived. 
There was more discussion of the Tatoi decision, and at this point Dill, 
finally, said that the position had to be looked at as it was today. The 
British would still help if Papagos would put forces on the Aliakmon Line. 
Papagos said that unfortunately he had no more forces, not even, when 
pressed by Dill, three more divisions. Dill then proceeded to play his old 
role of staff college instructor, reminding the Greek commander-in-chief 
as though he were a student at Camberley that he had one division then 
forming, and what about the 12th in Thrace? Papagos said that the people 
of Macedonia would regard its withdrawal in the face of the German 
presence in Bulgaria as betrayal. Dill then pointed out that Papagos was 
proposing to hold the Aliakmon with four dividions where heretofore he 
had said the minimum was nine; wasn't this courting disaster? Papagos 
said that he could see no alternative, especially as northern Greece was 
under constant German air reconnaissance. The dilemma was that to hold 
the Aliakmon indefinitely needed eight to ten British divisions, but as 
soon as they started to arrive the Germans would attack. 
They then went round again about the Tatoi decision. Dill hoped that 
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Papagos saw the British problem in shipping, and the Greek C-in-C 
replied that "the problem was insoluble." He went on that Greece was 
most grateful for the help that Britain had offered, but it was limited. Dill 
then suggested that the whole undertaking had become unsound, to 
which Papagos responded that that was why the British should come up 
to the forward line around Salonika. 
Dill: "1 do not think that that is a sound plan." 
Papagos: "Yes, but it is the only feasible one." 
Dill, who had never seen the ground, then said he would have to talk 
to Eden, "as he could not recommend putting the only British reserves in 
the Middle East into this plan which he considered unsound. It would not 
be essential to have the nine originally proposed divisions for the Aliak-
mon Line; if three Greek divisions could be found we would be prepared 
to build up a line on this basis and would try to operate forward from it." 
Papagos declared that the only troops which could be brought over from 
Albania would need thirty days by sea to come from the left flank, and 
they would be tired troops. 
As they were getting nowhere, the meeting adjourned at seven. The 
king came to a banquet at the legation, and the problems were covered 
with good manners and good cheer until the next day. 
Meanwhile on this day the COS wired Dill that "time is obviously the 
dominating factor in the Greek enterprise." They gave a detailed analysis 
of what forces the Germans could bring to bear on the Graeco-Bulgarian 
frontier: by 6 March they could have four divisions there, with an infantry 
division in place by the eleventh, but that would be the maximum number 
that could be maintained until the weather improved, normally about 15 
April. Even so, assuming weak Greek delaying forces and ineffective RAF 
action, the Germans could have two divisions on the Veria line by 15 
March and all five by 22 March. They wanted to know if Wavell agreed 
with this estimate, and "whether you now consider that Allied forces will 
arrive Veria line in time to hold on it." After asking detailed questions 
about shipping, Greek munitions supplies, and ports of disembarkation, 
the COS concluded, "Grateful also for fullest possible appreciation on all 
points raised in this telegram to enable us to present a clear picture to the 
War Cabinet." 
The staff in Cairo replied at once that Wavell had left that morning for 
Athens, but then provided all the information requested and gave the 
following arrival schedule for debarkation at the Piraeus, Eleusis, and 
Uepalos (Oropos), the ports for Athens: 
1st flight, AA and administrative units. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 March 
2nd flight, Armoured Brigade and NZ Brigade. . . . . .. 7 March 
3rd, NZ Brigade .................................. 10 March 
4th, Australian Brigade ............................ 18 March 
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5th, remainder NZ Division ....................... 21 March 
6th, Australian Brigade ............................ 24 March 
7th, remainder Australian Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 April 
8th, Polish Brigade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 April 
9th, Australian Brigade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7 April 
10th, Australian Brigade ............................ 15 April 
11th, remainder Australian Division ................. 18 April 
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The divisional, corps, and administrative units would be spread 
among flights, and the whole schedule depended on the Suez Canal's 
being open all the time. As to MANDIBLES, the first phases, BLUNT 
(against Kasos) and ABSTENTION (Castelorizzo), would be carried out 
shortly, with two more phases to follow, but as the C-in-C Med' could not 
carry out both LUSTRE and the second phase of MANDIBLES con-
currently, it had been decided that LUSTRE should take priority and that 
ARMATURE should be put back to Apri1.206 
This communication was followed on the fourth by a long signal from 
Cunningham to the Admiralty in which he noted all his difficulties, "so 
that their Lordships can strike a just balance with their knowledge of 
available resources. It would be useless hiding the fact that mine are taxed 
to the limit and that by normal security standards my commitments 
exceed available resources. I have, however, considerable hope that all 
these difficulties can be overcome. We are, I am convinced, pursuing right 
policy and risk must be faced up to."207 
Ronald Iran Campbell left Athens at noon on the fourth with a 
personal letter from Eden to Prince Paul detailing what the British were 
doing for the Greeks, and would do in the way of revising the Yugoslav-
Italian frontier in Istria. But Eden never did get his wish, expressed in this 
letter, to go to Belgrade for some personal summitry. 
In London the Foreign Office was bored and disappointed with Eden 
and longed for Halifax again. 208 
On the night of 3 March Menzies asked that the Chiefs of Staff make a 
further appreciation of events in the Balkans, as he was anxious about the 
timing of British policy. The First Sea Lord, Pound, speaking for the 
Chiefs, said that they would have by 7:00 p.m. an estimate of how long it 
would take the Germans to reach the Aliakmon Line, and they proposed 
to send this out to the C-in-C's ME for their comments to see whether the 
British could get there in time to hold up the German advance. They also 
wanted Cairo to provide London with a whole appreciation. 209 
In other words, Menzies, who was in the awkward position of being 
the outsider in a crucial decision-making process in which his own troops 
were the pawns, was trying to raise the very obvious question which no 
one ever seemed to bring into the open: as the American Civil War general 
put it, Could the British get there "firstest with the mostest?" He had a 
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nasty feeling that they could not, and that, despite the fact that everyone 
was circulating figures of what the Germans could do and the schedules 
for the British lifts, there was an invisible curtain between the two sets of 
calculations, like the emperor's new clothes. (For the War Cabinet meet-
ing on the 5th the Chiefs did produce an aide memo ire in which they 
pointed out that the Germans would have five divisions on the start line 
by 22 March, while the British would have one armored brigade and one 
New Zealand brigade to meet the first two German divisions to reach the 
Veria position.) 
At eleven in the morning on Tuesday, 4 March, the meetings resumed 
at the British legation. Papagos said that he was reinforcing the Greeks in 
Macedonia with the 12th Division from Thrace and the 19th motorized 
division from Larissa. He had also assigned three divisions to the Aliak-
mon Line to help the British. In reply to a question by General Wilson he 
said that no engineers to improve the roads were available, as they were 
all working in Albania. 
For five minutes at 12:15 Dill, Wavell (incognito in mufti), and Wilson 
went out and discussed Papagos' proposals among themselves. They 
then returned to the meeting, and Dill said that the eight battalions 
proposed instead of the thirty-five agreed on "was too small a force to 
allow our regarding the plan as a sound military proposition." They 
added that they had asked the king to step over to the legation. He was 
expected at 12:30, and, no doubt, Papagos would like a word in private 
with him first. Papagos reiterated that the problem had been caused by his 
waiting for the Yugoslavian response, to which Dill agreed that there was 
no doubt that there had been a misunderstanding, but the concern now 
was what to do next. After the king arrived and talked to Papagos, they 
decided not to continue the discussions until later, so the meeting ad-
journed. 
Sometime during the afternoon (or it may have been after they 
reconvened at ten-the minutes and D'Albiac's own report are not clear 
whether there were one or two meetings on similar points heard through 
different ears), King George, Koryzis, Papagos, Eden, Dill, and Wavell 
met with D'Albiac, who at Eden's request described the British air forces 
in Greece, which now included some Fleet Air Arm Swordfish. There 
were one Blenheim IV and two Blenheim I light bomber squadrons, and 
10 Wellingtons expected to arrive from Egypt for the moon period starting 
on 8 March. Possible targets included German concentrations in Bulgaria 
and the Rumanian oilfields, as well as Durazzo and other targets the 
AOC-in-C ME might designate. D'Albiac proceeded to discuss each of 
these in turn and noted the dangers of retaliation from the Germans. 
Unless continuous attacks were carried out on the oilfields, past experi-
ence suggested that "against targets of this description, it was pure 
chance whether much damage would be caused." Durazzo was a far 
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better target and much less likely to spark a German response. At this 
point the Greeks said that they could not afford to provoke the Germans, 
but once the Germans attacked 0' Albiac would be free to choose targets as 
the opportunity arose. It was agreed that the Blenheims should be con-
served and used in daylight only against advancing German forces. The 
problem of fighters was then covered, and the AOC pointed out that he 
had to withdraw his one and a half Hurricane squadrons from Albanian 
operations in order to cover the British landings. The king and Papagos 
were not happy about this, as they were relying on that air power to blunt 
any Italian attack while forces were being moved to the Aliakmon Line. 
0' Albiac could only respond "that it was quite impossible with the limited 
forces at his disposal to be strong everywhere ... [and]although the 
Hurricanes would be withdrawn, there would still be one complete 
Gladiator squadron on the Albanian front. "210 
Either at 5:45 (British minutes) or at 6:30 (Greek minutes), the main 
meeting reconvened with the king, Papagos, and Colonel Kitrilakis facing 
Dill, Wavell, Heywood, and Mallaby. Papagos promised his 12th, 19th, 
and 20th divisions for the Aliakmon Line, saying they would be there in 
ten days, and that he would send some munitions from Salonika to 
Florina now. In his opinion, however, the best position was the 
Nestos-Rupelline. Dill thought this was too far forward and too long, so 
Papagos asked if he was willing to take the Aliakmon with seven bat-
talions from Thrace and the 12th, 19th, and 20th divisions. Dill said yes. 
He then left the room to consult with Eden, who accepted the plan. Next, 
Eden came in and suggested that Wilson should command this new force, 
under Papagos, and the king agreed. These arrangements were put in 
writing, and Wilson and Papagos sat down to arrange the disposition of 
the Greek forces until the British could take over the Line. 
Later on in Cairo Eden would say that "the real alternative for Greece 
was whether she should stand up and fight Germany or allow herself to 
become a victim of German seduction like Rumania." At least, that was 
his view. 
Meanwhile, at six that evening in London, Prime Minister Churchill 
had told the War Cabinet that the prospects in the Balkans were not 
promising. Bulgaria was in German control. Yugoslavia would not move 
until she was surrounded, though she could wipe out the Italians in 
Albania if she acted at once. He had not heard from Eden, but the 
movement of troops to Greece was to start today, though they would not 
arrive for four days. "If General Dill and General Wavell wished the 
movement to proceed, he (the Prime Minister) was most disinclined to 
issue countermanding orders. Nevertheless, he still thought the Cabinet 
might wish to take a final view of the whole position in the light of the 
information to be received in the next few days." And as the minutes 
report, "The War Cabinet took note of this statement. "211 
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Eden reported to Churchill on 5 March, and his telegram was fol-
lowed by a very long signal from Eden and Dill to Churchill covering the 
changed situation they had found on their return to Athens.212 The 
British leaders thought Papagos' attitude was "unaccommodating and 
defeatist," and therefore they had enlisted the aid of the king. Fortunately 
George II was "calm, determined and helpful." "By a process, which at 
times painfully resembled the haggling of an oriental bazaar, we were 
finally offered three Greek divisions . . . together with battalions from 
Western Thrace, provided the Turks would agree to release them .... We 
were thus faced with the following alternatives. (a) to accept the plan of 
Papagos, to which he constantly returned, of attempting to dribble our 
forces piecemeal up to the Macedonian frontier; (b) to accept 3 Greek 
divisions offered for the Aliakmon line, the equivalent of about 16-23 
battalions instead of 35 we had been led to expect on our previous visit, 
and to build up our concentration behind this; ... (c) to withdraw our 
offer of military support altogether." 
After some misgivings they had agreed to solution b, provided that 
General Wilson was given command of the whole of the Aliakmon as soon 
as he could take it over, and this was accepted. Dill did not think it was a 
hopeless proposition, and at the worst the country behind the line was 
suitable for rearguard action. But "the hard fact remains that our forces, 
including Dominion contingents, will be engaged in an operation more 
hazardous than it seemed a week ago. "213 The Foreign Office in London 
noted that the Germans were moving south more rapidly than expected. 
When the Prime Minister read Eden's telegram to the Cabinet, Cadogan 
noted, they asked with disdain how he could have sent such a jaunty 
message in the face of complete failure. 214 
McClymont, the New Zealand historian, concluded that those in 
Athens felt the abandonment of Greece would be the more costly step, 
while Wavell himself later claimed political and psychological considera-
tions took precedence over military ones.215 It is doubtful that leaving 
things as they were in Greece would have brought a disaster. The fate of 
the Yugoslavs was already foreordained. The Turks were not going to 
budge and had said so. Lend-Lease would pass in the United States 
anyway. And 0' Albiac had had clear orders from the beginning to evacu-
ate when necessary (and did so in far worse circumstances in April). Time 
and again the British had been given the chance to back out gracefully, but 
they had convinced themselves they could not do that. The real problem 
was the lack of a grand strategy and a purely military appreciation. If a 
move was to be made in the eastern Mediterranean, it should have been to 
Crete and the Dodecanese. 
Could it be true that Wavell, an expert at deception and at keeping his 
own counsel, agreed to go along with Eden's wishes as an honorable 
political gesture? The military argument for this is that Wavell knew he 
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could not afford the help Greece needed. Did he now calculate that 
because of shipping difficulties little aid would get to Greece before the 
Germans attacked and dissolved the war in Greece? Perhaps he thought 
he could make the grand gesture without appreciable losses. The Ger-
mans were expected to attack early in March, and his staff appreciation 
showed that, even with the Suez Canal open, by 22 March only the New 
Zealand Division would have disembarked at Athens, and very little of it 
would have been dug in on the Aliakmon Line. Nor by mid-March would 
the RAF have been present in full strength, as the airfields simply were 
not ready. 
On a higher level, the assumptions and emotions involved in assay-
ing the Yugoslav and Turkish positions were uninformed and unin-
telligent; the emotional attachment to the Greeks was not reciprocated by 
Hellenic realists, while a knowledge of American politics would have 
shown that foreign policy issues were generally settled in the United 
States by domestic concerns and not by actions overseas. 216 
Meanwhile in Athens, apparently unknown to the British, the Greeks 
still had contacts with Berlin through Belgrade, by which they were 
attempting to arrange peace. But Hitler did not trust them, and the British 
landings in the Piraeus on 4 March confirmed his suspicions that they 
were merely trying to buy time. 217 
Brigadier W. 0' A. Collins arrived at the LUSTRE headquarters in 
Athens, but since he was without most of his staff he could make few 
decisions. The Royal Army Service Corps arrived in the first flight of 
ships, but it never had enough time to operate efficiently before it was 
thrown out at the end of April. All during March the RASC suffered from 
an acute shortage of labor, but nevertheless supply depots were built up, 
and petrol stocks, at least, were no problem.218 
For 19 and 20 Battalions of the New Zealanders, preparation for 
departure had started on 27 February at Helwan, but they did not reach 
the Piraeus until 15 March, a bare three weeks before the German at-
tack.219 (In fact, 19 Battalion did not arrive until the nineteenth.) Their 
drill jackets and topees were withdrawn in Athens, and they were loaded, 
forty-five men at a time, into the famous wagons marked "Hommes 40, 
Chevaux 8" and sent off by train up country.220 Their landing was no 
secret. The German military attache in Athens greeted the ships in the 
Piraeus, and one of his colleagues walked through the New Zealanders's 
camp on Hymettus chatting with the men in perfect English.221 
Things had been no better managed on 4 March when General 
Wilson arrived in Athens disguised as "Mr. Watt," with his baggage 
bearing the initials "H.M.W." On that day the British army magazine hit 
the newstands in the Greek capital with a full-page front cover of him in 
uniform. As part of the disguise he was confined to the legation and not 
even able to get to his headquarters at the Hotel Acropole opposite the 
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National Museum; nor was he allowed to visit Greek headquarters or go 
north to reconnoiter the ground until the end of March.222 (This really 
was very sportsmanlike, as it gave him about the saem familiarity with the 
ground as that enjoyed by the German commanders in the short April 
campaign.) Wilson as commander of "Force W" was thus deprived of even 
the advantage of knowing the country, and was only able to officially 
open his headquarters in the little town of Elasson literally just before the 
Germans attacked. 
Wilson's command was to have included the Greek forces known as 
the Central Macedonian Army, which was originally to have been com-
posed of the 12th Division from Macedonia (six battalions and some 
guns), the 20th from Florina (six battalions and some guns), and the 19th 
Mechanized Division from Larissa, a euphemism for an untrained unit 
with some vehicles which only held part of the line until the New Zealand 
Division came forward. The rest of the Central Macedonian Army consis-
ted of seven battalions from western Thrace. In his official account of the 
campaign, Wavell noted that "this Greek force consisted of second line 
troops of doubtful fighting value, and was a very poor substitute for the 
original force of five good divisions promised by General Papagos. "223 
But one of the questions which certainly arises is whether or not Papagos 
had promised five good divisions in the first place. In fact on 3 March Dill 
had forced Papagos to produce battalions without assessing their fitness. 
What Wavell said even as early as 1942 was not what he had said in the 
fall of 1940, or even in early 1941 while General Metaxas was alive. In fact, 
much as Wavell is to be admired as the premier British general of the first 
part of the war for his grand strategy in Africa and his strategy and tactics, 
he is to be criticized for his loyalty in trying to support Eden and Dill. The 
more one reads the evidence of the way in which the British decision to 
aid Greece in March 1941 was made, the more one comes to the con-
clusion that it was a cliff-hanger, in which either Wavell or Dill could have 
thwarted Eden, or Eden and Wavell could have stymied Dill, and every-
one would have been thankful from Athens to London to Berlin. Or 
London could have remained in control, as it should have, and said Stop! 
The conference of 4 March was not a very well-kept secret. Major 
Crow, the assistant United States military air attache in Athens, heard 
almost immediately from the economic director of the Greek Foreign 
Office that there had been a meeting of Eden, the king, and the prime 
minister, and that the German southward movement was rapid, with five 
divisions and four hundred aircraft already in Bulgaria. Crow learned, 
too, that the Greeks now had an entirely inadequate equivalent of six 
divisions in Macedonia, but bad weather in Albania was preventing them 
from shortening the line there so as to allow the transfer of more troops, 
while because of sea transport difficulties it would take the British two 
months to build up to the total of three divisions. The RAF in Athens, 
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Major Crow continued, expected the Germans to attack as soon as they 
were ready, and that date should coincide with the arrival of good weather 
in about one month. 224 (this latter estimate proved to be absolutely 
correct, for the Germans attacked on 6 April.) 
In London a number of people were worried about developments. 
The Chiefs of Staff felt that the hazards had increased considerably, as the 
Greeks were too heavily involved in Albania to disengage there; the force 
might not be able to reach the Aliakmon Line in time to halt the advance. 
The navy was worried about the safety of convoys, ports, and the Suez 
Canal. The Australians in particular were unhappy (their first troops were 
due to sail from Alexandria on 6 March) because the British raid on 
Castelorizzo in the Dodecanese had failed on the fourth, German aircraft 
had appeared over Cyrenaica, where an unblooded Australian division 
was in garrison, and German armor was reported to be in Tripoli; more-
over, the Australians were not at all sure that the protocol signed in 
Athens between Wilson and Papagos was binding upon them. In London 
Menzies asked that the Greek plan be reexamined. 225 
The proposed attack on Rhodes, Operation MANDIBLES, was can-
celed on 4 March on the advice of Admiral Cunningham, who considered 
that after the fiasco at Castelorizzo the hazards of getting the expedition-
ary force to Greece were great enough: the transport of 68,000 troops 
required the use of fifty ships from 4 March to 24 April, (of which six 
merchantmen and the light cruiser Bonaventure would be lost). 226 With the 
Suez Canal blocked by German mines all sorts of cargo was delayed, 
including coal for the Greek railways, fuel oil for the Fleet, and war 
material for Greece and Turkey. Several projects were proposed to bypass 
the Canal, create new ports, and construct railway routes, but they all 
required time, which Wavell did not have. 
IY-_____ _ 
Denouement and Disaster 
5 March 1941 - 26 April 1941 
The final act of this tragedy was played out in two months in the spring of 1941 
against a backdrop varying from blinding snow in the north to balmy sunshine in 
the south of Greece. Almost everywhere to the north of the country were dic-
tatorships, dominated, of course, by Hitler's German one. To the northwest the 
Italians still clung successfully to Albania, and Mussolini still ruled across the 
Adriatic. Far to the west was Generalissimo Franco in Spain, and in between was 
Marshal Pitain in Vichy France. To the east, hostile French forces controlled Syria 
and blocked the land route between British Palestine and Turkey. Directly north of 
Greece were the vacillating Yugoslavs, the oil-rich but occupied Rumanians, and 
the hated Bulgarians. Distantly in the northeast were the Russians, unreliable and 
inscrutable. The only free country at all likely to be able to help was still Britain, 
although there was in the wings, of course, that great land of freedom, to which so 
many Greeks had gone to seek their fortunes, the United States. The situation there 
was changing, but not fast enough. Lend-Lease was about to be signed into law, 
ripping down much of the neutrality legislation, but, in spite of Colonel Donovan's 
words, America was still powerless. And Britain was in not much better case. 
The war in the Mediterranean theater was still very much one in which Wavell 
was an underdog commander forced to use all his wiles, even against the Italians, 
who were still active in East Africa as well as alive in Tripoli and the Dodecanese. 
And the Germans were about to emerge both in the air and on the ground in 
strengths with which he could not cope, especially when the direction from London 
chopped and changed and divided his forces. 
5 March 1941 
Early on 5 March Cairo notified Athens and London that, because of the 
closing of the Suez Canal, ships for carrying lorries were at a premium; 
since there were available inside the Mediterranean only half the required 
ships, motor transport would become the big bottleneck as the LUSTRE 
forces moved to Greece. 
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And Eden and Dill sent a third communique, on that cloudy day in 
Athens, outlining the military position: the Germans might attack in the 
next seven days, by which time the three Greek divisions should be on the 
Aliakmon Line. The implication was that the Germans should be held 
long enough on the Rupel and by demolitions, which Wilson was arrang-
ing, that all the Greek troops should have time to get into position before 
the Germans got to the line. At the moment British plans simply called for 
the armored brigade and one New Zealand brigade to be in place by 19 
March and a second New Zealand brigade by 26 March, with the whole of 
the New Zealand Division complete by the end of March. But the subse-
quent program had not been arranged. It had been decided that there 
would be no bombing of Bulgarian communications until after the Ger-
mans attacked in order to gain time. And this communication was fol-
lowed by a further telegram giving the text of the agreement signed by 
Papagos and Dill. 1 
In London the War Cabinet met at 5:30 in the afternoon after Eden's 
two telegrams arrived. Cabinet members heard that Eden admitted now 
that "the situation in Greece had deteriorated considerably. Deprived of 
the guidance of General Metaxas, General Papagos seemed to have lost 
confidence." The First Sea Lord observed that on 24 February they had 
gotten a schedule from the Middle East on the time it would take the 
British to reach the Aliakmon, but none for the Germans. Until they got 
this the Chiefs of Staff could not make a reasoned revision of their 
previous conclusions. 
Churchill listened dully, suffering from a cold caused by the snuff he 
was taking to prevent colds! He reminded the Cabinet that before Eden 
left he had been told not to hesitate to act on his own authority if the 
urgency was too great to allow interference from home. But with the 
failure of the Castelorizzo operation and the postponement of MANDI-
BLES, Middle East resources were now being further strained to guard 
the Suez Canal. Given the continuing deterioration of the situation, 
Churchill had cabled Eden suggesting that he manage things so that 
London would have the final say in the Greek undertaking. Eden said that 
they had no choice but to see it through, but the prime minister respond-
ed that since the Greeks had not moved to the Aliakmon Line as prom-
ised, the British were still free to decide their own course of action. Now, if 
the British liberated the Greeks from their obligations, the Greeks could 
make their own terms with the Germans. Churchill, however, politician 
that he was, was concerned about the reaction in Spain and North Africa if 
Britain abandoned Greece without a fight. He went on to think out loud 
about the problem to the War Cabinet, which concluded that it should 
reconsider the position when the Yugoslav decision was known. 
And so Churchill telegraphed Eden and sent along also an appraisal 
by the Chiefs of Staff. He explained that Eden should leave the Greeks free 
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to accept a German ultimatum, because not much of an Imperial force 
could arrive in time. And he concluded, "Loss of Greece and the Balkans 
by no means a major catastrophe for us provided Turkey remains honest 
neutral." The Chiefs of Staff had noted that the hazards had considerably 
increased; "Nevertheless ... we are not as yet in a position to question 
the military advice of those on the SpOt."2 
6 March 1941 
Thursday was an overcast day with patches of sunlight. No. 33 Hurricane 
Squadron, which had arrived in Greece in February and was split be-
tween between Paramythia on the west coast and Larissa on the plains of 
Thessaly, was ordered to Eleusis. It was to have three aircraft at readiness 
during daylight hours and three ready to intercept any enemy aircraft 
approaching Larissa or Volos. 3 
The Athens press carried the official announcement of the Foreign 
Secretary's visit, and at the same time the papers published editorials 
which openly admitted the chance of a new aggression against Greece 
and proclaimed the country's determination to resist attack now that she 
was supported by the United States and Britain.4 
Some time during the day Papagos had one of his regular con-
versations with Heywood, in which he reported on the disposition of the 
three Greek divisions assigned to the Aliakmon position. These forces, 
very thin on the ground, were very lightly equipped to stop a German 
blitzkrieg. A total of 16 Italian 47-mm antitank guns were allotted to the 
entire ninety-mile line from the sea west to Mt. Kajmakalan, near Florina 
(or one every 5.6 miles), together with 15 20-mm antitank guns; in 
addition 26 old 7S-mm artillery pieces were being sent from England to be 
used as antitank guns, but their date of arrival was unknown. Additional 
mountain artillery would be sent as soon as breech-blocks had been 
manufactured for these captured guns, and a group of ISS-mm howitzers 
was also being sent. 5 This list was again evidence of how Papagos and the 
Greeks were scraping the barrel. And it is such items as this that empha-
size how much the whole scheme was put together on the theoretical 
grounds of what fully equipped and trained divisions could handle, and 
not in terms of the half-trained and badly underequipped forces actually 
available. Even an unskilled eye has only to look at some parts of the 144-
kilometer line to realize how absurdly inadequate were the proposed 
defending forces. 
During the conversations at the military mission, General Wilson 
agreed to send his chief engineer, Brigadier H.P. W. Hutson, forward as 
soon as Major Wavish returned from a preliminary reconnaissance, so 
that measures for demolitions could be discussed with the Greek officer in 
charge. As soon as they were available two British field companies were to 
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be sent to work in the Vardar plain and on the Aliakmon position. As for 
the protection of bridges and airfields against airborne attack, General 
Papagos thought that the twenty-four tanks of the motorized division 
might be most usefully employed in this task. Wilson agreed and prom-
ised some of his own, when they arrived, to cover the Aliakmon position. 
The problem of liaison officers and interpreters was then considered, and 
it was agreed to find as many as possible in Egypt, but in the meantime 
the Greeks would provide as many as they could. The most serious 
problem, though, was lack of coal, for by 16 March the Greeks would run 
out of coal and there would be no trains at all. The military mission was to 
contact Cairo urgently about this, while a mixed railway commission 
would handle all transportation problems. The possibility of bringing 
over a proper ambulance train from Egypt was also to be looked into. 
Lastly, Wilson raised the problem of refugees and security procedures, 
and these were discussed down to the immobilization of unattended cars 
and the destruction of local petrol supplies. 
In Belgrade the Crown Council felt it had no alternative but to sign the 
pact with the Axis. 6 By 6 March Prince Paul knew the British intentions 
. and limitations, and the Yugoslav general staff said that a German thrust 
into the country would soon take Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubliana, leav-
ing the Yugoslavs only the mountains of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 
they could hold out for about six weeks before they ran out of supplies. 
Paul was physically and mentally worn out (and not helped by nightly 
phone calls from his family in Athens, which were no doubt tapped). 
From Paul's point of view contacts with Athens had been a failure, 
because neither Papagos nor Wavell's chief of staff, Arthur Smith, would 
be specific. Neil Balfour avers that Eden wrote Paul off after hearing from 
Smith, and so did not read the signals being sent from Belgrade.7 
At the Piraeus that Thursday morning more British troops landed, 
camped on the outskirts of Athens, and were inspected by the German 
consul-general, a fact confirmed by the British legation listening service. 8 
Also on Thursday morning Rear-Admiral Pridham-Wippell with the 
battleships Barham and Valiant, escorted by six destroyers, sailed from 
Alexandria for Suda Bay, Crete, where they arrived the next morning to 
act as a covering force for the LUSTRE convoys. No. 805 FAA Fighter 
Squadron and the remains of No. 815 Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance 
Squadron were sent to Maleme airfield on Crete to provide air cover for 
this force. 
Eden, Dill, and Wavell departed by flying boat from Salamis Bay at 
8:30 a.m. Each apparently sat silent. Eden may have preened himself 
mentally and physically, Dill may have sat in a weary daze. We do know 
that Wavell sat quietly reading Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, a not at 
all inappropriate diversion for a general with a sense of humor. 9 
At five o'clock the C-in-C's met with Eden at headquarters in Cairo. 
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Cunningham said at once that if the Canal were closed, moving forces to 
Greece would take four months, not two. Otherwise he and Longmore 
thought that the right decision had been made. Wavell said that "provided 
we could get our forces into Greece, there was a good prospect of a 
successful encounter with the Germans. The results of success would be 
incalculable and might alter the whole aspect of the war." And so the 
group broke up feeling that they had made the right, if a difficult, 
decision. Asked one final time by Eden if they should go, Wavell respond-
ed, "War is an option of difficulties. We go." Outside, Dill said to Elm-
hirst, "I am afraid that there will be a lot of bloody noses this spring in the 
Aegean. "10 
After dinner they assembled quietly in the drawing room of the 
embassy with the vital and humorous South African prime minister, 
Smuts, and weighed the decision again. The "Old Baas" said, with 
Biblical flavor, that since the decision had already been taken, they would 
have to proceed, and that in balance aiding Greece would be more noble 
than defeat at the hands of the Germans. After some discussion Smuts 
said that what really worried him was the timetable-it was getting down 
to days and even hours. And Egypt must not be hazarded. ll 
After he had seen Blarney, Dill cabled the Dominions secretary in 
London that Wavell had explained the risks to Blarney and Freyberg and 
that both had expressed their willingness to continue the operations 
under the new conditions. What he did not say was that neither Blarney 
nor Freyberg felt, in Gavin Long's words, that they had been consulted. 
Both were in the awkward dual roles of subordinates as well as national 
commanders and their governments' principal military advisers. Both 
found themselves in the invidious position ultimately of being criticized 
for not having challenged their superior officers either swiftly enough or 
sharply enough. 12 This was harder for Freyberg to do than for Blarney, for 
Freyberg had been a close associate of Wavell's before the war and was 
imbued with the C-in-C's concepts of loyalty. 
(Actually Blarney had not agreed; he had been short-circuited by 
Menzies' presence in the Middle East in February, and he himself had 
failed to apply the lesson of the Dardanelles Commission report that a 
senior officer who did have doubts was duty-bound to make them known 
to the government. It was not, in fact, until it was suggested to him by 
Maj. Norman Carylon on 8 March that Blarney put forward his view of the 
situation to which by then the Australians were already committed. 
Moreover, Blarney, when he did send in his appreciation, was under the 
misimpression that there would be twenty-three RAF squadrons in 
Greece, when in fact that was the total RAF in the Middle East.)l3 
At the evening gathering Wavell said that he had talked with Blarney 
and Freyberg that afternoon; neither of them had wanted to back out. 
Smuts then stressed the need to strengthen the forces in the Balkans as 
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quickly and heavily as possible. He doubted the Germans intended to 
invade the United Kingdom and felt that London should realize the need 
for air reinforcements in the Middle East, as well as the need to fight the 
Germans in the Balkans rather than keeping large forces idle in the United 
Kingdom. In his view, the Germans in Tripoli were only a feint. And so 
the discussions ended there. As they left the room after the meeting, Dill 
said to Cunningham, "Well, we've taken the decision. I am not at all sure 
that it's the right one."14 
Perhaps the one really bright ray of light in the meetings at Cairo was 
that Smuts said that South African troops could be moved to any place in 
Africa, by units if needs be, and that while he would like them kept in 
divisions, he did not want a South African Corps. IS 
Cairo was, of course, a leaky sieve. The American military attache 
there reported that the British would send seven to eight divisions, 
including two armored ones, to Greece. Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 
once flashed this "extremely confidential" news to MacVeagh.16 
At the end of the day, Wavell completed a note on the defense of 
Cyrenaica and made the point that there was a need to get mobile forces 
forward at once. 17 
After the war Wavell said that when the decision was made to go 
ahead in Greece despite the changed circumstances, " ... it was probably 
the political and psychological considerations that tilted the balance over 
the military dangers." Troops were already beginning to land and any 
change of plans would have caused confusion. "So, we decided to carry 
on, although obviously we were on a much worse wicket. In this case 
London was apprehensive and they were right and we the men on the 
spot were wrong, as regards the immediate danger, but not in the long 
run."lS 
Whether or not those in Cairo had made a good decision on military 
or moral grounds, they were certainly aware that there were risks. When 
on 7 April Sir John Dill said goodbye to Wavell just before boarding the 
plane to return to London, Wavell is reported to have said to him half-
jokingly and half-sadly, "Jack, I hope that when this action is reviewed, 
you will be selected to sit on my court-martial."19 
Earlier in the day the Prime Minister had told Geoffrey Dawson, 
editor of the influential Times, that the situation in the Balkans was 
"murky".20 
Later that night of 6 March Churchill told the War Cabinet that he "did 
not wish to expose ourselves to the charge that we had caused another 
small nation to be sacrificed without being able to afford effective help." 
But he was most anxious that the Greeks understood that all the British 
could send in March was two brigades. As the Greeks were evidently 
determined to fight the Germans, in spite of the option to withdraw 
Churchill had given them in his telegram to Eden stressing that they 
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should feel free to accept a German ultimatum, Palairet had cabled that 
lithe question was whether we would help them or abandon them. II The 
Prime Minister then, according to the minutes, remarked that lilt was 
inconceivable that the chief of the Imperial General Staff would have 
signed the military agreement with General Papagos [a copy of which the 
War Cabinet now had before them] if he regarded the chances of success 
in the operation as hopeless. II The Australian prime minister then said 
that the problem had been presented in a way which made it un-
necessarily difficult and what had been hazardous had become even more 
so, while "no reason was offered why the operation should succeed. II He 
asserted that the War Cabinet had not been well informed, and that the 
action of the Foreign Secretary "was embarrassing. II The War Cabinet was 
annoyed that it had been rushed into the business by Eden, but happy 
that a clear scapegoat had been established. 
Speaking for the Chiefs of Staff at the War Cabinet, the First Sea Lord 
said that on 16 March the Germans would have three divisions on the 
Aliakmon Line when the first New Zealand brigade arrived. CAS Portal 
added that the RAF had three fighter squadrons and five bomber squad-
rons to oppose 475 German aircraft. The VCIGS said that the main 
weakness was the unprotected Yugoslav frontier, where the Germans 
might push through. In response to a question, the COS replied that to 
lose in Greece "would not affect the ultimate issue of the war or our 
successful defence of this country. II It was not necessary to tell the Greeks 
that intervention would be a failure, as they had said that they would fight 
anyway. 
The Prime Minister concluded that the War Cabinet was not in a 
position to make a decision until Eden replied to their previous telegrams, 
nor would they go back on the Dill-Papagos agreement unless the Greeks 
themselves released Britain from it. 21 
Not long after the gathering adjourned for dinner, a short interim 
reply from Eden in Cairo arrived, reporting on the reexamination of the 
Greek question carried out that afternoon with Dill and the three C-in-C's, 
in which it was unanimously agreed that the right decision had been 
made. This was passed to the reconvened War Cabinet at 10:10 that 
evening, and at 2:15 in the early morning of the seventh an additional 
sentence on the discussion with Smuts came through, with a concluding 
promise that a detailed appreciation would follow in the morning. 
7 - 9 March 1941 
At 3:00 a.m. on 7 March, Churchill cabled to Eden: "All preparations and 
movements should go forward at utmost speed .... But we must not take 
on our shoulders responsibility of urging Greeks against their better 
judgment to fight a hopeless battle and involve their country in probable 
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speedy ruin .... It must not be said, and on your showing it cannot be 
said, that, having so little to give, we dragged them in by over-persuasion. 
I take it from your attitude and from Athens telegrams ... that you are 
sure on this point. /I 
Equally important, the Prime Minister had to be able to tell the 
Dominions that the venture had been undertaken not because Eden had 
entered into a commitment at Athens, "but because Dill, Wavell, and 
other C-in-C's are convinced that there is reasonable fighting chance./1 
"Please remember in your stresses that so far you have given us few facts 
or reasons on their authority which can be presented to these Dominions 
as justifying the operation on any grounds but noblesse oblige. A precise 
military appreciation is indispensible .... You know our hearts are with 
you and your great officers." 22 
During the morning of that day Smuts sent his old World War I War 
Cabinet colleague a message: 
We have a reasonable chance to build up a stable front in Greece. 
Such a front would be a most important development and may 
possibly become decisive. I build no great hopes on Turkey and 
Yugoslavia in the immediate future but feel that a firm British 
front in the Balkans would transform the situation in southern 
Europe and the Mediterranean basin generally .... I would thus 
urge most strongly that this new front be supported with all our 
strength. Our chief immediate need here is more aeroplanes .... 
I am expediting another bomber squadron from South Africa and 
Beaverbrook should surely also disgorge from his hoard. Next in 
order I place tanks and guns for us and our allies. We are already 
grievously late and should now move with all possible speed.23 
Then Eden's long signal came in. 
This started with the fundamental assumption that Prime Minister 
Koryzis's Tatoi declaration was valid and the consistent basis of Greek 
policy. The Greeks understood there was no honorable peace open to 
them. More to the point, the British already had eight RAF squadrons and 
supporting forces in Greece. Then the message reverted again to emo-
tional arguments based on the surplus of forces now that a great victory 
had been won in Libya. (One senses a political speech written by the 
Foreign Secretary and not a military appreciation.) Longmore's diffi-
culties were again pointed out, however, and his grave doubts as to 
whether his forces could face their many commitments. Cunningham felt 
that the naval situation had deteriorated sharply in the last ten days, but 
Wavell remained stoically optimistic that if his forces could be transported to 
Greece and concentrated on the Aliakmon position, "there is a good chance of 
holding the enemy advance./1 Defeating the Germans in Europe was rated 
very high for propaganda purposes. And the signal ended with another 
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long paragraph once again supporting the decision taken, in spite of the 
serious RAF shortages: "The struggle in the air in this theatre will be a 
stern one. Longmore requires all the help that can be given. If he can hold 
his own, most of the dangers and difficulties of this enterprise will 
disappear. "24 
At noon on the seventh the War Cabinet met to consider these 
messages. Here it was not the shadow of Chanak but the aura of the Battle 
of Britain which subtly colored the discussion. The view was that the RAF 
had won against odds before. (No one stopped to consider that the 
reasons included the radar-backed fighter direction system that Dowding 
had commanded, short supply lines, and modern aircraft and airfields.) 
Having now decided to proceed, Churchill justified the shaky ven-
ture by saying that it was not such a bad decision, for the British had a fair 
chance of reaching the Aliakmon Line before the Germans could break 
through, there was still hope the Yugoslavs would join the Allies, and, if 
the Anglo-Greek forces did have to retire, they would be retreating down 
a narrowing peninsula with a number of strong defensive positions. And 
the British would shortly have a strong air force in Greece, which, al-
though outnumbered by the Germans, would face about the same odds 
as in the past. To this Menzies, the only person present who seemed 
willing to contradict the Prime Minister, said that it was funny that a 
decision was being made based on the assurances of those in the Middle 
East all of whose points supported the case against going to Greece. 
Churchill brushed this off by saying that the military conclusions were 
already known, although the appreciation had not arrived, so now was 
the time to make the decision. 
So it was settled. (Beaverbrook admitted later that no one dared to 
stand up to Churchill. And that night Cadogan noted that on a nice 
balance he thought it right.)25 Then the earlier message from Greece 
about not bombing the Rumanian oilfields was read, and the CAS said 
that no bombing could be undertaken anyway until after 9 March, when 
three squadrons of Wellingtons would be in Greece. Nevertheless, most 
of the discussion concentrated irrelevantly on the fact that the Greeks had 
deprived the British of the bombing initiative.26 In fact, there was little 
hope of bombing Rumania in March because of the weather, but (judging 
with the benefit of hindsight) perhaps it would have been better if the 
RAF had been allowed to do this. The Germans would then have attacked 
before the British could have landed many forces, forcing cancelation of 
the expedition. Though perhaps not what the Greeks wanted, this might 
have saved them additional bloodshed. 
And the COS were right: the RAF in the Middle East was ill-suited for 
its task. To stop panzers in either Cyrenaica, as it would turn out, or in the 
plains of northern Greece, the RAF needed long-range fighters to main-
tain local air superiority, and fighter-bombers to destroy tanks in a coun-
5 March 1941 - 26 April 1941 163 
try whose topography often channeled armor into ideal target areas. It 
had neither, and it still looked down upon tactical work, called army 
cooperation. 
On the ninth Churchill told Eden that there was still a chance that 
Yugoslavia might come in, but he rather thought not. Among other 
matters he asked Eden to look into the use of manpower in Wavell's 
command: "Do not overlook those parts of your instructions dealing with 
economy of the Middle East Armies. Am relying on you to clean this up, 
and to make sure that every man pulls his weight. A few days might well 
be devoted to this." Though Eden would remain in the Middle East 
another month, there are no signals home reporting discovery of fat at any 
level. 
The lack of air resources in the Middle East, while such resources 
accumulated at home, led to bad feeling starting with Portal's signal of 6 
March questioning the wisdom of keeping a fighter squadron at Aden. 
Longmore replied that Gladiators were better against Italian fighters than 
were Hurricanes, but Portal still thought it would be better if the crews at 
least were sent north to learn about Hurricanes in Egypt pending the 
arrival of sufficient aircraft to reequip the squadron. Longmore did not 
think SO.27 
The growing irritation between the two men, due largely to lack of 
contact, signals written by underlings, and inadequate time for the writ-
ing of long personal letters exchanging views, was exacerbated during 
Smuts' one-day visit to Cairo. Evidently at some point in the con-
versations Eden, Wavell, or Longmore, or possibly even Cunningham, 
unwisely made a comment about the number of aircraft at home com-
pared to what was available in the Middle East. Or Smuts, as the principal 
founder of the RAF, put it in himself. At any rate, on the seventh, Portal 
sent the following tart message to his AOC-in-C ME: "I have seen General 
Smuts telegram in which he refers to "Beaverbrook disgorging from his 
hoard." In case you may have the impression that the flow of reinforce-
ments to you is in any way restricted by the views or actions of the 
minister of aircraft production I wish to assure you that the only limit 
which now operates is our power to pack and ship the aircraft and to fly 
them across the Takoradi route and from Europe direct." 
And he followed that signal with another, sent in three parts, each of 
which was to be given to a different officer to decipher; Longmore was to 
read it by taking alternate words from the second and third parts! 
I feel bound to tell you that further emphasis on your shortage of 
aircraft is quite unnecessary. Certain passages in recent telegrams 
to Prime Minister from General Smuts and/or Eden presumably 
included as a result of your representations to them have created a 
bad impression especially in view of repeated suggestions as to 
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desirability of concentration at decisive point at the expense of 
less important theaters .... Inference can be drawn either (a) 
that you do not believe my repeated assurances as to our efforts to 
reinforce you or (b) that you are indirectly disassociating yourself 
from recent decision on Greece. I am sure that you will agree that 
confidence and determination must now animate whole com-
mand .... We will do everything humanly possible to meet your 
needs. 
The message given above is the way it was hand-drafted by Portal, the 
printed text being very slightly more polite. And Longmore responded 
on the 10th: "I have received your X.940 % to which I take grave excep-
tion." (Portal received this signal just as he finished writing by hand a 
personal letter to Longmore explaining that he had been forced by the 
Prime Minister to send the carefully ciphered signal, since Churchill 
insisted on reading all messages that passed between Cairo and London. 
He hoped, Portal scrawled, that Longmore understood how great were 
the efforts London was making on his behalf.) 
Meanwhile the air member for supply and organization had also been 
increasingly disturbed by the tone of the signals he was receiving from the 
Middle East. He laid the blame on Air Vice Marshal A.c. Maund in Cairo, 
who was no doubt thoroughly exasperated. To the AMSO's signal Long-
more replied that he agreed that the signals from Maund could have been 
less acidly expressed, and that he had so informed the author. However, 
he went on that he felt that the problem was much deeper and that the 
RAF needed liaison officers similar to those of senior rank who constantly 
traveled between the War Office and the Middle East, and suggested that 
this be discussed with the CAS. "Like you we are all working at very high 
pressure and hard put to it to meet our wide commitments." And he went 
on to suggest that two officers who were on their way home should stop in 
at the Air Ministry to give them some firsthand impressions of the 
maintenance problems in the Command. 28 
On 8 March Menzies sent Deputy Prime Minister A.W. Fadden in 
Canberra an eight-hundred-word cable. He admitted that he had had a 
most anxious time of it and hoped that he had posed faithfully all the 
questions that those at home had asked. But, "Our military advisers 
discount the possibilities of a successful thrust by a German armoured 
force in North Africa and there is complete confidence that the Benghazi 
front can be held without interfering with the new project." 
What upset the Dominions was that once again an Imperial minister 
had committed them without asking. Menzies noted that he attached a 
high value to the judgment of Smuts, but the timetable was such that the 
first Australian troops would not get into position much before the end of 
the month "by which time many things may have happened." He con-
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cluded "that although the hazards are considerable the proposal is by no 
means hopeless" and should be governed by the overwhelming impor-
tance of impressing the world, especially America, with the idea that the 
British were not abandoning the Greeks. 
The New Zealand government had already pointed out on 26 Febru-
ary that it thought that the force being sent for what Churchill called this 
"glorious task" was a bit small, but it had been willing to accept the 
explanation that if linked with Greek and Turkish forces the whole would 
probably be as strong as anything that the Germans could bring against it. 
However, when they heard the revised figures after the conferences of 
early March, the Auckland Cabinet cabled on 9 March a very realistic 
appreciation: in effect it saw the emperor's new clothes, and that the 
position was one of extreme gravity. The Germans had unlimited resourc-
es, interior lines, and a superior air force, not to mention the Italian fleet, 
the Dodecanese Islands, and the likelihood that the Suez Canal would be 
blocked; the Greeks would collapse quickly, "leaving the British force in 
the air." Nevertheless, having said what Dill should have said, they felt 
morally bound to support the Greeks. The New Zealand Cabinet's cable 
ended with three caveats, however: full air and sea escort for the transport 
was to be provided; full and immediate consideration was to be given to 
the means of withdrawal on both land and sea; and the operation should 
not be mounted unless the full force contemplated could clearly be made 
available at the appropriate time. 29 
If everyone had not been so busy keeping a stiff upper lip, and so 
concerned with not letting down the side, they might have seen that there 
was absolutely no hope of sending anywhere near the full 120,OOO-man 
force contemplated. No one seems to have made a chart that showed the 
time lag between decision and reality. Or it may have been part of Wavell's 
plan not to have Churchill risking security by asking questions. 
The Dominions were further upset on 9 March when the Australian 
Cabinet received a cable from Blarney asking permission to present his 
position before the Australian Imperial Force was committed to Greece. 
The ministers were confused, as they had been told that Blarney was 
"agreeable" and knew that the force was already committed. Nev-
ertheless, Sir Percy Spender, the minister for the army, told the GOC to go 
ahead and submit his views. 30 
As McClymont has pointed out, Churchill, under Australian pres-
sure, tried to get Eden to get them all off the hook. 31 Unfortunately for 
Eden's reputation, he apparently insisted upon being obtuse and failing 
to see that Churchill was asking him to make the excuses that would allow 
everyone to repudiate the Dill-Papagos agreement. One fly in the oint-
ment was Palairet and the embarrassment that British troops had landed 
prematurely at the Piraeus. The latter could have been explained away, 
however, as having been sent only to provide airfield protection for the 
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RAF tactical air forces helping the Greeks against the Italians. Or they 
could have been withdrawn to Crete to bolster its defenses. But somehow 
Crete was never seen in proper perspective as the right flankguard of the 
British position in the Middle East in either naval or air terms. Nor were 
the dangers of the Axis-held Dodecanese airfields fully appreciated. 
To compound the coming difficulties, even though Wavell had noted 
that he needed to strengthen his defenses in Cyrenaica, the signals 
emanating from London late on Thursday 6 March and early on Friday the 
seventh injected another miscalculation. Churchill suggested to Eden the 
possibility of going to Tripoli instead of Greece, but he put the onus for 
making the decision on Dill and Wavell. To this Eden replied that the 
Dominions would not make difficulties about going to Greece, while 
Wavell had pointed out that to reverse plans would create practical mili-
tary difficulties. So the COS cabled Wavell that the Cabinet accepted full 
responsibility for the decision to aid Greece and authorized him to pro-
ceed, promising that it would communicate with the Australian and New 
Zealand governments. 32 
De Guingand remarked in Generals at War that it would have helped if 
Wavell had said to Eden and Churchill that Greece would end in evacua-
tion (as he must have concluded that it would). Wavell's confidence in the 
Greek operation was shown by his attitude to evacuation plans: the Joint 
Planning Staff in Cairo arranged to meet with Dill's aide, Mallaby, but he 
refused to answer their questions. Foreseeing disaster, this band of junior 
staff officers started preparing their own plans for evacuation, only to be 
stopped by Wavell. However, a few days later, given an indirect hint by 
Wavell himself, they set to work once again (luckily, for it meant that two-
thirds of the force sent was recovered, though all equipment was lost). 
As the authors of the official history, Grand Strategy, have pointed out, 
motives of honor are often confused with policy. "In this case Cairo never 
sent London a military appraisal and Whitehall never for its part appreci-
ated the drain on Middle East resources. In fact, no considered estimate 
was made of how much we were prepared to lose."33 
Campaigns have neither tidy beginnings nor neat endings: the ad-
ministrative side inevitably stretches out at either end. It was, moreover, 
in part the tail that caused Wavell not to want to change plans again and 
switch from Greece back to Cyrenaica; he feared the truth of the old 
military proverb, "Order, counter-order, chaos." 
Planning for the Grecian campaign had begun at least as early as 12 
February, long before even Eden, Dill and the C-in-C's had agreed on the 
move. By 17 February road and port forces had received orders which 
raised the question of mobilization orders for an expeditionary force. 34 
Now, as the troops were moved to Greece in March, highest priority was 
given to armored units, to impress the Greeks, and second highest to the 
New Zealanders, who were to dig defenses. High enough priorities were 
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not given to medical necessities in a land of large, low-lying, malarial 
plains. And malaria was not the only disease to create concern-there 
were also typhoid, paratyphoid, and related fevers. Intestinal diseases 
were a constant campaigners' worry even in Athens, the one city with 
modem sanitation. Many hospitals had to be sited in malarial areas in 
order to obtain adequate water, and this meant a high chance of dysen-
tery. Apart from a high rate of VD (which even engaged 0' Albiac and his 
staff in a debate over whether to issue free sheaths, as at least fifty airmen 
were constantly hospitalized with the side-effects of pleasure-seeking), 
there was also a 3 percent rate of pulmonary tuberculosis to worry 
about. 35 
Though the leading element of the 1st Armoured Brigade landed at 
the Piraeus on 7 March and proceeded north shortly thereafter when its 
transport arrived, it was not until 2 April that the New Zealand Division 
was in line on the Aliakmon, backing up its exposed position on the plains 
forward on the road to Salonika. And on 2 April the first flight of the 
Australian Division was just landing at the Piraeus. Command difficulties 
in Athens were never really straightened out. The navy was scattered 
about the Piraeus, about three miles away from the army in the Hotel 
Acropole, while the air force commander reported directly to the Greek 
C-in-C and had western and eastern wings operating independently of 
each other and of Wilson. For much of this period the military mission (it 
never accepted the name change to liaison delegation) had to supply the 
nucleus intelligence section, liaison officers, interpreters, and a number 
of administrative staff from its own very small resources, for it was the 
only group that knew the personalities, the language, and the country. 
The Greek and British armies were two almost totally different organi-
zations equipped with incompatible arms. The Greek force was a march-
ing army that lived on its feet, supported by a supply train of mules, 
donkeys, and women. The British army was a mechanized, technological 
organization. The Greeks could move up and down mountains and across 
plains at four kilometers an hour; the British could make hardly any better 
speed in the mountains, but they and the Germans could move consider-
ably faster on the plains, provided it was dry.36 The Greeks fully under-
stood that one of the main problems was that the only rail route to their 
main supply base for the Albanian front ran up the east coast almost to 
Salonika, and then northwest along a highly vulnerable line with all of the 
section Plati-Florina lying in front of the Aliakmon position. In the discus-
sions of the British presence in Greece, this fact and the paucity of paved 
roads had hardly been considered. It was in part to remedy this vul-
nerability that since 1931 the Greeks had been extending the Volos-
Pharsala one-meter-gauge line from Kardista westward to Trikkala and 
thence north up the valleys to rejoin the main line at Amyndeon. The 
ballast had been spread but the rails had not been laid before Greece was 
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overrun in April 1941. Besides the shortage of coal and the need to 
transship goods between gauges, there was also a shortage of meter-
gauge waggons. 
On the other hand the needs of a mechanized army can be seen from 
the example of the New Zealand artillery alone. Each of its three field 
regiments of 45 officers and 590 men had 112 cars and trucks, of which 36 
were quads towing guns. There were 48 ammunition trailers, 29 motorcy-
cles, and 72 field guns, plus a headquarters unit of 7 cars and trucks and 2 
motorcycles. 
Use of the Greek railways in early March was limited by the capacity 
of the single-track main line to two 25-car trains a day, or a total of 240 tons 
daily to Larissa. After 10 March this increased to three trains daily. From 
Volos, loads had to be reduced from 137 to 60 tons because the loco-
motives simply could not develop enough power burning olivewood in 
place of coal. 37 
Larissa, a sleepy little provincial town with an airfield, offered no real 
solution to the supply problem. It flooded in winter, and it had no 
sidings, so when trains arrived their contents were dumped onto the 
ground along the tracks. It was mid-March before enough motor trans-
port got through from Athens to begin clearing this mess and organizing 
a proper dumping system. And even so, Larissa was fifty to one hundred 
tortuous road miles from the positions along the Aliakmon and in the 
passes behind that line. Originally GHQ ME had intended that the main 
base should be moved from Athens to Thebes, but the Greeks would not 
allow the area about that town to be scouted. The British suggested Stylis 
(Stilida, the port of Lamia), but the Greeks did not like that idea as they 
wished to keep the railway line free for the storage of waggons evacuated 
when the Germans took Salonika. Eleusis was not discovered to be 
inadequate until after the Piraeus was bombed out of action; then it was 
found that it would have to be dredged. Another choice was Ithea, the 
bauxite port below Delphi from which the British had built a road to 
Larissa via Lamia in World War I. But even a supply of mules proved to be 
difficult to find. The Middle East was not a mule area and the British were 
not muleteers. Two shiploads were dispatched, but one was sunk en 
route. Thus there were never enough mules forward on the Aliakmon, 
where they were badly needed as many of the best defensive positions 
could not be reached by vehicles. 
As the planners in the Hotel Acropole got to work in the middle of 
March they discovered that there were many problems which had not 
been discussed in the plenary talks, though Dill was apparently aware of 
some of them. The question of fighting delaying actions from the Struma 
River back was governed not so much by the lack of air cover-the 
scapegoat of the campaign-as by a lack of bridges which could take lorry 
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columns, and of bridging equipment: on the flat plains in March and 
April, rivers flooded wide; they were not deep, but they could stall motor 
vehicles during freshets. As the military tactical realities began to sink in 
at the Acropole, Brigadier Brunskill says, the administrative staff came to 
the conclusion that the only solution was a hurried withdrawal and 
evacuation to prevent the British from being annihilated. And the more 
they considered the hazardous situation of the roads and the railway and 
the vulnerable bridges, the more pessimistic they became.38 In other 
words, partly because the Greeks had not allowed reconnaissance, partly 
because the British had not done their homework, and partly because 
Eden was determined to create a Balkan alliance, the British army was 
sent into an untenable situation. Perhaps that is the trouble with doing 
military appreciations only from large-scale maps in the staff-college 
fashion without viewing the ground. 
On Friday, 7 March, Formidable finally squeezed through the Suez 
Canal and the Royal Navy once again had an aircraft carrier in the 
Mediterranean. 39 
In Cairo, where it might have been most sensible to allow matters to 
lie fallow, on instructions from London Eden and Dill stayed on, trying to 
do something about Yugoslavia and Turkey. At midnight Eden decided to 
compose a message to Churchill, a process for which he liked an audi-
ence. He summoned Dill and Wavell from their beds, and the two gener-
als sat on the couch in their brown English wool dressing gowns like two 
teddy bears and fell asleep while Eden declaimed telegraphic phrases.4o 
Early on Saturday morning in London Cadogan had just got into bed 
when he was routed out by an irritated Prime Minister who had dis-
covered that the Foreign Office was closed. Churchill needed information 
about a signal that had just come in from Belgrade that Prince Paul was 
sending an officer to Athens. After Cadogan had gone over and talked 
with him, the Prime Minister sent off a telegram to Athens urging that all 
support be given to this new mission. (Cadogan later got a reprimand 
from Eden for not going through the Foreign Secretary, who was in 
Cairo.)41 
The Yugoslavs had decided upon another delaying tactic, and on 6 
March had sent Lt. Col. Milisar Perish:, traveling on a British passport in 
the name of L[ast] R[ay] Hope, to Athens to talk to "Mr. Watt" (General 
Wilson). He was to explain the Yugoslav dilemma, request evacuation of 
the northern Yugoslav armies when the Germans attacked, determine 
how soon a line could be established from Salonika to Lake Doiran, and 
ask for aircraft, tanks, and antitank guns. Wilson could give only general 
replies, while urging the Yugoslavs to attack the Italians in Albania in the 
rear. Part of the mission of "Forlorn Hope," as the British called him, was, 
of course, to find out as much about British strength as he could, and the 
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puny British force of three and a half divisions hardly encouraged 
Yugoslav action. 
Perisic met twice with General Arthur Smith, Wilson, 0' Albiac, Turle, 
and Papagos. As the Yugoslav laid especial emphasis upon the necessity 
of holding Salonika if his country were to come in, this, naturally, made it 
difficult for the Greeks to evacuate it as long as there was that hope. In the 
end Papagos concluded that this visit was an act of bad faith; Prince Paul 
had always given the Greek king friendly assurances, but sixteen days 
after the meetings in Athens the Yugoslavs signed the treaty with Hitler, 
receiving a promise that they would get Salonika as their reward. 42 
In Washington on that Saturday, 8 March, the Senate passed Lend-
Lease by a vote of sixty to thirty-one, the only fear being that it would 
allow the president to aid Communist Russia. Roosevelt was already 
making sure that aid went to England, so Churchill's original fears that a 
British withdrawal from Greece would hurt her in the United States were 
no longer valid.43 Perhaps he sensed this: he now appeared to be willing 
to pull back, but by this time he had lost his grip over Eden. 
At just after midnight Papagos told the British military attache that the 
movement of his troops from Thrace by train was going smoothly, even 
though the Germans were constantly conducting air reconnaissance over 
all of northern Greece. The morale of the troops was high, but the 
prospects of a German attack were causing misgivings, especially as the 
Germans knew all about the arrival of British troopS.44 
The weather on Sunday, 9 March, was not on the side of the British. 
The Brallos Pass was so badly clogged with snow that AI A guns could not 
get through and so had to be sent up the coastal road by Thermopylae. 
Some days later when the road was opened, it proved to be in such bad 
condition that it was less damaging to the towed guns to send them by 
rail. 45 Even in the best of weather the road, with its switchback curves and 
steep winding gradients, was a challenge for British drivers. In the Hotel 
Acropole well-muffled commanding officers heard that Greece was not at 
war with Germany, so the German military attache was free to record the 
comings and goings of all British units. 46 
On the south shore of the Mediterranean the 6th Australian Division 
was warned to proceed to Greece in three groups, to begin embarking at 
Alexandria on 19 March.47 At the port General Freyberg promulgated an 
embarkation message for the New Zealanders which said that they would 
be fighting "in defence of Greece, the birthplace of culture and learning." 
The message, the New Zealand historian Murphy said, put "the mission 
... in the crusading tradition of Anzac and had overwhelming appeal." It 
was to be a sparkling adventure compared to the dirt of Egypt. 48 
Bernard Freyberg was the rare VC who rose to general rank and 
continued to act with distinction. He was a New Zealander, but after the 
First World War he had become a regular in the British army, attended the 
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Staff College with Marshal-Cornwall, and retired in 1937 as a major 
general. He was a huge, broadchested man of six feet with a sometimes 
grim visage but an eager welcoming smile, a rasping voice, and a good 
memory for names and faces. The troops called him "Tiny," but his staff 
called him "the General," a name he liked, or "Bernard," which as a New 
Zealander he tolerated. He spoke authoritatively on a wide variety of 
subjects, but his biographer, Major-General W.G. Stevens, who was also a 
member of his staff, believes he lacked a wider perspective. A fighting 
soldier much respected by the troops, he had arrived back in Cairo in 
September 1940 after an absence in England of three months. 49 
Just before bedtime that night in Cairo, Pierson Dixon, filled with the 
news that Prince Paul might at last see Eden, dropped in at the C-in-C's 
house, only to find Wavell already in his russet pyjamas. Nevertheless, 
they had a long conference. 
10 March 1941 
In Athens there were arguments in the Cabinet about the relationship of 
Mussolini's plans to Hitler's. Prime Minister Koryzis said that they were 
related, but at least four Cabinet members indicated that they saw no evil 
in Hitler's plans, and they were supported by some lesser lights. Koryzis 
argued that control of Greece was essential to Germano-Italian plans to 
drive the British out of the Mediterranean and was part of the general 
German plan to seize the Suez Canal and the Mosul oilfields. He also 
revealed to the Cabinet a secret Metaxas memorandum which expressed 
distrust of the Germans. Metaxas believed that the Italians had torpedoed 
the Greek warship Helle without Hitler's knowledge, but anticipating a 
German attack upon Greece. 50 The American director of the Near East 
Foundation, Laird Archer, added in his report of the discussions that he 
had been told that Koryzis reaffirmed the Greek determination to resist 
the Germans in the Metaxas spirit. 51 The American ambassador reported 
to Washington that the consul-general in Salonika had phoned him that 
morning to say that British troops had arrived in Salonika52 (which was 
quite untrue). 
On 10 March General Heywood saw General Papagos and then 
reported to Wilson. Papagos agreed at once to a British air reconnaissance 
of the Struma valley and added that the British were now free to make 
reconnaissances wherever they wished, even of Salonika, but he hoped 
that they would not send too many people there at once. It was agreed that 
liaison officers should be attached to the three Greek headquarters at 
Salonika, Serres, and Kozani, that Heywood himself should visit the 
Macedonian fortifications, and that British troops going forward of the 
Aliakmon position should have special passes, but that elsewhere in 
Greece their ID cards would suffice. The question of Wilson's incognito 
172 Denouement and Disaster 
status was again raised, and Papagos said that the prime minister re-
quested that it remain in being until General Wilson was ready to take 
over command; Papagos would then publish an order of the day to the 
Greek army explaining who he was and why he was in Greece; the choice 
of the exact moment should be left to Wilson. 
Papagos sent for Heywood that same evening and raised a number of 
points about the command of British units forward of the Aliakmon Line. 
He thought that if they went beyond the Vardar they should be under 
Greek command, but then, as the whole frontier force retreated and 
passed through the Aliakmon position, it should come under General 
Wilson's control. Papagos hoped that Wilson would give him a few days' 
notice before taking over command, and Heywood assured him that he 
would, but that he could not do so until his headquarters and communica-
tions were established. They then discussed why Germany had not 
already attacked, and Papagos laid it to the firmer attitude of Yugoslavia. 
As they parted, Papagos asked Heywood to drop in again the next day, 
and to keep him informed of the arrival and movements of British troops 
in Greece. 53 
From Egypt Blarney cabled home that neither the 7th Australian 
Division nor the New Zealand Division had ever trained as divisions, and 
both the 6th Australian Division and the armored division were unready. 
That left no other troops in the Middle East not fully engaged. Because of 
shipping difficulties the arrival of troops would be uncertain and the 
movements now ordered would take two months. In contrast, he said, 
the Germans already had available as many divisions as the roads would 
carry, and would have more by the time the Australians arrived and were 
in position-and that these troops would be completely trained and 
conditioned. Blarney felt that to land a small British force was only asking 
the Germans to attack and knock the British off the Continent. The choice 
appeared to be between the public-opinion effect, especially on Japan, of 
not sending aid and that of another evacuation. He concluded, "Military 
operations are extremely hazardous in view of the disparity between the 
opposing forces in numbers and training." Blarney's cable much upset the 
Australian Cabinet, which, however, waited until 18 March to respond. 
From Cairo Wavell could report that Papagos was much more cheerful 
and helpful, that Wilson on his way back from his meeting with "Mr. 
Hope" had visited the Aliakmon Line and made contact with the Greek 
commanders, and that the seven battalions from Thrace had begun to 
move onto the position. Equally good news was that the Suez Canal was 
open again and that, while the second and third flights had had to sail at 
half strength, another flight would be fitted in before the fourth one 
scheduled to carryover the rest of the two first groups. 
Eden cabled the Prime Minister that "I still have hopes of a triumph, 
but we are not home yet." Smuts could only stay in Cairo one night, as his 
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parliament was in session, and so Eden had not extended Churchill's 
invitation to visit London. And as to the matter of the economy of the 
British army in the Middle East, Wavell agreed that a general officer 
should be sent out from Home to make a thorough investigation and 
report. 
There followed a message from Wavell to the War Office pointing out 
that Portal was being shortsighted in trying to get Longmore to pull in his 
forces from the Sudan and East Africa just when they were needed to help 
wrap up those campaigns, whose completion would free both military 
and naval forces for operations elsewhere. Moreover, the C-in-C ME 
noted, on 21 February it had been suggested that Italian East Africa could 
be liquidated if air reinforcements were sent, but they had not been. 
The military mission in Athens reported that the three Greek divi-
sions were now in line from the Aegean Sea to Kajmakalan. 54 
At noon in London the War Cabinet met and began a discussion 
(which in the end dragged on until after the Germans attacked Hellas) as 
to when to announce that aid was being given Greece. It was pointed out 
that the Germans and the press would report the arrival of troops imme-
diately, but Menzies argued for waiting until the agreement of the Domin-
ions had been received. As the Prime Minister was not present, it was 
agreed that the Ministry of Information should hold a session that after-
noon to draft a communique, but that it should not be released until the 
Prime Minister gave his approval. 55 No agreement with Wavell was 
reached on this before the German attack on 6 April made it academic. 
11 March 1941 
In Athens on Tuesday Major Crow reported to MacVeagh that the two 
RAF Gladiator squadrons had finally got Hurricanes and that the mixed 
Blenheim squadron had been converted fully to fighters. More RAF 
squadrons were expected when they could be released from Africa; the 
RAF anticipated the German attack within a month. 56 
Starting on 11 March there were rumors that various Greeks, from 
Cabinet members to generals, had approached the Germans for a "peace 
with honor" (an expression first used by Disraeli upon his return from the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878).57 Metaxas had tried to discuss this with the 
British in 1938-1939 without success, and now Papagos faced the same 
dilemma. Some of his officers were proposing that the Germans be told 
that if terms could be arranged they should include Greek assurance that 
the British would leave the country and give up Crete, which they had 
seized without Greek assent. The fact that the proposals existed and were 
apparently emanating from the Central Macedonian Army made the 
Greek C-in-C's task all the more difficult. Yet again, it may be suggested 
that if he had broached it to London, the Cabinet there would have 
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welcomed a way out of the mess, even if it meant that Eden would have 
resigned (temporarily?) in a huff at being bypassed and ignored. The 
point is that the British had built for themselves a house of cards, but no 
one was willing to knock it down as it deserved. 
German air attacks from Rhodes again closed the Suez Canal, this 
time until 22 March. On the other hand, the Lend-Lease administration in 
Washington issued two directives declaring the defense of the United 
Kingdom and of Greece vital to the United States. 
The same day Admiral Cunningham signaled the First Sea Lord, Sir 
Dudley Pound, that there were only sixteen heavy AI A guns between 
Benghazi and Alexandria, and that these were being concentrated at 
Tobruk; the rest had gone to Greece. Malta had but eight serviceable 
Hurricanes, while in the Middle East they had but thirty fighters to face 
over two hundred Axis machines. He added that London was misin-
formed about British strength in the air in the Middle East. In fact, 
Longmore wrote to D' Albiac, "It will help if you are aware of the aircraft 
position here. It has reached the most acute stage since the war broke out, 
and for some little time to come, as I have foreseen and warned Air Staff, it 
will be impossible to keep all our existing squadrons up to establishment. 
As regards Fighters, the supply for the moment is not keeping pace with 
wastage .... As regards Medium Bombers, 2 squadrons have had to be 
reduced to cadre already, one having no operational aircraft at all and the 
other only two .... "58 
By mid-March Air Intelligence in London was becoming, thanks to 
ULTRA, very accurate. Their estimate of the number of German aircraft in 
the Balkans was 482 (the actual figure was 490). But Military Intelligence 
was hopelessly off. On 27 March it reported thirty-five German divisions 
in the Balkans, when actually only seventeen were present. It was clear 
from Enigma that an invasion of Britain was unlikely, though in late 
February, according to Hinsley, London was still not aware of the coming 
invasion of Russia. 59 
And as if to confirm Cunningham's allegation that London did not 
fully comprehend the air situation in the Middle East, the COS sent 
Wavell a telegram suggesting that, since the Germans had not bombed the 
British landing in Greece, perhaps they could not; it might therefore 
throw them off balance if the British struck at their lines in Bulgaria. (Yet 
Eden, who certainly did understand the air situation there, sent a mes-
sage to Churchill on the thirteenth emphasizing that the suggestion that 
Longmore get fighters from East Africa hardly made good sense: General 
Alan Cunningham actually only had eight, and even if these were moved 
to Egypt, it would be some time before they were again fit for action. Of 
the Hurricanes promised for March, none had yet arrived. Of 44 Well-
ingtons promised in February and March only eight had reached the 
Middle East. Malta was a constant drain on the Hurricane supply; would 
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it be possible to fly in some off a carrier from the western Mediterranean? 
And at the same time fly out 30 Wellingtons to bring the four squadrons in 
the theater up to strength?)60 
Far more serious was the fighter defense of Cyrenaica. 
12 March 1941 
As far as the state of his fighters was concerned, Longmore certainly had 
the backing of Wavell and Cunningham. On 12 March the latter added in a 
signal to the Admiralty on the problems of Malta: "A. 0. C. in C Middle 
East is doing utmost he can with his meagre force and cannot possibly 
supply all Malta's needs-which in my opinion are at least two full 
squadrons of fighters and constant replacement of inevitable wastage in 
such conditions. "61 
In London Portal was trying to calm Longmore down after the Smuts 
affair, assuring him that he regularlly got all signals received in London 
and that cooperation was close. Moreover, "Within military policy laid 
down by the government I have always recognized your right to make 
decisions, but this does not relieve me of duty to express opinion when I 
think this may be of value to yoU."62 The air member for supply and 
organization also wished to be more conciliatory and explained that not 
only had they been making special efforts since last autumn to fill the 
Middle East's needs, but also they had established a special section to 
watch over Longmore's interests in the directorate of equipment and 
would arrange for a squadron-leader from the equipment branch to travel 
constantly between the United Kingdom and Egypt. And Portal offered to 
send either Air Marshal Sir Bertine Sutton, commandant of the RAF Staff 
College, or Marshal of the RAF Sir John Salmond to help. 
Cunningham responded to an Admiralty signal pointing out that 
aircraft-carriers should not be used except in emergencies for the trans-
port of aircraft: "I am not aware that Longmore has expressed any opinion 
about the reinforcement of Malta by aircraft from carriers, but I feel that 
you are not being kept well-informed about fighter situation in the Middle 
East. Large reinforcements of this type of aircraft are urgently necessary if 
we are not to find ourselves at all points in serious difficulties. Are you 
aware that in February only one (repeat one) Hurricane was received in the 
Middle East and that in March none have yet arrived? ... I agree that by 
looking ahead it should be quite possible to supply fighter necessity of 
Malta without use of carriers, but, as you will realize, there has been a 
definite failure to do this which has placed us in present rather grim 
situation. "63 
This obviously stung the Air Ministry, which immediately demanded 
if it was not true that actually in February and early March ME Command 
had received 27 Hurricanes. To this Longmore replied that Cunningham 
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would have been correct if he had said Takoradi; London was correct that 
27 Hurricanes had reached the Middle East. 64 
Meanwhile on 12 March Knatchbull-Hugesson, good old "Snatch" in 
Ankara, informed his listeners that the Turkish Foreign Minister said that 
the Turks would stand only on the defensive and would neither occupy 
the bridgeheads the Greeks were abandoning at Demotika and De-
deagatch nor destroy the bridges there. He added that he was "sick of 
Yugoslavia."65 At the same time the Turkish War Office passed along 
intelligence from the military attache in Belgrade which gave details of the 
estimated seventeen to twenty-one German divisions in Bulgaria. And 
Wilson signaled a rumor that the Germans would make an airborne 
assault on Mytilene and Lemnos.66 
In Cyrenaica Neame and the GOC of the 9th Australian Division, 
Morshead, had begun to indicate their concern to Cairo about the pres-
ence of German units in North Africa. Wavell himself became more 
anxious, but still gambled that the Germans could not attack until May, by 
which time the two veteran Indian divisions would be finished in East 
Africa and moved to the Desert. Group Captain L.a. Borwn, command-
ing the Desert air force, was much more anxious, as his small force of PRU 
planes was bringing in photographic evidence of small ports in use and 
landing grounds under construction. Though he attacked the main air-
fields and Tripoli with the four Wellington squadrons based in the Canal 
Zone and at Malta, his force was too small to stop enemy activities. 67 
13 March 1941 
Clues to the presence of ULTRA in Greece are conspicuous by their 
absence, but in the BFG HQ operations record for this date there is the 
intriguing entry that Pilot/Officers R.W. Green and A.J. Silver arrived for 
cipher duties from the Middle East Code and Cypher School. 68 According 
to Hinsley, these were the first ULTRA officers to reach Athens. 
14 March 1941 
On 14 March the RAF was finally allowed to bomb airfields inside Albania 
in aid of the Greeks.69 
Eden's departure from the Middle East was delayed for various rea-
sons, so on 14 March Churchill sent him a long message: "I have come to 
the conclusion that it is better for you to stay in the Middle East until the 
opening phase of this crisis has matured. Your instructions give you the 
means of concerting the political and military action of all the factors 
involved. The attitude of Yugoslavia is still by no means hopeless and 
situation may at any moment arise which would enable you to go there. 
Turkey requires stimulus and guidance. No one but you can combine and 
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concert the momentous policy which you have pressed upon us and 
which we have adopted. The War Cabinet needs a representative on the 
spot, and I need you there very much indeed." 
He then went on to say that General Sikorski had agreed to the use of 
the Polish Brigade and that he, Churchill, was concerned that not enough 
Englishmen were in action in the Middle East and so he was sending the 
50th Division in W.S.8, leaving on 22 April. He urged that MANDIBLES 
be undertaken and completed as the 6th Division would be needed 
shortly; he hoped that MANDIBLES would be over by the end of March. 
Then he wanted to know why Papagos had not withdrawn three or four 
divisions from the Albanian front, urged that the Yugoslavs get their new 
equipment by knocking the Italians out in Albania, and instructed that 
Lemnos, just reported by the naval attache in Athens as unmanned, be 
occupied to prevent the Germans seizing the airfield there. As for Long-
more's complaints, they overlooked the fact that 104 Hurricanes and parts 
for Tomahawks were on the way. In addition every effort was being made 
to fly out 22 Wellingtons within the next fortnight. And lastly, he wished 
to point out that it was increasingly difficult to keep the press from 
mentioning the landings in Greece, especially when the German military 
attache had already reported the correct numbers to Berlin. He ended by 
agreeing with Longmore and Portal that when Eden and Dill did fly 
home, they should go via Lagos, but it would put them out of action for a 
critical seven days. "Everything is going quietly here, and we have begun 
to claw the Huns down in the moonlight to some purpose. God bless you 
all. "70 
In London Chips Channon had lunch at the Mirabelle with Beaver-
brook and Rab Butler, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, and 
agreed that Eden should stay in the Middle East. Elsewhere in town the 
Prime Minister was being vituperative about everyone, but especially 
about Wavell (the munching trio suspected jealousy), and referred to 
Prince Paul as "Palsy. "71 
15 - 16 March 1941 
Eden sent a long reply to Churchill which really did not say much more 
than that they were in agreement, except that he wanted Churchill to 
know that the complaints as to Longmore's needs were not the AOC-in-
C's, but his own. And on 16 March Eden and Dill gave Churchill the bad 
news that MANDIBLES had to be postponed till after 12 April so as not to 
interfere with LUSTRE, and that even then it would be limited to COR-
DITE (attacks on Rhodes) because of time and lack of intelligence. 72 
In order to clarify the air situation in the Middle East it is instructive to 
go through the file prepared in November 1941 for Portal to use in 
refuting the Australian charges that they had been misled in giving their 
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support to the Greek adventure. We find that on 14 March Churchill had 
confirmed to the prime minister of Australia that fourteen and possibly 
sixteen RAF squadrons would be in Greece, though there were airfields 
for only thirteen south of the Aliakmon Line, and that no more than 
twenty could be accommodated there before the end of June. The same 
information was sent to the prime minister of New Zealand, to whom it 
was also pointed out that the Greeks had on 13 March 21 bomber aircraft, 
46 fighters, and 48 old reconnaissance machines, but that their serv-
iceability rarely exceeded 50 percent. British reinforcements in March 
were to be three Blenheim squadrons, one army cooperation squadron of 
Hurricanes and Lysanders, and three heavy bomber squadrons, and a 
further two fighter squadrons if the aircraft became available. In the last 
four months, Churchill maintained, every aircraft that could be spared 
from the United Kingdom had been sent out.73 
Actually none of these aircraft went to Greece, as they could not be 
spared from the Middle East. Moreover, through bad planning, large 
quantities of Whitley bombers were being produced in Britain which, 
according to Postan, Hay, and Scott, the official historians, never went 
further than packing crates. 74 
On 14 March the Middle East Air Force had (by London's count) 502 
aircraft either serviceable or likely to be made so within fourteen days: 9 
Bombays, 173 Blenheims, 61 Gladiators, 134 Hurricanes, 38 Wellingtons, 
36 Wellesleys, and 51 Lysanders. Three more RAF squadrons were in 
Aden, and four South African Air force squadrons were in East Africa, 
which might be made available for operations in Greece when the East 
African campaign stopped. In addition, there were on their way to Egypt 
381 more aircraft, and the flow on the Takoradi route was rising as facilities 
were expanded. 75 
The trouble with these figures, just as with the ones the RAF quoted 
about the Greeks, was that for a force constantly on the go, serviceability 
was often less than 50 percent. Moreover, most of the aircraft listed above 
had been or were being phased out of operational service in Britain. In 
other words, though the Middle East air forces were facing first-line 
German aircraft, they were doing so largely with second-line machines. 
By mid-March Wavell in Cairo was increasingly unhappy with the 
presence of Eden and Dill, whose departure had been delayed since the 
seventh by bad weather and hopes of a visit to Belgrade. For the COffi-
mander-in-chief, or for that matter for any commander of an active cam-
paign, to have not only the chief of staff but also the deputy prime 
minister (as Eden was in effect if not in name) residing in his house, was a 
strain. This was true for personal relations, especially with someone such 
as Lady Wavell who could herself be difficult, and in all sorts of other 
ways, from having to arrange their entertainment and listening to them at 
meals-especially to Eden who liked to hear himself talk-to ensuring 
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their security and answering their questions about matters which were 
normally strictly within the purview of the C-in-C. Wavell knew that he 
needed to get out to the Western Desert to see how Neame was getting on, 
and to ensure that he had taken the proper tactical and strategic disposi-
tions now that it was becoming increasingly obvious that the Germans 
were present in Tripoli. Wavell's biographer, John Connell, has rightly 
noted that the presence of distinguished visitors (coupled with his own 
lack of a personal aircraft, we should add) meant that he did not get 
forward in time to view the ground and to convert the salt marshes at EI 
Aghila into a strong defensive position. Wavell was later to admit that, 
perhaps because he was not free to focus properly on military matters, he 
underestimated the speed at which the Germans could build up. Connell 
suggests that Wavell never got time to read the excellent report, taking 
Rommel's position, prepared by Brigadier John Shearer of his own staff. 76 
At the same time Wavell was still having to be involved in the diplo-
matic side of the Greek adventure, which he already regarded as hope-
less. As Connell noted, by 15 March Wavell had lost his illusions but could 
only go on. 77 He had too many problems on his mind to be able to give the 
necessary thought to them all, for he was being forced into roles which 
should not have been his as the military C-in-C. 
On 15 March the Yugoslav Foreign Minister told the British minister, 
Campbell, that Yugoslavia would sign the Axis pact, and when Campbell 
urged a positive stand, he replied, "What do you want us to do, attack 
Germany?"78 Campbell's long report on this conversation reached Lon-
don at 2:25 a.m. on the sixteenth. It said that the Yugoslavs would 
maintain contact with the Germans, would not fight, and that the minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs was defeatist. The latter was a term applied to those 
who did not jump on the British dream wagon. 
Further to the south Eden, Dill, and the C-in-C's had met in Cairo to 
discuss how to get Turkey to bolster Yugoslavia. The result had been a 
telegram to Belgrade which suggested political rather than strategical 
discussions. In the course of these talks Wavell had said that it was vital 
that Yugoslavia not be lost to the Allies and so Turkey should be urged to 
declare war if need be to keep her in. On the sixteenth, after they heard 
Campbell's report, they decided to urge the Turks to come more into the 
open, and for this purpose Eden and Dixon flew to Cyprus on 18 March. 79 
Meanwhile in London on 15 March the deputy director of Military 
Intelligence circulated an appreciation which pointed out that the Ger-
mans had ample transportation facilities to support the twenty-nine 
divisions they were estimated to have in the Balkans (including those 
watching Turkey and Russia) as well as to maintain the 480 aircraft in 
Rumania and Bulgaria. For operations against Greece the Germans would 
have four armored, five motorized, two mountain and four infantry 
divisions. 80 
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In Athens the British naval attache prepared to open discussions the 
next day with the Greek Admiralty on Greek naval arrangements in case 
the country was overrun.81 
Wavell and Dill finally managed to get away to visit Neame at 
Benghazi. They were appalled to find him pessimistic, demanding rein-
forcements which Wavell did not have, with crazy dispositions, and with 
half his cruiser tanks in the shops and the other half unreliable. Wavell's 
confidence in him was shaken, and as soon as he got back to Cairo on 19 
March he dictated detailed instructions.82 (Neame did not get these until 
26 March, as the original was lost while being sent up by air. He claims that 
by the time he did get them they were unnecessary as his own disposi-
tions had already been made. But the situation, as Dill and Wavell had 
recognized, was serious, especially as Neame had at his disposal only 
three daily sorties of Hurricanes and six of medium bombers for all tasks 
including distant reconnaissance of the Germans west of him. )83 
17 March 1941 
By 17 March Wavell had already stopped all reinforcements for LUS-
TRE,84 but the AOC-in-C ME, Longmore, indicated that he hoped to be 
able to let the Greeks have 18 Hurricanes as soon as reinforcements came 
through from Takoradi and Nos. 80 and 112 Squadrons in Greece were 
brought up to strength. One thing was sure, the Greeks were not getting 
any aircraft from the United States, because of American and British 
maneuvering. 85 
London asked Cairo for a draft dispatch announcing the landing of 
British troops in Greece. Menzies wanted it, but Wavell refused. Why he 
did so is unclear in view of the fact that the arrival of British troops had 
been reported in most newspapers in Europe and abroad. 86 It would have 
been better to have released the cover story that the troops were to 
support the RAF, though the arrival of armor hardly made sense in that 
case. Churchill's view, that the Foreign Secretary was playing his hand 
with great skill, seems more complimentary to an ostrich than to a 
diplomat. 
Meanwhile in Athens the American ambassador reported that the 
Germans had as yet made no demands, but this was thought to be 
because of the impassible state of the passes south from Bulgaria and the 
uncertain position of the Yugoslavs. Delay was at any rate from the Greek 
point of view a blessing.87 
The blocked passes had not stopped the British air attache in Sofia, 
Wing-Commander MacDonald, from dropping into Athens on 16 March 
and two days later discussing with 0' Albiac the problems of evacuating 
Yugoslavia. At the same time that "rank-unconscious" regular soldier, the 
Scot Brigadier A. "Sandy" Galloway, Wilson's chief of staff, was taking the 
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view that Prince Paul was a weakling and that nothing could be expected 
from him, and he said as much to Major Reid at lunch at the Athens Club a 
few days later.88 And another interesting English character had rolled into 
town when the Fleet Air Arm sent Lt. Charles Lamb in his Swordfish to 
Eleusis. Lamb had a discipline problem on his hands, what with the 
Germans loose in town, and was constantly afraid that he would be forced 
to charge one of his pugnacious able-bodied seamen with "assaulting the 
enemy." Being a boxer himself, Lamb, one suspects, was not averse to a 
scrap. He had come into Athens in fact to be briefed by D' Albiac on 
operating out of the field in the valley at Paramythia, which he thought 
was inside Albania (after all, all foreigners are alike to a sailor). Having 
topped up with fuel, the Swordfish left at dusk, climbing from the field at 
3,000 feet to get over the mountains at 6,000; they then swept down to sea 
level, literally running their wheels on the water into Durazzo harbor, to 
drop their torpedoes before heading back in the dark to Eleusis.89 
(Lamb and D' Albiac were themselves involved in an incident at the 
Hotel Grande Bretagne, where they had gone to lunch one day late in the 
month with the senior air staff officer. The German ambassador and his 
party sat down at the next table to eavesdrop. After a while D' Albiac said, 
"SASO, have you given any thought to the problem of what we might do 
with Germany after the war?" Group Captain Willets replied offhand he 
thought it wouldn't be a bad idea to give it to the Poles. The Germans 
shortly moved to another table.) 
18 March 1941 
On Tuesday, 18 March, General Blarney sailed from Alexandria on the 
cruiser HMS Gloucester, which seemed to spend most of March as a 
troopship. By this time the lines of communications between Cairo and 
Athens had become so sluggish that Blarney actually reached the Hotel 
Acropole to report to Wilson before the signal announcing his movements 
was received. Shortly after his arrival he made a quick trip north to see the 
lie of the land, conferred with Freyberg, and came back to start collecting 
as much information as he could garner on the roads, towns, and beaches 
of the Peloponnesus. All of this was carefully plotted on an evacuation-
plan map, which he gave to Wavell on 20 April, so that his troops could be 
withdrawn in the next few days.90 
When he reported Blarney's arrival to Washington, MacVeagh com-
mented that the German G-2 had told Greek headquarters that the dis-
patch north of British troops would mean a fight. Under the 
circumstances MacVeagh felt it was silly that General Wilson was still 
going around in mufti as Mr. Watt. 91 
Up country in Veria, on the road from Salonika to Kozani, the purple 
Judas trees were just bursting into bloom at the entrance to the pass. 
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Freyberg and Brigadier Charrington were headquartered at Kozani until 
the twenty-fourth, when Charrington moved down to Edessa, on the 
escarpment overlooking the orchards on the road from Veria westward to 
Florina.92 
At the Marasleon School AVM D' Albiac issued a five-page memoran-
dum on air policy in Greece in which he pointed out that while the 
expectation was that he would have fourteen squadrons by 15 April, 
reinforcement squadrons were arriving below strength; and in any con-
tinuous operations, and especially fighting on two fronts, the rate of 
serviceability would be low. Given the many tasks facing the force, and its 
limited size and lack of suitable airfields, discretion by the commanders of 
the eastern and western wings would playa large part, but for many roles 
the forces employed would be far below "that considered necessary for 
the efficient conduct of war. "93 
Eden and Dixon flew to Nicosia on this Tuesday and met with the 
Turkish Foreign Minister, Sara~oglu, and with Knatchbull-Hugesson 
from Ankara. In long discussions that afternoon and on into the nine-
teenth, the Englishmen learned that the Turks expected the Germans to 
attack Greece down through the Monastir Gap; otherwise Turkey would 
be the target. The English thought they had persuaded the Turks to send a 
message to Belgrade urging their common interests, Eden's diary says, 
but when he got back to Ankara Sara~oglu did not send it. (According to 
the War Cabinet records in London, however, a telegram was sent. )94 For 
this there were in fact good reasons, which Eden already knew, as his 
official diary for the trip reports. Three days earlier Campbell had learned 
from the president of the Council that Yugoslavia was going to join 
Germany, so Eden had sent Terence Shone, the British minister in Cairo, 
on a personal mission to Shone's friend Prince Paul with a message which 
he had delivered on the eighteenth.95 On the nineteenth Eden himself 
offered once again to go to Belgrade. But this was all too late. By the 
twentieth the Yugoslav cabinet was in a crisis and the Serbian ministers 
resigned rather than capitulate to the Germans; this, like the appeals that 
day from King George VI and Churchill, did no good. 
One outcome of this internal maneuvering was that the former prime 
minister Milan Stojadinovic was turned over to the British at the Greek 
border for safekeeping, so that Hitler could not use him. Channon's 
reaction perfectly reflected sentiment in London of that day, "No Balkan 
can ever be relied upon. "96 
In Belgrade, the prime minister, Cincar-Markovic, took the view that 
Churchill merely intended to use Yugoslav arms to support his grand 
gesture to the Greeks, and since like most small neutrals he regarded 
Churchill's attitude as arrogant, he was not sure that the little powers 
should suffer for the benefit of the great. When in the evening the sad 
Prince Paul and his beautiful Greek wife, Princess Olga, dined with the 
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American minister, Lane, and were lectured again on their duties, they 
pointed out to him that unless the Germans attacked after the pact was 
signed, there was nothing that could be done, since the British had plainly 
indicated that they could provide nothing but verbal support. And 
Belgrade was not Zagreb, with its glorious memories of Serbian defiance 
of Austria in 1914 (nor, he might have added, was Hitler's Germany the 
waltzing Hapsburg Empire of Franz Joseph II). So that evening the 
Yugoslav cabinet met and voted fourteen to three for the pact with 
Germany. 
19 March 1941 
The British dream had blown away like dandelion seeds on the winds of 
Balkan realities and the lack of British resources. On 19 March Longmore 
estimated that he was 450 aircraft short of commitments. 97 When in 
London on the same day the Greek ambassador left one of his regular 
notes complaining about the lack of British air aid to Greece, this was 
circulated to the Prime Minister, who sent the under-secretary of state for 
foreign affairs, RA. Butler, to tell the ambassador in Churchill's words 
that "we had been filled with pride in being able to help so gallant an ally." 
The ambassador was impressed neither with the gesture nor with the 
suggestion that the Greeks apply to the C-in-C ME and to Eden. He knew 
there were no aircraft to spare in the theater. 98 
That same Wednesday General Heywood reported to Cairo and Lon-
don on the extensive travels he had at last been allowed to make in 
northeastern Greece. His basic conclusions were that the area was well 
fortified and that morale was very high among both the troops and the 
commanders, who were determined to acquit themselves as well as their 
brethren had been doing in Albania. The problem was that not only had a 
certain number of antitank and other weapons been "borrowed" for the 
campaign in the west, but that there were large gaps between the fortified 
areas which were only wired in and very lightly held with no reserves at 
all, so that multiple breakthroughs were a real possibility. The frontier 
commander felt that, if the attack did not come until after the British 
reinforcements had arrived in strength, the line could be held almost 
indefinitely, but he needed, in addition to adequate air support, field, 
antitank, and antiaircraft artillery, six battalions of infantry, and the 19th 
Motorized Division as a mobile reserve to deal with any parachutists or 
mountain troops that would come down over the Beles to the plain. Daily 
German air reconnaissance was occurring over Salonika and the rest of 
the area. Heywood noted that the most likely line of attack for the 
Germans would be to violate Yugoslav territory and strike down the 
Strumitsa valley and the Kosturino Pass to the Vardar with mechanized 
forces, which would outflank the whole frontier position. From the 
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Yugoslav consul in Salonika he learned that his country's forces were 75 
percent mobilized and that no German attack was expected before 25 
March. The Yugoslavs thought the British had landed fourteen divi-
sions.99 
Heywood further reported to London that the recent Italian offensive 
in Albania had cost the Greeks 5,000 casualties, and there remained only 
one month's supply of ammunition for 105-mm mountain, 85-mm and 
155-mm guns. Papagos was scouring the barrel for reservists. 100 
The British military mission also reported to Wavell, repeated to the 
War Office and the Admiralty in London, that the king and the president 
of the Council were thinking how to fight on if Greece were overrun. The 
Greeks were now prepared, the mission reported, to evacuate Thrace and 
eastern Macedonia, but they also wanted to raise another army corps of 
50,000 men, for which they needed additional equipment. Greek bay-
onets would make the decision, and while all recognized the great impor-
tance of the actions of the British government, the rapid equipment of the 
new army corps was vital. 101 
The nineteenth was a sad day for the RAF meteorologists in Athens, 
for the Italians changed their cipher system. Until then the RAF had been 
able to decode Rome's weather broadcasts, which gave them a most 
helpful idea of what was coming and especially what would be happening 
over the Adriatic ports. They were also until then able to use the Bulgarian 
codes, which applied both to Sofia and to Budapest. But for the next week 
or so they had only the Yugoslav weather from Belgrade, as that con-
tinued to be given in the International Meteorological Code. 102 
20 March 1941 
On Thursday, in the course of a conversation between Papagos and 
Wilson it was agreed that when the arrival of more Australian troops 
allowed the second New Zealand brigade to move to Katerini, it would 
relieve the 19th Motorized Division, which would be released to General 
Papagos on about 25 or 26 March. There were further detailed discussions 
about locating the incoming troops along the Aliakmon Line.103 
Late that night Papagos talked, as usual, with Heywood and told him 
that the Greek military attache in Ankara had earlier been instructed to 
call on Papagos's friend the assistant chief of the Turkish general staff, 
Assim Giindiiz. The attache was to ask him what action the Turks would 
take if Greece were attacked from Bulgaria, in view of the 1934 Graeco-
Turkish mutual guarantee of their "common frontier," as Papagos called 
it. He had now received a private letter, dated 12 March, which he asked 
Prince Peter to read to Heywood, who, Papagos said, would see how 
defeatist the Turks had become. In his letter Assim said that the Greeks 
must not expect anything from the Turks. The military attache reported 
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that he believed that the German ambassador's pressure tactics were 
having more and more success in Ankara. 104 
On 20 March, the New Zealand 19 Battalion was traveling north from 
Athens, having departed at 2:00 p.m. the day before. Their train stopped 
for breakfast at Larissa for two hours, and then they joggled north 
through the Tempe Pass to Katerini, snuffling and cursing the colds 
brought on by a rapid change of climate. By teatime they had detrained, 
and soon the colds were being sweated out as they began the laborious 
task of digging defensive positions on the Aliakmon Line. 105 
From Cairo Wavell signaled the War Office that the personnel ships 
were now through the Suez Canal and that LUSTRE was moving on 
schedule; the equipping of troops, especially with transport, was still the 
limiting factor. The preparatory work on demolitions along the Aliakmon 
and on the canal to Edessa were completed and a start was being made on 
the River Axios. The situation in Cyrenaica was beginning to worry him, 
as growing enemy strength indicated an early forward movement; if the 
British advanced troops were driven from their present positions there 
was no good covering position south of Benghazi, as the country was a 
dead-level plain. But he thought that administrative problems would 
preclude anything but a limited German advance; beyond a large increase 
in transport, the enemy was showing no offensive intention at present. 
21 - 23 March 1941 
On Friday 24 Battalion of the New Zealanders left Athens by train, while 
their motor transport of 220 vehicles made up a convoy twenty-two miles 
long as it crawled up the passes out of Athens, covering one hundred 
miles the first day. When at last it got to Mount Olympus, the convoy took 
five hours to crawl past one spot in the road. 106 
The difficulties of operating British forces in Greece were not well 
understood at the time that the decision was made to go there, perhaps in 
part because Wavell was weak on the "Q" side of his training and experi-
ence. Movements in Egypt and Palestine in the First World War had not 
been limited to a single-line railway; both shipping and lorries could be 
used. But in Greece shipping was limited by the shortage of escorts, the 
few ports, and the fear of air attack; and the use of lorries was severely 
restricted by the scarce and difficult roads. Moreover, even the single-line 
railway system was complicated by the fact that there were two gauges in 
use, a situation that necessitated transshipment. A report made on 26 
March to the director general of transportation at HQ ME began: "The 
difficult and extremely vulnerable line of communication has throughout 
influenced the general "Q" policy and the tendency is for all services to 
want "something of everything everywhere" so that we are tending 
towards a chain of maintenance from rear to front. "107 
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Often the ground was so low-lying and soft that at places like Larissa it 
was only good for II summer dumping"; spurs needed to be constructed to 
higher ground. And an overall difficulty was a shortage of waggons on 
the railways. Just to make the port of Volos effective would take nine 
months' work. And in transportation as in so much else at this stage of the 
war, the British were simply badly understaffed and lacked the manpower 
to carry out even those plans that could be properly developed. 
Another problem that arose because of the haste of the movement of 
the LUSTRE forces resulted from rapid and careless handling of ammuni-
tion being loaded in Egypt, so that about 20 percent of it arrived at the 
Piraeus in an unsatisfactory condition-shells with damaged driving 
bands, antitank mines loose in the hold because the boxes had been 
smashed, and gelignite rolling around with loose shells. Some 20-mm 
ammunition for the RAP arrived wet in boxes carefully stenciled "W E T," 
raising the question of why it was shipped in the first place. Other 
difficulties also arose in the north from storing ammunition under tar-
paulins in the wet winter and spring weather, because condensation 
accumulated and caused corrosion and rust. lOS 
In the post-mortems on the campaign held in Cairo in Maya disagree-
ment surfaced between the ordnance and the engineer officers on the 
conditions in Greece. While ordnance wished to be near rail spurs, the 
engineers correctly pointed out that, in an environment in which the 
British suffered from II air inferiority" to the point of having no air force at 
all, it was essential that dumps be as far from rail lines as possible, that 
movements be made over widely dispersed roads and generally at night, 
and that dumps be created that would facilitate movement by freeing 
transport from carrying unwanted materials and toolS.109 
In London the interminable arguments over how to supply the 
Greeks with ammunition were still being waged back and forth with 
Washington, but Cadogan thought the news from the Balkans better, 
especially after Eden's talk with the Turks on Cyprus; though Churchill 
kept calling that afternoon to know about the distribution of Anthony's 
telegrams, he seemed to be in a good mood.110 That evening Churchill 
told the Cabinet that he was not afraid about air attacks, invasion, or the 
Balkans, but he was anxious about the Battle of the Atlantic.111 
Cadogan was far less cheerful the next day when he found out that the 
Yugoslavs had sold their souls to the Devil, but what could you expect 
from people who were trash anyway, poor dears with no arms, no money, 
and no industry.112 Eden began dabbling in the idea of a coup proposed 
by Shone and Campbell and on the 24 March gave full authority to do 
whatever they thought fit to further a change of government or regime, 
even by a coup, and to get in touch with those in whom they had 
confidence. Cambpell telegraphed that the best chance lay with the 
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military, who had, however, to be convinced of British support by the 
offer of equipment. 113 
Meanwhile on 21, March in London the Greek minister had told the 
Foreign Office that the United States had at last agreed to give the Royal 
Hellenic Air Force 45 Grumman Wildcats. He asked at once for help in 
transporting them to the Middle East. Cairo had suggested flying them 
from the Gold Coast, but the Air Ministry said it would be better to send 
them by sea all the way, because the facilities at Takoradi were already 
strained. This meant an additional six weeks' delay at a most critical time. 
So in view of the pressing operational needs of the Greek air force, the 
Greeks asked for the immediate delivery of the 30 Mohawks originally 
promised out of British stocks, or in their place Hurricanes. When Long-
more had last visited Athens, the minister continued, his suggestion had 
been accepted that the British keep the Mohawks and deliver Hurricanes. 
But the Greeks could not rely on the RAF in Greece and had to have their 
own aircraft not subject to other calls.114 
In fact the interesting and disgraceful story of the Anglo-American 
buck-passing on the matter of aircraft for Greece revealed a total lack of 
appreciation for the urgency of the situation, a complacent concern for 
business as usual, and an attitude that what the RAF did not want could be 
discarded to the Greeks. l15 
On Saturday, 22 March, the American ambassador in Athens learned 
from the Turkish ambassador, just back from a visit home accompanied by 
the Swedish charge d'affaires, that the Germans had two motives in their 
drive on Greece: to get the British out so that they could not attack the 
Italians in Albania and thus Italy, and to cut Turkey off from the West. Von 
Papen, the German ambassador in Ankara, had told the Swede that the 
Germans had 700,000 troops in the Balkans and that the campaign would 
take two weeks. The Germans hoped to get Yugoslav permission to use 
the Monastir Gap, but it was not necessary. 116 
Meanwhile all four RAF squadrons in the Western Desert had been 
warned to be able to move on short notice and to prepare demolitions, 
and given special tactical instructions. 
And at Suez Cameronia of the Anchor Line dropped anchor with the 
missing 5th Brigade of the New Zealand Division, which had been for six 
weeks on its way from the United Kingdom. It was immediately greeted 
with Freyberg's special order of the day saying he expected them to be in 
action against the Germans very shortly. Four days later they landed at the 
Piraeus. 117 
In the meantime Mo.5 at the War Office in London was trying to find 
out who was in Greeece and what exactly was the order of battle. Quite a 
file had been building upon this subject in order to answer queries from 
the VCIGS and the director of military operations and plans. Even in early 
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April the estimates contained phrases such as "This seems to mean ... " 
and the like. But several things are clear. The 7th Australian Division had 
been held back in North Africa. The Polish Brigade was re-equipping and 
would not sail until 12 April, and at the end of the first week in April only 
the 1st Armoured Brigade and the New Zealand Division were concen-
trated forward, with the 6th Australian Division just arrived. About 
12,000 administrative troops and 33,000 fighting men were in Greece 
when the Germans attacked with five divisions.118 
24 March 1941 
In view of the imminent likelihood of the signing of a Yugoslav-German 
Pact, early this morning all RAF units in Greece were ordered to "a state of 
preparedness for defence." The Greek under-secretary for foreign affairs 
thought the news from Yugoslavia gloomy, especially since the Tripartite 
Pact signed at Vienna did not specify German "wounded" and there 
might be troops passing either way through Yugoslavia. He also felt that 
this new development would have a further depressing effect on a Turkey 
regarded in Athens as cautious and hesitant. 119 
MacVeagh also bemoaned the fact that after all the efforts to get the 
Greeks 45 Grumman Wildcats (Martlets, to the British), at the last minute 
Washington had acceded to a British request to swap these for Hurricanes 
to be delivered to Greece from Middle East supplies, a proposal which the 
Greek government had properly, he said, refused, as they knew that the 
British in the Middle East did not have any spare Hurricanes. The Greeks 
were thus left on the eve of the German attack exactly where they had 
been four and a half months earlier, because once again Washington was 
reexamining the question!120 
On this Monday General Wilson and General Papagos had another 
tactical discussion, concerned at first with antiparachutist measures in the 
Salonika and Vardar Valley areas; it was ageed that the Greek air force 
would be dispersed to satellite airfields and that the 19th Division would 
be added to the forces available, together with the British 1st Armoured 
Brigade, to assist in antiparachutist activities. They then discussed dis-
affection and resignations in Yugoslavia in the wake of the approval of the 
pact with Germany, and action to be taken, both to contact the opposition 
in Yugoslavia and to keep in touch with the army there and ensure that it 
stayed intact. Wilson then asked Papagos what his view was with regard 
to the disclosure of his identity, to which the Greek C-in-C replied that it 
ought to be made now, as the Germans obviously knew British troops had 
disembarked in Greece. It was agreed that if the Greek prime minister and 
Middle East headquarters concurred, Mr. Watt would become General 
Wilson on 26 March. General Papagos would announce it in an order of 
the day to the Greek army. 121 
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Shortly after this General Blarney was having a meeting with Jumbo 
Wilson and his chief of staff in the British embassy in Athens. The 
purpose was to clarify the role of Blarney's forces. It was agreed that 
defense of the passes on the Aliakmon Line was of paramount impor-
tance, and that work on these defenses should be given priority, a matter 
which Galloway, the chief of staff, would take up with the New Zealand 
commander, Freyberg; additional defenses were to be prepared at the 
Katerini Pass and between Mount Olympus and the sea. The advanced 
Australian corps headquarters was to be established at Gerania just south 
of the pass leading to Servia as soon as possible, and Blarney would take 
over the command of the front as soon as it could be arranged (which was 
not actually until 12 April). There followed a discussion of the shifting of 
troops forward as they arrived at Larissa, the need for reserve forces, and 
the development of lateral roads between the passes. The roads into the 
passes would have to be closed to Greek civilians the minute the Germans 
began their advance, and the inhabitants warned by the Greek authorities 
to remain at home. Advanced HQ was to leave Athens the next day to 
open on the twenty-sixth at Elasson. 122 
Far to the south of Athens Monday, 24 March, was a significant day, 
for Neame's outposts in Cyrenaica were being driven in by Rommel's 
fresh German troops, who took posssession of El Agheila. 
In Cairo Eden, having sent a cautious telegram to Belgrade saying that 
he had no authority to offer materiel to the Yugoslav army, now reiterated 
London's suggestion that if they attacked the Italians in Albania they 
would get a rich haul. But after he and Dill heard that the Yugoslavs were 
on their way to Vienna that afternoon to sign the Axis pact, they left for 
England. They were in Malta on the 27th, when the coup took place in 
Belgrade. 123 
The Dominion governments were getting very worried about the 
prospects for the expedition which at best they now regarded in the slang 
of the day as "dicey," so the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was 
told on 24 March that he should prepare plans for the evacuation of the 
Dominion forces from Greece. He replied that he already had such 
contingency work well under way and that he guaranteed that everything 
possible would be done. 124 
In London the Chiefs of Staff met with an adamant, growling, bellig-
erent Churchill, who demanded that more forces be sent overseas. The 
COS found themselves forced to back down from the Joint Intelligence 
Committee's appraisal of 31 January and their own position of 3 March. 
On 27 March they consented to say that the danger of the invasion of 
Britain had become less likely, but they were unwilling to go further than 
that. Even on 10 April they maintained that it was still a priority item. At 
the same time, they wrongly said that a German attack on the Middle 
East, via the Balkans and Syria in one prong and via Cyrenaica in the 
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other, was unlikely, as was an attack on Russia, in spite of recent evidence 
to the contrary. Hinsley notes that it was not until 27 April that battles 
between the War Office and the Foreign Office began to inject more 
realism into the JIC's assessments, upon which the COS were basing their 
strategic predictions and guidance. 125 
By late March as things went wrong and the thinness of Longmore's 
forces became increasingly obvious in London, Churchill's temper (or 
was it a guilty conscience?) became more evident. On 24 March he sent 
the AOC-in-C the following: 
I have been concerned to read your continual complaints of the 
numbers of aircraft which are sent you. Every conceivable effort 
has been made under my express directions to reinforce you by 
every route and method for the last five months. In order to do 
this the Navy have been deprived of Argus and Furious and are left 
without a single A.c. except occasionally Ark Royal to cope with 
the German battle-cruisers in the Atlantic. We are as fully in-
formed as you of what you are getting. A weekly report is submit-
ted to me of all movement via Takoradi. Therefore when I read a 
telegram from General Smuts in which he refers to "Beaverbrook 
being persuaded to disgorge his hoard" or when I read the C-in-
C. Med's telegram to First Sea Lord stating that "only one Hur-
ricane was received during the month of March," and when I also 
read your A.442, which seeks to justify this absurd statement, I 
fear there must be some absurd talk emanating from your Head-
quarters which is neither accurate nor helpful. 126 
To this Longmore responded two days later that he hoped that when 
Eden got back to London he would give Churchill the air picture as seen 
from Cairo, and that he would clear up the misconception that the AOC-
in-C was responsible for Smuts' remark about Beaverbrook's hoard. And 
after saying how grateful he was for "Pageant" (the Hurricane resupply of 
Malta by carrier), he went on to point out that in the last two weeks he had 
lost thirty aircraft of which sixteen were Hurricanes. The Middle East's air 
commitments were growing faster than one air supply line could build 
them up. For instance, at that moment five air convoys were held up by 
weather on the route from Takoradi. He added that he had suggested to 
the CAS that a direct route from America across the Pacific to Basra and 
then by air would help, or to South Africa, where erection facilities had 
been offered, after which aircraft could be ferried up (the old Imperial 
Airways route opened in 1932). He realized this was long-term policy 
"and that in the meanwhile we are facing a difficult period which you may 
rest assured we will do with confidence and determination but with our 
eyes open. "127 
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And on the same day Portal told the Prime Minister that the Air 
Ministry's estimates of the Germans' strength in the Balkans were 314 
(less 100 cooperation) aircraft in Bulgaria and 175 in Rumania plus trans-
ports, with Italian strength in Albania less than half Palairet's estimates 
and in the Dodecanese about two-thirds. In contrast the AOC-in-C had 
ten and a half fighter squadrons in the whole of his command, of which 
three were South African units not yet released from East Africa. Long-
more had, then, three squadrons in Greece, two in Egypt, one in Malta, 
one in Aden, and the remaining three and a half in the Sudan and Kenya. 
Portal had several times urged Longmore to concentrate his fighters 
northwards, but Wavell had replied that, although Greece was recognized 
as the major theater, it would be better to clear up East Africa before 
moving the air forces north; the COS had responded that this was a 
decision for the commanders-in-chief on the spot. (The rest of this letter is 
missing from the PRO file). So on 28 March Churchill sent a memoran-
dum to Butler and Cadogan at the Foreign Office, saying that Britain could 
not send out more fighters, but that additional bombers were being flown 
out to bring the squadrons up from twelve to twenty aircraft each.128 
25 - 26 March 1941 
Tuesday, 25 March, was Greek Independence Day, and Churchill had 
already approved on the twenty-first a message to be dispatched to 
Athens for the newspapers to use. This put the myths about Greece in a 
nutshell: liOn this day of proud memories, I would add one brief tribute to 
those which the whole civilized world is paying to the valour of the Greek 
nation. One hundred and twenty years ago, all that was noblest in 
England strove in the cause of Greek independence and rejoiced in its 
achievement. Today that epic struggle is being repeated against greater 
odds but with equal courage and with no less certainty of success. We in 
England know that the cause for which Byron died is a sacred cause: we 
are resolved to sustain it. "129 
In Athens Wilson and Papagos met again to discuss the German 
terms and conditions given Yugoslavia, which they understood included 
the right to run hospital and ammunition trains through Yugoslav territo-
ry. Papagos had heard from the Greek military attache in Berlin that the 
German attack would probably start on 27 March.130 Wilson proposed, 
and Papagos agreed, that Ross, the British military attache at Belgrade, 
who was then in Athens, should go back to Belgrade and make contact 
with the dissident elements of the army, and should then return via 
Skoplje, where he should try to get in touch with the commanding officer 
of the 3rd Yugoslav Army and arrange a meeting on the border with 
Wilson. It was agreed that the Greek consul should meet Ross at the 
railway station and give him the latest information as he passed through. 
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Ross was to have a special colored handkerchief so that the consul would 
be able to recognize him at once. 
They then talked over the problem of Wilson's taking over command 
of the Central Macedonian Army, which they both agreed he should do at 
once, in spite of the fact that both the Greek prime minister and Cairo 
believed that the announcement of his presence would precipitate a 
German attack. It was agreed that a secret order would be sent to General 
Ioannis Kotulas that as soon as Mr. Watt visited him he would hand over 
command to General Wilson. 131 
Brigadier Brunskill wrote from Athens to Arthur Smith that the 
Greeks were short not only of ammunition but of regular administrative 
supplies such as motor transport, food, clothing, barley, and coal. Ship-
ments of these items ordered from the United Kingdom were unpredicta-
ble, yet British troops arrived well equipped with transport and adequate 
reserves. The lavish scale with which the British were building up reserve 
stocks in a country whose troops and civilians were living on a hand-to-
mouth basis was causing adverse comment in the highest circles. One 
offshoot of the disparity was that Brunskill was forced to provide seventy 
British lorries to help establish the Greeks on the left wing of the Aliak-
mon position. More than this, the British needed to supply the Greeks 
with boots and bully beef immediately; Brunskill wondered if these could 
not be issued against what was on order, because otherwise Greek morale 
would suffer. "Though we can hardly go so far as to reduce the British 
ration, which to the Greek appears to be luxurious, we must give them 
what direct help we can, as one is particularly anxious to avoid criticism, 
which might affect adversely the whole manner of the Greeks in relation 
to our troops, which at the moment is excellent."132 
Also at the Hotel Acropole, General Staff Intelligence issued a memo-
randum on possible German tactics in Greece, which made considerable 
use of knowledge of German tactics in Norway. It pointed out that the 
Germans were especially adept at working through defiles, but that the 
same positions gave the British considerable options for defense, if the 
troops could be positioned ahead of time and reserves sited where they 
could be moved in rapidly. It also stated that a German infantry divison 
had 16,762 men, 1,200 motor vehicles, and horses and motorcycles, as 
well as guns. A motorized division had 17,482 men and 260 tanks, and an 
armored division had 14,000 men, 480 tanks, and 3,300 other vehicles, 
plus 1,238 motorcycles.133 In contrast, a British division consisted of 
about 14,000 men and 1,400 vehicles, and the understrength Greek ones 
were almost all on foot. 
The sexual appetites of airmen and Australians had already been the 
cause of considerable consternation in Athens. 0' Albiac had devoted part 
of more than one of his command meetings to the problem. 134 In Kozani 
Major Reid found that it created problems of a different sort at the local 
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brothel. Having ineffectively, he thought, complained to Athens about 
the lack of military police to deal with the problem and been assured that 
none could be spared, he was greeted the next day by a beaming MP 
sergeant and twenty men. Twenty-four hours later the results of the good 
sergeant's zeal proved very embarrassing when on raiding the brothel he 
found the Australians engaged in an altercation with a high Greek officer 
who regarded the place as his own establishment. 135 Alliances can prove 
to be rather delicate affairs in which discretion may be the better part of 
valor. 
Greek Independence Day was the beginning of another momentous 
movement as well. Thanks to a seduction in Washington, the British 
Security Co-ordination in the American capital had obtained the Italian 
naval code. (At least that was the cover story for the fact that ULTRA could 
now be read daily.) This had allowed Admiral Cunningham to be alerted 
that the Italians were planning an attack on the convoys to Greece, and so 
on this Tuesday he sailed for what would go down in history as the Battle 
of Cape Matapan, where he caught the Italians by surprise on 28 March, 
even though they also could read his signals. 136 
Cunningham was one of the early beneficiaries of ULTRA. In this 
instance, Enigma traffic from the German air force indicating a major 
operation coming up was passed to the admiral, who kept his ships on 
alert after they returned to port on 24 March. Then came a move of all 
German twin-engined fighters to Palermo, followed by an Italian mes-
sage that there would be an operation from Rhodes in three days and a 
request for information on British convoys to and from Greece, together 
with a request to neutralize British air cover. Cunningham had this 
information from the Admiralty before lunch on 26 March, and in the 
afternoon it was confirmed that all the messages referred to one major 
attempt to disrupt the LUSTRE convoys. Cunningham at once canceled 
the southbound convoy from the Piraeus and ordered the northbound 
one from Alexandria to reverse course after nightfall. Then he went to 
play golf, so as to be seen. 
After dark on the twenty-seventh the Fleet sailed and surprised the 
Italians off Cape Matapan, in the first important naval operation in the 
Mediterranean in which "sigint" played a significant part. Without it the 
convoys might have been massacred and LUSTRE would have very early 
lost its shine.137 
On 25 and 26 March the imperturbable Wavell was flying to and from 
Platt's headquarters under the teboldi, known as "Platt's Tree," at Kilo 
126, where the battle for Keren in Eritrea was being brought to a successful 
climax. He had gone to ask for the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions with 
which to meet Rommel, as these could be moved by rail from Keren back 
into Egypt. Ever taciturn, when on the morning of the twenty-sixth he 
flew up to the Tree again and was told that Platt was through to Keren, he 
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merely said, "Then let's have some breakfast," ate, and flew back to 
Cairo,138 
But as Wavell flew north from Keren, he had to contemplate the 
realities that Cunningham could not mop up quickly enough to really 
help against the Germans in the very near future, that Platt was still 
involved in East Africa, and that the victors of Cyrenaica had been sent to 
Greece. Now as the news of Rommel's activities began to reach him in 
alarming clarity, he had almost nothing to throw in his way. The activities 
which had sufficed to deal with the Italians were not good enough for the 
Germans, now threatening his command on two widely separated fronts. 
Wavell had hoped that the Germans would not attack until May, but on the 
next day, 27 March, the GOC of the 6th Australian Division, then well 
forward in the Western Desert, warned of impending attack. This was the 
one seasoned division left, one that Blarney had earmarked for Greece 
because of its state of readiness. 139 
On 26 March the Joint Planning Staff in London produced Paper No. 
43 for the Middle East planning staff, in which they suggested that 
because of the paucity of railway and road systems in Turkey, the pOSSibil-
ity of a German invasion of Egypt or Iraq through Turkey was not very 
likely. However, in their view it was essential to control Crete and Cyprus 
and to plan the sabotage of communications in Turkey. 140 
Also on that day Churchill cabled Wavell that London was concerned 
at the rapid German advance to El Agheila, as it was their habit to push on 
whenever their attack was not resisted. "I presume that you are only 
waiting for the tortoise to stick his head out far enough before chopping it 
off. It seems extremely important to give them an early taste of our quality. 
What is the state and location of the 7th Armoured Division? Pray give me 
your appreciation." As Wavell was then on his way back from the Sudan, 
General Arthur Smith replied, "Every effort is being made to reinforce 
our troops in Cyrenaica. I attended conference with C-in-C Mediterra-
nean and AOC today to discuss situation, and urgent need of more 
aircraft was again emphasised." The deputy chief, general staff, Brigadier 
John Shearer, signaled British dispositions. 
When he got back the next morning, Wavell sent the Prime Minister a 
"Personal and Most Secret" which included: 
I have to admit to having taken considerable risk in Cyrenaica 
after capture of Benghazi in order to provide maximum support 
for Greece. My estimate at that time was that Italians in Tripoli 
could be disregarded and that Germans were unlikely to accept 
risk of sending large bodies of armoured troops to Africa in view 
of inefficiency of Italian Navy. I therefore made arrangements to 
leave only small armoured force and one partly trained Aus-
tralian division in Cyrenaica. 
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After we had accepted Greek liability evidence began to 
accumulate of German reinforcements to Tripoli, which were 
coupled with attacks on Malta which prevented bombing of Tri-
poli from there, on which I had counted. German air attacks on 
Benghazi, which prevented supply ships using harbour, also 
increased our difficulties. 
Result is that I am weak in Cyrenaica at present and no 
reinforcements of armoured troops, which are chief requirement, 
are at present available. 
195 
He then went on to tell of his difficulties, including aircraft and 
transport. The good news was that Keren had fallen, and so Platt would 
push towards Asmara; and Cunningham, who had taken Harrar the day 
before, could move to Addis Ababa. 141 
In the Western Desert a conference took place from 27 to 29 March at 
which Neame, whose earlier fears had been considerably mollifed by 
assurances from headquarters in Cairo, maintained that only German 
technical experts were in Tripolitania. On the thirtieth Neame, who had 
been DCGS of the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1940, went so 
far as to say in his operational orders that no further enemy action was 
likely. Unfortunately, the next day, as these orders were being distributed, 
the enemy achieved surprise and attacked. Rommel had intended only a 
limited advance, but he seized his opportunity; the British were soon on 
the run that in twelve days took them four hundred miles and landed 
Neame in a prisoner-of-war camp. Wavell, too, had been caught by 
surprise. He should not have been. Rommel had forced the surrender of 
the 51st Highland Division in France in June 1940 and then charged 250 
miles in five days to stop the evacuation at Cherbourg. 142 
27 - 30 March 1941 
From down under, the deputy prime minister of Australia, Fadden, 
cabled Prime Minister Menzies, still in London, that the government in 
Canberra was very resentful of the fact that the Allied High Command 
had not been consulted. It was most embarrassing in both the Cabinet and 
the War Council to discover that the assumption that Blarney had been 
asked about the Grecian operation was incorrect. 143 
But the big news was the coup in Yugoslavia. The takeover in 
Belgrade was well within the patterns of Yugoslav politics. Prince Paul, an 
Oxford graduate with the Order of the Garter, was a Yugoslav who had 
alienated the retired Serbian officers. Brigadier General Bora Mirkovic of 
the air force had been planning a Yugoslav-Italian Pact since 1937, yet only 
in early 1941 had he approached Major-General Dusan Simovic, a St. Cyr 
graduate, and found him willing. But it had never occurred to Mirkovic, 
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since he kept Goering's autographed portrait in his quarters, that the 
Germans would react hostilely to his work. The coup succeeded because it 
was supported by the army, the air force, young officers, leftists, and the 
Church, and because the prime minister's lax internal security and lack of 
agents left him uninformed. It was almost bloodless (one policeman was 
shot at the radio station), and was completed between 11:30 p.m. on 26 
March and 3:00 a.m. on the twenty-seventh. Yugoslavia was now free to 
join Britain, but her new rulers did not realize the press of time. That 
evening Prince Paul abdicated and left for Athens. George II of Greece 
wished to allow him to stay there, but Eden and the Foreign Office were 
adamantly hostile and Churchill backed them, and so Paul was sent to 
another of Churchill's colonial outposts, Kenya. l44 The young Prince 
Peter succeeded as Peter II; his godfather was King George VI of Great 
Britain, who looked after him when as a refugee he arrived in Britain on 21 
June. (Later he emigrated to the United States and died in California in 
1970.) 
Hitler's reaction to the coup was rapid: he at once ordered the invasion 
of Russia-which would likely be delayed anyway by flooding in Pol-
and-postponed for four weeks while the Balkan mess was cleared up. 
(The Swiss knew this that evening). 145 
In London some members of Parliament thought the coup was Chips 
Channon's doing, which pleased him; but he was profoundly sad for his 
friend Prince Paul and much resented Menzies' bon mot that it was a case of 
"robbing Paul to pay Peter." Nor did the Prime Minister smile at him. He 
was too busy. 146 
Churchill ordered Eden and Dill back from Malta to Athens to form a 
united front and to get the Yugoslavs to attack the Italians in order to 
capture their equipment in Albania and thus arm themselves to stand off 
the Germans. 147 It was a wild dream which had no relation to Balkan 
realities. 
In his memoirs Papagos blames the British for not taking the lead-
ership at this point and, as the outsiders, appointing a supreme com-
mander in order to avoid personal jealousies. 148 But no matter what 
happened, the Yugoslavs were incapable of acting at the speed necessary 
to forestall German action. 
Interestingly, perhaps the most realistic assessment was that made by 
the director of military intelligence at the War Office in London, Major-
General EH.N. Davidson, who told the VCIGS on 28 March that while the 
coup should have upset the German timetable by about one or two weeks, 
the Nazis could attack from three directions and would possibly move at 
once to attack Greece and seize Salonika and then separate Yugoslavia 
from British forces. It was essential, therefore, that the Allied High 
Command settle the line south of the Nis River. Papagos was now consid-
ering moving forces from the Aliakmon forward. But if the Germans 
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delayed to mid-April they would have not five, but eleven divisions 
available. Davidson regarded the situation in Yugoslavia as at worst a 
conflict into which the Germans would move to restore order and at best 
an Allied front to liquidate the Italians in Albania. So he thought that the 
British should stimulate the Yugoslavs in every possible way, including 
naval action up the Adriatic as far as Kotor and Zara, help in armaments, a 
general officer as liaison, air support, and so forth.149 Unfortunately his 
ideas of aid were simply not possible within the time to be allowed, even if 
the Yugoslavs had been, in fact, one nation indivisible. 
Churchill, not unnaturally, since Eden and the Special Operations 
Executive claimed to have had a hand in the successful coup in Belgrade, 
proclaimed the rightness of his policy and sent the president of Turkey a 
telegram telling him the time had arrived for a common front.15o 
There was still an argument going on in air circles in Athens and 
London as to the proper use of air forces. 151 Now Col. Leslie Hollis of the 
War Cabinet in Great George Street sent a note over to Sir Orme Sargent at 
the Foreign Office saying that the coup in Yugoslavia helped, as that 
country had the best air force in the Balkans, but that the British could not 
yet say how they were going to help the Greek air force. 152 
The news of the Yugoslav coup caught Eden and Dill still weather-
bound in Malta, waiting to go on to Gibraltar and England. They got off 
secretly, just missed the Italian fleet, and arrived at Scaramanga at dawn 
on the twenty-eighth. D'Albiac met them, and they at once saw General 
Wilson and his staff. Late in the day there was a conference with Koryzis 
and a more optimistic Papagos to discuss combined action with the 
Yugoslavs. Papagos wished to defend Salonika, but the British doubted 
that there was time enough to organize that. Papagos noted that a 
Yugoslav division with its 40,000 men was two and a half times the size of 
a Greek or Turkish division, and that Yugoslavia had twenty-four such 
infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. Turkey had twenty-six 
infantry, one cavalry, and one armored division in eastern Thrace, with 
five more divisions in the Dardanelles and ten in the Caucasus. This 
discussion terminated without any conclusions, but with Eden and Dill 
wishing to meet with the new ruler of Yugoslavia, Air Vice Marshal 
Simovic. 
Later in the evening Eden talked with King George II, whom he found 
in good spirits but not very confident about the situation in Belgrade, 
"that hive of intrigue." Yet he hoped for time and, Eden claimed, said that 
"the presence of British troops had already saved Greece from being 
overrun." And he went on that "the king expressed satisfaction at the 
appointment of General Wilson who had made an excellent impression 
on all who had worked with him. He also spoke cordially of the conduct of 
the troops who had arrived, although there had unfortunately been 
complaints of the behaviour of the Australians." The king ended by 
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saying that he would see Prince Paul at the railway station, but that it 
would be awkward. 1s3 
On the twenty-seventh, the day of the coup in Belgrade, General 
Heywood was in Albania visiting the front, and General Wilson was on 
the way north to his new headquarters at Elasson. 
On 28 March Churchill signaled Wavell that he realized how much 
they were piling on him, "but events at Belgrade have made LUSTRE into 
a great stroke of policy, quite apart from its purely military aspect." In the 
meantime he hoped that everything was being done to assure that MAN-
DIBLES would take place as scheduled. On Sunday he was going to make 
a broadcast and, in addition to mentioning the fine work of the 4th Indian 
Division in both the Desert and East Africa, he wished to say, "Considera-
ble British and Imperial Forces have arrived in Greece." Since the Ger-
mans and the Americans knew, it seemed silly not to tell the Australians 
and the British. Other exchanges of telegrams this day provided at last for 
a British battalion to be landed to garrison Lemnos, which was under 
daily air surveillance, presumably German. 1S4 
On Saturday morning the twenty-ninth, Eden told Lincoln MacVeagh 
that he felt that the immediate implications of the Yugoslavian coup were 
being exaggerated in England and America, but that he had returned to 
explore the possibility of their development. He went on, "I don't care if 
the Yugoslavs don't actually repudiate their signature of the Tripartite Pact 
if only we can get together now and formulate some sort of a common 
policy after which we can take it to the Turks." He added that the British 
minister in Belgrade was to talk with the Yugoslav prime minister and 
would fly to Athens immediately afterwards. 
MacVeagh reported to Washington that he had also talked to Dill, 
Wilson, and 0' Albiac, who thought that the situation in Yugoslavia was 
holding up the German attack. The AOC and Eden both were of the 
opinion that it had been scheduled for 28 March in conjunction with the 
Italian naval sweep (which had just ended in the British victory at Cape 
Matapan). MacVeagh then passed on to Eden and D'Albiac the rush 
telegram from the American consul in Bulgaria containing the informa-
tion that the initial German attack would be an air blitz of British and 
Greek aircraft on their airfields in daylight, "THE TIME VERY SOON." 
The AOC said that he expected this to be combined with parachute 
landings at Salonika and other places in the immediate rear of the defend-
ing lines. Eden was greatly annoyed at this time by British radio broad-
casts of the whereabouts of Prince Paul, and in MacVeagh's presence (he 
always liked an audience) he dictated a telegram to the British minister (of 
information?) stating that it would be well if the BBC "ceased speculating" 
as it embarrassed the king of Greece. MacVeagh only then discovered that 
Prince Paul and his wife were in Athens. ISS 
On Sunday, 30 March, Eden was still waiting to see what developed in 
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the Yugoslav situation, suggesting that he might make a secret visit to 
Simovic, "who personally takes the view that the Yugoslavs will fight if 
the Germans attack Salonika and has told the Germans so." But Eden was 
not, absolutely confident, because there were other Yugoslav ministers to 
be taken into account. 156 
Meanwhile, on Saturday, Terence Shone had arrived from Belgrade to 
say that a meeting would be fine; but later in the day Campbell tele-
phoned from there to say it was off. On Sunday there was another change 
of mind when Simovic said that he would "receive Sir John Dill very 
secretly in Belgrade." So it was agreed that Dill should go in mufti (he 
looked something like a middle-aged professor anyway) and that the 
CIGS should say that, if the Yugoslavs would cooperate, Anglo-Greek 
forces would try to hold Salonika, where the Yugoslavs had a vital free 
port, with "all Anglo-Greek forces in Macedonia under a Greek com-
mander." 
31 March - 1 April 1941 
So on the evening of Monday, 31 March, Dill, Brigadier Mallaby, and 
Dixon flew to Belgrade and had three hours of talks with General Simovic, 
General Ilic, the minister for war, and General Nikolic, the acting chief of 
the general staff. The British team got the impression that the Yugoslavs 
were much preoccupied during this conference; they were frequently 
called out to deal with problems of the internal state of the country and of 
mobilization. It seems that a Yugoslav journalist had misled them into 
believing the British had landed fifteen divisions and a hundred aircraft. 
Having carried out the coup, they now heard the abysmal truth. 157 They 
wanted to buy time and so would not attack the Italians in Albania or let 
Eden make a visit. Moreover, they badly needed arms from Britain. Yet 
Simovic was willing, he'said, to sign a mutual declaration of support if 
Greece was attacked. Because he wanted a strong force about Lake 
Doiran, he agreed to staff talks which would take place at Florina in two 
days. 
On the following day Mallaby and Dixon had a very unsatisfactory 
conversation with the Yugoslav general staff, who did not wish to draft 
and see signed the general accord to which Simovic had apparently 
agreed. Moreover, the general staff argued for limiting Yugoslav support 
to the case only of an attack west of the Struma valley. This unsatisfactory 
state of affairs led, then, to a second meeting between Dill and Simovic at 
which the latter withdrew altogether his willingness to sign any agree-
ment, saying that he now found that he would have to submit it to the 
whole government (presumably meaning his Cabinet) and that as to do so 
would split the delicate alliance of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, he would 
not do so at all. Nevertheless, General Jankovic, the director of military 
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operations, would be at Florina with full power to discuss hypotheses and 
arrive at conclusions on strictly military plans. During all these con-
versations, Dixon's diary-report avers, Simovich and Hitch were adamant 
that they would resist the Germans, but could not say so out loud because 
of a fear that the Croatians would pull out. 158 
The real difficulty with making any arrangements with Yugoslavia 
was that the country was neither militarily nor psychologically ready for 
war. Churchill, Eden, and Papagos were hoping to count on forces which 
existed only on paper and upon which no one appears to have completed 
thorough intelligence assessments, any more than the British had studied 
the Czechs or the French before 1938-1939. 
Not until Friday evening, 4 April, did Dill report from Athens on his 
disappointing visit to Belgrade. He concluded that the Yugoslavs seemed 
determined to fight, but not until Germany attacked them, when a strong 
British liaison mission would be needed at once. Dill had djscussed the 
leadership of this with Wavell and Wilson and reported that they wanted 
the one-eyed General Carton de Wiart, Vc, who had lived in Poland 
before the war, to lead it, with Brigadier George Davy, then on the staff in 
Athens, as the second in command. Dill reported that he and Eden would 
not be involved in the forthcoming staff talks, which would be handled by 
Papagos and Wilson, but would be close at hand if needed. 159 
Meanwhile in the cold rain and wind on the northern slopes of the 
Aliakmon Line, grim New Zealanders on 30 March began the task of 
digging in, well aware from intelligence summaries that they faced twen-
ty-one German divisions under Field Marshal List. What they thought 
about the odds was obscured by the sweat and mist on their goggles as 
they labored in gas-masks, having been convinced by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Marnham, a British gas expert, that this was necessaryP60 
From Athens Lincoln MacVeagh reported that the people were fright-
ened, and that the prime minister was hoping momentarily for a German 
demarche but was determined to hold to the policy of 28 October. At the 
same time Koryzis was completely disillusioned with the attitude of the 
Turks, who gave nothing but praise (in spite of the fact that their military 
attache estimated that so far 120,000 British had landed; evidently British 
secrecy was paying off, as at this time probably not many more than 40,000 
troops had landed, of the 58,000 total finally sent). 
On the thirtieth Churchill had cabled Fadden in Australia to point out 
that the British moves initiated late in February were paying dividends, 
gave renewed hope of a Balkan front of seventy divisions from four 
powers, and put LUSTRE in its proper setting with risks somewhat 
lessened. 161 And interestingly, while Churchill knew from agents in 
Yugoslavia by 28 March that three out of the five German panzer divisions 
were on their way to Cracow from their threatening positions near 
Belgrade, a fact that indicated an attack upon Russia and so a warning had 
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been sent to Stalin, it was not until 31 May that the C-in-C's in the Middle 
East were told of this switch in German intentions.162 
Blarney cabled Canberra from Athens on 31 March. He was now more 
in tune with Wuson's feelings, after having toured the Greek positions. 
They were very weak in the north, and Florina would early be lost to the 
Germans. Both the railway and the road ran through narrow defiles easily 
subject to disruption by intensive air attack. The air and ground defenses 
were hopelessly inadequate, and serious dislocation of the lines of com-
munication was, therefore, likely. The Germans, he reported, had twen-
ty-three to twenty-five divisions in Bulgaria and could concentrate eleven 
to thirteen against the four Greek divisions on the frontier and six to 
seven against the Vermion Line held by the one armored brigade, the 
New Zealand Division, and two Greek divisions. Papagos had wanted 
nine full divisions on the line with strong air support, but he had got 
instead eight weak ones with little air support. 163 
If this war had lasted long enough the Greeks would have received 
their 30 Grumman Wildcats as, in another switch of policy, these had been 
released by President Roosevelt on 28 March. Some had left on 1 April and 
the rest left 4 April, but their transit time was six weeks plus set-up and 
training. l64 In London Rab Butler told the Greek ambassador that the 
British hoped to be able to send more of the RAF to Greece, "if the menace 
in Tripoli did not grow. "165 
On April Fool's Day the air attache, in Belgrade signaled that the 
Yugoslavs would start to mobilize on the third, and that that would bring 
their strength to 1,800,000 men under arms.166 
On the same day the New Zealand Division and the 1st Armoured 
Brigade were in line on the eastern end of the Aliakmon position, the 19th 
Greek Division had moved up to the Eastern Macedonian frontier, and 
the 6th Australian Division was just beginning to arrive on the line. The 
opinion in British circles was that the Aliakmon Line was as strong as any 
one of its four passes at Veria, Edessa, Katerini or on the coast, but once 
the enemy penetrated one of those, a speedy withdrawal was a necessity. 
The basic weakness of the whole position remained the Monastir Gap 
from Yugoslavia down past Florina, a route that would allow the whole 
position to be turned from the west. The New Zealand Division's position 
was too long, not tankproof, and could not be covered by the divisional 
artillery. The few lateral communications were mostly over one-way 
muletracks. Both infantry and artillery were unhappy about their posi-
tions.167 
In these early April days the RAF in Greece was divided into three 
groups. In the western wing were No. 112 Squadron with Gladiators and 
No. 211 with Blenheims, both by then obsolescent. In the eastern wing, 
based at Larissa, were No. 11 and No. 113 with Blenheims, No. 33 with 
Hurricanes, and No. 208 Army Cooperation with a mixture of Hurricanes 
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and Lysanders. Grouped in the Athens area were No. 30 with a mixture of 
Blenheim fighters and bombers, No. 80 with Gladiators and Hurricanes, 
and No. 84 with Blenheim bombers, together with detachments of Nos. 
37 and 38 in Wellingtons. Hardly a full-strength, modern fighting force, 
based on waterlogged airfields, it would shortly face the first-line strength 
of the Luftwaffe. Yet at this period Churchill believed that the war would 
be won by aircraft.168 
One of the flyers who arrived in Greece with No. 33 Squadron was 
Vernon "Woody" Woodward of Victoria, British Columbia, who, like the 
Malta ace "Buzz" Beurling, had been turned down by the RCAF before 
the war because he did not have a college degree, so had joined the RAE 
He had finished flying training and been commissioned a pilot-officer 
and posted to No. 33 in Egypt in the spring of 1939. The Italians declared 
war on 10 June 1940, and by the end of the month Woodward, flying 
biplanes, was an "ace" and had earned the sobriquet "imperturbable" for 
taking on nine Italian fighters single-handed after his wingman had been 
shot down. The squadron was commanded by one of the RAF's top-
scoring fighter-pilots of World War II, the South African Pat PattIe, who by 
the time of his death on 20 April 1941 in Greece had between twenty-eight 
and forty-one victories. No. 33 Squadron moved to Greece in February 
and was in action escorting Blenheims before the Germans attacked. 169 
On 1 April London raised the question of using the RAF in Greece to 
support either Yugoslavia or Turkey or both, if they, but not Greece, were 
attacked by Germany. "The basis of our plans must be to give full support 
to our own forces, but we must be prepared to assist our allies if they are 
attacked." London did not want to move aircraft forward into Yugoslavia 
and they could not aid Turkey from Greek bases, so both cases presented 
dilemmas for which Greek consent to operations from Greek fields was 
needed. Eden replied the next day that these matters had been considered 
and that the Greeks had no objection in the case of Yugoslavia. But as no 
definite answer could be obtained from the Turks, that was more diffi-
cult. 170 In a few days it became irrelevant. 
2 - 3 April 1941 
There are times when men refuse to believe news they do not wish to 
hear. In Belgrade the new Yugoslav government insisted that it had time 
to mobilize before the Germans were likely to attack. Thus when on 2 
April it received two telegrams from the military attache in Berlin, which 
slipped through German intelligence censorship (perhaps because Admi-
ral Canaris, its head, had told him), they refused to believe him that the 
attack would open on the sixth with an intense bombing of Belgrade. 171 
From Athens MacVeagh told Washington that the Yugoslav minister 
had received word from Belgrade that Yugoslavia would honor the Tripar-
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tite Pact of 25 March but treat it as a dead letter and remain friendly to all, 
and had so informed the Greek government. 172 
The British 1st Armoured Brigade was warned on this Wednesday, 2 
April, that the Germans would attack at dawn on Saturday. The attack 
actually came on Sunday, 6 April. I73 
Toward the rear, 1 NZ General Hospital was not happy about the 
situation. This 490-bed unit had 350 tons of equipment and no transport of 
its own. It did not think that the red cross symbol would be a protection 
from either German or Italian airmen, and so the whole unit was dis-
persed in tents in a narrow valley twenty miles from its supply base in 
Larissa. 174 
Further to the rear, in Athens the weather was better than the day 
before, when it had been cloudy, windy and cold. On this Wednesday the 
temperature had risen to 60 degrees under an almost cloudless sky with a 
light breeze. Otherwise things were not so pleasant. The king and the 
president of the Council had asked urgently once again for ammunition 
for their Schneider mountain guns, of French manufacture. Could Lon-
don, they asked Eden, get at the stocks known to exist in the United 
States, as none were being manufactured elsewhere? They also asked for 
rifles and light machine-guns, with ammunition for a new army corps. 
London passed the request to Washington both directly and through 
FDR's special envoy, W. Averill Harriman, who sent it to the president's 
aide, Harry Hopkins. 175 
On Tuesday, the day before, London had finally called the British 
Purchasing Commission in New York and at last discovered that there was 
no 105-mm mountain ammunition available in the United States. It had, 
in London's opinion, taken the commission a long time to discover this. 
Even if production started at once there would be at least a six- to eight-
week gap when the Greeks would be out of it. Two days later Lord 
Hankey's special committee at the Cabinet Office decided that the time 
had come to propose to the Greeks that their forces be rearmed with 
British weapons and equipment, which was replaceable, and that the 
ideal time to make this suggestion was while Eden was still in Athens. 176 
And to try and straighten out the business of providing the Greeks 
with Hurricanes rather than Tomahawks, Longmore signaled Palairet that 
because many people were interested in this matter, confusion was result-
ing. But he had arranged with Papagos that, as the RAF had Hurricanes in 
Greece and they were satisfactory there, it made better sense for the 
Greeks to use them rather than the American-made Tomahawks: spares 
and maintenance would be simplified. As soon as Longmore's own 
squadrons were supplied, the Greeks would get the eighteen aircraft 
promised. 177 
In fact Longmore was not in an enviable position. While he was 
expected to give his primary support to the campaign that was about to 
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develop in Greece, on this Wednesday he had to order a flight of No. 45 
Blenheim Squadron sent from Greece to reinforce its parent in the West-
ern Desert. The Wellington squadron had had to be withdrawn from 
Malta under pressure from Fliegerkorps X of the Luftwaffe, now operat-
ing from Sicily just sixty miles to the north. But even these efforts were 
insufficient, as a crisis was rapidly developing in the Desert which pre-
vented the 7th Australian Division's planned embarkation for Greece. 178 
Wavell decided that Neame had lost control by staying at his head-
quarters at Barce and prepared to go up to take charge, but he could not 
find a suitable aircraft. He sent O'Connor by car, followed by a signal to 
him to take over. This did not make the man who had recommended 
Neame for the post very happy at all, since the battle was already lost. By 
the time O'Connor arrived on 3 April Wavell had located an aircraft and 
beaten him to Barce. That evening the situation was so bad that Wavell told 
O'Connor to go ahead and evacuate the coast in the face of the dashing 
Rommel (who, as it turned out, was disobeying orders in attacking).179 
The British situation was exacerbated by the poor condition and shortage 
of their material, only partly a result of the switch of emphasis to Greece. 
Some of the inadequacy was due to the lack of ports once Benghazi was 
abandoned, and the consequent excessive demands upon motor trans-
port. Wavelllater pointed out that he had been promised, and had made 
his plans upon the receipt of 3,000 vehicles a month from January 1941, 
but in fact had received less than half that number (though at the same 
time he claimed that 8,000 were lost in Greece).I80 Eden, who was as much 
to blame as anyone for the mess in the Desert, said later in his memoirs 
that Neame's defeat was entirely due to the command's faulty apprecia-
tion of the speed with which Rommel could mount a desert offensive. But 
in truth it was just as much due to prewar failures to set up intelligence 
networks and to wartime dissipation of inadequate resources. Even more, 
this fatal dispersion of effort was due to an unwillingness to analyze the 
evidence available. People like Eden and Dill did not need ULTRA; they 
needed reading glasses and perceptive minds coupled to decisiveness. 
On Thursday evening Eden telegraphed from Athens that the RAF 
was making arrangements to transfer squadrons to Turkey if the need 
arose, and the Turks themselves had already sent ships to Alexandria to 
collect the necessary supplies and had other preparations in hand.181 Late 
that night Wavell reported from Cairo that he was back from Cyrenaica. 
When he had left at four o'clock the situation was obscure, but he feared 
that a large part of the armored brigade and its support force had been 
overrun by a superior German armored force. This defeat uncovered the 
flank of the 9th Australian Division and would probably force its with-
drawal from the Benghazi area. As it was essential to stop an apparent 
drive on Egypt, he had had to withdraw the 7th Australian Division from 
LUSTRE and send it forward; a mobile reserve would be created of what 
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armored units could be pulled together, and the incomplete 6th British 
Division would be the force reserve, compelling the postponement of 
MANDIBLES yet again. When the 4th Indian Division arrived from the 
Sudan it might be possible to release the 7th for Greece. He had asked for 
the CIGS's and Blarney's views from Athens. And lastly, when O'Connor 
arrived at Benghazi, Wavell found that he had been sick and that he might 
become ill again; so, since Neame was doing well in a difficult situation, 
and it was agreeable to both, it was left that O'Connor would act as 
Neame's adviser. 
On 4 April Wavell had to signal that, since the enemy had taken Msus, 
the 9th Australians had to be pulled back and Benghazi abandoned. In 
Greece the concentration of the New Zealand Division was complete 
except for 21 Batallion, still in Athens, and 7th Field Company, which 
moved up the next day. 
Meanwhile on the second the C-in-C's in Cairo had cabled the Chiefs 
of Staff that the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization should be 
established at Sud a Bay, because "the movement of large military and 
RAF forces into Greece has greatly enhanced the importance of Crete." 
The air threat from Bulgaria precluded its establishment farther north 
until more NA guns were available. So Suda Bay would now become a 
Fleet base rather than just a refueling base. 182 Thus Crete continued as a 
ghostly base at the bottom of the priorities ladder, because of the paucity of 
resources, when its strategic importance should have placed it at the top. 
In ways it is symbolic of the immaturity and lack of focus of British grand 
strategy at this period. 
Churchill sent Simovic a telegram in which he told him that Germans 
were concentrating against Yugoslavia from as far away as France, and 
that his only hope was to make "one supreme stroke for victory and 
safety" by winning" a decisive forestalling victory in Albania" and collect-
ing the "masses of equipment" that would fall into his hands-and to do 
this before the Germans reached Albania, while he could still fall upon the 
"rear of the demoralized and rotten Italians."183 
On 4 April Wilson, whose code address was Braig, Athens, cabled that 
he and Papagos had met with General Jankovic, "D.M.e. Jug.army, and 
with M.J. Hope" late on the night of the third, but that the talks had been 
limited to operations in the event of an Axis attack on Salonika only, for 
which the Yugoslav army would fight. The Allies produced a plan based 
on a British army that was twice its present strength, with the Greeks 
holding their fortified areas and the British and Yugoslavs attacking the 
line Petrich-Djumaya-Kustendil, at the same time that a Graeco-Yugoslav 
attack was launched in Albania. The Yugoslavs, who had brought only 
one copy of their plan, which they took home again, reported that their 
concentrations were completed on the Bulgarian front and would be on 
the Albanian by the twelfth. The British were asked to concentrate on an 
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Axis attack in the Ooiran-Valandovo area. Papagos stressed the need for 
a higher proportion of the Yugoslav divisions in southern Serbia. "I 
indicated our forces available near future, risk of weak Struma front 
against attack from east and unsuitability of equipment to terrain. Agreed 
to recco with view to joining up later on line Struma-Ooiran with Jugs, 
and for three staff to visit Athens for further discussions. O.M.C. some-
what defeatist, especially on A.F.V.'s. Meeting ended [at two in the 
morning] on friendly and cheerful terms."I84 
4 April 1941 
Starting at 10:10 Friday morning, in the train heading back to Athens from 
Kenali Station, Papagos, Wilson, 0' Albiac, Heywood, and Colonel 
Kitrilakis discussed what they should do next. When and how might any 
change in the disposition of their forces be carried out, in view of the fact 
that the Yugoslavs had four of their 4O,OOO-man divisions fully mobilized 
in southeast Yugoslavia and the Vardar valley? 
General Wilson was of the opinion that, if there was to be an immedi-
ate German attack, the best place to meet it was on the Aliakmon Line. If 
moves were started, they could not be completed during the next moon 
period (5-19 April). On the whole he thought it best to strengthen the 
strong Aliakmon position first and then to bolster the Struma, and with 
this General Papagos agreed. After acknowledging that the Australian 
brigade, which might be sent to the Veria Gap, would not be available for 
eight days, the officers agreed to make no changes until after that time 
had passed. 
As to the question of eventually sending the 1st Armoured Brigade to 
the Lake Ooiran area, Wilson said that any move would have to await 
reconnaissance to find out if the ground was suitable. Holding the Struma 
would require at least three divisions, and it would be at least a month 
before they were available. Papagos then asked if any reinforcements 
could be expected as a result of the victory in Abyssinia, and Wilson 
replied No, because of the German attack in Cyrenaica. What about the 
third Australian division, which Blarney had told him about, Papagos 
asked, and Wilson responded that that would only be much later. Events 
would move quickly as they had in France, and the Anglo-Greek forces 
could not afford to be caught on the move. Much of the rest of the 
conversation was an exchange of views on things that did not happen. But 
in the course of this, Papagos said that one of the good things about last 
night's meeting with Jankovic was the Yugoslav decision to intervene in 
the case of an attack upon Salonika. On the other hand Papagos was not 
very happy about the concentration plan of the Yugoslav Army: it was too 
even, with far more allotted to the Albanian front than was needed. He 
concluded by saying that he would press his Foreign Secretary to ask that 
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Yugoslav officers visit Athens to give information on their general plans, a 
point Wilson had earlier reinforced by saying that the British and the 
Greeks needed to be allowed to scout north of the Greek borders also. 18S 
Churchill on 3 April had sent off a warning to Stalin of the impending 
German attack on the USSR, (although it took him until the nineteenth to 
persuade the stubborn Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador in 
Moscow, to deliver it). At the same time, the Prime Minister received a 
signal from Wavell saying that Neame had lost control in Cyrenaica. The 
Chiefs of Staff advised that MANDIBLES, the seizure of Rhodes, be 
dropped, that the 7th Australian Division be held in Egypt, and that all 
services concentrate on stabilizing the front in Cyrenaica. The Defence 
Committee met that night at 10:30 and expressed surprise that the Ger-
mans could operate better than one armored division at the end of such a 
long line of communications. At midnight when the meeting broke up, it 
was agreed to send a telegram to Eden in Athens that the loss of Benghazi 
and its airfields was serious and would probably deny the use of Tobruk. 
Most distressing was the idea that the British could not face the Germans. 
Eden should, as Wavell also urged, proceed to Cairo. 186 
Upon his return to Athens on Friday the 4th, Eden signaled that he 
and Dill had just got back from the Yugoslav frontier. They had generally 
been out of touch for several days, but they felt that what had happened in 
North Africa was what had been anticipated as a risk taken when aid to 
Greece was agreed upon. The build-up had been faster than anticipated. 
Then sensibly he suggested that he and Dill leave for home the next day, 
the last one with a favorable moon period for flying through the Mediter-
ranean at night. If they went to Cairo it not only would increase the 
burdens upon Wavell, but also might make everyone there and in the 
Balkans think the situation even more serious than it was. 187 
Early on Friday Tedder sent the CAS a short report on his trip to 
Cyrenaica in the absence of the AOC-in-C. He felt that the military 
situation was "somewhat dangerous owing largely to the armoured ad-
vance across the desert towards Mechili. Only immediate means of check-
ing is air action." But the RAF was very thin. He had discussed LUSTRE 
and MANDIBLES with Wavell, and they had agreed that both would have 
to take second place to Cyrenaica; he was acting on that basis and sending 
all replacements there. 
At the same time Wavell teletyped that the reverses in the Desert were 
due to shortages of tanks, transport of all kinds, and antitank and AlA 
guns. "Recent reverse in Cyrenaica has been due to insufficiency of these, 
and, unless I can receive them faster than Germans, Egypt will soon be 
seriously threatened. Western Desert war is almost purely mechanical." 
And he went on to point out that those in London knew his wants and that 
he had been disappointed in not receiving promised transport and air-
craft from the United States. 188 
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Portal responded to Tedder on 4 April that he entirely agreed that 
absolute priority must be given to Cyrenaica. If necessary, Blenheims 
were to be operated from Greece, but the squadrons were to be retained 
there. "We are sending you all we can. Best of luck."189 
Perhaps the only bright spot on the British side of the war in the 
Middle East and the Balkans at this time was that London had finally 
decided that the Enigma decrypts should be sent directly from the United 
Kingdom to battlefield commanders, and this prevented the clash of main 
forces which might have proved disastrous to the British. For the first time 
the commanders in the field were told of the source and reliability of this 
information. But, as Hinsley notes, how the material was received and 
acted upon is unknown today.l90 It appears that Wilson in Greece did 
shortly pay attention to it and skillfully pulled his forces back in time. 
Wavell may have been less willing to rely upon ULTRA, perhaps because 
his mind was cluttered with far too much information and engaged in 
making too many decisions. At the higher level in London, we know that 
Churchill and others read ULTRA, but they were not getting the correct 
messages because they did not know the Germans well enough. Raw 
intelligence is not necessarily intelligible. 
Later on the fourth the Prime Minister sent Wavell a telegram, repeat-
ed to Eden in Athens, which began, "We are making an intense effort to 
reinforce you with aircraft and tanks at earliest. Chiefs of Staff are now 
drafting statement of decisions we have taken to-day. Feel sure you will be 
surprised as well as encouraged by all this. Press and public have taken 
evacuation of Benghazi admirably. Confidence in High Command is 
unshakable. I warned the country a week ago that they must not expect 
continuance of unbroken successes and take the rough with the smooth. 
Therefore be quite sure that we shall back you up in adversity even better 
than in good fortune." And he went on to ask again for a draft announce-
ment of the landing of British forces in Greece.191 
The promised memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff was sent on 5 
April. It basically at last accepted a number of suggestions made by the 
Middle East, including now a second lift of Hurricanes to Malta in a repeat 
of OPERATION WINCH, this time with two carriers flying off 24 to 30 non-
tropical Mark I Hurricanes, which could be used there or in Greece or in 
Egypt; much more armor was to be shipped out in a special convoy due in 
mid-June; and various other actions were listed, as well as approval for the 
cancelation of MANDIBLES. 192 
5 April 1941 
Just before he left Athens for Cairo on Saturday, Eden told MacVeagh that 
the Germans in Libya were formidable, but he was buoyed up by a 
telegram from "Winston" which said that he would be surprised at how 
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much they could now send from the United Kingdom. Eden, however, 
stressed that time was the critical factor. He was greatly encouraged by 
FOR's view that with Eritrea cleared the Red Sea could be opened to 
American shipping; what the United States could send in the next couple 
of months would be crucial. He thought the Yugoslav talks had gone well: 
they were very determined, but anxious not to provoke the Germans 
before they were ready. He and Dill had toured the British positions, 
which were "very strong," but he felt that Turkey's attitude was little 
better than "fluctuating," unless Britain could send more mechanized 
equipment, "but unfortunately we can't." In a further exchange, Mac-
Veagh told Eden that the Greek king had heard that Hitler intended to 
attack the Ukraine, and if this was successful then to overrun Russia as far 
as the Urals; Eden responded, "Megalomania." Eden's return to Cairo, 
MacVeagh told Washington, was being kept secret so as not to alarm the 
public after the loss of Benghazi. 193 
Major-GeneralI.G. Mackay, commander of the 6th Australian Divi-
sion, who had just arrived in Athens the day before with his senior staff, 
drove north under orders to report to Blarney at Gerania, close to the blue 
house from which Prince Constantine had in 1912 launched his successful 
campaign against the Ottoman Empire to take Salonika. Mackay was at 
once ordered to take over the Veria Pass from the 12th Greek Division, 
even though he only had the 16th Brigade Group available. The actual 
takeover did not begin until the seventh. 194 
On Saturday, 5 April, Blarney officially opened the headquarters of 
the 1st Australian Corps and assumed command of all Imperial troops 
from the Aegean near Mount Olympus to the Veria Pass. His command 
was far from settled. The New Zealand Division was listed as almost 
concentrated, but only the forward elements of the 6th Australian were 
arriving in the front lines. 
In its daily status report to the Air Ministry, Air Headquarters Middle 
East reported in some uncertainty on the location of its squadrons: No. 
113 was presumed to be in Greece; No. 45 was also presumed to be there, 
but the chief of the Air Staff crossed out that note and wrote in by hand 
"still in Cyrenaica"; No. 208 was presumed to be in Greece. The total 
strength in Greece at 0900 hours that morning was presumed to be 19 
Hurricanes, 16 Gladiators, 30 Blenheim I's and 34 Blenheim IV's, as of six 
days earlier.195 Or 99, to face the Luftwaffe's 490! 
Wilson had now set up his command post at Elasson, a few miles from 
Gerania, so that he was within easy telephone and dispatch-rider distance 
of Blarney. But Papagos was back in Athens, and communications from 
Elasson to the capital were at best tenuous and at worst took eight hours 
by car. Under these circumstances, GHQ ME had finally ordered that the 
headquarters be split, with half in Athens and half forward at Elasson, a 
solution which did nothing to alleviate the already severe shortage of staff 
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officers in the whole Middle East. Though Brigadier Brunskill, at least, 
claimed that the lack of staff did not affect the campaign, he did admit that 
with only the GSO 3 in Athens he was overwhelmed by the combined 
Greek staff and the British military mission and was unable to get deci-
sions on demolitions in the crucial days of the retreat.196 
At the same time Wilson wrote GHQ ME that he needed a larger 
organization in Greece, especially since he would have to hive off a liaison 
section for work with the Yugoslavs if the line advanced to the Struma. He 
was short of clerks, and his staff officers were badly overworked because 
of this, so he appealed for a draft of women clerks to be sent from Egypt or 
South Africa to act as drivers and for clerical duties, so as to relieve 
ablebodied clerks with some knowledge of the work to get on with their 
proper jobs.197 
On 5 April Wilson, heard from London that the direct Enigma warn-
ing service gave the time of the German attack on Greece as 0530, 6 April. 
Very early the next morning, London transmitted a correction that the 
time would be 0600-first light. 198 (In contrast to the timeliness of this 
service, official air mail between HQ in Cairo and headquarters at Larissa 
was taking more than three weeks northbound and ten days the other 
way.) 
At 11:30 a.m. on the fifth General Kotulas and General Wilson met 
with three of their staff to discuss the relief of the Greek 12th by the 6th 
Australian Division. Kotulas was most anxious to make the transfer as 
soon as possible, as he was very thin on the ground and had only minor 
local reserves. As the Australians came in, he intended to thicken up the 
20th. This would give greater depth on the left flank and provide some 
excellent battery areas. Wilson said that he was not anxious to put the 
Australians into the Veria Gap until their commander arrived, but he 
expected them to take over the Greek front within the n~xt eight days. 
They then discussed the building of a second bridge across the Aliakmon 
and of making a track passable for motor vehicles north of the Veria-
Kozani road. The two left battalions of the 12th could not be relieved by 
Imperial troops until the latter were equipped with pack animals, as there 
were no other means of communication in their area. The group dealt 
with various other problems, and it was agreed that Wilson would assume 
command of the Allied forces at the Vermion position as of 1400 hours that 
day. 199 
Wavell asked Wilson to please explain to Blarney why he had to keep 
18 Australian Brigade in the Desert, and he apologized to both comman-
ders for having to upset LUSTRE; the CIGS agreed with him and also 
conveyed his regrets. 200 
Churchill replied to Eden's signal saying that he was glad that Eden 
could be so reassuring about the Libyan situation, as it looked pretty 
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serious from London. Since he and Dill felt they could do no good in 
Cairo, they should return home. 
By that Saturday evening the two Englishmen were in Cairo, where 
they had a full discussion with Wavell and Tedder; Longmore was in the 
Sudan. They came to the conclusion that the Italo-German operation in 
the Desert was a major diversion well timed to precede the German attack 
in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the enemy had succeeded better than he 
had hoped; but the situation appeared to be becoming less critical, since 
the Germans were not using their air force to the degree that was to be 
expected in a major attack. The new cruiser tanks sent out recently 
seemed to be breaking down much more than they should, and the 
British were weak both in these and in aircraft. Because of bad weather, 
Eden and Dill did not expect to leave for home until Monday. 201 
In London Cadogan noted in his diary that they had received sure 
news that Germany would attack Yugoslavia on the morrow; all the right 
pepole had been informed, but he did not know what Britain could do. 
This was followed by the opening entry for the 6th: "7:45 am. Rung up 
with the news that Yugoslavia attacked-that'll stop the dithering. "202 
And so began the beginning of the end. On 7 April Eden and Dill 
slipped quietly out of Cairo and headed home for London, where they 
arrived on the tenth, much to the depression of the Foreign Office. 203 At 
last Wavell would have friends at court and not in his hair. 
6 - 26 April 1941 
The story of the next three weeks is quickly told. The Germans attacked 
with standard blitzkrieg, professional tactics; the exhausted Greeks reeled 
back; and the totally inadequate British forces, which had never got dug 
in, simply were forced to withdraw in good order as their pitifully small 
air force was decimated, often on the ground at unprotected airfields. 
And all of this happened in steadily improving weather, though in north-
ern Greece wet roads meant slow, slick driving until after the eighteenth. 
After the campaign there would be much outcry that there had been 
insufficient air cover in Greece and that that was the reason for the failure 
there. That is both the truth and nonsense. Lack of air power on the 
Anglo-Greek side was a reality, but it was by no means the prime reason 
for the British defeat. There never had been an honest military apprecia-
tion of all the factors, with the result that some boys had been sent to do a 
professional army's job. But after the campaign was over Jumbo Wilson, 
for one, and others who favored a tactical air force, argued that the failure 
to subordinate the RAF to the army had contributed to the disaster, rather 
than admit the true facts. The argument may also have been a cover for 
ULTRA. 
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Dill was at least more honest and more perceptive. On 21 April 1941, 
before the campaign was over, he wrote a memorandum (which was not 
added to the diary of Eden's trip until 21 December 1971 when it was 
inserted by the Public Record Office staff, who copied it from another file). 
Dill said that a military appreciation of sending forces to Greece had not 
been made, and when the discussions took place in Cairo on 20 and 21 
February there was an opportunity to condemn the project as unsound 
for military reasons; and he then gave the reasons both pro and con. It was 
estimated at that time that the Germans could attack the Greek frontier 
eighteen days after crossing the Danube. If the British did nothing, the 
Germans would have their way in the Balkans. So it was unanimously 
agreed in Cairo to make an offer to Greece, provided (a) the Greek 
government would accept, and (b) a sound military plan could be agreed 
on with the Greeks as to the line to be held. But by early March the British 
could not withdraw because of public opinion in the Middle East. Dill 
concluded that lithe military risks were throughout clearly seen and given 
full weight. Nevertheless opinion was at the outset unanimous that we 
should aid Greece ... and the military authorities concerned were all 
agreed that even in the altered circumstances of the second visit to 
Athens, the risks must be accepted and the plan still had a reasonable 
chance of success."204 
As even Eden predicted, the Germans came through the Bulgarian 
passes just as soon as the snows permitted, propelled by events in 
Yugoslavia and the plans for Russia. It is almost amusing to find the 
British reporting critically on 3 April that General Jankovic of Yugoslavia 
seemed to think that he had months in which to prepare for war, when in 
fact the whole British plan depended upon not being attacked by the 
Germans until at the earliest late May. As it was, they were pushed off 
their positions almost before they had got their privies placed. 
Even the briefest account of the campaign shows an army unready for 
the contest: 
At 5:45 on Sunday morning, 6 April 1941, the German minister in 
Athens handed a note to the Greek Foreign Office stating that Germany 
was going to attack Greece. This was fifteen minutes after the signal 
BaCHE (German attack) had been received from the British forward unit 
in the Struma valley and relayed through Reid to Wilson at Elasson.205 
Simultaneously the frontier posts from Beles to Xanthe were attacked by 
German troops with air support. War was also declared upon Yugoslavia. 
In all, the Germans employed twenty divisions with ten in reserve. 
Sunday was a brilliant day in Athens, with no clouds, a temperature 
in the low seventies, and light winds.206 During much of the month of 
April the sky was cloudy, but only on the sixteenth did Athens report 
lOhoths cloud cover; the daytime temperature never fell below the mid-
fifties, and only for three nights was it in the forties. The winds were light 
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and there was almost no rain. In other words, at least in the Athens area it 
was ideal campaigning weather. Snow, sleet, rain, and fog persisted 
farther north until the fourteenth. Most of the time it was ideal flying 
weather, once the airfields were dry enough for the planes to take off. 
At nine o-clock that Sunday evening two flights of German aircraft 
flew in over the Piraeus and dropped magnetic mines, one of which set on 
fire the freighter Clan Fraser. She was loaded with two hundred tons of 
explosives for the Greek Powder Factory, and in spite of strenuous efforts 
to tow her to sea she exploded in the entrance to the main port. Firefight-
ing facilities in Athens had earlier been reported as poor. 207 The Clan 
Fraser disaster was said to have caused the closing of the main Greek port 
for both maintenance and evacuation. Later it was claimed that all that was 
left to complete the destruction of the port of the Piraeus was to take the 
drydock gates into the Saronic Gulf and sink them. Only one other ship 
discharged at the port of Athens, and the Greek Powder Factory closed 
down.208 Reexamination of the photographs of the damage, and measure-
ment of the shock wave, do not show all these statements to be true. The 
Clan Fraser explosion was a useful cover for the lack of magnetic 
minesweeping gear and of ships fitted with degaussing aparatus. These 
factors added to the reasons for the British pull-out. 
As the Piraeus lay reeling under the shock of the explosion, Wavell 
sent home a draft communique, a short announcement that British troops 
had landed in Athens. 209 He had now milked the mysterious in that to the 
maximum. 
Sir Claude Auchinleck, the man who would take over as Wavell's 
successor in Egypt in a few months, noted later, "This was a period of 
supreme challenge, of a complex mingling of triumph and disaster, of 
bold decisions and nightmare risks, above all of overwhelming respon-
sibility. "210 Even on a personal level it was a time of trial and tribulations 
for Wavell. On the evening of the sixth Neame and O'Connor and Gam-
bier-Parry were captured by the Germans in Libya. (They escaped but 
were recaptured the same night. )211 
In the meantime the infamous German air attack on Belgrade had 
taken place in which a reputed 17,000 died, just as Simovic signed a 
friendship pact with the Soviet Union. Stalin canceled the agreement a 
few days later, when Yugoslavia was overrun and Belgrade fell. Across the 
world in Washington the Yugoslav military attache asked the American 
government for 100 bombers, 100 fighters, 500 reconnaissance planes, 
100 medium tanks, 2,000 trucks, 1,500,000 gas masks and helmets and a 
large number of antitank and antiaircraft guns. As the administrator of 
the new Lend-Lease program put it, it was "utterly impossible to meet 
these modest demands," but a plan was drawn up the next day to start 
supplying material out of stocks on hand, and by the end of April a few 
guns, trucks, and gas masks were actually starting to move. But by then 
214 Denouement and Disaster 
the war in the Balkans was over, and these and the supplies for which the 
Greeks had been pressing for more than five months were diverted to the 
British in the Middle East.212 
On Monday there was an urgent appeal from Athens for magnetic-
minesweeping equipment as a result of the German raid the night before, 
which had accounted for six ships in addition to the Clan Fraser, out of the 
fifty-three available for the LUSTRE shuttle.213 The Kent Fortress Troops 
were rushed to Salonika to undertake demolitions of oil, petrol supplies, 
and all facilities and dock machinery. They found the Greek high com-
mand not cooperative, as they rightly believed that the Germans would 
overrun Greece in short order and that Salonika would be needed for the 
well-being of the country. So on the eighth the Kent Corps troops evacu-
ated about 270 Britishers and left. Farther south at Volos the demolition 
teams had their work done for them by German bombers, so they re-
turned to the Athens area to water the roads, which-in contrast to those 
in the north-were dry and dusty, destroy stores, and ruin the airfield 
under construction at Araxos and the scarce machinery that had been 
imported to make it.214 
Left behind at Salonika for the Germans were about 1,000 tons of 
chrome owned by the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London, a quan-
tity of lead considered of little value, and some antimony. 215 
In view of the fact that the Greek air force was negligible and the 
Yugoslav force had already been reduced to half its strength, D'Albiac 
decided to use all his aircraft in the tactical support role. But bad weather, 
especially 250 miles north of Athens, hampered operations until the 
nineteenth. 216 
Meanwhile farther south in Cairo the tensions were building up as 
the crises "seemed to go beyond the possibility of human solution." HQ 
ME became pessimistic enough that a plan was mooted to pull back to 
Northern Rhodesia, but that was quickly dropped when Churchill had a 
fit. No one in Cairo had any inkling that Hitler's real objective was 
Russia.217 Disconcerting, to say the least, was the outbreak of a revolt in 
unstable Iraq. 
India had seen this coming, and the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the 
commander-in-chief, Auchinleck, had laid plans, as Mesopotamia had 
traditionally been an Indian responsibility. Wavell, with more than 
enough on his plate and without good communications with Iraq, had 
resisted getting involved there, though London had dumped it into his 
lap. Unfortunately for poor Wavell, the vigor with which India reacted to 
events in Iraq only confirmed Churchill's impression that Wavell was a 
good average colonel, and the constant transmission of that impression 
did not increase Wavell's confidence in his relationship with the Prime 
Minister. Churchill was anxious to have Iraq settled in a hurry, as the 
United States had been persuaded to set up a great aircraft assembly plant 
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at Basra to which crated aircraft could be delivered across the Pacific 
Ocean more safely-at that time-than across the war-torn Atlantic. 218 
When it met at five o'clock on Monday afternoon 7 April, the War 
Cabinet had not discussed Greece since noon on 20 March. With Church-
ill and Menzies present, the Prime Minister said that he had not realized 
that the 7th Armoured Division would be so completely out of action 
when it was sent back to refit in Cairo. (For all his love of guns and 
gadgets, Churchill had little understanding of the complexities of modern 
technology as his constant complaints about the overstuffed Middle East 
betrayed.) Churchill then read Wavell's 2 March appreciation of the situa-
tion, upon which the War Cabinet had based its own decision to aid 
Greece. Menzies added that Wavell had underestimated the likelihood of 
a German advance in Cyrenaica, a question his colleagues in Australia 
had raised earlier. Now the Germans had upset plans to send more troops 
to Greece and it would perhaps be unwise to try and hold Benghazi with 
only partly-trained troops. Churchill agreed and admitted that losses in 
the Mediterranean, coupled with the failure to take the Dodecanese, had 
all hurt, but "we had no strategic error with which to reproach ourselves, 
although we had no doubt underestimated the likelihood of a serious 
enemy attack in Cyrenaica." (Neither had the German and Italian high 
commands expected one, as it turned out.) On the whole the Cabinet was 
very gloomy, and Menzies was worried and critica1.219 
On Tuesday the Anzac and Greek commanders were just starting to 
sort out their front-line arrangements on the Aliakmon position. The 16th 
Australian Infantry Brigade was preparing to take over the pass at Veria, 
where the Aliakmon flowed swiftly down through a gap between the 
Vermion Range to the west and the Olympus to the east. The town of 
Veria itself was perched on the edge of an escarpment to the west of the 
river. Leading back from it was a road, hardly more than a track, which 
climbed sharply up through the cloud-shrouded mountains, switchback-
ing its way toward the summit near Kastania until it peaked and hairpin-
ned rapidly down past Polimilos and thence across the plain before rising 
up and over the hill into Kozani. The 16th and its accompanying field 
artillery battalion had scarcely started to get into position when Blarney 
arrived at Corps headquarters at Gerania with the news that Yugoslav 
resistance in the south had collapsed and that, as far as was known, there 
were no troops between Monastir and Florina. The decision was taken at 
once to constitute Mackay Force, a scratch infantry group which was to be 
rushed forward to look over the beautiful rolling country, just coming into 
spring flower, which stretched all the way to Florina with but one possible 
blocking position where the road and railway cut through low hills at 
Vevi. Mackay Force, in good British fashion, was detached from Blarney's 
command and placed directly under Wilson's HQ British Troops Greece. 
Wavell had flown up to Tobruk on 8 April and had then disappeared. 
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Never allowed the benefit of a properly maintained and equipped air-
plane, he had had to take what was available. On the way back they had to 
make two forced landings, and he was out of touch for several precious 
hours. 220 
In the morning on 9 April Papagos told Wilson over the telephone that 
the Yugoslavs in Veles had surrendered to the Germans and that there 
were no Yugoslav troops between there and the Greek frontier. He asked 
that the Mackay Force link up with the Greek reserves forming a line 
Florina-Kozani. At the same time Papagos said that he was stopping the 
Albanian offensive and would withdraw reserves from there. The min-
utes of the telephone call seemed to bear out that Wilson had had to say 
earlier about his clerks: "This is the first intermission [sic] received by 
General WILSON of the collapse of the Southern YUGOSLAV front.//221 
At 6:15 that night Wilson learned that at 5:30 the night before the New 
Zealand Cavalry Regiment had had the first Imperial contact with Ger-
man ground forces in Greece. The more than twenty-three-hour delay in 
passing such vital information was indicative of the operational difficulties 
in Greece in 1941.222 
When he wrote his report later, Wilson took the view that by the ninth 
the Greek generals were becoming defeatist and the front was likely to 
crumble (or was this a cover for ULTRA?). The retreat began on 11 April 
and became a full withdrawal on the twelfth. From 8 through 12 April the 
Anglo-Greek forces benefited from bad weather in northern Greece that 
severely limited enemy air activity. But after that, especially when the 
weather cleared on the fourteenth, the Germans were everywhere, and 
the normal daylight spacing of ten to twelve vehicles per mile had to be 
reduced to five. It was not realized until afterwards that the Germans did 
not fly at night, and that lorries could have operated then with their 
headlights on and made much better time and had fewer accidents. 
Taking out casualties from the Aliakmon Line positions was a nightmare 
for the stretcher-bearers, involving as it did in some cases a carry of seven 
miles for which mules and donkeys, already in short supply, were neces-
sary. Many medical difficulties occurred simply because the units were 
barely set up before casualties arrived and the withdrawal began. 223 
On Wednesday, 9 April, the Germans swept into Salonika, and Cairo 
asked permission to withdraw the 1st Battalion of the Bedfordshires and 
Hertfordshires (the "Beds and Herts//) from Lemnos, where it had arrived 
on the fifth, as this force was now but a hostage to fortune and would be 
much better placed in the Middle East reserve in the Delta. 
At Gerania orders went out to the New Zealand Division to move one 
brigade group to the Servia Pass south of Kozani to act as a pivot for the 
subsequent withdrawal of the 12th Greek Division and the 16th Aus-
tralian Infantry Brigade. The position was a strong one if covered with 
enough artillery. The road snaked up the mountain pass from a river 
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crossing down in the shallow valley to the pretty little town of Servia 
itself, then climbed up the pass past a small white-washed Greek 
Orthodox chapel on its little graveyard bastion. On Thursday further 
orders were issued to organize the defensive position and to outline the 
procedure for withdrawal to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line and arrange 
the preliminary moves of vehicles out of the area in order to clear the 
roads. 
In London Channon noted in his diary that the tendency was "to 
blame Wavell, who, after all, only obeyed-and reluctantly, I have reason 
to believe-orders in withdrawing his forces from Libya and sending 
them to Greece." And the next day he added, "Why not leave the 
prosecution of the war to the Generals?"224 
A gloomy Cabinet met to hear that three British generals had been 
captured. Cadogan then left the meeting to go to Paddington Station to 
meet Eden and drive him to the Foreign Office. On the way over in the car 
Eden told him that the Libyan disaster was due to the muddle by the 
military command. After a few moments at the Foreign Office, and a short 
chat with the Prime Minister, Eden went over to his flat nearby, where 
Cadogan joined him. Eden was upset because Churchill had been diffi-
cult, saying he had never wanted to help Greece. Cadogan tried to cheer 
Eden up by saying that that was just Churchill's mood of the moment, as 
in the past no one could have been more stoutly and consistently his 
supporter while he was away than the Prime Minister. 225 
Dill in the meantime arrived tired (he had not slept for three nights) 
and worried about the situation in the Middle East, especially about 
Rommel's drive, which had swept in twelve days across the desert that 
Wavell's fast-moving forces had captured in fifty days. Dill's train was 
early, and the ACIGS, Sir John Kennedy, missed him at Paddington. 
Gloomily Dill arrived at the War Office at 4:30 p.m., where Kennedy 
caught up with him and tried to allay his pessimism about Egypt. They 
had scarcely begun to talk when Dill received a summons from the Prime 
Minister. He did not return from No. 10 Downing Street until 6:30, when 
he went at once again to Kennedy's room and repeated that the situation 
in Egypt was "desperate-I am terriby tired. II He then spoke of the 
difficulties in Greece and told Kennedy that he feared that a bad mistake 
had been made. They then discussed a telegram that had been drafted 
that afternoon telling Wavell to hold onto Tobruk, in spite of Wavell's 
response to the first signal that it was not a good defensive position. 
Kennedy said that while Dill was away they had had a lot of trouble with 
signals being sent out before the War Office saw them. Dill was most 
unhappy. He put in a call to Eden and used Kennedy's words that London 
should not dictate strategy and tactics to commanders in the field. Eden 
agreed and got Churchill to add a sentence giving Wavell a free hand. 
Before this revised message could be sent, a signal came in from Wavell 
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saying he would stand temporarily at Tobruk. Kennedy carried a copy 
over to the Prime Minister's office at once, whereupon Churchill canceled 
his un sent telegram and sent a short one endorsing Wavell's decision. Dill 
then went off to bed and Kennedy to dinner. 
Even the next day Dill was so worn out mentally that he could not 
concentrate on papers for the Cabinet. On the twelfth he was summoned 
to Chequers to spend the night with the Prime Minister, and Kennedy 
spent two hours briefing him on matters that might come up to put him 
"back into the picture."226 
And London evidently still did not understand its own lack of power. 
Knatchbull-Hugesson in Ankara was ordered to tell the Turks to break 
relations at once with Germany and Italy, and to ally themselves with 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Britain.227 On Thursday the tenth he met with 
President Inonii and General Marshall-Cornwall, who had known the 
president years earlier as General Ismet Pasha. As instructed, Marshall-
Cornwall urged Turkey to join the Allies and in response to Inonii's 
question said that Churchill promised 100 Hurricanes and 100 AlA guns. 
The president roared with laughter and ended by saying that his visitors 
knew that Turkey was more useful to Britain as a benevolent neutral. And 
that, of course, was quite true.228 
On 10 April, only four days after the Germans crossed the Bulgarian 
border, HQ British Forces Greece began to consider how to withdraw the 
RAF squadrons from Greece. Wilson had driven over the snaking road 
from Elasson to Perdika and back again to his headquarters between 10:00 
a.m. and 9:00 p.m., only to have to get back on the road an hour later to 
meet Papagos at Pharsala soon after midnight. 
For over an hour they discussed the deteriorating situation. Papagos 
did not fully know the Yugoslav situation, but he did know that German 
armored forces were east of the Vardar, while Wilson confirmed that the 
head of the German column coming down the Monastir Gap had reached 
Sisteria, where patrol action had taken place. At Perdika Wilson had told 
General Carassos to start withdrawing as soon as night fell, since he 
would need three or four nights in which to pull back from Lake Vegoritis, 
pick up transport at Perdika, and ride to Klissoura and on south. Consid-
eration was then given as to how long Wilson could hold on the Servia-
Aliakmon position, but he was unwilling to commit himself. Papagos 
hoped that he could hold for the five or six days that it would take to 
march the Greek reserves from the Albanian front to strengthen the 
Greek left along the Aliakmon. The reserves would have to be a division 
taken out of the line at Koritsa, as reinforcements from Janina would take 
fifteen days by route march: because of lack of air cover, they could only 
move at night. Wilson was worried, as he had no reserves to bring up from 
the Trikkala area, and Papagos was frightened of an Italian attack if he 
pulled two divisions out of the Albanian front. 
5 March 1941 - 26 April 1941 219 
Wilson agreed to send as much British motor transport as possible to 
help with these moves, but Papagos observed that from Janina to Grevena 
was 218 miles, and it would take the lorries four days for the round trip. It 
was agreed the division should start marching and the lorries would pick 
it up when they met. The meeting ended with a warning from Wilson to 
keep the Yugoslav troops away from the Greeks, as their morale was very 
bad, and to check up on the Yugoslav refugees as there could be many 
enemy agents among them. 229 
So a start was made just before 3:00 a.m. to thin out the 12th Greek 
Division and to start moving it back, while at the same time the 16th 
Australian Infantry Brigade began to move to the south bank of the 
Aliakmon. Because of poor communications the 12th Greek Division was 
unable to get permission to start its flank battalions moving in spite of the 
fact that they had very large distances to cover. 
On 10 April the last convoy bound for Athens loaded in Egypt and 
sailed, docking on the twelfth at Old Phaleron, as the Piraeus and Eleusis 
were closed by magnetic mines. 230 
At the unusually early hour of 11:30 on Good Friday the eleventh the 
War Cabinet met in London to hear Eden's long account of his trip to the 
Middle East. He said that when he and Dill went back to Athens in early 
March they were "shocked" to discover that the four Greek divisions had 
not been moved, although the Germans were then already in Bulgaria. 
Eden averred that they were told that these Greek divisions would only 
fight in western Thrace and Macedonia and not elsewhere. The Greeks 
had then agreed to provide three other divisions; two of these were then 
on the Aliakmon Line, but the third had been refused by Wilson, who 
regarded it as insufficiently trained. Eden then mentioned his trip to 
Turkey and his impression that the Turkish army was "pre-1914." While 
he was in Ankara he had talked with Sir Stafford Cripps from Moscow, 
with the result that a Turco-Soviet rapprochement had been worked out 
relating to a German attack upon Turkey. He concluded by saying that the 
Greek resistance and the Yugoslav coup had completely thrown off 
Hitler's timetable for a peaceful penetration of the Balkans. This would 
not have happened were it not for the help Britain had given Greece. The 
Germans would now try to act by force and attack Britain's Middle Eastern 
position through Cyrenaica. Therefore, it was of the utmost importance 
that the enemy supply line through Tripoli should be attacked, and 
Wavell's main needs-for modem aircraft and tanks-should be met. 
Dill then spoke briefly about his meeting and many phone calls with 
Simovic. He also read an appreciation from Wavell, which called for 
holding the enemy as far west as possible in order to keep air attacks away 
from Alexandria and to keep up Egyptian morale. Wavell admitted that 
the enemy had been underestimated, and he felt the Western Desert was 
critical without having to be concerned about Greece.231 
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After the meeting Churchill cabled FOR that the situation was man-
ageable and hopeful, and that Eden and Dill concurred in this assess-
ment. But by Sunday he was telling the Defence Committee that it was 
grim and that the British might easily be driven out of Egypt. 232 
On 12 April Blamey gave orders for the 12th Greek Division and the 
16th Australian Infantry Brigade to leave their defensive positions astride 
the Veria Pass that night, and to withdraw to new ones on the Servia Pass, 
where sharp steep heights on either side were virtually impassible. 
During the afternoon Blamey moved his headquarters back to Elasson, on 
the main road from Larissa to Katerini, to be next to Wilson. At the same 
time he officially became commander of the newly recreated ANZAC 
Corps, composed of the New Zealand and the 6th Australian divisions. 
On Sunday the thirteenth the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment on the 
Aliakmon River north of Katerini was attacked by German infantry cov-
ered by artillery and mortar fire. The Germans secured several crossings 
despite heavy casualties, and after the loss of one motorcycle the New 
Zealanders broke contact and withdrew to Platamon. That night the 
elements of Mackay Force known as Lee Force, holding part of the hill area 
covering the Florina-Kozani approach to the Aliakmon Line at Servia, 
were attacked and forced back. Since the rooads were still reasonably 
passable in this area in spite of rain, the force was pulled out by lorry, 
including elements of the 1st Armoured Brigade, shedding mechanically 
broken tanks along the way down the road from Kozani to Grevena on the 
road to Kalambaka. 233 
The thirteenth of April was Easter Sunday. By the following morning 
the Aliakmon position had been turned. The Germans had breached the 
defenses at both ends and there was no longer any RAF air cover. The next 
major position was at Thermopylae, an ancient site now to be menaced 
not merely by enemy infantry but shortly by hostile aircraft based on the 
airfields about Larissa. Moreover, both British supply ports were useless: 
Volos would soon be cut off and the Piraeus had been flattened. No 
landing craft were then available to use the many beaches along the coast. 
Churchill signalled Wavell that Eden and Dill were back "and we all 
send you our assurance of complete confidence and every wish for good 
fortune. This is one of the crucial fights in the history of the British 
Army. "234 The Prime Minister also sent a message to Belgrade that, 
because of air forces which had not existed in the First World War, no naval 
forces could be sent into the Adriatic to help Yugoslavia evacuate her 
troops, while 0' Albiac had all the air help that it was pOSSible to give at that 
time. Churchill continued, "You must remember that the Yugoslavs have 
given us no chance to help them and refused to make a common plan, but 
there is no use in recriminations, and you must use your own judgment 
how much of this bad news you impart to them. "235 
The next day, c.L. Sulzberger visited Wilson at his headquarters at 
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Elasson. He found him resolute, friendly, and intelligent, especially in his 
quizzing of the young American correspondent about conditions to the 
north. Sulzberger later wrote that he felt that Jumbo never got fair credit 
for all his work. 236 
Orders were given to form Savige Force out of the 17th Australian 
Infantry Brigade Group and attached forces as a reserve to hold the 
Kalambaka area, while the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment was ordered 
to move across from Katerini through Elasson, on the main north-south 
road on the east coast, to cover the headquarters area from the west. 
On Tuesday the fifteenth the eastern wing of the RAF asked permis-
sion to withdraw, and this was granted. The AOC signaled the AOC-in-C 
ME that they would retire to Athens, but that "evacuation was imperative 
and should start forthwith. "237 
Wilson's headquarters had left Elasson and moved into a farmhouse 
near Pharsala that was hidden in an oak wood carpeted with asphodels in 
full bloom, which gave off a pungent smell as the traffic crushed them. 
The commander had just lost his own car to a direct bomb hit while he and 
his ADC lay in the ditch nearby. And it kept raining. Reid's special signals 
set was the only one working; all the rest of the standard Royal Corps of 
Signals sets had "packed it in," as the expression went. 238 
The decision was made on 15 April to withdraw to the Thermopylae 
position, and control of the battle in the Aliakmon area was passed from 
Wilson to Blarney. The latter at once ordered the 19th to move more than 
two hundred kilometers south to Domokos, where the road and railway 
end a long run across the Plains of Thessaly via Pharsala. Here the road 
climbs southward up the pass, while the railway line heads west on a 
more level route to Lamia. The rearguard position was to be reinforced by 
two battalions that were on their way up from Athens when the fighting 
started. The 16th Australian Infantry Brigade was ordered back to Zarkos 
on the Larissa-Kalambaka road to cover forces retreating along that line, 
and the 6th New Zealand Brigade Group was moved to a covering 
position between Elasson and Tyrnavos. The 5th New Zealand Brigade 
Group withdrew from the Katerini Pass, and the 4th moved out from the 
Servia Pass; both had a long march over mountainous roads that were 
difficult to negotiate in the dark and wet. 
The New Zealand 21 Battalion was in serious trouble at Platamon, 
where they held a commanding position overlooking the flat shoreline 
and the road down which the Germans had advanced alongside the 
railway line. At this point the line swung seaward and moved into a 
tunnel along the shore. If the Germans came through the tunnel they 
would pin the New Zealanders against the mountains of the lower Olym-
pus range. Mount Olympus itself, towering 9,500 feet high, rose up very 
sharply to the left flank ahead of the position. The motorized New 
Zealanders were also in trouble because the road south only went as far as 
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the mouth of the Pinios (Tempe) Gorge. And though the railway went 
through the gorge on a series of ledges and through a number of tunnels, 
it was not envisaged that lorries and other vehicles could be driven along 
the tracks. The New Zealanders had to get back nine miles from Platamon 
to the gorge, at a point where Blarney hoped a stand could be made and to 
which he sent more guns. Before the situation could be resolved, how-
ever, the Yugoslavs capitulated on 15 April. 
The next day Longmore reported to Portal that D' Albiac's strength in 
Greece was rapidly diminishing in the face of enemy attacks on forward 
airfields. Only 18 Blenheims, 16 Hurricanes, and 12 Gladiators were 
serviceable, apart from the Wellingtons of No. 37 Squadron. "He sees no 
possibility of providing the Army with adequate air support, even if they 
establish themselves on a rear line." So Longmore had ordered the 
Wellingtons back to Egypt, and one Blenheim fighter and one Hurricane 
squadron to Crete, and he was sending over Sunderlands and Bombays to 
move their spares and mechanics to the island. The RAF had been 
ordered to coordinate with the army on evacuation plans. Meanwhile 
Longmore himself was planning to go to Iraq to try to stabilize the 
situation there before the collapse of Greece made it critical. 239 
By this time Nos. 33 and 208 Squadrons had moved to the Athens 
area, and that evening all "E" Wing Squadrons were instructed to with-
draw to Athens. Longmore signaled that he was sending a planning party 
the next day to Crete. Spare pilots and aircrews were to be evacuated at 
once to Egypt, while operations personnel were to go to Heraklion or 
Maleme to open operations rooms there. 24o 
After a gallant defense of the Platamon position, on Wednesday the 
New Zealanders had withdrawn to the Pinios Gorge, where they had 
taken up a strong defensive position with weak Australian and New 
Zealand artillery to back them up. But German mountain troops climbed 
around them and came down through the village of Gonnos on the 
western side. As elsewhere, the forces were ill-matched, with the advan-
tage to the aggressor. 
The reaction in London was pessimistic. Cadogan feared that with the 
general staff's abilities the Germans would roll right across the Mediterra-
nean and turn the British out of Egypt, toO.241 So on this day the Chiefs of 
Staff asked the C-in-C's in the Middle East for their proposals for the 
evacuation of British forces from Greece, if that step were forced upon 
them. This communication was immediately followed by a signal from 
Wilson to Wavell: Papagos had told Wilson that the Greeks were getting 
into administrative difficulties in their retreat, and the Greek commander-
in-chief had suggested that "as things may become critical in the future, 
we should re-embark British troops and save Greece from devasta-
tion. "242 Wilson considered that this operation should begin as soon as 
they had withdrawn to the Thermopylae line, a suggestion with which 
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Papagos had agreed. Wavell reported that he had ordered the evacuation 
to start, pending both instructions from home and a formal request from 
the Greek government. He proposed to make all arrangements; he pre-
sumed that Crete was to be held. Longmore concurred and had canceled 
his proposed trip to Iraq. 
London at once replied that the evacuation could proceed as soon as 
the Greek government approved, trying to save as much material as 
possible. Crete was to be held in force, and for this it was important that 
strong elements of the Greek army should be established there, together 
with the king and the government. And the Prime Minister concluded, 
"We shall aid and maintain the defence of Crete to the utmost. "243 
All through Thursday the seventeenth the British forces were with-
drawing, sending back or destroying stores around Larissa; that morning 
the ANZAC headquarters closed at Elasson and opened again at Soum-
pasi (now Hara). Heavy enemy air attacks on the road from Larissa to 
Lamia became troublesome on the eighteenth, and an appeal was made to 
Athens for air support, but there was precious little available. ANZAC 
headquarters moved again, from Soumpasi to Levadia. By midday on the 
nineteenth the flow of vehicles through Lee Force at Domokos had 
virtually ceased, and the two-hour strafing of the road by German air-
craft, which began at 3:00, was, to quote the war diary of the HQ 1st 
Australian Corps, "mistimed." During the night Lee Force withdrew 
from Domokos. Other forces had been driving down the road to Volos 
and to the Thermopylae position on the coast, or grinding up the switch-
backs of the Brallos Pass and on toward Athens. 
The remainder of No. 30 Squadron, RAF, was ordered to Crete, while 
the mobile W rr station was sent south to Argos. The western wing pulled 
back that night to Patras in the Peloponnesus. All airmen were ordered 
confined to camp because of the deterioration of the internal situation in 
Greece.244 
On the seventeenth Cadogan was still upset. Papagos had asked the 
British to evacuate and they had agreed, but no one knew what was 
happening, and "How the hell did the Germans get to N. Africa-no one 
knows!"245 Churchill told the War Cabinet that there were no grounds for 
the charge that it had been imprudent not to finish off the winter cam-
paign by an advance to Tripoli. The arguments that had been put forth by 
the Chiefs of Staff against such a campaign were entirely convincing. And 
to the charges of defective intelligence services, the reply had to be made 
that the military authorities in the Middle East had discounted the possi-
bility of a serious German thrust developing before summer. 246 
An even more significant statement was also made at that meeting on 
17 April, though it has so far received little of the highlighting it deserves. 
It was recorded that between November 1940 and the end of May 1941, 1,785 
aircraft had either been sent or were to be sent to the Middle East. Of these, 905 had 
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actually been sent, but only 377 had by 17 April actually arrived. 247 In other 
words, one of the principal themes running all through this diary of a 
disaster was true: London thought that it had sent far more in the way of 
air support than Cairo had received. Approximately 4.75 times as much 
had been allocated as had arrived, and not all of that was by any means 
first-class material. But because of the lack of liaison between Cairo and 
London exasperation had tended to replace communication. 
On 18 April Canberra reported the very great concern in Australia 
over the fighting in both Greece and North Africa, since Australian units 
were involved in both places, and especially because the LUSTRE force 
had never been brought up to strength. The Australian Cabinet sug-
gested that the time had come to look at the British position in the eastern 
Mediterranean and make a decision on where the vital center lay, namely 
about the Suez Canal, and warned that the present division of efforts was 
disastrous. They signaled, "We agree with you that the decision to send 
our troops to Greece was strategically correct and retract in no way from 
that decision," but went on to ask for a candid appreciation, even, if 
necessary, to include a recommendation of withdrawal before the position 
became irretrievable. This message was followed at teatime by another, 
which stressed that immediate evacuation should include equipment, as 
this would be essential both for holding Crete and for the re-formation of 
the complete Australian Corps in the Middle East. The New Zealand 
Cabinet made similar comments, and Churchill was moved to reply that 
early reembarkation was indeed a necessity, and for this plans had been 
made some time before and had only to be applied. "Safe withdrawal of 
the men will have precedence over any other consideration except that of 
honour .... Undoubtedly a phase of acute anxiety lies before us in the 
Greek theatre, but the highly competent officers on the spot seem to feel 
good confidence in their ability to solve its problems."248 
Certainly not everyone felt that way. On the morning of the eigh-
teenth in Athens, the president of the Council, Alexander Koryzis, com-
mitted suicide, a victim of the Greek tragedy. 
On that same clear morning, ideal for air operations, General Wilson 
drove over the tortuous road from his new headquarters at Thebes to the 
Tatoi Palace, where at eleven o'clock he met with the king, Papagos, 
Palairet, Turle, Heywood, 0' Albiac, and others. The military situation was 
analyzed, and it was agreed that withdrawal to the Thermopylae line was 
the only possible plan. Wilson was confident he could hold there, al-
though "it would be difficult to do so indefinitely" because of the lack of 
airfields behind his lines to counter German air forces, Palairet reported 
to London. It was decided that Wavell would be asked to be present on the 
next day to discuss whether or not evacuation was necessary and, if so, 
when. The king agreed that to bolster morale, which was in danger of 
falling apart, he would announce that he and the government were 
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staying at least for a week, as the general impression was that the war was 
finished for Greece. In the meantime the ambassador had begun to 
evacuate British subjects and others as transport became available; he 
hoped that all would have departed before he himself left with the 
government for Crete. 249 
Evidently after this meeting, Wilson accompanied 0' Albiac back to 
his headquarters in the Marasleon School for a conference which con-
cluded that evacuation was imperative. Wavell was already on his way, 
apparently, for at 4:00 p.m. he met with the Greek staff at the Tatoi.25o 
Palairet told London that there was not likely to be much Greek 
resistance after Athens fell, and that the Greek government would get 
little support in Crete because the island was Venizelist. "So if it is of the 
utmost importance to us that the island should be held, we must rely 
chiefly on our own efforts."251 
Perhaps thanks to ULTRA, RAF aircraft at Eleusis and Menidi were 
ordered to Araxos and Tanagra in order to escape an anticipated enemy 
air attack. 252 
In Cairo the commanders-in-chief sent a long telegram setting forth 
strongly their views on the need for a War Cabinet member in the Middle 
East who could be decisive in the face of a well-directed German subver-
sive effort in the area. The recent visit by the secretary of state for foreign 
affairs had shown how efficacious it was to have a responsible minister 
present who could make decisions above the departmental level and 
disburse adequate funds for actions required. 253 
In response to an inquiry about the order of priorities among Libya, 
the evacuation of Greece, and Iraq, the Chiefs of Staff cabled later on the 
eighteenth that, if there was a clash, victory in Libya had to take priority, 
then the evacuation of Greece: they were not to worry about Iraq, as it 
would go smoothly. Crete would be at first only a receptacle for whatever 
could get there from Greece, its fuller defense being organized later. 
Forces there should protect themselves from bombing "by dispersion, 
and use their bayonets against parachutists or air-borne intruders if 
any. "254 
Very late on that Friday a meeting was held at General Wilson's house 
in Levadia to consider the question of evacuation. Present were Wilson, 
Wavell, 0' Albiac, and two other officers. Wavell started out by saying that 
it was evident that the Greek army was not capable of further resistance 
and that the government was not in a settled state. "The question was [ran 
the report of the meeting] should the British leave Greece to avoid further 
devastation of the country by the enemy. So far as our Government was 
concerned, if it was the wish of the Greek Government that the British 
people should go, then we should go. Meanwhile it appeared that there 
was no Greek Government prepared to form in Greece which could face 
that decision." The British had the choice of fighting it out or of evacuat-
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ing, but it was essential that there be II a new Government in Greece to 
back us, and a new Greek C-in-C to restore the morale of the Army and 
the people." In general it was better to fight and inflict damage on the 
enemy than evacuate and probably suffer large naval and shipping casu-
alties; and to remain would help divert enemy resources from Libya and 
Egypt. On the other hand the British could not stay in Greece without 
heavy reinforcements. In addition the British would have to feed the 
civilian population of Athens and Attica if they stayed, yet they could 
hardly maintain themselves. And lastly, Wavell said, to remain in Greece 
might well so drain British resources as to threaten the security of the vital 
center in Egypt. 
Wilson agreed with what had been said. He was concerned over signs 
of a weakening of the morale of the British as well as of the Greek forces. 
0' Albiac asked if there was really any prospect of taking the offensive 
again in Greece, and if Britain could afford the drain of at least six fighter 
squadrons in Greece with a replacement rate of thirty to forty aircraft a 
week. He thought it a pity not to accept the possibility of withdrawal if 
there was no hope of future recovery. 
Brigadier Galloway then said that it was "a question of sentiment 
versus facts." The instinct might be to fight it out even at a severe loss, but 
the lack of RAF cover and the problem of feeding civilians were decisive 
factors: could they really feed 2.5 million Greeks and maintain an expedi-
tionary force under the present circumstances? 
After some further discussion, it was agreed to evacuate, and Wavell 
laid down the priorities: personnel, then small arms, gunsights, and all 
optical instruments, then mortars, and fourth, if possible, all antitank and 
light antiaircraft guns, then guns, and finally transport. It was pointed 
out that in view of the destruction of the Piraeus, there was scant hope of 
getting off more than the first two categories. The feeling was that they 
would be lucky to embark 30 percent of the force, and this was accept-
ed.255 
There was no mention at this time of an earlier precedent, but it 
certainly could have been applicable. In mid-June 1940 there had been 
talk of sending General Sir Alan Brooke back to France with a second 
expeditionary force to hold Fortress Brittany. Brooke had refused. With-
out absolute control of sea, air communications, or the ability to keep air 
superiority over the bridgehead, such an operation would have been a 
septic drain of Britain's resources at the heart of the Empire. A similar 
effort could not fail to have been a disaster in ravaged Greece, especially 
given the paucity of British resources in the Middle East. 
On Saturday 19 April Churchill sent a very strongly worded signal to 
Wavell and Wilson about a lack of reports from Greece. Wavell responded 
that the problem was interrupted communications due to the facts that 
two out of three liaison officers had been wounded, that all army coopera-
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tion aircraft had been shot down by the end of the second day, and that 
travel over roads crammed with military convoys and refugees was slow, 
not to mention that the weather was bad and that officers busy fighting 
often forgot to send in reports. The staff in forward units were not all 
highly trained, but nevertheless they would try to do better. He then gave 
a situation report and instructed Wilson to send daily cables to Lon-
don. 256 
As in the matter of shifting troops before the agreements of 4-6 
March, there is disagreement between the Greek and the British versions 
of the events of 19 and 20 April. On the fourteenth the Greek High 
Command had urged an armistice. Then, General Papagos in his 
memoirs claimed, on the nineteenth it was agreed that the British would 
evacuate and that the Greeks would keep fighting until this had been 
accomplished. They would then continue to fight in Crete and the is-
lands. He added that the Greeks had thanked the British for their help, 
though it had been inadequate. On the twentieth, the intentions of the 
Greek commander-in-chief were disrupted when the GOC of the 3rd 
Greek Army Corps arrested the GOC of the Army of the Epirus, his 
superior officer, mutinied, and surrendered by capitulation on the twen-
ty-first to the Germans. 257 
Wavell, who on the eighteenth was still speaking of holding on in 
Greece as being less costly than evacuation, on Sunday the twentieth 
asked Palairet to put it to the government in London that they should not 
accept Papagos's reason for leaving Greece (to prevent its devastation) as 
this would be a bad precedent that the Egyptians might use; it would be 
much better to say that it was due to the collapse of the Greek army under 
overwhelming numbers (chiefly as a result of the Yugoslav debacle) and 
the British inability to defend Greece alone. In London Kennedy had 
come to the conclusion that practically all the purely military considera-
tions pointed to an early evacuation, and he had papers drawn up 
showing the pros and cons so that the CIGS could explain it to Menzies 
and to Churchill. 258 
On the British side by Sunday the twentieth the end was obviously 
rapidly approaching. Headquarters 6 Australian Division asked for naval 
assistance to pick up parties who might reach the sea at various places, 
and for motorboats to support the movement of the right flank from 
Khalkis on Euboea to a coastal area just north of Thermopylae. On 
Monday the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment was ordered to cross into 
Euboea and give warning of any Germans coming down that way, and 
also to form a reserve for the Rangers holding the Khalkis crossing. 
Another battalion was sent to Thebes to watch for parachutists. 
The remaining Blenheims of Nos. 11, 84, and 211 Squadrons were 
ordered to Crete. Menidi and Eleusis were continually being strafed, and 
operations from them were difficult. By this time the RAF in Greece had 
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15 Blenheims, 11 Hurricanes, and 3 Gladiators serviceable. On the follow-
ing day the Blenheims were used to run a ferry service to transfer crews 
and personnel to Crete, while at the Marasleon School and on the airfields 
"All papers were destroyed by fire."259 
At ten o'clock on the morning of 21 April the king and the new 
president of the Council, Tsouderos, met with Wavell, Wilson, and Pal-
airet. Wavell asked if the Greeks could support the left flank of the British 
at Thermopylae, and the king said no; Wavell then said it was his duty to 
reembark.260 The king told the British that the minister for war and the 
commander-in-chief thought that the Greek forces could hold their pres-
ent positions on the Graeco-Albanian frontier for four or five days. 
General Pitsicas had been ordered to arrest General Tsolacoglou, who 
had initiated negotiations with the Germans at Epirus. No one believed 
that Tsolacoglou was in German pay, just that he was infected with 
defeatism. Palairet concluded his report: "It would seem that, after the 
long ordeal of the struggle in Albania nobody but Metaxas was strong 
enough to make the nation and the army face a second and more powerful 
aggressor, especially after the collapse of Yugoslavia."261 
Palairet's telegram was followed later that day by another one: 
The Greek Government, while expressing to the British Gov-
ernment and to the gallant Imperial troops their gratitude for the 
aid which they have extended to Greece in her defence against 
the unjust agressor, are obliged to make the following statements: 
After having conducted for more than six months a victorious 
struggle against strongly superior enemy forces, the Greek army 
has now reached a state exhaustion and, moreover, finds itself 
completely deprived of certain resources indispensable for the 
pursuit of war, such as munitions, motorised vehicles and aero-
planes-resources with which it was, in any case, inadequately 
supplied from the outbreak of hostilities. This state of things 
makes it impossible for the Greeks to continue the struggle with 
any chance of success and deprives them of all hope of being able 
to lend some assistance to their valiant Allies. At the same time, 
in view of the importance of the British contingents, of the avia-
tion at their disposal and of the extent of the front heroically 
defended by them, the Imperial forces have an absolute need for 
the assistance of the Greek army, without which they could not 
prolong their own resistance for more than a few days. 
In these conditions the continuation of the struggle, while 
incapable of producing any useful effect, would have no other 
result than to bring about the collapse of the Greek army and 
bloodshed useless to the Allied forces. Consequently, the Royal 
Government is obliged to state that further sacrifice of the British 
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expeditionary force would be in vain, and that its withdrawal in 
time seems to be rendered necessary by circumstances and by 
interests common to the struggle. 262 
229 
More telegrams followed during the day. Martial law was declared 
that night in Athens, and Wilson signaled Wavell that he was putting the 
evacuation scheme into force immediately. The next day the New Zealand 
offer of medical officers to serve on evacuation ships was accepted. 263 
The king and his ministers as well as Palairet were to leave for Crete 
on the twenty-second, but did not in the end get off until the twenty-
third. 
The War Cabinet met in London at five that afternoon. At the end of 
the discussion of the evacuation of Greece, Menzies said that he "thought 
it was most important to make it clear that the sending of our forces to 
Greece had been based upon overwhelming moral grounds. We should 
keep it clearly before the public mind that it would have been impossible 
for us to have deserted Greece." The minutes report that the War Cabinet 
"took note of these statements."264 
On Tuesday 22 April, ANZAC Corps Operational Order No.2 was 
issued for the evacuation of Greece. The Thermopylae position was to be 
abandoned over the next three nights. On the twenty-third ANZAC 
Corps headquarters made one more move, this time from Levadia to 
Mandra (near Eleusis). The next day ANZAC closed, headquarters and 
British Troops Greece took over command for the last three days. The RAF 
had already ceased operations on the sixteenth. 
By the twenty-second the tempo of disaster had increased to a daily 
drumbeat of telegrams. Blarney had signaled home that the situation 
looked very bad. Both Fadden in Canberra and Menzies in London 
backed up their commander on the spot and stressed the need for supply-
ing the troops with the necessities of war to enable them to defend 
themselves in their awkward situation and to ensure a safe and rapid 
evacuation. Whitehall had discussed what, if anything, should be said to 
those down under about evacuation. Churchill and Menzies agreed that 
nothing should be said until the operation was either well under way, or, 
preferably, concluded. But in the morning the Times reported that the 
Australian government was under heavy fire, and Palairet had made it 
plain from Athens that the news of the Epirus armistice would no doubt 
shortly be announced by German radio. If the Australian and New 
Zealand governments heard of this development first from the press they 
would have every right to be indignant, so Lord Cranborne, the Domin-
ions secretary, sensibly prepared a short telegram, which Churchill or-
dered dispatched at once to those governments, though it did not 
mention evacuation. It did give the conclusions reached at the Tatoi on the 
21st.265 
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Next the Prime Minister cabled Wavell: 
Consider time has come to prepare public in official commu-
nique for impending Greek collapse. Effect on World opinion is of 
such importance that I consider communique should be issued 
from Home where various implications can be assessed at their 
full value. Suggested draft as follows: 
At the request of the Greek Government forces of the Empire 
were dispatched to Greece after the German occupation of Bul-
garia to assist our heroic ally in the defence of her country against 
the threatened German invasion. Before our concentration was 
complete the Germans wantonly invaded Greece and Yugoslavia 
with powerful land and air forces. The early collapse of organised 
military resistance in Yugoslavia enabled the Germans to direct 
their main effort through the passes of Central Macedonia against 
the open flank of the Greek and Empire Forces defending the 
Northern Provinces of Greece. A general withdrawal became 
necessary during which determined action by our covering forces 
inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. In spite of heavy attacks 
by the bulk of the enemy's armoured forces in Greece and large 
air forces, the Empire front was never broken, and our troops 
were able, despite all difficulties, successfully to reach new defen-
sive positions south of Lamia. In the centre, however, a grave 
situation has developed. Taking advantage of better communica-
tions available to them, important German forces succeeded in 
reaching positions astride the main links of communications of 
that part of the Greek Army which had been so victorious against 
the Italians in Albania .... Cut off from support and from their 
main supply bases, the Greeks, with their traditional bravery, 
have violently resisted ever-increasing pressure by enemy forces 
in great numerical superiority, but any further withdrawal of this 
Army as an organised body seems improbable. 
Do not wish anything yet said about possibility of our re-
embarkation. 266 
On the twenty third General Papagos resigned as commander-in-
chief of the Greek forces and passed under a temporary cloud. 
At 3:00 a.m. on 24 April D'Albiac embarked on a Sunderland and left 
Greece. He arrived two hours later at Heraklion and set up his new 
headquarters there. Later in the day 6 Hurricanes arrived at Maleme and 
reported that they were all that were left of those that had been at Argos; 
13 had been destroyed on a ground which was now untenable. 269 Among 
those lost was Squadron-Leader PattIe, an RAF ace who has been largely 
ignored because he fought in a minor, unsuccessful campaign. 
The withdrawal through the Peloponessus was as remarkable as the 
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retreat in general. There was only the one bridge across the Corinth 
Canal, at the western end, and the roads from there were twisting and 
dusty. The meter-gauge railway ran only to Nauplion and Kalamata. 
Other than these two ports there were only a few places that could be used 
for embarkation, though there were other rocky inlets into which small 
ships could with care be brought, and where boats could be used to bring 
the men off-a risky situation if enemy aircraft were about. With clear 
weather from the fourteenth and the RAF withdrawn from the sixteenth, 
there was no air cover. 
Between two and four in the morning on 25 April 530 vehicles crossed 
the Corinth Canal bridge going south. It seemed obvious to Major Reid, 
camped out on the southern side, that-as in France-the Germans had 
left the bridge intact for a purpose. At 1:00 a.m. on the twenty-sixth 
Brigadier Galloway found Reid sleeping by his lorry near the bridge, 
woke him, agreed with his assessment, gave him his last orders, and 
drove on south. At seven am the sky filled with Iu-52's and paratroopers 
rained down. In spite of forebodings, no one had sited the antiaircraft 
guns for defense against an airborne attack, nor were the troops disposed 
for one. In no time the disorganized and isolated British units were 
surrendering. But someone did manage to blow the demolition charges, 
and the bridge fell into the canal. Later Reid, while a POW, noted with 
interest the German aircraft packed onto the landing ground at Corinth, 
an airfield the RAF had said was unusable. 268 
On 25 April, despite an increased flow of new aircraft, Longmore had 
but 21 serviceable Hurricanes for the defense of the Western Desert, and 
14 for the Delta, with 19 expected within seven days and another 30 
sometime after that. There were 12 Tomahawks in the Middle East, 17 en 
route, and 145 at Takoradi. He hoped that their gun and engine troubles 
were cured enough that they could be sent on operations.269 
By the twenty-sixth the Western Desert had only 14 Hurricanes 
available; of these, 4 were in No. 73 Squadron, which Tedder had decided 
had to be rested at once. Nos. 33 and 80 Squadrons had been evacuated to 
Crete, where they managed to shoot down eighteen enemy aircraft in 
fourteen more days, but by then they were exhausted, having lost all 
spares and equipment in Greece while limping away with five aircraft of 
which only three were serviceable.270 
On 26 April HQ ME sent a special message to Greece to urge that all 
two-pounder antitank guns be brought off, as these were in very short 
supply. This simply was not possible, as the ships could not take them, so 
they were destroyed on the spot. 271 
On the twenty-eighth at its usual five o'clock meeting the War Cabi-
net heard the Prime Minister say that they could congratulate themselves 
on getting out of Greece with total losses of between 5,000 and 10,000 men 
(though actually it was a bit over 16,000). "The concluding stages of the 
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Greek campaign had been a glorious episode in the history of British 
arms. He felt no regret over the decision to send troops to Greece. Had we 
not done so, Yugo-Slavia would not now be an open enemy of Germany. 
Further, the Greek war had caused a marked change in the attitude of the 
United States. "272 
On Tuesday the twenty-ninth Churchill warned Wavell again (for 
there had been an earlier alert against an airborne attack in a telegram of 
the eighteenth) that Crete could expect a heavy airborne attack in the near 
future. He wanted to know the C-in-C's plans, and he added in his usual 
bloodthirsty manner, "It ought to be a fine opportunity for killing the 
parachute troops. The island must be stubbornly defended. "273 (British 
forces had arrived in Crete from Greece by 28 April and were evacuated by 
28 May.) 
On Wednesday night Portal signaled Longmore, "Having regard to 
changes in the air situation in the Middle East, the Prime Minister wishes 
you to return as soon as possible for discussion on all aspects of air 
operations. Air Marshal Tedder is being appointed acting A.o.C.-in-C. 
and Air Vice-Marshal Drummond acting deputy A.o.C.-in-C. Please 
telegraph dates of your departure and expected arrival. "274 
On 28 April Dill had cabled Wavell, "Can you give me a rough 
estimate of total losses incurred in Greek venture?" To which Wavell 
responded thatit appeared that 43,000 had been evacuated of the 55,000 to 
56,000 actually landed. To this the Prime Minister responded on 1 May: "1 
congratulate you upon successful evacuation. We have paid our debt of 
honour with far less loss than 1 feared. Feel sure that you are waiting to 
strike a blow. Enemy's difficulties must be immense."275 
According to Wilson's final report on the campaign, the 10,000 left 
behind might not have been abandoned if bad luck had not intervened. 
Some 1,500 had been left stranded at Nauplion, and 700 were lost there 
when a transport was sunk and the men rescued by destroyers, only to 
have them sunk in their turn by enemy aircraft. But the biggest loss was 
some 8,000 men left behind because of a muddle at Kalamata: the enemy 
broke into town and captured the landing officer, who had the code to 
signal the warships to come alongside the adequate piers, and there was a 
rumor of mines. As a result a cruiser and accompanying destroyers did 
not take off the men on the last night, although the Germans had been 
driven out of the town again. 276 
On the morning of the thirtieth the Greek royal family, accompanied 
by Heywood and D'Albiac and Blunt, flew to Egypt. On 1 May D'Albiac 
was rested by being posted to command the RAF in Palestine and Trans-
jordan. Some time shortly after that Heywood was killed in an air acci-
dent, so he, at least, never filed a final report. Though badly shaken by it, 
Churchill and Eden survived the 6-7 May debate in the House of Com-
mons. 
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General Papagos had conducted himself with sense and dignity 
under trying circumstances during a particularly difficult campaign in 
which he as commander-in-chief had had not only to conduct the cam-
paign but also to be at the political center in Athens. To their shame the 
politicians decided that the reasons given for the armistice and the sur-
render of Greece should not be simply his sensible one of preventing 
needless destruction, but the elaborate ones declared in the official state-
ment of 21 April. Palairet, reporting from Heraklion on the twenty-seventh, 
said the new president of the Council rejected Papagos's reason, and told 
the British ambassador "in confidence that General Papagos had com-
pletely lost his head lately and had come under the influence of suspected 
elements in the General Staff . . . . I know many of the Greeks feel they 
have been betrayed by treachery within Greece."277 
Fortunately, the Greeks came to their senses. General Papagos was 
recalled and reinstalled as commander-in-chief. He led the struggle 
against the guerrillas from 1944 to 1949, was promoted to field-marshal, 
and then was elected prime minister. 
The authors of the official history, The Mediterranean and Middle East, 
took a look at what happened to the structure of command in the Middle 
East in May and June 1941: Longmore was called home for consultations, 
while Air Vice Marshal G.G. Dawson was sent out to investigate his 
command and subsequently to become the head of a new maintenance 
organization there under the new AOC-in-C, Tedder. Then Dill sent 
General Sir Robert Haining, the vice chief of the Imperial General Staff as 
"Intendant-General of the Army of the Middle East," an unprecedented 
position, to look into the monstrous tail of which Churchill was always 
complaining. And it was his report, combined with the failure of Wavell's 
premature BATTLEAXE offensive (thrust on him by Churchill), which 
caused the replacement of Wavell on 5 July with Sir Claude Auchinleck. 
And finally in 1942 came the appointment of a minister of state, a position 
Wavell had long suggested. 
As Playfair and his colleagues correctly pointed out, the problem was 
that people in London were used to waging war from their own country, 
with all the governmental and industrial apparatus at their beck and call, 
while Longmore and Wavell had been compelled to operate in another 
sovereign country not at war with Germany, at the end of a very long 
supply line, in a new kind of technological war, and without the sort of 
base organization under its own commander which those in Britain 
enjoyed. Thus Longmore and Wavell were the victims both of Churchill's 
own concepts of war-making and of a conflict in which they had to do far 
too much with much too little. 
This diary of a disaster records, then, a Greek tragedy marching to its 
inevitable conclusion to the beat of a score conducted by Fate, Churchill, 
and "son" Anthony. 
¥------
Conclusion 
July 1985 
Forty-five years after the events related here, it is possible to stand back 
and make some dispassionate comments. Of the senior participants, the 
only one I know to be still alive and active is General Sir James Marshall-
Cornwall, whose memoirs were completed in 1981 and published in 1984. 
But if the people have passed, recent events have made it seem quite 
likely that the same sorts of decisions will be made, leading down the 
same tragic path, for much the same reasons as in the past-human 
frailties and misjudgments. If we work back now from the smaller points 
to the final question-Why did Wavell decide, or agree, to go to Greece in 
February and March of 1941?-perhaps we can achieve some solid guid-
ance and understanding for the future. 
First, there is the matter of British Air Forces Greece, personified for 
us by 0' Albiac, who commanded this small force of regulars in Attica with 
a few staff officers and efficient clerks, although neither he nor his staff 
spoke Greek. As long as their involvement was minimal and kept at the 
level of about five squadrons or less for attacks against the Italians, the 
Germans could tolerate the situation. But unfortunately the RAF wore a 
halo after the summer of 1940, and London thought that their air force 
could beat anyone. London's vision became misty with thoughts of 
classical Athens that obscured the reality of the view from Cairo. Yet for 
the vision to work, the restraining fear of invasion at home had to be 
thrown off, and the forces in the Middle East had to be reinforced with the 
best equipment available. The realities of European geography meant that 
Germany could put her best on interior lines to the Balkan front. The 
British had to do likewise for success, but they did not see it that way, 
instead shipping out what they did not want at home. O'Albiac was 
expected to beat the Italians and parry the Germans with a force one-
tenth the size of that of the Home Command, and without the support 
base, in a situation in which weather, terrain, and operational conditions 
were abysmal. 
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As long as British Air Forces Greece was merely a stopgap force ready 
to evacuate at any minute, a long-range plan was not essential. But when, 
by the end of November 1940, it became obvious that the force was likely 
to be staying a while, then it needed such a plan to protect itself against 
Churchillian schemes for a toehold in Europe (for a war the British would 
in no way be ready to fight until at least 1942). Crete became symbolic of 
the lack of a grand strategy. Planning was suspended after Metaxas 
sensibly vetoed aid on 18 January 1941, to Wavell's delight. But a change 
came, either with the ULTRA intimation in late January of a German 
thrust into Greece or with the death of the Greek prime minister three 
days later. At any rate, it seems highly probable that Wavell began plan-
ning the move to Greece at that time (if not earlier, around 15-17 January) 
because he foresaw that Churchill would not be satisfied without it. 
Meanwhile 0' Albiac remained in Athens at the head of a token force, until 
he became subordinate to Jumbo Wilson early in April. 0' Albiac's job was 
to fight a limited war within an unlimited one. 
Longmore was in the unenviable position of many British senior 
commanders at the beginning of a war: he was expected to do wonders 
with very, very little. And in the days between handwritten letters and 
telephones, the terse exchange of signals without commuting liaison 
officers served him badly. Like Wavell's, his responsibilities covered an 
enormous area, but his means were paltry. Just as Wavell should have 
been relieved by a Cabinet-level minister of much of the essentially 
political and diplomatic work which he had to undertake in governing the 
whole of the Middle East in wartime, so Longmore, seriously short of 
administrative staff (he even had no deputy commander until December 
1940), lacked a technical staff officer to organize and run his maintenance. 
Many of these essential positions were filled after Wavell and Longmore 
had been relieved. 
Linking Wavell and Longmore, too, was the matter of air intelligence. 
The shortage of suitable aircraft to watch Tripoli and the coast, as well as to 
keep a close eye on the Dodecanese and other spots, was partly responsi-
ble for Wavell's being surprised by Rommel in the spring of 1941. The 
British forces, which remained on an amateur basis until 1942, simply did 
not have their priorities straight, though Wavell himself was conscious 
enough of the need for news. He set up an intelligence organization that 
rivaled that in London in efficiency, even if it lacked the tools and the 
sources in certain vital areas. But there was nothing like the interservice 
understanding that existed by 1945: as the RAF commented, the army 
tended to ignore what the RAF provided. 1 All of this played an important 
part, as did the fatigue of the fifty-nine-year-old Wavell, in the hesitation 
over going on to Tripoli in mid-February 1941. There are arguments pro 
and con, but it can certainly be said that at this time Wavell was at least 
distracted with the idea of increasing the commitment to Greece. Not 
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going to Greece would have freed fifty-three ships to help maintain the 
army on the road to Tripoli, while adequate aircraft on the forward 
airfields could have provided fighter cover for the navy. 
Wavell, a dutiful soldier, interpreted his orders as requiring him to 
send a force to Greece to maintain a toehold in Europe. Was this a matter 
of the lessons of Munich, Norway, and Dakar all coming home to roost 
again at the same time? At Munich the Czechoslovakian army had been 
thrown away at the stroke of a pen because the British and the French were 
not ready for war. Now, since there might be a good chance that a Balkan 
bloc could be created of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, should not that 
be tried? Certainly that was London's view. This was to be a political 
decision, but was it a sensible military one? 
Wavell had studied the political aspects of military decisions, and he 
was experienced in the uses of deception: he had been chief of staff to 
Allenby when the latter had fooled the Turks and broken through their 
lines. More than this, he was by nature a taciturn man who could keep a 
secret, and he was adept at putting out what would now be called 
disinformation. In January 1941 it must have become obvious to him that 
the pugnacious and energetic Prime Minister was going to keep on 
demanding action. Churchill had instructed Wavell to offer support that 
he did not really have and could not afford to give to the Greeks. For-
tunately, Metaxas had responded as one commander-in-chief to another 
and refused it. But now the little general was dead, and the GOC-in-C 
ME's intelligence sources all told him that a German invasion of Greece 
was coming in early March. The answer to the puzzle of why Wavell 
agreed to go to Greece is that he believed that he could make a gallant 
gesture at almost no risk at all. 
The late February estimate-based on the then available intel-
ligence-of a German attack on 6 March and arrival in Athens three weeks 
later meant that very little of a British expeditionary force would have 
even landed in Greece before it would have to be evacuated. If all had 
gone according to the usual German schedule, if the snows had melted on 
time in the Bulgarian passes, the Germans should have been well past the 
Aliakmon Line before the British had even begun to get into position. 
And the Greeks would have been free to surrender to the Germans, as 
they knew they inevitably must. 
Wavell had no doubt read Heywood's reports. He knew that the 
Greeks were about to exhaust their supplies of ammunition and that the 
British could not resupply them. He also knew that the country's econo-
my was barren. Metaxas had seen that he knew the truth, and Papagos 
knew it also. The people who did not understand the realities were in 
London. They were the ones whom Wavell had to deceive. Thus OPERA-
TION LUSTRE evolved. It was designed to satisfy Churchill with a show 
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of force, to be a gesture to a gallant ally that would not cost the British and 
Commonwealth forces too much. 
It was a gamble, and the weather shifted the odds. 
When he died in 1950, Wavell was given the first state funeral on the 
Thames since Nelson's in 1805. Prime Minister Attlee attended, but 
Churchill only sent a representative. 
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Much closer to the subject of British aid to Greece are the official histories. Sir 
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Llewellyn Woodward's five confidential volumes have replaced his original single 
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volumes of The Mediterranean and Middle East, by I.S.o. Playfair et ai., 1954 and 
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diary published by MN AH Publishing (Manhattan, Kans., 1983), entitled Athens 
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The most detailed history of the campaign in Greece is that of the Hellenic 
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accounts from the British and Commonwealth units, which were the forces 
mainly engaged. An earlier clear account from a different perspective is the U.S. 
Department of the Army, The German Campaigns in the Balkans, Spring 1941 (1953). 
Although a lot has been written since 1974 on ULTRA, the British decoding of 
German signals, there is little evidence that ULTRA was of much influence in the 
Middle East at this time. A start on the subject of intelligence can be made with the 
new and enlarged edition of Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1982) which contains sections modifying the author's 
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World War, of which volume 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
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Obviously the most important sources for my work have been the papers 
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preserved at the British Public Record Office. When the archives on the 1939-1945 
war were opened, the PRO also made available (as a supplement, in effect, to the 
well-known revised M.S. Giuseppi Guide to the Contents of the Public Record Office) 
The Second World War: A Guide to the Documents in the Public Record Office (1972). This 
contains a dated list of ministers, a description of each department and its records, 
and a numbered list of classes (e.g., AIR 8) with one-line descriptions, including 
an indication of the size of the holdings. Even when using the files, however, it is 
not at all plain whether the surviving records relating to overseas commands 
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during the war, or are a mixture of both. Working from the Second World War 
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Anthony Eden after their return. It must be in some file other than where it 
belongs---or it has been destroyed as too embarrassing. 
While the Foreign Office record has been the traditional source of informa-
tion, it should not in diplomatic history be the only one. Moreover, its files are very 
tedious to go through, since there are numerous drafts of proposed signals as well 
as the one that was actually approved and sent. Much the same is true in reverse 
with incoming messages, which are subject to all sorts of comments from what 
was then a very small staff of perhaps half a dozen men including the Foreign 
Secretary. The flavor of these insiders' comments, in connection with the subject 
of this book, is reinforced by the diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State (edited by David Dilks, New York: Putnam, 1971). 
Also close to the top in Whitehall are the minutes of the Cabinet, which 
generally record what the Prime Minister told his colleagues, and related papers 
that are found in the CAB and PREM series. These can be supplemented with the 
DEFE series for the few signals of the period which contained ULTRA material (not 
passed on as such to the Middle East until 14 March 1941). Churchill had batches of 
the signals to and from the Middle East printed from time to time as the months 
passed, and these were issued as Cabinet Telegrams, Middle East. They must be 
consulted by date, as the page numbers repeat in fairly short order. 
A large and useful collection is WO 106, Military Operations and Intelligence, 
which contains copies of many of the signals to and from the Middle East, plus 
special assessments of the situation in the Balkans in general. WO 201 contains the 
papers of HQ ME; these include copies of the many signals sent by the military 
mission in Greece, giving a very full picture of the situation there. 
For the RAF, AIR 8 contains the papers of the chief of the Air Staff, AIR 23 
contains those of Middle East Command, and so on. Some records are kept by 
squadrons, so it is necessary to consult such books as John Rawlings, Fighter 
Squadrons of the RAF and Their Aircraft (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1969), 
Philip Moyes, Bomber Squadrons . .. (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1964), and 
John Rawlings, Coastal, Support and Special Squadrons . .. Uane's, 1982), in order to 
get the actual dates and locations after picking up the unit numbers from Playfair. 
Operational records, kept on the RAF Form 540, are bound as Operational Record 
Books. The same form was used for other records (those of HQ, British Air Forces 
Greece, for instance) to log the movements of personnel and other events. Little 
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use has been made here of naval papers, since the Fleet was only involved in 
convoying to and from Greece and almost all the decision making of importance 
was handled by HQ in Cairo. 
As for papers of the principal British actors, Longmore's are at the RAF 
Museum at Hendon, but they contain little that was useful for this book; and 
Wavell's have been inaccessible. 
General Alexander Papagos' memoir, The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941 (Athens: 
Scazikis, 1949), remained the basic Hellenic statement in English until the Greek 
government broke the fifty-year rule in 1980 and released the documents locked 
up since April 1941 in the Foreign Office archives. They appeared as a white paper, 
Greece, 1940-1941, in which the texts are in Greek, French, and occasionally 
English. 
Apart from these British, Commonwealth, and Greek publications, which 
enabled me to see what the British were doing and thinking and what were their 
assets and liabilities, there is another valuable source of information: the records of 
the Americans in Athens. The diaries (already noted above) of Lincoln MacVeagh 
and Laird Archer provide useful commentaries, and in addition most of Mac-
Veagh's official reports to the U.S. State Department, with some from his attaches, 
have appeared in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Military and naval 
attache reports and other diplomatic documents are also available in the National 
Archives in Washington, or in Army or Navy files. 
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